Between State and Transnational Community: U.S.-Japan Technoscientific Diplomacy in Earth Observation by Plafcan, Daniel John Jr
  
 
BETWEEN STATE AND TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNITY: 
U.S.–JAPAN TECHNOSCIENTIFIC DIPLOMACY  
IN EARTH OBSERVATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Daniel John Plafcan, Jr. 
January 2007 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2007 Daniel John Plafcan, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
BETWEEN STATE AND TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNITY: 
U.S.–JAPAN TECHNOSCIENTIFIC DIPLOMACY  
IN EARTH OBSERVATION 
Daniel John Plafcan, Jr., Ph.D. 
Cornell University 2007 
 
This dissertation examines intergovernmental collaboration in science and 
technology. In particular, it ventures into a new area of theoretical and empirical 
inquiry by investigating how scientists and engineers, working on behalf of different 
states, built an international remote-sensing system and created knowledge about the 
earth in the absence of the shared social, political, and cultural resources that would 
have been made available by a shared state or other shared authority, such as an 
international organization or treaty regime. In contrast to two prominent 
interpretations of scientific activity in the international arena, namely science as an 
idealist epistemic community and science as a Hobbesian imperial endeavor, the 
dissertation offers an explanatory interpretation that accounts for the creation of 
scientific knowledge and the development of international order by analyzing 
U.S.-Japan collaboration in remote sensing as a kind of international negotiation that I 
call “technoscientific diplomacy.” Through this technoscientific diplomacy, U.S. and 
Japan scientists and engineers, working on behalf of their governments, accomplished 
something that had never been previously accomplished: they developed and operated 
in near-real time a space-based remote-sensing instrument, its ground data and 
information system, and an international political economy of scientific data, all under 
the management of two states. 
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PREFACE 
 
This dissertation required me to learn in detail about the political and technical 
work of scientific and engineering communities in Japan and the United States. That 
involved drawing extensively upon my engineering background, upon critical-thinking 
skills and an interpretative sensibility that were developed through graduate-level 
coursework in the humanities and social sciences, and upon whatever skills I had in 
establishing rapport with individuals who were not accustomed to being studied. It 
also demanded becoming proficient in the Japanese language. If I was going to learn 
about these scientific and engineering communities—and especially if I was going to 
learn about crucial matters that were not published in any journal article or public 
technical report—I needed to be able to move around competently in their worlds and 
prove myself as someone who could comment intelligently and responsibly upon their 
work. To my surprise, however, that turned out to be the easy part.   
What was difficult was learning about the world from which I came—the 
academy—so that eventually I could effectively convey in writing what I had thought 
I had learned about these scientific and engineering communities. Inspired by the 
cross-disciplinary discussion that took place in the dinner seminars of the Peace 
Studies Program at Cornell, I saw a common set of ideas being tossed around in the 
fields of Government, Anthropology, and Science and Technology Studies. All of 
these ideas went under the broad banner of “constructivism.” In the naivety of a young 
graduate student, I at the time could not think of a compelling reason to get behind any 
particular corner of literature and join a particular camp when, it seemed to me, 
debating the differences between the camps—especially in the abstract, outside of the 
context of an empirical investigation—was like debating the proverbial “how many 
angels could dance on the point of a pin.” Apparently, I had not yet taken to heart 
 xix 
 
enough of the lessons from my own field about the politics of knowledge when that 
knowledge is expressed in particular social circumstances. Consequently, much of the 
time, work, and energy that went into this dissertation were spent not on learning 
about the work of geologic remote-sensing communities in the United States and 
Japan or about Japan and the Japanese language, but on learning how intellectual ideas 
that are very similar in the abstract could come to life very differently in the writing of 
different corners of the academy. However this dissertation comes to life in any 
discussion (if it does at all), I hope it is less in the spirit of specialization and 
alienation and more in the spirit of synthesis and engagement. 
A note about the use and transliteration of Japanese in this dissertation: I have 
generally followed the style and guidelines recommended by the Society of Writers, 
Editors, and Translators (based out of Tokyo, Japan). Japanese names are written in 
their native order—family-name first and given-name second—except when citing a 
work in which the order has been reversed. Thus, consistency is sacrificed when it 
risks confusion. When the Japanese is written, it is transliterated into Roman letters 
using the Hepburn system. A note on sources precedes the bibliography in the 
references section.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
TECHNOSCIENTIFIC DIPLOMACY 
 
 This dissertation investigates the politics of an international collaboration in 
science and technology. It explains in detail how scientists and engineers, who were 
working on behalf of the governments of the United States and Japan, developed an 
international remote-sensing system that included a space-based instrument, an 
internationally-integrated ground data and information system, and an international 
political economy of scientific data. These scientists and engineers developed this 
remote-sensing system, called the ASTER remote-sensing system, so that they and 
other users could acquire certain imagery data of the earth’s surface and produce 
scientific knowledge about the earth. The ASTER remote-sensing system was the first 
land remote-sensing system in which two states shared responsibility for the system’s 
design, development, data acquisition operations, and data processing.1  
                                                  
1 Some readers, especially those with knowledge of the history of earth observing satellites, might 
want my claim of ASTER’s exceptionality to be unpacked and clarified. Previous to ASTER, there 
had been intergovernmental collaborations on atmosphere-observing and ocean-observing satellites 
in which states contributed their own instruments to a common satellite platform (e.g., the UARS 
satellite that was launched in 1992 with seven instruments from the United States, one from the 
United Kingdom, and one from a Canadian-French consortium; the TOPEX-POSEIDON satellite 
that was launched in 1992 with instruments from the United States and France; and the TRMM 
satellite that was launched in 1997 with instruments from the United States and one from Japan). 
The focus of these intergovernmental collaborations was much more on balancing the satellite 
platform’s complement of instruments and less on any single instrument. These collaborations did 
require coordination in instrument development, operations, and data processing, but this 
coordination was qualitatively different than the collaboration that came to be required for the 
ASTER instrument. Since these instruments observed the earth’s atmosphere and ocean on set, 
periodic schedules that were established before launch, the complexity of their post-launch 
operations and the extent of collaboration required between each state’s team(s) were substantially 
less than that of the ASTER collaboration. The ASTER instrument was tasked daily with different 
operations in order to meet the changing needs of different users. Furthermore, unlike for the 
ASTER collaboration, for the other collaborations mentioned above, two states did not share 
responsibility for a single instrument’s data processing, in the sense that the processing was 
distributed and harmonized between two states. Some data processing for the TRMM satellite did 
require data to be collected and integrated from more than one of its instruments, but that data 
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This international achievement poses a question for scholars of the politics of 
science and technology who write within the field of Science and Technology Studies. 
The field of Science and Technology Studies generally holds as a central tenet that the 
development of science and technology draws upon, interacts with, and changes 
socio-political order.2 Yet, the field to date has largely investigated the workings of 
science and technology within the context of established socio-political orders, such as 
personal relationships, a coherent community, an institution, a culture, or relations 
within a single state, especially those of liberal-democratic states.3 The literature on 
the politics of science and technology in particular has emphasized, for instance, the 
importance of states’ “political cultures” or national “technopolitical regimes” for the 
buttressing of scientific knowledge-making and technology-building.4 The relatively 
                                                                                                                                               
processing was centralized in one state (in the United States). Finally, because the ASTER 
instrument observed the earth’s land at high-resolution, rather than the atmosphere or ocean at 
low-resolution, its data potentially had much more commercial value. The political significance of 
these differences for intergovernmental collaboration becomes clearer in the chapters ahead. 
2 Central texts of the field of Science and Technology Studies which make this point include Bloor 
(1991 [1976]), Collins (1992 [1985]), Shapin and Schaffer (1985), and Latour (1987). More 
recently, the point is emphasized by Jasanoff (2004) and the chapters therein. Surveys of, and 
introductions to, the field of Science and Technology Studies which approach the field from a 
variety of antecedent disciplinary concerns, such as Ethnomethodology, Sociology of Science, 
History of Science, and post-positivist Philosophy of Science, include, respectively, Lynch (1993), 
Shapin (1995), Golinski (1998), Biagoli (1999), and Zammito (2004). Jasanoff et al. (1995) and 
Sismondo (2004) perhaps do the most to frame the field of Science and Technology Studies as an 
emerging intellectual discipline. 
3 Literature in the History of Science does offer some illuminating exceptions to this 
generalization, such as Schaffer (1988). Yet, even in that study, the emphasis is on cross-national 
(or cross-institutional) diversity, rather than on the settlement of scientific and political difference 
across borders. All differences of course do not need to be settled. Whether or not (provisional) 
settlements of difference are demanded, and what form those settlements take if they have occurred, 
are empirical questions. Clearer exceptions to my generalization are a few of the chapters in 
Crawford et al. (1993), such as Abir-am (1993) and Elzinga (1993). The latest volume in the 
History of Science Society’s Osiris annual series, which appeared too late for this dissertation to 
take into full consideration, takes as its theme science and technology in international affairs. See 
Krige and Barth (2006). Studies within the History of Science that have investigated the rhetoric, 
ideologies, and use of scientific internationalism in national activities include Forman (1973) and 
Hamblin (2002). 
4 See, respectively, Jasanoff (2005) and Hecht (1998). Other accounts of the politics of science and 
technology within the field of Science and Technology Studies, broadly defined, which focus on 
the activities of state-centered bureaucracies and institutions include Shapin and Schaffer (1985), 
Smith (1989), Ezrahi (1990), Jasanoff (1990), Mack (1990), MacKenzie (1990), Smith (1990), 
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small collection of recent studies that have investigated intergovernmental 
collaboration have turned to the context and resources offered by established 
intergovernmental organizations or treaty regimes to account for knowledge-making 
and technology-building. 5  What is the socio-political context or what are the 
socio-political resources for scientific and technological development that is 
undertaken without the benefit of a shared institution, a shared culture, a shared native 
language, or a shared state?6 How did a U.S. team and a Japan team of scientists and 
                                                                                                                                               
Leslie (1993), Dennis (1994), Samuels (1994), Bimber and Guston (1995), Gusterson (1996), 
Vaughan (1996), Alder (1997), Scott (1998), Guston (2000), Hilgartner (2000), Eden (2004), and 
Parthasarathy (2005). Not all of these studies completely lean on the workings of bureaucracies 
and the stability of state institutions in their accounts. For example, MacKenzie’s historical 
sociology of the development of nuclear missile guidance attends to C.S. Draper as an 
entrepreneurial, “heterogeneous engineer” and to the members of the “guidance mafia” that passed 
through Draper’s MIT Instrumentation Laboratory, in contrast to earlier accounts of the 
development of weapon systems which drew heavily upon logics of bureaucratic politics (1990: 
7-12, 85-92, 118-119). Dennis (1994) describes in more detail Draper’s pedagogy and argues that 
Draper’s pedagogy and MIT’s Instrumentation Laboratory both relied upon and helped to 
reconstitute the United States’ national security establishment after World War II, especially the 
boundaries between the civil and the military. 
5 For instance, the institutional procedures of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and 
of United Nations-affiliated multilateral organizations play a crucial role in Miller’s analysis of 
knowledge-making concerning climate change (2004). The new regulatory regime for genetically 
modified organisms closely analyzed by Lezaun (2006) was conditioned upon the shared 
bureaucratic practices of the European Union. Other examples include Elzinga (1993) on the 
Antarctic Treaty System; Bonnet and Manno (1994), Zabusky (1995), and Krige (1997) on the 
European Space Agency; Miller and Edwards (2001) on international environmental regimes; 
Thompson (2004) on the Convention of International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and 
Flora; and Waterton and Wynne (2004) on the European Environment Agency. 
6 This question is analogous to the “anarchy problematique” in the field of International 
Relations—that is, the political dilemmas posed by the absence of a central governing authority for 
states. This problematique undergirded many explanatory projects in the field of International 
Relations (e.g., Oye 1986), especially explanations of resolutions to problems of cooperation 
among states as those puzzles were posed most trenchantly within the field of International 
Relations in the 1980s and early 1990s by the schools of “neorealism” and “structural realism.” For 
works that exemplify neorealism and structural realism, see Waltz (1979) and Buzan et al. (1993), 
respectively. For a canonical debate over cooperation under anarchy between the two “rationalist” 
schools of thought within the field of International Relations, called “(neo) realism” and “(neo) 
liberalism,” see Grieco (1988, 1990). Ashley (1988) offers a critical theory commentary on the 
“anarchy problematique” as it has been articulated in the field of International Relations. In an 
early article in what was then International Relations’ newly emerging “social constructivist” 
school of thought (a school of thought which is now established), Wendt (1992) questioned 
whether or not anarchy had any natural or inherent logic (i.e., an asocial logic). The article made 
clear that it was not questioning the empirical state of anarchy in contemporary world politics, just 
the use of the idea of anarchy in international relations theory. See also chapter six in Wendt (1999). 
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engineers—whose respective members had never previously met—develop an 
intricate international remote-sensing system? What was the politics of their 
collaborative work? How did they manage to arrive at their decisions? How did the 
two teams advance technical claims and together make scientific judgments, and how 
in that knowledge-making and technology-building did they assert, ascribe, and 
exercise power? Those are the questions concerning the politics of intergovernmental 
collaboration in science and technology which this dissertation seeks to answer. 
I want to make clear that by saying that this dissertation investigates the 
“politics” of a U.S.-Japan collaboration in earth observation, I do not mean the “petty 
politics” of who personally got along with whom or of who said what about whom 
(although when carefully considered, that information can offer insights). Nor do I 
really mean just the “who got what” issues that typically came to mind as “politics” 
for many of the scientists and engineers who were involved in the ASTER 
remote-sensing system, when I had explained to them that I was interested in the 
history and politics of their international collaboration. Questions that concern gains 
and losses—for example, what government paid for what, whose requirements were 
designed into the system, who controlled the instrument’s operations, and what data 
were produced for whom and at what cost—are indeed significant political questions. 
Explaining “why” gains and losses were distributed among parties in the way that they 
were is an important analytical task that is regularly taken up by studies of politics and 
                                                                                                                                               
For fields of intellectual inquiry that are informed by “post-structuralist” or “constructivist” 
thought that interrogates or rejects strong structural assumptions, as does the vast bulk of the 
literature in Science and Technology Studies, the static problematique of anarchy can be explicated 
as a dynamic problem: the problem of creating socio-political order (on the rejection of strong 
structural assumptions in Science and Technology Studies, see in particular Latour (1987), Gieryn 
(1992b), and Lynch (1993)). Recent constructivist literature in International Relations has also 
studied the creation of socio-political order. See, for example, the account of Price (1997) which 
examined the emergence of a chemical weapons “taboo” in war among states, the explanation 
offered by Crawford (2002) for decolonization, and the argument of Katzenstein (2005) that “the 
American imperium”—as both an actor and a system—has shaped a world of regional orders and 
identities.  
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policy (such as studies of international bargaining or interest-group politics).7 Yet, this 
dissertation suggests that by focusing on the “how” questions—by describing and 
explaining especially how particular decisions were made—it can better explain the 
often-asked “why” questions, as well as better account for the political and technical 
development of the ASTER remote-sensing system as a whole. Taking on directly the 
“why” questions can too easily have the ironic effect of diverting attention to the 
social and political conditions outside of the activity of the ASTER collaboration and 
thus neglect precisely what it is that this dissertation seeks to understand and explain: 
the politics of technical decision-making and scientific judgment in the development 
of a U.S.-Japan remote-sensing system and, more broadly, the politics of 
intergovernmental collaboration in science and technology. 
 
Intergovernmental Collaboration in Science and Technology 
 
In the past few decades, states around the world have pursued a myriad of 
diverse intergovernmental collaborations in science and technology to achieve ends 
that are scientific, technical, political, and economic in nature.8 This point is best 
illustrated with several examples. Let us start in the Mediterranean and generally work 
our way east to the United States. The Abdus Salam International Centre for 
Theoretical Physics in Trieste, Italy was established in 1964 under the auspices of the 
United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the International 
                                                  
7 See, for example, Moravcsik (1993, 1997), Schoppa (1997), and Fearon (1998). 
8 I take “intergovernmental collaboration” to mean collaboration between governments which is 
conducted by individuals who either work for governments as civil servants or who are under 
direct contract with governments. A given intergovernmental collaboration need not necessarily 
involve the participation of governments exclusively. Only some of the collaborating parties might 
fall under the category of “state actors,” to use the vocabulary of international relations theory. 
That is, international organizations and non-state actors as well as state actors can be involved. I 
problematize below the membership categories of “state actor” and “non-state actor.” 
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Atomic Energy Agency, and the Government of Italy. The center’s primary mission 
has been to provide training and research facilities for scientists from developing 
countries, especially from Africa, the Middle-East, and South Asia, hosting over a 
hundred scientists each year for several months or longer for collaboration in research 
and training, and thousands of scientists each year for conferences and short-courses. 
Because “Italy views the center as an important foreign policy tool,” Italy supports 
about 85% of the center’s $23 million annual budget.9 In 1983, Italy added the 
secretariat of the Third World Academy of Sciences and the UN-affiliated International 
Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology to the Trieste research and 
development complex.10 The biotechnology center has over 55 member states, which 
are, again, largely from developing countries. This biotechnology center has another 
facility hosted in New Delhi, India. 
Further to the east, Japan’s Ministry of International and Trade and Industry 
launched in 1989 what was hoped to be a 10-year, $1 billion international research 
program on “Intelligent Manufacturing Systems” and invited U.S. and European firms 
to participate. According to the Government of Japan, one goal of the program was to 
develop global standards for factory automation that would encourage firms in Japan 
to build factories overseas, which would, in turn, reduce the trade imbalances that 
Japan was charged with having vis-à-vis the United States and European countries. 
The United States and the European Community reportedly feared, however, that the 
program was a Trojan horse designed for Japan to acquire expertise in U.S. software 
and European precision equipment. Eventually, after extensive consultations with the 
U.S. Department of Commerce, the European Commission, Australia, and Canada, the 
                                                  
9 Clery (2003). More detailed information about the International Centre for Theoretical Physics 
can be found at the center’s website at http://www.ictp.it (last accessed July 20, 2006). 
10 See the website of the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology at 
http://www.icgeb.org (last accessed July 20, 2006). 
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governments restructured the program into a “bottom-up,” “industry-led,” and 
“market-driven” program that was funded in part by the program’s member 
governments to promote the “industrial competitiveness” of their own countries.11 
Cooperation in science and technology in East Asia is not only about 
industrial competitiveness and trade. In April 2006, 200 researchers from South and 
North Korea met in secret in Pyongyang to discuss possibilities for international 
collaboration, perhaps leading to the establishment of an “Inter-Korean Science 
Center.” The conference came at a time when the “six-party talks” over North Korea’s 
nuclear program were stalled.12 According to the conference organizer, who was a 
university president in South Korea, the long-term objective of the collaboration was 
to ameliorate disparities in science and technology between the North and the South 
and to facilitate Korea’s reunification.13 
Continuing east and across the Pacific, Japan and the United States have had 
extensive bilateral collaborations in science and technology, particularly in defense 
and space. For instance, the two states have co-developed fighter aircraft and are 
involved in the construction of the International Space Station. Canada, the European 
Space Agency, and especially Russia also contribute to the International Space Station. 
In addition to the ASTER remote-sensing system, U.S. and Japan space agencies have 
collaborated on several other earth observing systems, beginning with Japan receiving 
imagery data from the U.S. Landsat satellite in the late 1970s. The two states 
participate with China, the European Union, Russia, and South Korea in the $5 billion 
International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor project. The reactor will be 
                                                  
11 Garnett (1990), Wagstyl (1990), and Heaton (1991). The quotes are from the international 
website for the Intelligent Manufacturing System program, which can be found at: 
http://www.ims.org/index_introduction.html (last accessed July 20, 2006). 
12 The six parties were China, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (i.e., North Korea), 
Japan, the Republic of Korea (i.e., South Korea), Russia, and the United States. 
13 Stone (2006). 
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constructed in France, and the project will be directed by a diplomat from the 
Government of Japan.14 Since 1991, Canada, China, Korea, Japan, Russia, and the 
United States have promoted and coordinated marine research in the northern Pacific 
through an intergovernmental organization.15  Since 1992, the United States has 
collaborated with Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union on protecting and 
controlling nuclear, chemical, and biological materials.16 Although the United States’ 
use of intergovernmental collaboration in science and technology as an instrument of 
foreign policy as well as a spur to the promotion of scientific and technological 
development is by no means unique, the United States is likely the largest supporter of 
intergovernmental scientific and technological collaboration in the world. 
In one of the last accountings of its kind, the U.S. Department of State 
reported in 1995 that the United States had in force 26 general science and technology 
agreements (known as “umbrella” agreements, most of which were bilateral).17 Over 
850 agency-to-agency international agreements were also in effect under the 
Department of State’s imprimatur.18 Many other agreements are not included in that 
count because they do not have or do not need the Department of State’s imprimatur. 
In fiscal year 1997, the U.S. Government spent approximately $4.4 billion on 
thousands of international collaborations that involved over 110 countries, according 
to a study by RAND.19 U.S. Government agencies in that same year were engaged in 
over 490 international agreements that related to environmental remote sensing alone. 
Only about 10% of these 490 agreements had been approved through the formal 
                                                  
14 Clery and Normile (2005) and Clery (2005). 
15 Perry et al. (2002). 
16 Stern (1996). 
17 U.S. Department of State (1996). 
18 U.S. Department of State (1996). See also U.S. General Accounting Office (1999). 
19 Wagner et al. (2001). $4.4 billion is about 6 percent of fiscal year 1997’s total federal R&D 
spending (including defense R&D, which is a little more than half). Not all of these international 
collaborations are intergovernmental. 
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interagency process that would have brought them to the attention of the Department 
of State.20 Even if this percentage was unusually low, it is reasonable to estimate that 
U.S. government agencies were—and likely still are—committed to thousands of 
agreements for international collaboration in science and technology, and most of 
these agreements are likely for intergovernmental collaborations. 
The United States’ purported goals for its collaborations in science and 
technology have been tailored to its foreign policy. The U.S. Department of State’s last 
report on “Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy,” covering fiscal year 1995, 
informs us that science and technology were "central to the goals of economic security, 
military strength, and diplomatic engagement—the vital elements of national 
security."21 The United States undertook international collaborations in order to 
"advance U.S. R&D objectives, minimize duplicative research efforts, gain access to 
R&D programs worldwide, jointly address global problems, and support U.S. foreign 
policy."22 The document described U.S. foreign policy objectives for that year as 
"building democracy," "promoting and maintaining peace," "promoting economic 
growth and sustainable development," "addressing global problems," and "providing 
humanitarian assistance." 23  Other states—such as those mentioned in the 
collaborations described above—have similarly tried to use collaborations in science 
and technology as occasions to support their foreign policies and advance state goals. 
States that, like the United States, have played or are now playing leading, dominant, 
or imperial roles in world affairs are the most conspicuous examples, such as China, 
France, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Spain, and the United Kingdom.24 
                                                  
20 Wagner (1998). Thus, remote-sensing agreements do not represent half of the 850 
agency-to-agency international agreements previously mentioned. 
21 U.S. Department of State (1996: iv). 
22 Ibid., p. 9. 
23 Ibid., p. 9-11. 
24 Articles in MacLeod (2000) describe the use of science and technology in colonial projects of 
the nineteenth and early twentieth century, and articles in Krige and Barth (2006) discuss the use of 
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Knowledge-Making and Technology-Building in International Affairs 
 
My dissertation’s account of a U.S.-Japan remote-sensing collaboration 
contributes to understanding scientific knowledge-making and technology-building in 
international affairs in three ways. First, it contributes to a general understanding of 
intergovernmental collaboration in science and technology as a tool of foreign policy 
by showing that state goals, while handed down from “higher” state authorities, were 
nevertheless (re)articulated in different, politically useful ways in the process of 
scientific and technical collaboration.  
Second, the dissertation’s methodology is itself a contribution to the fields of 
Science and Technology Studies and International Relations. The dissertation pushes 
common interpretative methods in Science and Technology Studies in two intertwined 
ways. First, while some of the literature in Science and Technology Studies has 
altogether avoided “why” questions, this dissertation proposes to address those 
questions in a way that is still in accordance with the interpretative sensibility of much 
of the field. Second, the dissertation incorporates alternative explanations (or 
alternative accounts, if one prefers) in analyses along with the author’s preferred 
explanation. In addition, the dissertation demonstrates to the field of International 
Relations the value of describing in detail the mundane work of international relations 
and of taking into serious consideration the various political and technical 
interpretations that actors might have offered of their own quandaries, essentially 
acting as analysts themselves before other analysts (such as this author) have come 
along to examine those quandaries. Using the methodology that this dissertation 
                                                                                                                                               
science and technology to promote foreign policy in the mid-twentieth century. Skolnikoff (1993) 
offers a broad discussion of the role science and technology in international affairs. National 
Research Council (1997) explores how the United States might “maximize” its interests in its 
science and technology relations with Japan. 
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advocates does not necessarily make an account more accurate, but it can help clarify 
what that account does and does not illuminate. 
Third, the dissertation contributes to literature on the politics of science and 
technology in the field of Science and Technology Studies and to literature in the field 
of International Relations, particularly the constructivist literature, by explaining how 
knowledge and power came together in the two teams’ technical decision-making and 
scientific judgment, especially through the two teams’ enactment of their respective 
states and U.S.-Japan relations and through the teams’ assertions and ascriptions of 
knowledge and power, particularly state power. The dissertation characterizes this 
technical decision-making, collective scientific judgment, and international relations 
as “technoscientific diplomacy.” This account of the “how” explains the “why(s)” of 
the “who got what” issues that were noted above. These three contributions are 
elucidated below. 
 
State Goals 
 
Although intergovernmental collaborations in science and technology occupy 
a central role in many states’ foreign policies, most discussions of the topic neglect the 
question of how the complexity of scientific and technical practice aligns itself with 
the advancement of states’ foreign policy goals, if it does at all. A typical narrative of 
the founding of the U.S. National Science Foundation’s overseas office in Tokyo 
exemplifies how commentators, especially those in policymaking circles, have long 
thought about scientific and technological collaboration in world affairs: 
 
In 1960 in the journal Foreign Affairs, Edwin Reischauer wrote 
about the "The Broken Dialogue" in U.S.–Japan relations. Reischauer was at 
the time a professor at Harvard University and a renowned scholar of Japan, 
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and he would become the United States’ most famous Ambassador to Japan.25 
Amid the massive protests in Japan over the signing of the Mutual Security 
and Cooperation Treaty of 1960, Reischauer wrote of a gap in understanding 
between the two nations’ general publics and between each nation’s elite 
intellectuals in particular. Friendship and mutual understanding between the 
United States and Japan could only be born from relationships of equality, he 
argued. Reischauer considered collaborations among intellectuals to be 
promising enterprises with which to lead the way in mending the U.S.–Japan 
alliance. Newly-elected President Kennedy took note of Reischauer’s article 
and subsequently made him ambassador, replacing Ambassador Douglas 
MacArthur, who was the nephew of the former Supreme Commander of the 
Allied Powers in Japan during the postwar occupation, General MacArthur. 
One of Reischauer’s and Kennedy’s first foreign policy initiatives 
was to suggest a U.S.–Japan committee of scientific cooperation. After the 
idea was affirmed by Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato in a summit meeting with 
Kennedy in 1961, the U.S. Government signed its first formal agreement for 
cooperation in basic science, its first not only with Japan, but with any state. 
Its implementation as the “U.S.–Japan Cooperative Science Program” quickly 
led to the establishment in Tokyo of what is now the U.S. National Science 
Foundation’s most senior overseas office. The National Science Foundation’s 
second permanent overseas office, which was in Paris, wasn’t opened until 
over twenty years later, in 1983.26 
 
In this state-centric narrative, scientific and technological collaboration follows broad 
foreign policy goals—principally that of building alliances against communism.  
When the U.S.–Japan relationship was seen to be deeply troubled in 1960, intellectual 
collaboration was a safe way to foster good will, a good will that could supposedly be 
leveraged to pursue other state goals. According to this state-centric reasoning, a kind 
of reasoning assumed not only by the narrative but also likely by the principal actors 
in it, collaboration is typically a means to a foreign policy end, an end that is 
determined in part by stable national interests, whether those interests are scientific, 
economic, or military in nature. Those interests are presumably expressed in goals that 
                                                  
25 Reischauer (1960). 
26 This standard narrative is a paraphrasing and blending of accounts in Bloom (1984: 91-92), 
Neureiter (1998: 30-32), Uyehara (2000: 25-26), and Blanpied (2002: 1-2). Although the United 
States’ first formal bilateral agreement for cooperation in basic science was with Japan, the U.S. 
Government had previously cooperated with other governments in basic science, most famously 
with the United Kingdom during World War II. 
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guide collaboration in practice. This fledgling U.S.–Japan collaboration in science and 
technology could well be said then to have been an epiphenomenon of power politics, 
at least up to a certain point in its history. 
State goals, however, do not float freely. How do we know whether or not 
state goals, even those publicly expressed, make their way from the supposed 
“summit” of the state to the collaborative practices of scientists and engineers? Even if 
these goals are passed on clearly and somehow make the trip through bureaucracy, are 
they in a form that is meaningful and useful? Wouldn’t they need to be further 
specified and refined? And when during the course of collaboration are they actually 
referred to and used? To answer these questions, we need to follow state goals as they 
are deployed in practice. Then, we can capture and assess, for example, how the state 
is and is not brought to bear in intergovernmental collaborations in science and 
technology and how scientists and engineers may or may not re-present and realize 
state goals.27 If there is something to these questions, the above story about the 
founding of the U.S. National Science Foundation’s office in Tokyo and about the 
U.S.–Japan Cooperative Science Program is at best incomplete, if not deceptive in its 
simplicity. To understand what the goals of the United States and Japan were in 
practice for the U.S.-Japan Cooperative Science Program and whether or not they were 
realized, we need to follow their articulation in the U.S.–Japan Cooperative Science 
Program and in the subsequent U.S.–Japan programs in the environmental and medical 
                                                  
27 National goals for international collaboration in science and technology are discussed in U.S. 
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (1995), National Research Council (1997), National 
Research Council and European Science Foundation (1998), and National Research Council 
(1999). These studies on international collaboration in science and technology are of course not 
unaware that the distance between policy planning and implementation can be large. The last two 
studies in particular are very much attuned to possible differences between planning and practice 
(i.e., NRC and ESF 1998 and NRC 1999). But they do not know what happens to state goals in 
practice. One excellent study of an international collaboration in science and technology that did at 
least examine whether or not state goals can be said to have been realized is Lorell (1996). 
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sciences, nuclear energy, defense technology, and space technology, among other 
areas.28  
This dissertation argues that states’ goals were (re)articulated and (re)cast 
within the context of the U.S.-Japan collaboration on the ASTER remote-sensing 
system. To state this, however, is not to say that the U.S. and Japan teams articulated 
state goals that were in contradiction with the state goals that were set forth and 
possibly passed on by their respective national policymakers and bureaucracies. Rather, 
for state goals to be useful in their collaboration, members of the two teams adapted 
                                                  
28 The science collaborations stemming from the U.S.–Japan Cooperative Science Program are 
briefly reviewed in Bloom (1984) and Uyehara (2000: 25-30). Let me offer an additional point that 
illustrates the almost necessarily deceptive simplicity of “high politics” narratives as well as of 
anecdotal “origin stories.” 
A close reading of Bloom (1984: 92), Uyehara (2000: 26), and Blanpied (2002: 2) 
reveals some ambiguity and disagreement over when and why the “NSF Tokyo Office” was 
exactly “established.” As I did in the “typical narrative” offered above, Bloom and Uyehara state 
that the NSF Tokyo Office was established to administer the U.S.–Japan Cooperative Science 
Program in 1961. Yet, Blanpied states that the NSF Tokyo Office was in fact established 18 months 
earlier in June 1960 as a small information gathering and reporting office and that “the 
responsibilities of the Office increased significantly as a result” of the Cooperative Science 
Program. If Blanpied’s details are correct, as seems quite likely, then the mistaken simplifications 
of Bloom’s and Uyehara’s narratives reinforce my point that practices “on the ground,” including 
the bureaucratic act of setting up an overseas office, are often assumed and retold to follow “high 
politics” stories, even by knowledgeable commentators such as Bloom and Uyehara.  
On similar grounds of skepticism, however, we can doubt Blanpied’s narrative that the 
Tokyo office was established in June 1960. In agreement with Blanpied’s story, the NSF’s 1961 
annual report notes that two personnel were assigned to the U.S. embassy in Tokyo in June 1960 (p. 
133). At the time, however, those personnel could have been considered just short-term 
representatives rather than as the definitive beginning of the “NSF Tokyo Office.” Blanpied seems 
to make elsewhere a general distinction between “short-term” activities and a long-term office. 
Blanpied’s tenth endnote recognizes the seniority of the “establishment of the NSF Tokyo Office” 
by contrasting it with “short-term” NSF activities at overseas embassies, one of which was prior to 
June 1960. If Blanpied had judged the NSF’s 1960 activities in Tokyo historically without the 
Tokyo office’s long future in mind, he might have found those activities comparable with the 
NSF’s other “short-term” international activities (this point is supported in part by NSF 1962: 153). 
Thus, even taking into account Blanpied’s details, it can still be reasonably said that while NSF 
representatives were in Tokyo prior to the Cooperative Science Program, it was the Cooperative 
Science Program that gave those overseas assignments the permanency of an overseas “office.” In 
any case, for Bloom and Uyehara, it was the intergovernmental collaboration that gave that office 
meaning for the U.S.–Japan relationship. Neureiter is also in agreement with this point (1998: 30).  
My warning here about stories of “high politics” and the ambivalent status of the 
founding of the NSF Tokyo Office is analagous to the analysis that is discussed in Winner (1980), 
Joerges (1999), and Woolgar and Cooper (1999) regarding the “parable” of Langdon Winner’s 
bridges and the ambivalent status of the bus schedule. 
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and modified state goals in ways that were politically significant, even if these state 
goals were not articulated “from scratch.”29 Thus, I am suggesting that each team was 
not a mechanical, talking intermediary for their respective state in their state’s 
relations with its counterpart state. Their words and actions were not smoothly guided 
by the supposed goals of their state. The team members were, at the very least, active, 
competent, and creative mediators in the international arena.30 As mediators, they 
                                                  
29 This attention to state goals as they are articulated or re-articulated in the practice of scientific 
and technical collaboration is indebted most immediately to the insights of ethnomethodology, 
particularly to the canonical debate in Science and Technology Studies between Lynch and Bloor 
about the treatment of rules and rule-following in Wittgenstein’s writings and in Science and 
Technology Studies more generally. The debate between Lynch and Bloor draws substantially on 
the writings of philosophers S. Kripke, S. Shanker, G.P. Baker, P.M.S. Hacker, and N. Malcolm, 
among others. See Lynch (1992), Bloor (1992), and Lynch’s explication of rules in “ordinary 
action” in chapter five of Lynch (1993). Suchman’s recommended approach to “plans” nicely 
summarizes the ethnomethodological touchstone for my approach to “state goals”:  
 
For situated action, the vagueness of plans is not a fault, but is ideally suited to the fact 
that the detail of intent and action must be contingent on the circumstantial and 
interactional particulars of actual situations. Given this view of plans, namely as 
resources for action rather than as controlling structures, the outstanding problem is not 
to improve upon them, but to understand what kind of resource they are (1987: 185-186). 
 
To be clear, however, it is neither this dissertation’s goal nor plan to be an ethnomethodological 
account.  
This focus on state goals as they are articulated in practice is also in agreement with 
Neumann’s call for scholars in the constructivist and critical schools in the field of International 
Relations to better integrate their recent “linguistic turn” with practice (2002). Neumann highlights 
Wittgenstein as a “seminal theorist” to which the field of International Relations should “return” (p. 
627). Neumann’s article argues that an integration of discourse with practice can lead to a more 
distributed and localized understanding of diplomacy. 
On a different point, the quotes around “from scratch” mark the word as an idiomatic 
expression. Those quotes can also be read as scare quotes, questioning when there ever might have 
been in a U.S.-Japan intergovernmental collaboration in the late twentieth century a tabula rasa 
that could be “scratched” for the first time. In this sense, because articulations de novo are arguably 
an historical impossibility, the qualification “even if these state goals were not articulated ‘from 
scratch’” might not be as much as a qualification as some readers might think. 
30 Here, my use of the terms “intermediary” and “mediators” reflects a distinction recently defined 
by Latour (2005), a scholar whose writings have centrally shaped the field of Science and 
Technology Studies. In Latour’s vocabulary, 
 
an intermediary is what transports meaning or force without transformation: defining 
inputs is enough to define its outputs. For all practical purposes, an intermediary can be 
taken not only as a black box, but also as a black box counting for one, even if it is 
internally made of many parts. Mediators, on the other hand, cannot be counted as just 
one; they might count for one, for nothing, for several, or for infinity. Their input is never 
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exercised judgment and selectively turned to state goals for guidance; they used state 
goals as rhetorical props on occasions that called for persuasion and justification; and 
they specified, refined, and recast state goals so that these goals would be more useful, 
politically and scientifically. The goals of the United States and Japan were substantial 
resources that the two teams used to shape the character and content of their 
collaboration, even if state goals were not dispositive of the two teams’ development 
of a U.S.-Japan remote-sensing system. 
 
Explanatory Sketches of International Political Order 
 
This dissertation’s central burden is to offer a convincing account of how a 
U.S. team and a Japan team of scientists and engineers worked together to build an 
international remote-sensing system. In particular, I seek to understand and explain 
how they made complex technical decisions and scientific judgments, since the two 
teams—initially at least—worked without the benefit of extensively-shared 
socio-political resources, such as shared authority. That is, in developing the ASTER 
remote-sensing system, the two teams faced the challenge of creating an international 
political order as well as the challenge of creating scientific and technical order. They 
worked on behalf of two states with different goals that in some cases diverged, and 
the two teams comprised members who were drawn from different communities of 
                                                                                                                                               
a good predictor of their output; their specificity has to be taken into account every time. 
Mediators transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the elements they are 
supposed to carry (p. 39, italics in original). 
 
As other scholars in Science and Technology Studies have done, I too am “sociologizing” to some 
extent the actor-network theory that is advanced by Latour in that my account of, and use of, 
Latourian actor-network theory: a) knowingly “misreads” the loose semiotics of Latour’s analysis 
by conflating rhetorical signs and their referents, b) interprets actor-network theory as giving 
agency to nature and technologies, and then c) proceeds to reject that ontology and to privilege 
human agency in most of my use of actor-network theory. On “sociologizing” actor-network theory, 
see Lynch (1993: 107-113), Shapin (1995: 308, note 17), and Hilgartner (2000: 160, note 17). 
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remote-sensing practice. The depth and scope of the challenge that they confronted in 
creating order are left to the empirical chapters to substantiate. Yet, their achievement 
of order—to the extent that it was in fact achieved—presents a question for the 
literature in Science and Technology Studies. The question points to a gap in literature 
from International Relations as well. Both of those literatures to date have not 
explored to any great extent scientific knowledge-making and technology-building in 
international affairs outside of the realm of international organizations and regimes, 
especially scientific knowledge-making and technology-building in intergovernmental 
collaborations. 
The most widely-cited literature in the field of International Relations which 
examines the politics of scientific and technical knowledge in international affairs is 
the literature on “epistemic communities.” Peter Haas and others who have 
collaborated in and advanced that literature have defined an epistemic community as: 
 
a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a 
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge 
within that domain or issue-area. Although an epistemic community may 
consist of professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds, they 
have (1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a 
value-based rationale for the social action of community members; (2) shared 
causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or 
contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve 
as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy 
actions and desired outcomes; (3) shared notions of validity—that is, 
intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating 
knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and (4) a common policy 
enterprise—that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of 
problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out 
of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence.31 
                                                  
31 See P. Haas (1992: 3) and the articles in that special issue of International Organization, which 
are reprinted as P. Haas (1997). E. Haas (1990) and Adler (2005a) have also advanced the study of 
epistemic communities. While the above definition of epistemic communities likely arouses many 
skeptical questions from readers within the field of Science and Technology Studies—some of 
which are discussed below—it is commendable for Haas to lay out a tight definition and then 
subsequently an argument that is generally faithful to that definition in a manner that is clear 
enough to allow sharp critique. Other definitions of epistemic communities have been posited, as 
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For Haas and other students of epistemic communities in the field of International 
Relations, these epistemic communities serve as the backbone for an explanation of 
international coordination in policy questions such as global climate change.  
The logic of the explanation is straightforward. Epistemic communities 
provide “decision makers” with “human interpretations of social and physical 
phenomena” in conditions of policy uncertainty, particularly “those which arise from 
the strong dependence of states on each other’s policy choices for success in obtaining 
goals and those which involve multiple and only partly estimable consequences of 
action.”32 Epistemic communities may or may not be from the same profession or 
intellectual discipline, and they may or may not be “transnational” in nature (e.g., 
transnational coalitions).33 Still, the emphasis in the literature is on transnational 
                                                                                                                                               
Haas’s article notes. For example, Ruggie (1975), borrowing Foucault’s term episteme, defines 
epistemic communities as consisting of “interrelated roles which grow up around an episteme; they 
delimit, for their members, the proper construction of social reality” (p. 570, italics in original).   
32 Haas (1992: 3-4). 
33 The term “transnational” has circulated in the academic literature that is relevant to this 
dissertation with a variety of definitions. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “transnational” as 
“extending or having interests extending beyond national bounds or frontiers; multinational.” 
Crawford et al. (1993) in their study of “the nationalization and denationalization of the sciences” 
defines “transnational science” as “activities involving persons, equipment or funds from more 
than one country” (p. 1). As Crawford et al. recognize, the term “transnational” can take on the 
connotation of “not-national” in contrast to “international” and “multinational.” They chose, 
however, to not rely on the term “transnational” for that connotation and to make that meaning 
explicit in their use of the term “denationalizing” (which they do not concisely define). A 
well-known edited volume that explores “Bringing Transnational Relations Back In” the field of 
International Relations uses as its definition of transnational relations “regular interactions across 
national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a 
national government or an intergovernmental organization” (Risse-Kappen 1995: 3). Evangelista, 
for instance, explicitly adopted that definition in his study of a “transnational movement” among 
scientists and physicians which sought to shape the arms control policies of the United States and 
the Soviet Union (and later Russia) (1999: 6). In line with what I consider to be currently connoted 
by word “transnational,” I take the term to mean not just “international” or “multinational” but as 
an extension across and outside of the “national” with respect to both geopolitical boundaries and 
political control, as is implied by the terms “denationalizing” and “non-state actor.” Thus, in my 
taxonomy, I have the rough dichotomy of the “intergovernmental” (defined in note 8) and the 
“transnational,” leaving the more general word “international” to mean either intergovernmental, 
transnational, or both. The distinctions in my dichotomy become problematized to some extent 
when the rhetorical practices of scientists and engineers are closely studied (see, in addition to this 
dissertation, Forman 1973).  
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epistemic communities of natural or social scientists who typically work in 
universities, think-tanks, or non-governmental organizations. Epistemic communities 
bring about international policy coordination in ways that suggest different kinds of 
political involvement and different kinds of influence, such as by “educating” decision 
makers, by “framing” issues for decision makers, by “identifying” particular interests 
and policies to decision makers, and by “formulating” specific policies.34 For Haas 
and his collaborators, while “epistemic communities provide consensual knowledge, 
they do not necessarily generate truth.”35 Nevertheless, if epistemic communities were 
“confronted with anomalies that undermined their causal beliefs, they would withdraw 
from the policy debate, unlike interest groups.”36 Thus, in Haas’s portrayal, although 
epistemic communities do not quite bring “truth to power,” they are certainly not 
lobbyists. They are groups of true believers of particular theories who are looking to 
realize their policy preferences. 
After being “informed by the causal beliefs and policy preferences of the 
epistemic community,” decision makers of one state negotiate with the decision 
makers of other states, who may or may not have been similarly influenced by that 
same epistemic community.37 If the decision makers of all of the states that were 
involved in negotiating a given international policy were similarly influenced by a 
transnational epistemic community, then it would be easier, “all things being equal,” as 
the saying goes, to arrive at an international policy that was coordinated internationally. 
Empirical studies have argued that the degree to which international policies reflect 
                                                                                                                                               
On a different point, with respect to the literature on epistemic communities, Adler 
(1992) makes clear that the term epistemic communities, according to the definition employed in 
the Haas (1992) collection, can be used to refer to groups that are exclusively national and to 
groups with members from different professions and disciplines. 
34 Different forms of these verbs are used throughout Haas (1992) to describe what epistemic 
communities do. Adler (1992) frequently uses “educate.” 
35 Haas (1992: 23). 
36 Ibid., p. 18. 
37 Ibid., p. 4. 
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the “principled” and “causal” beliefs that were shared by an epistemic community can 
depend upon a variety of factors, including the “distribution of international power” 
and “domestic [institutional] structures.”38 In sum, the epistemic community approach 
that was articulated by Haas and his collaborators adopted what they called a “limited 
constructivist view”—a view that made intellectual space for ideas, knowledge, and 
practices within the “rationalist” orientation that dominated the field of International 
Relations at that time; the rationalist orientation emphasized the development of 
conditional hypotheses (i.e., “if . . . then . . .” statements) and the explication of 
“causal mechanisms” in theory building with the goal of generalization.39 While the 
                                                  
38 Ibid., p. 7. See, for example, the articles in the Haas (1992) collection. More recently, 
Evangelista (1999) has contributed to the literature on epistemic communities by investigating 
under what domestic structural conditions, such as “decentralized, fragmented states” (resembling 
the United States) or “centralized, hierarchical states” (resembling the Soviet Union), a 
transnational movement was and was not able to effect its preferred policy (p. 19). To be clear, 
Evangelista (1999) does not take on the full assumptions of the epistemic community research 
program, nor does he even call the transnational movement of scientists and physicians whom he 
studies an “epistemic community.” While Evangelista does draw upon the literature on epistemic 
communities, such as Adler (1992) (e.g., p. 18, 195, 378), he generally situates his study in the 
literature that is organized around the theme of transnational social movements, ideas, and 
international norms in international relations (e.g., p. 6, 16-21). If the analyst drops any claims that 
the actors under study are in some way epistemologically-privileged in their beliefs, the intellectual 
move from the “epistemic communities” literature to, for example, the “transnational advocacy” 
literature is a small step. Keck and Sikkink (1998) define a “transnational advocacy network” as 
including “those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by 
shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services” (p. 2). 
Whereas epistemic communities “inform,” transnational advocacy networks “persuade” as well as 
“inform.”  
39 Haas (1992: 23). Katzenstein et al. (1998) reviews and explains the “International Political 
Economy” literature in International Relations in terms of “rationalist” and “constructivist” 
orientations. Fearon and Wendt (2002) offer a review and critique of the International Relations 
literature which also organize the literature in those terms. Dessler and Owen (2005) in their 
review of constructivism in the field of International Relations highlight the development of 
conditional statements as a central element of the structural and rational conception of theory 
building and as a piece of the puzzle of explanation which to date, they argue, constructivism has 
not provided. “Causal mechanisms” specify how the effects of a condition come into being. For 
example, a causal mechanism of the epistemic communities literature is the way that an epistemic 
community interacts with decision makers to bring about their preferred preferences (by 
“informing,” “educating,” etc.). In Hacking’s explication and critique of constructivist literature 
writ large (especially that in Science and Technology Studies), which he calls “constructionism” in 
order to avoid confusion with constructivism in the philosophy of mathematics, he characterizes 
the literature partly by its attention to causal mechanisms (what he calls “causal routes”): 
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theoretical and metatheoretical landscape of the field of International Relations has 
changed significantly since the articulation of the epistemic communities approach, 
especially with the establishment of “constructivism” in various forms, no approach in 
the field of International Relations has examined the politics of scientific and technical 
knowledge in international affairs as thoroughly as the epistemic communities 
literature has.40 
Whereas the epistemic communities literature and the more general literature 
in International Relations have used consensus on “principled” and “causal” beliefs 
concerning nature and technology to support explanations of international order (e.g., 
                                                                                                                                               
Hence by constructionism (or social constructionism if we need, on occasion, to 
emphasize the social) I shall mean various sociological, historical, and philosophical 
projects that aim at displaying or analyzing actual, historically situated, social 
interactions or causal routes that led to, or were involved in, the coming into being or 
establishing of some present entity or fact (1999: 48).  
 
40 Haas and Haas (2002) and Adler (2005b) have integrated their work on epistemic communities 
into their preferred forms of constructivism, which they respectively call “pragmatic 
constructivism” and “communitarian constructivism.” While the different versions of 
constructivism that have been recently staked out in theory in the field of International Relations 
are different in their theoretical positioning, differences in how various studies handle, in practice, 
the empirical material in their accounts are arguably much more revealing and often do not neatly 
correspond to the differences that were articulated in their respective theoretical statements. 
Consequently, I make no effort here to translate at the level of abstraction among the nuances of 
the various constructivisms in International Relations (or in Science and Technology Studies as 
well), especially when studies’ handling of the empirical material and the content of their empirical 
material are usually much more interesting, often providing insight by showing how distinctions 
are ordered and then blurred in practice. More importantly, because this dissertation is focused on a 
particular question concerning intergovernmental collaboration in science and technology, its 
contribution is relevant to most of the constructivisms (“critical theory” or “critical constructivism” 
being the possible exception), and detailed parsing of the various constructivisms is unnecessary to 
communicate that contribution. 
In his integration of “epistemic communities” into his preferred version of 
constructivism, P. Haas has preserved and made use of much of the original epistemic communities 
approach, particularly the rationalist divide between science and policy and between scientists and 
policymakers. In a recent article, P. Haas (2004) conceives of epistemic communities as “the 
transmission belts by which new knowledge is developed and transmitted to decision-makers” to 
influence policy (p. 587). According to Haas, the more “autonomous and independent science” and 
these epistemic communities are from policy “the greater its [i.e., science’s] potential influence” (p. 
576). Science and policy should be thought of as separate, and “it may be best if the two activities 
can be kept as separate as possible” (p. 580). Haas’s empirical overview of the workings of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in that recent article draws heavily upon the original 
framework of epistemic communities (p. 580-584). 
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in the form of international policy coordination), the field of Science and Technology 
Studies has taken as one of the field’s central projects the examination of that 
consensus and the creation (or the “production”) of knowledge at the core of that 
consensus. The field of Science and Technology Studies has in general questioned any 
easy consensus on beliefs about nature and technology and has studied how consensus 
has in practice been achieved with difficulty—if it is achieved at all—especially with 
respect to beliefs or claims that are asserted or accepted as scientific knowledge. Much 
of the literature has emphasized that any consensus is not just an achievement, but a 
“social” achievement that could have been filled with contention at one point in time 
but that was (provisionally) settled within a socio-political context and with the 
assistance of particular socio-political resources.41 
For example, studies in the field have argued that the successful replication of 
experimental results has often required personal relationships of trust and the 
person-to-person (or the person-to-instrument-to-person) passing of skill-based 
techniques.42 If experimenters were to persuade their scientific community of the 
validity of their results, of the proper calibration of their experimental instrument, or 
of the significance of their results for scientific knowledge, then they had to conduct 
themselves as competent members of a scientific culture that comprised rhetorical and 
literary techniques, certain methodological practices, particular understandings of what 
did and did not count as evidence, and socio-political organization.43 As described by 
work in the field of Science and Technology Studies, knowledge claims that arose 
                                                  
41 Footnote 2 lists central texts and literature reviews from the field of Science and Technology 
Studies which substantiate this point. In writing here about a “difficult consensus,” I am not 
implying that consensus in the sciences is inherently any more difficult to achieve than consensus 
in other human enterprises. 
42 For example, Shapin and Schaffer (1985) and Collins (1992 [1985]). 
43 Ibid., and also see Gilbert and Mulkay (1984), Dear (1991), Gieryn (1992a), Shapin (1994), 
Knorr Cetina (1999), Collins (2004), and Doing (2004). 
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from experiment were in principle open to challenge.44 Debate over the validity of 
knowledge claims inherently embroiled socio-political resources in socio-political 
circumstances along with rational thinking, technical analysis, and factual assertions. 
Successful claims to knowledge were successful in part because socio-political 
resources were used in ways that helped to make an experimenter’s thinking 
“rational,” her analysis “technical,” and her assertions “factual.”45  
Let me illustrate the point with a brief exemplar that does not require much 
background to be explained or discourse to be described, as many examples drawn 
from within the annals of science and technology would. As a member of the 
Guidance and Control Panel of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, the 
distinguished physicist George Gamow challenged the technical feasibility of inertial 
guidance in 1948. He did not challenge, however, just any inertial guidance system in 
the abstract. By drawing a cartoon depicting a confused Air Force pilot trying to 
understand the path that he had flown, Gamow literally caricatured the U.S. Air 
Force’s future use of inertial guidance systems—guidance systems that were under 
development by Charles Draper at MIT’s Instrumentation Laboratory. The “abstract 
argument” of the feasibility of inertial guidance was grounded in the political and in 
the personal. Likewise, the persuasiveness of Charles Draper’s response to Gamow’s 
challenge did not as much lay in academic papers that compellingly documented a 
feasible design but in the building and demonstration of the technology for the Air 
Force and in subsequent production contracts for the Air Force.46 The socio-political 
                                                  
44 See the “experimenter’s regress” in chapter four of Collins (1992 [1985]) and in Collins (2004), 
especially chapter forty three. Chapter ten of Sismondo (2004) reviews “controversy studies” in 
Science and Technology Studies. 
45 The precise theoretical underpinnings of this “making,” indeed what the word “make” means, 
are contested within the literature. See the debates in Pickering (1992) (particularly Collins and 
Yearly 1992), chapter three of Lynch (1993), Sismondo (1996), Bloor (1999), Hacking (1999), 
Latour (1999), and Zammito (2004).  
46 Dennis (1994: 447-450) and MacKenzie (1990: 66-74) 
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positioning, dynamics, and solidarity of this technical community were a far cry from 
that of an epistemic community. The definition of epistemic communities which is set 
forth by Haas and his collaborators could not be used to describe the community of 
scientists and engineers who researched, developed, and assessed inertial guidance 
systems at MIT’s Instrumentation Laboratory and elsewhere, if Haas and his 
collaborators wanted to explain, hypothetically speaking, the role of these scientists 
and engineers in producing accuracy assessments that were used to negotiate an arms 
control measure. 
The exclusion of these scientists and engineers from the epistemic community 
approach, however, raises the general question of how often epistemic communities, 
as defined by Haas and his collaborators, can convincingly be stipulated as existing in 
practice.47 From the perspective of the literature in Science and Technology Studies, 
the epistemic communities approach seems to be inattentive to knowledge-making 
practice and consequently seems to be problematically apolitical.48 Beyond debates 
                                                  
47 Perhaps a more persuasive example with which to illustrate this point might have been drawn 
from a controversy in “basic science” which would initially be presumed to be deeply isolated 
inside the laboratory or the “ivory tower,” without obvious connections to politics, especially 
national security politics. For those examples, see Pickering (1984), Shapin and Schaffer (1985), 
Latour and Woolgar (1986 [1979]), Pinch (1986), MacKenzie (2001), Doing (2004), and Collins 
(2004). Nevertheless, the moment these communities embark on a “common policy 
enterprise”—as described by the epistemic communities approach—they have an obvious 
connection to politics. 
48 Miller and Edwards (2001b: 4, 16) briefly allude to this critique, but Darst (2003: 86) argues 
that Miller and Edwards have unfairly taken the epistemic communities literature as a foil. In my 
reading, Darst is correct that Miller and Edwards (2001b: 4, 16) do not recognize in that essay how 
the epistemic communities literature has positioned the concept of epistemic communities in 
broader political contexts, such as in international regimes. Furthermore, in my reading, the 
critique of Miller and Edwards (2001b: 4, 16) overlooks the shared “principled beliefs” component 
of epistemic communities. Still, Darst misses Miller’s and Edwards’ fundamental point about what 
Miller and Edwards argue to be the inherent politics involved in the process of making knowledge. 
I write “seems to be” in the statement noted above because I would like to keep open the 
possibility that because the literature in International Relations and the literature in Science and 
Technology Studies generally emphasize different explanatory goals and generally have different 
metatheoretical assumptions, scholars in one field are not necessarily in the best position to take 
issue with the supposed “faults” of a work that is in another literature. I certainly do not mean to 
imply, however, that the sharing and critiquing of ideas across fields are not valuable to intellectual 
inquiry. This introduction to this dissertation plainly presumes otherwise.   
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about particular knowledge claims, work in Science and Technology Studies has 
argued that scientific cultures and particular ways of knowing the natural and social 
world are intertwined with and bolstered by the “wider polity” and the “wider 
society.”49 Framing that argument more holistically, some scholars in Science and 
Technology Studies have proposed that natural and social orders are “co-produced,” 
that is, that the “ways in which we know and represent the world (both nature and 
society) are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to live in it.”50 
Although the epistemic communities approach to explaining international 
coordination might stipulate too much solidarity, the literature in Science and 
Technology Studies suggests too few socio-political resources to account for 
international coordination outside of international organizations and treaty regimes.51 
In particular, the literature suggests too few socio-political resources to account for 
how a U.S. team and a Japan team of scientists and engineers collaborated to develop 
an international remote-sensing system. These scientists and engineers did not have 
pre-existing relationships of trust with each other. They did not even know each other 
before they embarked upon their collaboration. They did not share a laboratory or an 
organization, nor could they presume any shared bureaucratic or institutional 
procedures. Furthermore, they lacked a shared scientific or political culture in any 
meaningful sense of the word “culture” (previous to their collaboration, they had not 
even published in the same journals, with only very few exceptions). They did not 
share a native language, and it was not unusual, as it turned out, for members from one 
team to doubt whether their words were understood by members of the other. Finally, 
                                                  
49 For “wider polity” and “wider society,” see Collins (1981), chapter eight of Shapin and Schaffer 
(1985), and chapter six of Collins (1992 [1985]). MacKenzie (1990) advanced the argument for 
technology and technical knowledge. 
50 The quote is from Jasanoff (2004: 2). On the theme of “co-production,” see the studies that are 
collected in that volume. Also see Shapin and Schaffer (1985), Latour (1990), and Latour (1993). 
51 For the literature that substantiates this point, see notes 3 through 6. 
  
 
26
they did not share a centralized political authority. In principle, they answered to 
different states and to no particular international organization or treaty regime. Given 
the emphasis in Science and Technology Studies on socio-political context and on the 
use of socio-political resources to account for the jump starting (i.e., “bootstrapping”) 
and subsequent buttressing of the development of science and technology, and 
considering the field’s emphasis on the “local” creation of scientific and technical 
knowledge, what does the literature in Science and Technology Studies suggest can 
account for these two teams’ achievement of international order, as that order was 
realized in their development of a U.S.-Japan remote sensing system?52 
While many eclectic, historically-contingent answers to this question can be 
imagined in the abstract, only one systematic approach in the field of Science and 
Technology Studies could be used to sketch a compelling account of international 
knowledge-making and technology-building: the “actor-network theory” that was 
articulated in Latour’s book Science in Action (and to be clear, throughout the 
                                                  
52 Reviewing the literature concerning the sociology of scientific knowledge, Shapin (1995) asks 
similar, bur broader, questions: 
  
 The localist thrust of recent SSK [i.e., sociology of scientific knowledge] has 
generated one of the central problems for future work. If, as empirical research securely 
establishes, science is a local product, how does it travel with what seems to be unique 
efficiency? One appeal to the modernist grand narratives of reason, reality, and method 
was the table-thumping response they offered to questions about the travel of science. If, 
however, universality can no longer be accepted as an assumption flowing from the very 
nature of the knowledge or the “method” for making it, then what are the mundane 
means that so powerfully effect the circulation of science? And is that travel, indeed, to 
be treated as real, or is what circulates yet another illusory grand narrative? (p. 307) 
 
In my reading of the recent literature, work in Science and Technology Studies is still wrestling 
with these difficult questions, where they have not been skirted or else dismissed entirely or 
otherwise not grappled with because of more interest in other questions. Certainly no contingent 
generalizations have been offered for intergovernmental collaboration in knowledge-making and 
technology-building. In emphasizing a problem of international order, however, I am not adopting 
what Lynch (1993) sees as “the prevailing version of constructivism” which “tells us that scientists 
confront a primordial chaos from out of which they construct facts” (p. 286). As I suggested in note 
29, the U.S. team and Japan team of scientists and engineers were not working “from scratch.” 
They were working in time. 
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dissertation, when I refer to “actor-network theory” or “Latourian actor-network 
theory” I am referring not in a general way to Latour’s entire oeuvre but to 
actor-network theory as it is articulated in Science in Action).53 The actor-network 
theory of Science in Action describes the development of science and technology by 
implicitly adopting a Hobbesian realism as a political sensibility, with Machiavellian, 
will-to-power actors for whom power is manifested in the imperialist building of 
“networks.” 54  It presumes minimal socio-political order. Scientific facts and 
technologies are created when a protagonist links together in “alliances” human and 
non-human entities such as statements, readings from instruments (“inscriptions”), 
material artifacts, engineers, and scientists with increasing density and cohesion, until 
the network collapses and hardens into uncontestable “black boxes.” The building of 
                                                  
53 Before and since Science in Action (i.e., Latour 1987), actor-network theory has been set forth, 
developed, and used in different forms, rejecting some elements and revising and adding others, 
(e.g., Callon and Latour 1981; Callon 1986, Law 1986a and other essays in Law 1986b; Law 1987; 
Latour 1988a; Law and Callon 1988; Latour 1990; the essays in Law 1991; Latour 1993; Mol and 
Law 1994; Latour 1996; the essays in Law and Hassard 1999; Latour 2004; and Latour 2005). 
Many works in Science and Technology Studies have been informed by elements of actor-network 
theory without adopting its core assumptions or vocabulary (e.g., Hilgartner 2000). Latour himself 
has said that his work is a “moving target” (1999: 115). Despite the different interpretations of 
actor-network theory after Science in Action (including by Latour), I use Science in Action above 
and throughout the dissertation—rather than attempting to explicate and use later 
versions—because the motivating logic that drives the network building in Science in Action is 
explicit and because Science in Action is a well-known work that is indisputably within the canon 
of Science and Technology Studies. Furthermore, the later versions of actor-network theory 
sometimes lack the force of Science in Action. For example, although Latour (2005) generally 
remains true to the central methods and principles set forth in Science in Action, Latour (2005) 
does not have Science in Action’s explanatory suggestiveness owing to the attempt of Latour 
(2005) to position thoroughly actor-network theory as a generalized challenge to social theory in a 
manner that is frequently reminiscent of ethnomethodology. Whereas Science in Action is filled 
with well-developed empirical accounts of “science in action,” Latour (2005) rarely offers a 
sustained account or analysis, limiting itself instead to explicating vocabulary and method. 
54 In determinedly formal readings of Science in Action, these networks are rhetorical systems of 
signs, rather than networks of facts, material artifacts, and people. Much more work, however, is 
required of the reader to restrict Science in Action to a semiotic account of the development and 
circulation of scientific and technical texts than is required to read Science in Action as a guide for, 
and demonstration of, “how to follow scientists and engineers through society” (which is the 
book’s subtitle). Therefore, I knowingly “politicize” and “sociologize” Science in Action, as many 
other readers have done. For more on “sociologizing” Latourian actor-network theory, see note 30. 
Two penetrating reviews of Science in Action are Shapin (1988) and Amsterdamska (1990).   
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networks and the creation of black boxes are carried out by means of a power-laden, 
goal-oriented process. The “rules” of this process “are the oldest of politics”: 
 
Weaken your enemies, paralyze those you cannot weaken . . . , help your 
allies if they are attacked, ensure safe communications with those who supply 
you with indisputable instruments . . . , oblige your enemies to fight one 
another; if you are not sure of winning, be humble and understated (p. 37-8). 
 
According to Science in Action, black-boxed facts and objects are 
uncontestable and “objective,” at least until a “dissenter” with another network of a 
longer length can, in a controversy, pull the black boxes apart, rendering the 
competing chain of “associations” as “subjective.” In these “trials of strength,” 
battling knowledge-makers and technology-builders might construct laboratories and 
“counter-laboratories,” each trying to become an “obligatory passage point” through 
which other efforts at knowledge-making and technology-building must pass to 
achieve their interests, “betraying” their original “camp” and becoming “enrolled” into 
the network-building of the expanding laboratory. To fortify their 
“technoscience”—which is what Latour calls science and technology to emphasize 
their inseparability—competing knowledge-makers and technology-builders engage in 
“proof races.” Latour explains that: 
 
The similarity between the proof race and the arms race is not a metaphor, it 
is literally the mutual problem of winning. Today no army is able to win 
without scientists, and only very few scientists and engineers are able to win 
their arguments without the army. It is only now that the reader can 
understand why I have been using so many expressions that have military 
connotations (trials of strength, controversy, struggle, winning and losing, 
strategy and tactics, balance of power, force, number, ally), expressions which, 
although constantly used by scientists, are rarely employed by philosophers to 
describe the peaceful world of pure science. I have used these terms because, 
by and large, technoscience is part of a war machine and should be studied as 
such (p. 172). 
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The outcome of these struggles not only settles what is factual and what is not, but it 
“stabilizes society,” such as who is doing “science” and who is doing “politics.”  
Because the world, however, is not (yet) a single laboratory, to produce 
knowledge about the world sometimes requires going outside of laboratories and into 
the world and bringing back inscriptions that tell about the world. Here, the 
actor-network theory of Science in Action offers an imperialist vision in which 
knowing the world and dominating the world go hand-in-hand, both requiring the 
collection, sorting, and aggregation of regularly-formatted inscriptions at places where 
judgments can be made about the world and where action can be taken “at a distance.” 
These places are “centers of calculation”: 
 
After having followed expeditions, collections and enquiries, and observed 
the setting up of new observations, of new inscription devices and of new 
probes, we are now led back to the centres . . . inside these centres, specimens, 
maps, diagrams, logs, questionnaires and paper forms of all sorts are 
accumulated and are used by scientists and engineers to escalate the proof 
race (p. 232). 
 
National history museums, census bureaus, geological surveys, tax authorities, and 
military command and control centers are all mentioned by Latour as centers of 
calculation. These centers of calculation are greatly aided in their imperialist 
knowledge-making by metrology. In the “gigantic enterprise” of metrology, long 
networks of standardized weights, instruments, and measurement systems become 
ubiquitous throughout much of the world and “pave the way” for the work of centers 
of calculation (p. 252). In Latour’s vision of metrology, the world is slowly coming to 
resemble a laboratory, and a central question concerning dominance in the world is 
whose standards will be used and what advantage will be gained by the use of those 
standards. In sum, in the actor-network theory of Science in Action, the resources of 
knowledge-making and technology-building might be distributed, but they are not 
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shared. Gathering them to make knowledge and to build technology is not an act of 
community or of even socio-cognitive understanding, but of material power. 
To provide a convincing account of how a U.S. team and a Japan team of 
scientists and engineers worked together to build an international remote-sensing 
system, answers to “why” questions need to be provided. Why were certain technical 
claims challenged by some scientists and not by others? Why were particular design 
characteristics selected? Why did the two teams choose to calculate a measurement 
using the algorithm that they did? More broadly, why were the goals of one team 
realized in one area, but not in another? Why did a particular technical practice or 
decision-making process come to have the form that it did? Answering these “why” 
questions might not be sufficient to constitute an illuminating examination of the 
development of a techno-political system, but any account that did not offer answers to 
these questions would be lacking. 
Each of the two approaches outlined above can be employed to draft an 
“explanatory sketch” that might account for these “why” questions. What I mean by 
“explanatory sketch” is an interpretation that provides a rough account of some 
specific event, activity, or observation which can be compared and contrasted with 
other sketches of that event, activity, or observation and which can also offer lessons 
that can be adapted to other empirical contexts.55 The sketch for the epistemic 
                                                  
55 My use of the term “explanatory sketch” is indebted to Katzenstein and Sil (2004: 13). I hope 
my use of their term facilitates cross-disciplinary (as well as intra-disciplinary) discussion about 
developing portable analyses that are suggestive but that do not presume too much about what it 
means to provide an empirically-sensitive, convincing account. I think the term “explanatory 
sketch” is especially well-suited for this purpose because of the tenuousness that the word “sketch” 
connotes. Moreover, if the adjective “explanatory” is not required to mean something more 
forceful than “accounts,” then arguably most post-structuralists can also draft and submit 
explanatory sketches for discussion and comparison, provided that they do not deny that their 
accounts imply at least a weak sense of causality. According to Katzenstein and Sil (2004): 
 
Explanatory sketches broadly refer to any interpretation of a set of observations that is 
intended to generate a causally significant understanding of specific empirical outcomes, 
whether these are specific historical events, patterns of similarity and dissimilarity in 
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communities approach would first look for a core of principled and causal beliefs 
which is shared among the members of the U.S. and Japan teams. Although almost all 
of the members of these two teams had not met previous to their collaboration on the 
remote-sensing system, it could be argued, in line with the epistemic communities 
approach, that they were part of a “tacit” transnational community of geologic remote 
sensing.56 Members of the Japan team had followed closely the work of many of the 
U.S. scientists who had published path-breaking work in remote sensing, particularly 
thermal remote-sensing. A few of the U.S. scientists had authored textbooks and 
chapters of handbooks that some of the scientists in the Japan team had read in their 
doctoral studies.  
Based upon what had been published in these articles and texts, principled 
and causal beliefs could be assumed, such as the effectiveness of particular sensing 
bands in the thermal electromagnetic region for discriminating among different types 
of rocks. Using articles published in the English language (the U.S. scientists did not 
read Japanese), we could also map out standards of validity for technical claims, such 
                                                                                                                                               
broad configurations, or variations across comparable processes. As such, explanatory 
sketches are sufficiently open-ended to encompass a wide range of empirical claims (p. 
13). 
 
With this definition and with my definition given in the text above, I adopt a deflated, 
interpretative sense of causality which is not required to be statistical in nature. The causality 
claimed in this dissertation, I would argue, is in agreement with the causality claimed in 
Katzenstein and Okawara (2004) and Suh (2004). Those two essays are among those essays that 
Katzenstein and Sil (2004) introduce in the Suh et al. (2004) volume which they described as 
offering “explanatory sketches.” For critiques in Science and Technology Studies of strong 
causality claims, see Woolgar (1981), Latour (1988), and Lynch (1993: 57-59, 75-76). Deflated, 
implicit causality claims can be readily found even in analyses that their authors describe as 
“story-telling.” See, for example, Jasanoff (2005: 11). 
56 Evangelista (1999: 39-40) argues that Soviet scientists shared a “transnational scientific ethos” 
with activist scientists in the United States because the Soviet scientists read and were inspired by 
articles in journals such as Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Evangelista’s use of “tacit” to describe 
this form of transnationalism is distinct from the use of the word in “tacit knowledge,” a key 
concept in the field to Science and Technology Studies which describes skill-based knowledge that 
can not be well explained in writing and that is generally transferred through person-to-person 
interaction (for uses of “tacit knowledge” in the Science and Technology Studies literature, see, for 
example, Collins 2001 and Vogel 2006). 
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as signal-to-noise ratios, benchmarks for judging the effectiveness of remote-sensing 
systems, and typical comparisons involving well-established knowledge and methods 
(referring, for example, to the development and use of the United States’ 
widely-known Landsat satellite or to France’s SPOT satellite). Based upon the status 
of these scientists as geologic remote-sensing scientists, that is, as geologists and 
geophysicists, we might posit principled views that the group might have shared on 
issues such as the importance and utility of remote sensing for investigating a whole 
host of geologic concerns, including oil exploration, environmental pollution, and 
climate change. These principled views might then be reflected in their development 
of the remote-sensing system and its policies, such as what kinds of data would be 
collected and how these data would be distributed.  
Finally, once this normative and epistemic solidarity had been established, we 
would expect most of the “political” decisions to be negotiated between the officials 
from each teams’ sponsoring agency, informed by the united views of the two 
“science” teams. The sponsor of the U.S. team was the U.S. National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA). The sponsor of the Japan team was Japan’s Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI). On matters about which the two science 
teams had expressed their united preferences, we would then trace how some of their 
preferences were accepted and implemented and why others were not. The outcomes 
of negotiations that concerned issues for which the two teams’ preferences had not 
been accepted (i.e., the residual issues) would then be explained using well-developed 
analytical frameworks from bargaining theory, perhaps emphasizing the disparity in 
technical experience and financial resources between NASA and MITI and any 
differences in the hardware that the two agencies were bringing to the table for the 
collaboration. According to this reasoning, Japan’s preferences would win the day in 
the design of the instrument, since Japan paid for and was principally responsible for 
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the development of the ASTER remote-sensing instrument. The United States’ 
preferences would dominate in the design of the ground data and information system, 
since the data and information system for the ASTER instrument had to be 
standardized with NASA’s other data and information systems. 
In contrast to the epistemic communities approach, an explanatory sketch that 
employed Latourian actor-network theory would explain the “why” questions by 
examining closely the politics of technical practice: which team mustered what 
resources in each debate and what networks were attached to those resources.57 
Importantly, these debates would be goal-oriented “trials of strength” in which the U.S. 
and Japan team’s interests were posited in advance. The discussions of the two teams 
would be filled with measurements (i.e., “inscriptions”) and chains of citations, as 
each side tried to increase their rhetorical strength. Measurements conducted in the 
laboratory would likely be most persuasive, because they would be difficult to 
challenge without a “counter-laboratory.” When technical claims were disputed in the 
design of the remote-sensing system, the realpolitik that Latourian actor-network 
theory presumes would be conducted through tactics that did not as much investigate 
the reasoning behind the claims, as they dealt with the interests that those technical 
claims advanced and the “enrolling” of other scientists and instruments into those 
interests through the “translation” of their initial interests. These “translations” 
include: a team A “pushing” the interests of a team B to align them with those of team 
A; team A “displacing” team B’s interests at a time in which team B thought their own 
interests were “cut off;” and team A appealing to team B to take a “short detour” in 
achieving team B’s interests, through which these interests would then become 
entangled with the interests of team A. In the playing out of these and other tactics, 
                                                  
57 Throughout the dissertation, whenever I refer to “actor-network theory” or “Latourian 
actor-network theory,” I mean the actor-network theory of Latour’s Science in Action. For more on 
this point and for other literature on actor-network theory, see footnote 53. 
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one team would try to become indispensable to the fact-making, the “obligatory 
passage point.”58  
Because the U.S. team and the Japan team had available to them different 
networks for these “trials of strength,” we would expect that the team with the most 
developed network would generally win the contests. Unlike the explanatory sketch 
that employed the epistemic community approach, initial consensus would not be 
expected even regarding many “core” issues of knowledge. The Japan team would 
dominate the discussions—down to the slightest detail—about the instrument’s 
hardware: since Japan’s contractors were responsible for the actual building of the 
instrument, they could advance technical claims with much longer networks, claims 
that had attached to them laboratory inscriptions. Neither team would abandon their 
interests easily (remember, in Latourian actor-network theory, it is a Hobbesian world). 
The U.S. team would not hesitate to muster whatever leverage they could find in 
debates, including bringing in more rhetorical firepower by escalating issues up the 
chain of command of NASA’s hierarchy, if they thought that NASA might be able to 
exercise more influence with MITI. The U.S. side would dominate the design of the 
ground data and information system from the very beginning and on almost all issues, 
because the networks and centers of calculation of NASA’s systems were far larger 
and more established than MITI’s networks. Metrology would be essential to the 
circulation of data, and standardization battles would be expected, with again, the U.S. 
most likely winning, given its much more pervasive network of standardization and 
calibration in remote sensing, in comparison to Japan’s and especially MITI’s network. 
Neither team would cede authority to the other or embrace any norms, unless the team 
could anticipate that their interests would be advanced as a consequence. Data would 
not be shared if it meant a loss of national, team, or personal control. In sum, with the 
                                                  
58 Latour (1987: 108-120) 
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exception of issues that were tightly confined to instrument hardware, the ASTER 
remote-sensing system would be through and through an imperial extension of U.S. 
hegemony, according to the explanatory sketch of Latourian actor-network theory. 
The explanatory sketches offered by Latourian actor-network theory and by 
the epistemic communities approach are competing interpretations of the creation of a 
specific international political order. Comparing how these interpretations do and do 
not account for the “why” questions of the design of an international remote-sensing 
system contributes differently to the literatures of International Relations and Science 
and Technology Studies. The literature in International Relations generally has not 
investigated the practice of technical activity to answer political questions, even for 
political questions about techno-political systems. To investigate which interpretation 
is better able to account for the “why” questions of the design of an international 
remote-sensing system, the technical discussions, practices, and decisions of the two 
teams need to be examined in detail. Although a line between the “technoscientific” 
and the “political” is drawn by the epistemic communities approach, no such 
distinction is recognized by Latourian actor-network theory, at least not until that line 
is drawn as an outcome of a “trial of strength” through which technoscience and the 
political are “co-produced” in one move.  
In contrast to the literature from the field of International Relations, the 
literature of Science and Technology Studies generally does not have a practice of 
making “alternative accounts” explicit. These two explanatory sketches present 
different accounts of the development of science and technology in the international 
arena and lead us to expect different outcomes from the technical decisions and 
scientific judgments of the U.S. and Japan teams concerning the development of the 
international remote-sensing system. Focusing in on the “why” questions using these 
two explanatory sketches not only can help us better to explore the strengths and 
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weaknesses of each sketch, but keeping in mind two sketches also checks one or the 
other from being the assumed interpretation. Furthermore, the sketches might displace 
implicit, typical narratives—such as that offered earlier about the beginning of 
U.S.-Japan cooperation in basic science—as well as other forms of conventional 
wisdom. This dissertation, however, does not use every decision or negotiation as an 
opportunity to test one explanatory sketch against the other, judging which sketch was 
superior in its capacity to answer the “why” questions. Rather, the dissertation 
develops its own explanatory sketch which, I argue, better answers those “why” 
questions by interpreting how the two teams conducted their joint work, describing in 
particular the socio-political conditions and the evolving form of their technical 
decision making and collective exercise of scientific judgment.59  
 
The Practice of Technoscientific Diplomacy 
  
 This dissertation argues that the intergovernmental collaborative work of the 
U.S. and Japan teams to build an international remote-sensing system can best be 
explained by attending to what I call the “technoscientific diplomacy” that the two 
teams conducted. Here is what I mean by “technoscientific diplomacy.” Following the 
general use of the term “technoscience” by Latour and by other scholars to refer to the 
                                                  
59 Thus, I am in general agreement with Shapin (1995) when he writes in his review of the 
sociology of scientific knowledge: 
 
Latourian social order appears all natural fact and no moral fact. Therefore, the onus on 
those who suspect the adequacy of Hobbesian accounts of order would be to produce a 
post-Mertonian picture of the moral economies of science—the locally distributed 
conceptions of legitimacy, authority, and trust by which scientific knowledge comes to 
be a collective good, the moral-pragmatic preconditions for intersubjectivity, and the 
mundane means by which moral orders of scientific knowledge-making come to be 
distributed around the world (p. 309). 
 
This dissertation takes on an onus that requires that kind of socio-political exploration. 
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activities and tools of scientific and technological development, “technoscientific 
diplomacy” suggests a diplomacy that is not only political, as we would expect from 
the term “diplomacy,” but that is also scientific and technical in its character.60 I use 
the term “technoscientific diplomacy” to describe (and hence interpret) the negotiating 
practices that the U.S. and Japan teams employed in their technical decision making 
and in their exercise of collective scientific judgment.  
In coining (to my knowledge) the term “technoscientific diplomacy,” I am 
arguing that the conceptual vocabulary and explanatory sketch offered by the 
epistemic communities approach and the conceptual vocabulary and explanatory 
sketch offered by Latourian actor-network theory are insufficient to describe the 
negotiating practices of the two teams. Furthermore, while the term “negotiating 
practices” might itself be accurate, it does not characterize these practices beyond the 
word “negotiating.” Because the term “negotiating” is commonly used throughout 
Science and Technology Studies to describe many activities, it has unfortunately lost 
some of its conventional meaning that connotes two or more parties knowingly 
working out the terms of an agreement or settlement (in the sense that not every act of 
communication, discussion, or debate is necessarily a negotiation). The negotiating 
activity that is studied in this dissertation was filled with relations that were explicitly 
international in a way that justifies the use of the term “diplomacy.” For these reasons, 
I use “technoscientific diplomacy” to describe the negotiations of the two teams. 
“Technoscientific diplomacy” highlights three qualities of the negotiating practices of 
                                                  
60 Latour (1987: 29, 174-175). My use of the term “technoscience” and “technoscientific” avoids 
the repeated use of the words “science and technology,” as it did for Latour. I also use the term to 
remind us, as Latour did, that the activities of scientific and technological development are closely 
interrelated in practice. Histories of research and design in areas including aeronautics, 
semiconductor physics, laser engineering, and genomics demonstrate the difficulty of empirically 
distinguishing scientific and technological development (e.g.,Vincenti 1990). When science is 
distinguished from non-science, the boundary is drawn in particular circumstances (Latour 1987 
and Gieryn 1995). Ronald Kline has, for example, documented how engineers and scientists 
created the category of "applied science" for purposes of professionalization (1995). 
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the two teams: team members’ positioning as liminal state actors; the enactment of 
“the state” and of U.S.-Japan relations; and the synthesis of state power and scientific 
knowledge.  
 
Liminal State Actors 
Most of the team members were neither unambiguous state actors nor 
unambiguous non-state actors; to greater and lesser degrees, team members were on 
the threshold of their respective states, working on behalf of their state but carrying 
out work that they in part had proposed to their state. I call these team members 
“liminal state actors.” In some cases, the U.S. and Japan teams included scientists and 
engineers who were civil servants who worked for federal agencies or national labs. 
More often, however, team members were primarily affiliated with, and working for, 
universities, corporate contractors, and themselves (as entrepreneurial private 
contractors). This latter characterization might lead us to call them “non-state actors.” 
Yet, once their proposals for research and technical work were selected for funding by 
their respective governments, should their status in the eyes of an analyst change from 
“non-state actors” to “state actors,” as the common definition of “state actor” would 
suggest? Or should they still be considered “non-state actors?” Moreover, what if, as is 
frequently the case, their salaries and research activities were only partially funded by 
their governments? These questions concerning membership category challenge the 
existence of any bright line around the state in their collaborative activity and argues 
for an interpretive sensibility.  
 Rather than force fitting these individuals into either the “state actor” or 
“non-state actor” membership category when it makes little sense to do so, that is, 
when their position bears little resemblance to others who are grouped into those 
categories (such as military officers in the former and activists in the latter), it is more 
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analytically penetrating to describe how and when these actors were situated, and 
situated themselves, as working on behalf of their states. Thus, I use the term “liminal 
state actors” to provisionally label persons at the threshold of the state, who worked 
between what they and their colleagues saw as positions that were less ambiguously a 
part of either the government bureaucracy or the private sector.61 The degree to which 
these liminal state actors could put on the cloak of the state as a socio-political 
resource or reject their association with the state in any particular instance was a 
question of strategy, pragmatism, context, and personal identity. Yet, on the whole, 
their liminal status and their ability to situate their personal agency in relation to the 
state is part of what characterized their technoscientific diplomacy and their 
development of the ASTER remote-sensing system and its international political 
economy. These liminal state actors asserted and ascribed “the state” and its politics, 
as well as “science” and scientific knowledge claims, in their negotiations with each 
other and in their collaboration more generally.62 
                                                  
61 Evangelista (1989) confronted similar questions with respect to scientists involved in national 
security policymaking: 
 
Models that posit a sharp distinction between state apparatus and society (in order, for 
example, to evaluate state “autonomy”) are not particularly useful for studying security 
policy. How, for example, should one characterize a scientist working for a private 
corporation that depends entirely on Pentagon contracts—as a societal or state actor? . . . 
The issue is perhaps more problematic for the Soviet Union, where one is hard pressed to 
identify any nonstate actors involved in the formulation of security policy. 
 
As explained in note 56, Evangelista (1999) later addressed that last issue with the idea of “tacit 
transnationalism.” 
62 Forman (1973) closely examines the rhetoric and ideology of scientific internationalism in 
Weimar Germany and suggests that: 
 
The scientist’s persona, his image of himself, usually makes him most reluctant to admit 
that he has chosen between his science and his nation. He will often prefer to equate the 
interests of his nation with those of science (and, perhaps, humanity), most easily and 
most often when his nation is both a leading scientific power and a leading military 
power. At the same time, in order to maintain that persona intact, he must take care to 
avoid any direct repudiation of the ideology of scientific internationalism. And those who 
have the most to lose from a cancellation of international competition [in science] and 
recognition [from international science] are likely to take the greatest care (p. 156). 
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Enacting Technoscientific Diplomacy 
  The second quality of the U.S. and Japan teams’ technoscientific diplomacy is 
that they “enacted” their technoscientific diplomacy as a matter of course in their 
negotiations and in their development of the ASTER remote-sensing system. The term 
“enact” has two meanings, “act out” (as in enacting a role in a play) and “establish” 
(as in enacting legislation). My use of the term “enact” in this dissertation generally 
means “act out.” When I am using the term to mean also “establish,” I make that 
additional meaning explicit. The U.S. and Japan teams enacted both the meaning and 
form of their technoscientific diplomacy.  
  They took on the roles and authorities not only of scientists and engineers but 
also those of diplomats conducting international relations. These roles and authorities 
initially were in principle delegated to them to some extent by their state sponsors. Just 
as they (re)articulated the state goals of their states in their use of them, they also as 
mediators between states developed the roles and authorities that their state sponsors 
had assigned to them. Team members, especially key members of each team such as 
the team leaders, often spoke for the “United States” and for “Japan” in their 
collaboration, reasoning through and asserting the goals, interests, and intentions of 
their states and reasoning through and ascribing goals, interests, and intentions to the 
state with which they were collaborating. When they reflected upon their roles in this 
                                                                                                                                               
 
While Forman’s attentiveness here and elsewhere to the tensions between universal ideals and 
human choice in the particular is unsurpassed (here in the instance of scientists trading on the ideal 
of scientific internationalism), my portrayal of scientists and engineers in this dissertation as 
liminal state actors suggests that the concepts and interests of “science” and the “nation” were less 
established at their boundaries than Forman’s firm use of the terms connotes. In effect, while 
liminal state actors asserted and ascribed both “science” and the “nation” in their negotiations, it 
would be too presumptuous to argue with any definitiveness that either “science” or the “nation” 
was betrayed in those negotiations, owing to the changing boundaries of the “nation” and “science” 
and to the agency and authority of these liminal state actors. None of this is to say, however, that 
the rhetoric of scientific internationalism was not on occasion used instrumentally, as Forman 
(1973) explores. 
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intergovernmental collaboration, members of both the U.S. and Japan teams explicitly 
described themselves to me in interviews by using the word “geopolitician” as well as 
“geophysicist.” This dissertation takes those descriptions seriously. When they were 
negotiating scientific and technological issues, they sometimes saw themselves as 
conducting U.S.-Japan relations and as establishing U.S.-Japan relations in the ASTER 
remote-sensing system and in the ASTER system’s international political economy of 
scientific data.63 They did indeed do those things, as this dissertation describes. For 
example, in their techno-political practices, they broke out of state-to-state bilateral 
diplomacy and established a normative transnational authority that they exercised in 
their configuration and governance of the ASTER remote-sensing system and its 
international political economy. 
  
Synthesizing Power and Knowledge 
In their enactment of technoscientific diplomacy, of their respective states, 
and of U.S.-Japan relations, the two teams synthesized power and knowledge, 
particularly state power and scientific knowledge, to develop the ASTER 
remote-sensing system. “Power” and “knowledge” are elevator words that can be 
especially slippery. 64  In this dissertation’s account, “power” simply means the 
                                                  
63 Scott (1998) interprets the (micro-)practices of the state and the (macro-)consequences of those 
practices for development projects. Mitchell (1991), Ferguson and Gupta (2002), and Jasanoff 
(2004) call for examining the practices of the state at its boundaries, such as in international spaces. 
Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger (2002) describe “global microstructures,” but in that article at least, 
they do not study the development of global micro-structures. In the terminology of Knorr-Cetina 
and Bruegger, the ASTER remote-sensing system, with its space-based instrument and its 
trans-Pacific remote-sensing system, might be called a micro global-structure, and this dissertation 
does study its development. 
64 The meaning of “power” is problematized throughout the humanities and social sciences, and 
there is no need to review that expansive literature here (e.g., Lukes 1986). Lynch (1993: 76) 
critiques the contemporary literature in sociology of scientific knowledge, particularly the “strong 
program,” for the breadth of that literature’s use of the term “knowledge” and that use’s lack of 
distinction with “belief” and “opinion.” Jasanoff (2005), for example, explicitly and implicitly uses 
the term “knowledge” to refer to contested as well as uncontested scientific and technical claims 
that are asserted by scientists in scientific publications, by policymakers in administrative 
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capacity to influence. The dissertation usually does not try to describe power itself but 
rather interprets team members’ explicit assertions and ascriptions of power, especially 
state power. In a few places, however, the dissertation does infer team members’ 
assumptions about power in specific contexts, particularly power that arises from an 
asymmetry in interdependencies between states’ technological capacities.65  
Similarly, the dissertation generally describes contested and uncontested 
scientific and technical claims that are explicitly asserted and ascribed by team 
members, rather than making assumptions about “scientific knowledge” and then 
explaining what team members did or did not do because of that assumed 
“knowledge.” I use the term “knowledge-making” to refer to the acceptance and 
rejection of scientific and technical claims and to the creation of scientific data that 
were intended to be taken-for-granted as scientific knowledge. 
By investigating the enactment of technoscientific diplomacy and by tracing 
the intertwining of assertions and ascriptions of both state power and scientific claims, 
the dissertation provides an original and compelling account of how the U.S. and 
Japan teams worked together in an intergovernmental collaboration to build a 
U.S.-Japan remote-sensing system. This account offers a better understanding of the 
“how” of intergovernmental collaboration than either the epistemic community 
approach or Latourian actor-network theory. Because the dissertation examines closely 
the articulation of state goals and the enactment of state power within the context of 
                                                                                                                                               
procedures, by legislators in law, and by activists in public campaigns. Jasanoff (2005) also uses 
the word to encompass scientific and technical understandings held by publics. While that breadth 
in the use of the term can be justified in an interpretative exploration, because the empirical scope 
of my investigation is not as ambitious as, for example, Jasanoff (2005), this dissertation in its 
empirical chapters generally tries to be more specific. Literature in the field of International 
Relations has distinguished among individual beliefs (e.g., Goldstein and Keohane 1993), 
consensual, intersubjective belief (e.g., Haas 1992), and intersubjective knowledge (e.g., Adler 
2005a). Katzenstein et al. (1998) point to explorations of “common knowledge” as a site for 
productive exchange between rationalist and constructivist traditions in International Relations.    
65 Keohane and Nye (1977) is a seminal work for this understanding of power. 
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knowledge-making and technology-building, it is not required to stipulate—like the 
epistemic communities approach does—shared “principled” and “causal” beliefs 
among epistemic communities in order to understand how epistemic communities do 
and do not help effect international coordination. While investigating technoscientific 
diplomacy is more demanding and less straightforward in terms of the empirical 
research and description that is required, to justify the degree of solidarity and 
intersubjectivity assumed in the epistemic communities approach would also require 
extensive research and description for it to be compelling to audiences who are aware 
of the possibilities for contention in scientific and technological development.  
Describing the synthesis of power and knowledge as technoscientific 
diplomacy also fills some gaps in the literature of Science and Technology Studies. It 
explores state goals, the state, and international politics as socio-political resources 
that are used in knowledge-making and technology-building in the practice of 
intergovernmental collaboration without being narrowly realist about state goals, the 
state, state power, or the creation of knowledge. This exploration, in turn, opens up the 
possibility of connecting power exercised by “the state” in knowledge-making, which 
is a well-explored phenomenon in Science and Technology Studies, to power 
exercised by “other” states through international politics, which is a phenomenon that 
has only recently come to be investigated in the Science and Technology Studies 
literature. None of these themes have been explored to date by the “dramaturgical” or 
“performance” literature in Science and Technology Studies, which has loosely 
informed my account of the enactment of technoscientific diplomacy.66 In addition, 
                                                  
66 Hilgartner (2000) examined the production of scientific credibility at the U.S. National 
Academy of Sciences through a well-developed dramaturgical framework that draws on the 
seminal work of Goffman (e.g., 1959, 1974). The metaphors of drama and performance are not as 
well-developed in my account of the enactment of technoscientific diplomacy as they are, for 
example, in Hilgartner (2000). Yet, because my account integrates other accounts from interviews 
and from the “audience” and because my account does not make assumptions about the “public 
identity” of characters, its eclecticism is better able to portray the relational dynamics of 
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unlike Latourian actor-network theory, examining the articulation and the intertwining 
of both state power and scientific claims as technoscientific diplomacy provides 
interpretative space to develop the dynamics of norms in international politics and 
knowledge-making without cynically assuming those norms to be only instrumental 
rhetoric.67 In technoscientific diplomacy, rhetoric becomes constitutive of politics, 
especially through its role in persuasion, rather than only a tool of politics.  
 By offering a better account of the “how” than other well-known, potential 
approaches for examining intergovernmental collaboration in science and technology, 
this dissertation argues that it can develop an explanatory sketch for the two teams’ 
technoscientific diplomacy which better explains the “why” questions that are often 
about “who got what” issues. I illustrate the value-added of this explanatory sketch by 
answering “why” questions throughout the empirical chapters of the dissertation. In 
that way, the dissertation incorporates both social science problem-solving (i.e., 
puzzle-solving) and the emphasis in Science and Technology Studies on understanding 
and describing knowledge-making and technology-building as those activities are 
conducted “in the field” (for this dissertation, the “field” is in part an international 
                                                                                                                                               
intergovernmental collaboration, including the enactment of power. Other work in Science and 
Technology Studies which stress the performative aspects of producing scientific and technical 
knowledge include Pickering (1995), Law and Singleton (2000), Law (2002), Mol (2002), and 
MacKenzie (2003). Butler (1990) is canonical to the performance literature across the humanities 
and social sciences. Because I do not claim to be contributing to theories of dramaturgy and 
performativity, I do not review that literature in detail in the text. 
67 The literature in Science and Technology Studies has long emphasized normative assertions as 
strategic posturing (e.g., Gilbert and Mulkay (1984), Collins (1992 [1985]). In contrast, the 
literature on norms in International Relations, after having illustrated the significance of “idealist” 
norms in international relations, has recently worked to show how norms can be “bad” as well as 
“good,” strategic as well as principled. For instance, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) review 
theories about norms and norm construction in the International Relations literature. They explore 
how norm construction can be strategic as well as institutional or principled, and they highlight 
how theories of norms and norm construction do not need to side completely with either 
“rationalists” or “constructivists.” Chapter six in Katzenstein (1996) explicates contrasting norms 
in U.S.-Japan relations.  
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field).68 While the dissertation’s account requires the reader to engage with the 
technical as well as the political details of the U.S. and Japan teams’ intergovernmental 
collaboration, ultimately I hope readers will find this account of technoscientific 
diplomacy to be compelling because through the account readers are able to engage 
with the two teams’ mundane work and the technical and political challenges that they 
faced and overcame.69   
 
Outline of the Dissertation 
 
 The chapters ahead are as follows. Chapter two employs a comparative 
analysis of U.S.–Japan relations in defense and space to argue that an interpretative 
explanation of technoscience in international politics is needed. Science and 
technology—and scientific and technological collaboration—have been central to 
U.S.–Japan relations since the end of World War II. Yet, existing explanatory 
approaches in the fields of Science and Technology Studies and International Relations 
are unable to explain why U.S. and Japan scientists, engineers, and bureaucrats have 
negotiated crucial aspects of U.S.–Japan relations—such as reciprocity in knowledge 
sharing, equity in financial arrangements, and techno-political interdependencies—in 
                                                  
68 Katzenstein presented an argument for a problem-solving focus in social science, even—and 
perhaps especially—if it involved eclectically hybridizing various theoretical approaches, in Kohli 
et al. (1995: 10) as well as with Sil in Katzenstein and Sil (2004). Dear (2001: 130) characterized 
science studies as being driven by describing “science ‘in the field,’ as it were,” what he called 
“epistemography.” Lynch (1993: 299-308) outlined a program for research in Science and 
Technology Studies for investigating “epistopics”—“discursive themes that so often come up in 
discussions of scientific and practical reasoning: observation, description, replication, 
measurement, rationality, representation, and explanation” (p. 299). While “epistopics” pervade 
this dissertation, the dissertation neither investigates them head-on nor fully adopts Lynch’s 
admittedly appealing “post-analytic” orientation, owing to the dissertation’s central burden of 
accounting for the development of the ASTER U.S.-Japan remote-sensing system. 
69 Readers can then understand acts of scientific and technological development. Lynch (1993: 
287-299) discusses the value of demonstrating the transformation that is at the core of 
(re)discovery. Livingston’s studies of geometrical proofs are exemplars (1999, 2006).   
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the way that they have. Explanations that are highly-structured are especially 
insufficient.  
 Drawing upon ethnographic observation, numerous interviews, and extensive 
collection of unpublished and unarchived documents (including letters, faxes, and 
e-mails), and using the Japanese language as well as English, chapters three through 
six empirically investigate the U.S.-Japan collaboration that developed and operated 
the ASTER space-based remote-sensing instrument, its ground data and information 
system, and its international political economy of scientific data. Chapter three 
describes in detail how the practices of the two geologic remote-sensing communities 
in the United States and Japan differed from each other. They were different 
communities of practice. The key participants in the U.S.-Japan collaboration had 
conducted their scientific research and engineering within their respective 
communities of practice for at least several years before their collaboration, in some 
cases for decades before. Chapter three also contextualizes the development of 
geologic remote-sensing instrumentation in the 1980s, especially as that development 
related to each state’s goals. 
Chapter four describes the emergence of U.S.-Japan bilateral diplomacy and 
how NASA and MITI positioned members of the U.S. and Japan teams as liminal state 
actors within that diplomacy. In addition, the chapter analyzes how—as liminal state 
actors—members of the U.S. and Japan teams tried, before the formal establishment of 
their collaboration, to negotiate through bilateral diplomacy a remote-sensing 
instrument that they could share separately as a politically-neutral U.S.-Japan 
“boundary object.” This analysis accounts in particular for the design specifications of 
an instrument sensor in terms of technoscientific diplomacy, and it highlights how the 
explanatory sketches of epistemic communities and Latourian actor-network theory 
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are inadequate. While this effort to share separately proved unsuccessful, the two 
teams nevertheless pushed forward in their collaboration.  
Chapter five then compares two negotiations over ASTER’s design, both of 
which were conducted in the same time period. Bringing together the concern in 
Science and Technology Studies for describing ways of knowing, and a social science 
emphasis on puzzle-solving, chapter five explains why, in one negotiation, the teams 
broke out of their bilateral diplomacy and subsequently began to forge a new 
international techno-political order and yet why, in another negotiation, they did not do 
so, even though the latter negotiation—like the former—was conducted after the 
formal establishment of the institutional workings of the ASTER collaboration.  
Chapter six describes how the U.S. and Japan scientists’ and engineers’ 
technoscientific diplomacy constructed an international techno-political order, and 
more specifically an international political economy, in and around the ASTER ground 
data and information system. The chapter elucidates the workings of this international 
order by comparatively examining the politics of how different calculative routines, 
algorithms, and procedures became designed and embedded in the data and 
information system and were maintained as an international order. Chapter six also 
illustrates the use of normative notions of U.S.-Japan relations and how common 
political and normative commitments that were forged through the collaborative 
process held sway when managing the international political economy of the ASTER 
system, including its pricing arrangements. The ASTER remote-sensing system itself 
gradually became a stable political resource for the two teams, to an extent that 
fostered transnational authority and community. The concluding chapter articulates 
this dissertation’s explanatory sketch of technoscientific diplomacy and suggests other 
activities that are between states and transnational communities which might be 
illuminated by this sketch’s rethinking of science, technology, and international affairs. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS 
 
Scholars and policymakers in the United States and in Japan have long 
recognized science and technology as an important issue in U.S.-Japan relations.1 
Technoscience is not just an important issue, however. It is a fundamental thread that 
has tied together the United States and Japan since World War II. Scientists, engineers, 
and policymakers have practiced and materialized U.S.-Japan relations through 
technoscience and have thus made U.S.-Japan relations a reality through technoscience. 
Throughout the last sixty years, conflict, cooperation, and competition between the 
United States and Japan in technoscientific enterprises have shaped what each state has 
wanted to achieve—politically, economically, and morally, as well as scientifically and 
technologically—in both the domestic and international arenas. The centrality of 
science and technology for these two states and for their bilateral relationship is not 
without cause. Perhaps more than in any other bilateral relationship, the governments of 
the United States and Japan have, as a matter of policy and practice, used technoscience 
to underpin and promote their inter-state relationship, even if the two governments have 
periodically contested since the end of World War II the qualities desired for that 
bilateral relationship. 
This chapter argues for the need of an interpretative explanation of science and 
technology in international affairs by describing how the U.S. and Japan governments 
have used technoscience to build different U.S.-Japan relationships. Although it is 
common to talk about “the” U.S.-Japan relationship, the U.S.-Japan relationship has not 
                                                 
1 For general discussions of science and technology in the U.S.-Japan relationship, see Bloom (1984), 
National Research Council (1997), Matsumura (1999), Chinworth (1999), and Vogel and Zysman 
(2002). 
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been monolithic.2 During the same period of time, the governments of the United States 
and Japan have realized different versions of “the” U.S.-Japan relationship. These 
versions have neither been harmonized nor unified under “top down” policies. This 
chapter substantiates the disunity of the U.S.-Japan relationship post-1980 and the 
centrality of technoscience within that disunity by analyzing policies and technologies 
of U.S.-Japan collaborations in defense and space and by illustrating ways in which 
collaborations in defense and in space have differently materialized, operationalized, 
and practiced the U.S.-Japan relationship. I argue that the existence of different versions 
of U.S.-Japan relations, specifically in defense and in space, suggests that scholars need 
to re-think how to account for the politics of U.S.-Japan intergovernmental 
collaboration in technoscience. 
 
The Centrality of Technoscience in U.S.-Japan Relations 
 
The U.S.-Japan relationship was indelibly marked by the United States’ atomic 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.3 The bombings, or more accurately, reports of 
the bombings, testified to the potential power of science and technology to governments 
around the world, foremost among them the Government of Japan.4 In the shadow of the 
bombings, Japanese elites attributed their defeat not to the United States’ military or 
                                                 
2 For instance, Katzenstein (1996) has persuasively argued that the Japanese state has demonstrated 
policy “flexibility” in its military relations with the United States and “rigidity” in its economic 
relations with the United States (e.g., p. 15). I have argued in Plafcan (1999) that some technological 
issues have problematized policymaking boundaries between economic and military security. The 
governments of the United States and Japan have had great difficulty at times in distinguishing 
between economic and military security in technology policy. Stone (1999) has made a similar point 
regarding the boundary between trade and security in the U.S.-Japan relationship.  
3 The edited volume Hein and Seldon (1997) includes studies from a variety of perspectives which 
address this point. See also Hogan (1996). 
4 How and what the citizens of the United States and Japan learned about the atomic bombings is far 
from straightforward, especially given prolonged censorship and early “official” histories in both the 
United States and Japan. See Dower (1996b), Hogan (1996), and in particular within the latter 
volume, Dower (1996a). 
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industrial might, and not to the United States’ strategy or determination, but to their 
enemy’s science. Throughout Japan and to overseas troops, Emperor Hirohito broadcast 
via radio on August 15, 1945 that Japan was compelled to surrender under the threat of 
a “new and most cruel bomb.”5 A speech by Prime Minister Suzuki Kantarō followed 
Hirohito’s address, and in it Suzuki urged the Japanese people to “strive for the progress 
of science and technology, which were our greatest deficiency in this war.”6 
Turning to science and technology for strength was certainly not new for 
Japan.7 Nevertheless, during the chaotic and desperate times of the United States’ 
seven-year occupation of Japan, science and technology in Japan took on additional 
meanings, meanings that had inflections of political and moral renewal. In the early 
years of the occupation, prominent speeches and government reports “embraced defeat” 
and pronounced that prerequisites for democratization and a free-thinking citizenry 
were technological advancement and a scientific spirit among the populous. 8 In the 
name of these ideals, Japan embarked on another era of what the Government of Japan 
called “building a nation through science and technology” (kagaku gijutsu rikkoku).9  
And over the next few decades, Japan indeed rebuilt itself spectacularly.10 
                                                 
5 Butow (1954: 247-248). This taped radio address was the first radio address of Emperor Hirohito, 
and as such it was the first time that the people of Japan heard his voice. The address had been taped 
the previous day. 
6 Nihon kagakushi gakkai (1964: 44). I originally learned of this source from Morris-Suzuki (1994:  
161), and I have used her translation. The speech was reported in Asahi Shimbun, 17 August 1945. 
7 Samuels (1994). 
8 While idealistic, these invocations of science and technology were also in some ways pragmatic 
and self-serving, implicitly and often explicitly blaming the war on “irrationality” and providing 
justification for society-wide “rationalization.” See especially Dower (1999: 494-496) and the Asahi 
Shimbun, 17-20 August 1945. For examples of government commissions on such topics as economic 
reconstruction and education which promoted science and democracy as mutually interdependent, 
see Morris-Suzuki (1994: 161-164) and Hata (2001: 206-209). For a similar theme in American 
social and political thought about science, see Merton (1973[1942]) and Ezrahi (1990). The quote is 
adapted from Dower’s title (1999). 
9 For more on kagaku gijutsu rikkoku, see Samuels (1994) and Nakayama (1995). 
10 Johnson (1982) and chapter seven of Morris-Suzuki (1994). 
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Japan did so with the United States close by and with the United States’ 
technoscience readily available for use. The two states’ most intimate of times was, 
unsurprisingly, the occupation. With respect to science and technology, the boundary 
between “domestic policy” and “foreign policy” was porous; the two states were 
entangled in each other’s domestic policies, even if far from equally so. During the 
occupation, the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers 
(SCAP) was the ultimate, but indirect, governing authority. SCAP supported scientists 
and engineers in Japan who would fashion a Japanese technoscientific infrastructure 
that would ameliorate the anxieties of U.S. policymakers. These anxieties were about 
the United States’ national security and about the proper relationship between science 
and politics; they derived from circumstances within the United States as well as from 
those within and surrounding Japan. When New Dealers held key positions in the 
sections of SCAP during the first few years of the occupation, they worked to achieve 
what they could not in the United States: first, a complete rejection of the “garrison 
state,” a state in which the military dominated politics through its appropriation of 
science and technology, and second, the establishment of governance structures for 
science and technology that fostered democracy and economic revitalization.11 In these 
years, the projects of SCAP’s “Economic and Scientific Section”—its name betrays its 
New Deal thrust—were eagerly supported by most scientists and engineers in Japan, 
above all by members of the thriving Marxist associations of scientists and engineers.12 
But as the Cold War intensified in 1948, and with the arrival of the 
fiscally-conservative Detroit-banker Joseph Dodge as the finance advisor to SCAP in 
                                                 
11 With regard to the circumstances in the United States, here I am thinking in particular of the plight 
of Senator Harley Kilgore’s proposal for a National Science Foundation vis-à-vis the National 
Research Foundation which was later proposed by Vannevar Bush (1960 [1945]). See Kevles (1977) 
and Dennis (2004: 228). 
12 Nakayama (2001a: 41); Dees (1997), especially chapter eight; and Yoshikawa and Kauffman 
(1994). 
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early 1949, SCAP proceeded to quickly “reverse course” away from more 
comprehensive reform and moved toward conservative policies and practices. 13 
Balanced budgets and increases in industrial production became immediate goals. The 
Scientific and Technical Division of SCAP was reorganized to assist more with the 
development of industry than with academic research.14 The United States did not want 
Japan to be dependent upon the United States’ largesse, and the United States needed 
Japan in the Cold War; more specifically, the United States needed Japan’s geography, 
potential industrial capacity, and political support. The U.S. Government acquired these 
resources and solidified its long-term inter-state relationship with Japan through 
scientific and technological ties. Since the Government of Japan could also put this 
science and technology to other uses, to develop Japan’s economy and to legitimize its 
rule, the Government of Japan gladly accommodated.15 
During the Korean War, through technical assistance and technology licensing, 
Japan arguably became the preeminent forward-deployed arsenal of the United States. 
For the four years after the war's onset in June 1950, the United States infused about 
$2.4 billion into Japan's economy through special procurement (or roughly, $19 billion 
in 2005 dollars).16 Between 1951 and 1953, special procurement for the war amounted 
to 60% of Japan’s exports.17  The United States provided military, economic, and 
technical aid to Japan under the United States’ 1951 Mutual Security Act and the 
U.S.-Japan 1954 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. In particular, the United States 
                                                 
13  This summary presents the “reverse course” through the lens of U.S.-Japan science and 
technology relations, but changes in SCAP’s policies were felt throughout Japan’s politics and 
society. See Gordon (1993), Schaller (1997), Dower (1999), Forsberg (2000), and Gordon (2003: 
234-240). 
14 Dees (1997: 223). Academic organizations that SCAP’s Scientific and Technical Division helped 
to promote, such as the Science Council of Japan, did continue on, but after the “reverse course” 
more technocratic organizations came to dominate Japan’s science and technology policy. See 
Nakayama (2001b). 
15 Green (1995: 26). 
16 Johnson (1982: 228). 
17 Gordon (2003: 241). 
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encouraged Japan’s companies to take advantage of technical assistance and buy 
technology licenses from U.S. firms in order to increase Japan’s industrial capacity. 
Soon, hundreds of Japan’s firms were manufacturing war materiel, including ordinance 
and vehicles, and they were also repairing aircraft and ships.18 From 1950 to 1955, 
Japan’s total industrial production almost doubled.19 In the words of historian Laura 
Hein, "the Korean War, or more accurately, American use of the war, had an enormous 
impact on the Japanese economy in practical terms. It is hard to overestimate the 
importance of that timely influx of money, technology, and willing customers for 
Japanese industry.” 20  Through U.S. economic and technical assistance, the war 
“permanently linked Japanese economic development to United States military priories 
in Asia.”21 This connection extended through the Vietnam War as well. 
From the signing of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement in 1954 to the 
mid 1970s, the U.S.-Japan technoscientific relationship can be characterized in broad 
terms by four inter-state technoscientific practices and two political understandings that 
helped to sustain those practices. First, Japan willingly joined numerous 
intergovernmental science collaborations with the United States government (these 
collaborations also involved academics, often working as government advisors or 
consultants). Yet until the 1980s, only the United States crafted the initial offers to 
collaborate and the initial scope of collaboration.22 Second, through the practice of 
licensing and coproduction administered by the U.S. Department of Defense's Defense 
Security Assistance Agency, the United States essentially paid U.S. contractors to 
develop the technological capability and industrial capacity of Japan's major 
                                                 
18 Samuels (1994: 132-153). 
19 Johnson (1982: 4-5). 
20 Hein (1990: 217). I became aware of this statement from Samuels (1994: 133), who also quotes 
Hein. 
21 Hein (1990: 217). 
22 Bloom (1984: 108) and Uyehara (2000: 25). 
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corporations and their subcontractors.23 A 1970 study of U.S. assistance to Japan's 
aerospace industry in the 1950s and 1960s notes that: 
 
In general [through coproduction], the Japanese received all product designs and 
specifications and all process specifications. In particular, they had the benefit in 
every case either of the tooling or of the tool design information used by the 
developer in his production activities. They also received a great deal of 
planning information. And since important data exist in the notes and black 
books of foremen and other production line personnel, these too were collected 
and made a part of the data package.24 
 
One manager summed it up: "We were paid to put them in business, and we gave them 
everything we had." 25  Third, as Richard Samuels has compellingly argued, the 
Government of Japan and its contractors indigenized, diffused, and nurtured this 
technology throughout their industrial base with the United States’ encouragement.26 
Fourth, industry-to-industry collaboration was integral to sustaining this patron-client 
relationship between the United States and Japan, and as paid agents of the state, 
industries profited from it.27 
These inter-state practices did not exist in a political vacuum. The U.S. 
Government expected the Government of Japan to follow its lead in the Cold War in 
East Asia, and it regarded Japan's economic and military development as necessary to 
this endeavor. Japan viewed the “bilateral partnership” (during this time the term 
“alliance” was controversial in Japan) as a means to economic and technological growth, 
as well as a means to domestic stability and military security.28 
                                                 
23 Licensing and coproduction are different. Licensing refers to a commercial agreement to rent or 
purchase intellectual property which is approved by a government export license. Coproduction is a 
collaborative activity that is authorized and supported by a government-to-government 
memorandum of understanding, and this agreement often includes specific licenses, among other 
arrangements. 
24 Hall and Johnson (1970: 317). 
25 Ibid. 
26 Samuels (1994: 42-56). 
27 Chinworth (1992). 
28 I am referring here to what Pyle calls the “Yoshida doctrine” (Pyle 1996). 
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By the mid 1980s, however, the United States’ and Japan’s relationship in 
science and technology was unraveling, and this unraveling was jeopardizing 
U.S.-Japan relations in general. Fueled in part by a series of acrimonious trade conflicts 
of increasing intensity,29 governments, firms, and citizenry of both the United States 
and Japan were thoroughly interrogating the political assumptions and the inter-state 
technoscientific practices that undergirded the U.S.-Japan alliance. As a consequence of 
being confronted with Japan’s spectacular economic growth and technological 
accomplishment as evidenced in reports and by commercial products,30 the United 
States government questioned what it had previously presumed to be the United States’ 
dominance in science and technology.31 For the United States, defense technology 
assistance to Japan and intergovernmental technoscience collaborations could no longer 
be justified primarily as means for maintaining U.S.-Japan relations, despite the Reagan 
administration’s defense build-up and its “new Cold War” with the Soviet Union.32 In 
the United States—but also in Japan, even if to a lesser extent—science and technology 
policy and industrial policy were thrown much further into the foreground of national 
                                                 
29 By 1985, trade conflicts had already arisen over agricultural products, steel, automobiles, machine 
tools, and consumer electronics, among other goods. Their acrimonious character was foreshadowed 
by the “Textile Wrangle” of 1969-1971. See Buckley (1992: 122-130) and Destler, Fukui, and Sato 
(1979). Numerous and more intense trade disputes were yet to come in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. Prestowitz (1989) presents a forceful account of these times. 
30 Perhaps the most prominent public testimonial from an academic of Japan’s success was Vogel 
(1979). Impressive products that testified to Japan’s technological prowess by the mid 1980s 
included photographic equipment, audio and television equipment (e.g., VCRs), and 
microelectronics (e.g., DRAMS). 
31 In the U.S. Government, this questioning had started in the late 1970s in the context of U.S.-Japan 
“burden sharing” in defense technology. But for the United States government, these questions did 
not transform into full-blown anxieties until the late 1980s with the controversy over the FS-X 
fighter. See Rubinstein (1987) and Lorell (1996). Lorell (1996) is an excellent and comprehensive 
study of the history of the U.S.-Japan FS-X fighter collaboration from the perspective of policy 
analysis. 
32  For a general overview of the United States’ concerns during this time regarding defense 
technological assistance, see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (1990). Regarding 
U.S.-Japan international collaboration in technoscience during this time, see Bloom (1984) and NRC 
(1991). 
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politics and foreign policy, especially in relations between the two states.33 The decade 
beginning in the early 1980s came to be characterized by what was then called 
“techno-nationalism” 34 : technoscience, particularly “high-technology” (as the 
“advanced” technology of times was called) became a critical measuring stick in 
U.S.-Japan competition, and—in an explicit bow to mercantilism by the United 
States—even the United States’ technoscience outside of the military sphere became 
something that needed to be cautiously guided through industrial policies and held on to 
with managed trade policies.35 High technology became high politics. 
 
                                                 
33 See, for example, Zysman and Tyson (1983), Johnson (1984), Krugman (1986), Ergas (1987), and 
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (1991). 
34 Many commentators in the United States and some also in Japan have used the term 
“techno-nationalism” to describe this era of U.S.-Japan relations (for the case of Japan, I am 
referring to the term “techno-nationalism” as it is written in katakana, a writing system that is a part 
of the Japanese language and is frequently used for phonetically importing terms from foreign 
languages. Here, I am not referring to gijutsu rikkoku. See note 9). The term “techno-nationalism” 
has been used in different ways. For example, Robert Reich—who would later become Secretary of 
Labor in the first Clinton administration—used the term in a well-known article in The Atlantic 
Monthly (1987). That article is sometimes said to have coined the term. Richard Samuels used the 
term much differently in a prominent academic study (1994). Samuels used “techno-nationalism” to 
describe a central ideology in Japan which gives primacy to technological development as an end to 
itself (thus, he aligned “techno-nationalism” with gijutsu rikkoku). Samuels regarded 
techno-nationalism as a successful strategy for Japan and as a strategy from which the United States 
could learn. For Reich, unlike for Samuels, techno-nationalism was a distortion. In Reich’s view, 
states can not hold on to technology in what he regarded as a tightly interdependent world, nor do 
states leave political and social fingerprints on technology when they develop it: "The notion of 
'American' technology has become a meaningless concept" (Reich 1987: 64). Techno-nationalism 
"misconstrues the problem and thus advances the wrong solutions," and it interferes with 
recognizing what Reich called “techno-globalism” (63). For more about techno-nationalism in 
U.S.-Japan relations, see Moritani (1981), Johnstone (1988), Tyson (1992), Ostry (1995), Simon 
(1997), and Yamada (2001). 
35 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (1991); Committee on Science, Engineering, 
and Public Policy (1992); Harris and Moore (1992). In the U.S., the “managed trade” rhetoric and 
agenda moved most prominently into the center stage of policymaking with President Clinton’s 
Democratic administration in 1993, but academic and policy debate about “managed trade” and 
“strategic trade” was very prominent in the 1980s as well, fueled by U.S.-Japan trade disputes in the 
1970s and 1980s (see, e.g., Krugman 1986). In fact, “managed trade” policies were first pressed and 
implemented by the Reagan administration, most famously (or most notoriously) in the 1986 
U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Agreement, in which Japan agreed to limit the number of DRAM 
semiconductor chips it exported to the United States and agreed to try to ensure U.S. semiconductor 
manufacturers a certain share of the semiconductor market in Japan. For one analysis of that 
managed trade agreement, see Tyson (1992). 
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The Building of Two U.S.-Japan Relationships 
 
The United States’ and Japan’s techno-nationalism and each government’s 
questioning of its science and technology relationship with the other were largely 
worked out and given substance through specific contestations over technoscientific 
enterprises and collaborations. That is, while the above-mentioned political 
assumptions and inter-state technoscientific practices from the 1950s through the 1970s 
were, by the late 1980s, generally open for questioning in most of the United States’ and 
Japan’s bureaucracies and legislatures, how these questions were framed, what their 
stakes were, and how resolutions were negotiated were contingent upon the 
circumstances of particular technoscientific enterprises and intergovernmental 
collaborations. As will be illustrated below, these circumstances included the political 
saliency of the technoscience for various governmental institutions, 36 the goals of the 
institutions promoting a given enterprise or collaboration, the technologies and 
technoscientific practices involved in the enterprise, and the previous experiences of the 
                                                 
36 Tables in government reports that portrayed U.S. and Japan capabilities in “high-technology” and 
in “critical technologies” as either leading or lagging the other were straightforward rhetorical 
devices that cast a competitive, relative-gains edge to science and technology policies. During this 
time, both the governments of the United States and Japan widely circulated these tables to inform 
policy. For tables in the U.S. policy process, see for instance the multiple sets of critical technology 
reports, including the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Emerging Technologies series (e.g., 1987), 
the U.S. Department of Defense’s Critical Technologies Plan series (e.g., 1989), and, in the 
Executive Branch, the Office of Science and Technology Policy’s National Critical Technologies 
Report series (e.g., National Critical Technologies Panel 1991), all of which were commissioned by 
the U.S. Congress, and all of which listed different technologies as “critical.” Yet, what counted as 
“critical” depended upon the government entity that authored the list as well as the intended 
audience. For tables produced by the Government of Japan, see the Science and Technology 
Agency’s white paper series (e.g., kagaku gijutsu chō 1987). Technologies usually became “critical” 
(or not) and “lagging” (or leading) on the basis of results of surveys of specific business or technical 
communities. These surveys represented judgments that were informed by a wide variety of factors 
and usually did not include direct comparisons of technologies at the lab bench. Even for the cases in 
which formal technology assessment teams were organized for the United States (e.g., to evaluate 
Japan’s gallium arsenide microwave integrated circuits), it is likely that assessors were only privy to 
glimpses of technologies. See, for example, Defense Science Board (1984) and the account of Lorell 
(1996: 44). 
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institutions with the enterprise (i.e., the enterprise’s “legacy”). There was no high-level, 
overarching, and unifying policy framework for all U.S.-Japan intergovernmental 
collaboration in science and technology. Conventional explanations of science and 
technology in international affairs—such as the sharing of science and technology 
according to balance-of-power alliance politics (e.g., Green 1995; Synder 1997), 
economic competition in science and technology according to industrial sectors (e.g., 
Destler, Fukui, and Sato 1979), the expansion of science and technology as a Hobbesian 
imperial enterprise (e.g., Latour 1987), and epistemic communities as sources of policy 
coordination (e.g., Haas 1992)—do not account for the policymaking, policies, and 
practices of U.S.-Japan technoscientific relations. For example, although state defense 
and space bureaucracies are often supported by overlapping industrial sectors that 
develop broadly similar aerospace, electronic, and communications systems, as has 
been the case both for the United States and for Japan, U.S.-Japan technoscientific 
collaborations in defense and in space have differed markedly in their history 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s.37 During the same period of time, between the same 
two states, and supported by significantly overlapping industrial sectors, 
intergovernmental technoscientific collaborations realized U.S.-Japan relations 
differently. Collaborations in defense and space had different ways of negotiating: 1) 
common concerns about U.S.-Japan reciprocity in the sharing of knowledge and 
know-how, 2) the distribution of the project’s financial costs and benefits between the 
governments of the United States and Japan, and 3) U.S.-Japan interdependency in 
political and technological arrangements (see table 2.1 below). The next two 
sub-sections substantiate these differences, presenting first an analysis of U.S.-Japan 
                                                 
37 The industrial sectors of space and defense are similar and significantly overlapping in contrast to 
their lack of similarities and ties with, for example, the consumer electronics industry or the 
pharmaceutical industry (Bromberg 1999; Reppy 2000). For Japan’s heavy industry firms, however, 
space and defense business has been a much smaller percentage of those firms’ overall business than 
it has been for the less diversified defense and space firms in the United States (Samuels 1994). 
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technoscientific collaboration in defense and then an analysis of U.S.-Japan 
technoscientific collaboration in space. 
 
Table 2.1: Dimensions for Comparing Collaborative Practices 
 
1. U.S.-Japan reciprocity in knowledge and know-how 
2. Distribution of financial costs and benefits 
3. Techno-political interdependency 
 
U.S.-Japan Collaboration in Defense:  
Economically Explicit, Component-by-Component Negotiations 
 
From about 1980 until 2000, U.S.-Japan collaborations in defense technology 
were plagued with disagreements over reciprocity and how to judge it. For defense 
collaborations, reciprocity was for the most part focused on “critical” technologies, was 
conceptualized as “technology flowback,” and was largely adjudicated on a 
case-by-case basis, rather than settled by policy memoranda written by each state’s 
foreign affairs or defense bureaucracies. In 1979, then U.S. Under Secretary of Defense 
for Research and Engineering, William Perry, began to implement recommendations 
from the Department of Defense’s first report on "military critical technologies."38 The 
report called for the promotion of 15 critical technologies, and in many of those 
technologies, Japan was perceived to be a rival. In the face of what the Government of 
the United States considered to be a history of a one-way flow of technology from the 
                                                 
38 This report was issued by the Department of Defense's advisory body, the Defense Science Board. 
See Lorell (1996: 14). While the discussion here on U.S.-Japan defense collaboration is informed by 
many other studies, such as Chinworth (1992), Noble (1992), Green (1995), Katzenstein (1996), and 
Matsumura (1999), many of the specific factual details here are drawn from Lorell (1996). 
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United States to Japan, the U.S. Government started to judge "reciprocity" in the 
alliance in terms of "technology flowback."39 In order to facilitate flowback in defense 
technological collaboration and the exchange of technology and ideas related to defense 
research and development, the U.S. Department of Defense and the Japan Defense 
Agency established the Systems and Technology Forum in 1980. But that forum was 
soon crippled: Japan expanded its prohibition on the export of defense technology to 
include so-called "dual-use” technology in addition to weapons and equipment. The 
United States and Japan then wrestled with issues of categorization and debated over 
what would count as “dual-use” and “defense” technology.40 
Despite these setbacks for managing U.S.-Japan technology exchange, 
“technology flowback” became only further entrenched as a U.S. Government standard 
for reciprocity in U.S.-Japan relations. In 1982, the U.S. Congress inquired into the 
details of U.S.-Japan technology issues, particularly reciprocity. Its General Accounting 
Office issued a widely-read (and widely cited) report that drew attention to what it 
called a “one-way street” of technology transfer and to the commercial implications for 
the Japan’s aerospace industry of the technology transferred in the United States’ F-15 
fighter co-production program with Japan. 41  The Department of Defense also 
commissioned a study in 1983 on defense-related technology collaboration. That study 
found that the “prerequisite for continued transfer of U.S. advanced defense 
                                                 
39  Use of the terms "reciprocity" and "technology flowback" was often politically-charged, 
value-laden, and contentious. How these concepts were defined and measured was quite contingent 
on the circumstances of their use. As far as this author is aware, no single metric was ever adopted to 
substantiate when “reciprocity” and “technology flowback” were achieved. For prominent and 
public charges of a one-way flow in technology, see U.S. General Accounting Office (1982). 
40 Lorell (1996: 9-31). The Japan Defense Agency and its contractors also lost interest in the Systems 
and Technology Forum as a mode of exchange because the U.S. Department of Defense was 
persistent in its refusal to license sensitive technologies to firms in Japan for Japan’s co-production 
of the United States’ F-15 fighter aircraft. See Green (1990: 40-41) and Lorell (1996: 78). 
41 U.S. General Accounting Office (1982: ii). 
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technologies [to Japan] will generally be reciprocal transfer of Japan’s dual-use and 
military technologies.”42   
Only after high-level consultations were conducted under the pressure of 
President Reagan’s impending state visit to Japan did the Japan Defense Agency adjust 
in 1983 its stance with regard to technology transfer to the United States. Japan 
exempted the United States from its arms export ban in an Exchange of Notes on the 
Transfer of Japanese Military Technology, noting that Japan "welcomes the transfer to 
the United States of America defense-related technologies." The Exchange of Notes 
established the Joint Military Technology Commission composed of government 
representatives to facilitate paperwork for technology transfer (representatives were 
from Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the Japan Defense Agency, 
the U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Office, etc.).43 
Even with this organizational apparatus, the Joint Military Technology 
Commission could not resolve which technologies were defense-related, civilian, 
dual-use, public, or private; all the problems of categorization from the Systems and 
Technology Forum of 1980 remained. These categories had implications. Technologies 
classified as "private" could be owned by Japan’s firms and thus would require further 
negotiation, as well as funds, for licensing to the United States. This "private" category 
could cover "dual-use" technology too. What remained as "public" and 
"defense-related" technologies in the interpretation of the Government of Japan were 
only highly specific arms that excluded any potential civilian application, such as 
ammunition, explosives, and weapons. These arms were not necessarily the 
technologies the United States government or its contractors wanted. Prior agreements 
in the form of diplomatic notes, memoranda-of-understanding, or contracts could not 
                                                 
42 Defense Science Board (1984: 5). 
43 Lorell (1996: 23-26). 
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delineate interpretations of these technologies in practice. For the U.S. Government, 
technological “reciprocity” remained elusive, and the Government of Japan cast the 
United States’ efforts to achieve it as unwarranted foreign pressure.44 
 As the United States’ and Japan’s first joint effort to develop and produce a 
weapon system, their collaboration on the FS-X / F-2 multi-role support fighter forced 
questions about reciprocity to be addressed directly and answered concretely. The FS-X 
/ F-2 fighter is undoubtedly the most intense and notorious example of conflict in the 
U.S.-Japan science and technology relationship since World War II. The history of the 
controversy-ridden, with all its complex twists and turns over the course of a decade, 
will no be recounted here. A brief overview suffices for our purposes. 45   The 
collaboration illustrates how questions of reciprocity in the U.S.-Japan relationship 
were adjudicated and settled in the context of technical practice, on a 
component-by-component basis in the thick of an on-going collaboration, rather than 
through the standard diplomatic channels that had proved so problematic in the past. 
The Government of Japan did not intend for the FS-X to be a U.S.-Japan joint 
collaboration. By the end of 1985, after much disagreement among its ministries and 
agencies, the Government of Japan had reached an unofficial interagency consensus 
that Japan’s next fighter would be developed and manufactured domestically, instead of 
                                                 
44 For the U.S. Government, U.S.-Japan “reciprocity” in science was also a theme in the 1980s. For 
example, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-48) required 
science and technology agreements to provide for reciprocal access (sec. 5171). See Uyehara (2000: 
91). 
45 While under development, the fighter was called the “FS-X.”  When the fighter entered into the 
production phase, it was named the “F-2.” For the sake of convenience, I will refer to the fighter 
hereafter as simply the FS-X fighter. Accounts and evaluations of the FS-X controversy differ in 
important ways, even considering just the English-language literature (e.g., contrast Green’s and 
Lorell’s assessments of the project’s costs and benefits for the United States and Japan, in Green 
(1995) and Lorell (1996), respectively). For the purpose of illustrating the importance of 
collaboration as a means of defining and substantiating reciprocity, my account does not need to, nor 
does it attempt to, sort out those differences or present a comprehensive history of the FS-X 
co-development project. Lorell (1996) does a fine job of the latter task from a U.S. policy 
perspective. 
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purchased from the United States or produced under a co-production agreement.46  
Previously, the Government of Japan had consistently chosen co-production (e.g., for 
the United States’ F-86, F-104, F-4, and F-15 fighter aircraft). 47  Although the 
Government of Japan had come to a consensus to develop their next fighter 
domestically, in order to jump through what some key individuals in Japan considered 
to be just a bureaucratic hoop, Japan’s Ministry of Finance solicited import bids to help 
it frame and evaluate the cost of an indigenous program.48   
This process provided an opening for the U.S. defense aerospace industry and 
the U.S. Department of Defense to advocate the benefits of previous co-production 
arrangements vis-à-vis indigenous development. The U.S. Department of Defense 
thought that for Japan to develop and produce a top-of-the-line indigenous fighter 
would be extremely expensive and would redirect funds from Japan’s other defense 
programs that complemented the United States’ military posture in northeast Asia. 
Moreover, the Department of Defense feared that an indigenous fighter would diminish 
interoperability in the alliance and possibly encourage Japan to distance itself from the 
United States’ foreign policy.49 Alliance managers in the Department of State and in the 
Department of Defense came to regard the FS-X collaboration as a bellwether of future 
U.S.-Japan relations more generally, and they communicated that political escalation to 
the Government of Japan.50 After the U.S. Congress became involved51 and after 
                                                 
46 Kohno (1989: 459). 
47 U.S. General Accounting Office (1989) and Samuels (1994: 198-269). 
48 See, for example, the comments of the Director of Japan’s Technical Research and Development 
Institute, as quoted in Samuels (1994: 238). 
49 These concerns were voiced by numerous policymakers throughout congressional hearings on 
FS-X. See, for instance, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney’s testimony in U.S. House, 
Committee on Foreign Policy (1989). 
50 Lorell (1996: 120-154). 
51 Congressional pressure intensified, in part, because the Toshiba Machine Company was found in 
1987 to have secretly and knowingly breached export controls by selling the Soviet KGB 
high-precision computerized milling equipment that, it was alleged, could be used to manufacture 
submarine propeller blades. Indulging in political theatrics, some members in the U.S. Congress 
reacted to the “Toshiba Incident” by crushing Toshiba products on Capitol Hill using 
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several diplomatic miscues and missteps, in October 1987 Japan capitulated and agreed 
to co-develop with the United States a fighter loosely based on General Dynamic’s F-16 
C/D Block 40. 
But the controversy had really just begun. Not until two years later was the 
U.S.-Japan agreement for the FS-X co-development project free from challenges from 
the U.S. Congress and U.S. Governmental agencies concerned with trade and industrial 
relations, such as the Department of Commerce. The agreement’s opponents charged 
that the co-development project would be a boon for Japan’s commercial aerospace 
industry, who, they said, would receive through co-development valuable technology 
and know-how from the United States.52 As a result of these criticisms, in 1989 the 
Bush administration insisted on formally “clarifying” the 1987 agreement with Japan, to 
the outrage of the Government of Japan and Japanese commentators, an outrage that 
included charges that the United States was trying to clarify the agreement in order to 
shore up its techno-military hegemony. 53  Despite the FS-X agreement’s ultimate 
survival, contestations over reciprocity in technology transfer continued years later, 
even after the signing of the production agreement in 1996.54 
Technology sharing in the FS-X collaboration focused and gave material form 
to previously nebulous contestations over reciprocity in the U.S.-Japan relationship.55  
It exemplified how defense collaborations conceptualized reciprocity in the U.S.-Japan 
relationship in terms of “technology flowback” and how this flowback was eventually 
settled on a component-by-component basis by engineers, rather than by policy 
                                                                                                                                            
sledgehammers. Uyehara (2000: 100-102) notes the hypocrisy and inconsistency in the U.S. 
Government’s outrage. 
52 See, for example, a particularly influential op-ed, Prestowitz (1989). 
53 Noble (1992: 23). 
54 U.S. General Accounting Office (1995b); U.S. General Accounting Office (1997). 
55 The U.S. and Japan workshare in the development and production phases was also a significant 
component of reciprocity, but it was settled early on in the collaboration and was a much less 
troublesome issue. 
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memoranda of official alliance managers in each state’s foreign affairs or defense 
bureaucracies. The “technology flowback” discourse characterized the U.S. 
congressional hearings on the FS-X. 56 Both the House and the Senate also expressed 
concern about the adequacy of the United States’ controls on “critical technologies,” 
such as the computer software source code for the F-16’s flight-control and fire-control 
computer. A report by the Congressional Research Service, however, helped deflate 
how critical those technologies were for Japan’s commercial aerospace aspirations.57  
Most Congressional attention was focused on the value of “technology flowback” from 
Japan to the United States for the technologies whose development would not derive 
from the F-16 technology package that would be licensed to Japan. Under the terms of 
the “clarified” memorandum of understanding between the governments of United 
States and Japan, the United States would have free and open access to all technologies 
“derived” from the F-16 licensing package, and the United States (and its defense 
contractors) could pay to acquire technologies that Japan’s firms developed 
indigenously for the FS-X. These “non-derived” technologies included, among others, 
gallium arsenide monolithic microwave integrated circuits for the active phased array 
radar that Mitsubishi Electric Corporation was developing and the co-cured composite 
wings that Mitsubishi Heavy Industries was developing. At issue was not only the value 
of those “non-derived” hardware components, but just as important, the value of the 
techniques for manufacturing those components.  
                                                 
56 See, for example, the testimony of Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and General Dynamics 
Chief Executive Officer Herbert Rogers before the U.S. House’s Committee on Foreign Affairs 
(1989: 63, 192, respectively). Also see the testimony before, and the discussion within, the U.S. 
House’s Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs (1989), the U.S. House’s Committee on 
Science, Space, and Technology (1989), and the U.S. Senate’s Committee on Foreign Affairs 
(1989). 
57 The Congressional Research Service report is Moteff (1989). Lorell’s account suggests that the 
Congressional Research Service report, which questioned the value of FS-X technologies for 
commercial aerospace, was  influential among Congressional staffers and members of Congress 
(1996: 249-254). 
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Congress was able to debate the nature and value of those technologies in large 
part because these issues were left open and unspecified in the intergovernmental 
memorandum of understanding. The U.S. and Japanese negotiating parties had decided 
to leave those details for lower-level working groups to resolve.58 Yet, those details 
were hardly unimportant; they came up for debate in the U.S. Congress in the spring and 
summer of 1989. Despite extensive technical testimony, however, Congress did not 
resolve those matters. An effort in the Senate in September 1989 to override the 
President’s veto of a last-minute Senate amendment that added further conditions to the 
U.S.-Japan intergovernmental agreement, conditions primarily addressing work share 
and technology transfer, came up one vote short. Later in 1990, the U.S. Congress was 
able to keep the FS-X agreement under the spotlight by tasking their General 
Accounting Office to periodically monitor and review the implementation of the FS-X 
agreement and, in particular, to assess reciprocity in technology transfer. 59 
For most of the 1990s, the General Accounting Office followed and reviewed 
how the U.S.-Japan technical steering committee for the FS-X, its expert working 
groups, and its supporting bureaucracies negotiated reciprocity in the U.S.-Japan 
relationship. These actors, especially the working groups of the technical steering 
committee, managed “technology flow,” classified and re-classified key technologies as 
either “derived” or “non-derived,” and negotiated the nature and extent of technology 
flowback.60  It almost could not have been done any other way. The F-16 data package 
included over 10,000 documents and technical drawings.61 In addition to that package, 
the U.S. Department of State granted over 500 FS-X related munitions export licenses.62 
By 1997, Japan had sent over 40,000 technical documents “back” to the United States 
                                                 
58 Lorell (1996: 233). 
59 U.S. General Accounting Office (1992c: 2); Lorell (1996: 294). 
60 U.S. General Accounting Office (1995b); U.S. General Accounting Office (1997). 
61 U.S. General Accounting Office (1995b: 66). 
62 Ibid, p. 5. 
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which were related to technologies “derived” from the F-16 data package and from 
licenses acquired by Japan’s firms in support of the collaboration.63 U.S. technology 
assessment teams composed of experts from government and industry visited Japan’s 
manufacturing facilities to evaluate “non-derived” technologies of interest for 
technology transfer, such as the active phased array radar, the mission computer, the 
integrated electronic warfare system, and the co-cured composite wing.64   
The transfer of Mitsubishi Electronic Corporation’s gallium arsenide devices 
for the active phased array radar paved new territory in U.S.-Japan arrangements for 
exchanging technologies, territory unspecified by the formal technology transfer 
protocols that were still under negotiation at the time. Side stepping other contentious 
official export control categories, the gallium arsenide devices were transferred from 
Japan to the United States under a new category, as simply “data” for the purpose of 
testing. In a way similar to that of the gallium arsenide devices, ad-hoc practices by 
expert working groups adjudicated “technology flow” for other technologies too, such 
as the licensing of lower-tier vendor technologies and the re-classification of several 
technologies from derived to non-derived status. 65  Consequently, expert working 
groups negotiated and settled U.S.-Japan reciprocity in high-level matters for which 
high-level political forums and agreements had previously proven to be ill equipped or 
insufficient.66 They carried out these discussions on a component-by-component basis. 
In addition to the negotiation of technological reciprocity, a second dimension 
in which defense and space collaborations generally manifested different U.S.-Japan 
relations is the way that they distributed projects’ financial costs and benefits. In 
defense, the distribution of costs was a much more straightforward issue than 
                                                 
63 U.S. General Accounting Office (1997: 12). 
64 Ibid., p. 14. 
65 Lorell (1996: 312-356). 
66 Plafcan (1999: 30), and the author’s interview with a former bureaucrat in the Japan Defense 
Agency’s Equipment Bureau (2000). 
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technological reciprocity. 67  Most U.S.-Japan co-production and co-development 
collaborations in defense evaluated financial costs and benefits of projects in terms of ex 
ante agreements. Funding and workshare percentages were agreed upon between 
governments, and licensing fees were agreed upon between firms. For the FS-X, the 
Government of Japan funded the financial costs of developing and producing the fighter. 
After considerable negotiation and after the “clarifications” in the spring of 1989, U.S. 
firms were guaranteed in the memorandum of understanding a research and 
development workshare of about 40 percent of the Government of Japan’s research and 
development budget (about $1.2 billion). Most of that went to two firms: General 
Dynamics (later Lockheed Fort Worth), which was the U.S. sub-contractor for a portion 
of the aircraft’s structure, and General Electric Aircraft Engines.68 According to the 
memorandum of understanding signed for the production phase in 1996, U.S. firms 
were also guaranteed 40 percent of the workshare (or about $4.1 billion for the 
then-expected 130 aircraft production run). Although over 200 U.S. firms participated 
in the production of the FS-X (now called the F-2), Lockheed Martin and General 
Electric had 70 percent of the U.S. workshare. Which companies would produce which 
components was all stipulated up front in the set of production agreements. For example, 
Lockheed Martin was slated to produce four out of five of the fighter’s left wings.69  
Judging from the successful experience of workshare arrangements in the development 
phase, the quotas in the production phase were expected to be realized.70 
Concerning the third dimension of comparison, how collaborations negotiated 
U.S.-Japan interdependency, defense collaborations constrained interdependencies in 
                                                 
67 Distributional issues do have some complications, such as taking into consideration fluctuating 
exchange rates and validating that the agreed upon distribution has been realized in practice (U.S. 
General Accounting Office 1997: 9). 
68 U.S. General Accounting Office (1997: 6); Lorell (1996: 288). 
69 U.S. General Accounting Office (1997: 8). 
70 Ibid., p. 8-10. 
  
 
69
the U.S.-Japan relationship to issues about the supply of hardware, servicing 
agreements, and hardware development, rather than about operations. Negotiations in 
defense collaborations did not directly limit how the hardware would be used by the 
United States or Japan, once built. Matters of military cooperation and training were 
handled separately. Nevertheless, even for matters surrounding hardware development, 
balances between national autonomy and interdependency were contentious issues that 
required frequent negotiation, and those negotiations were often conducted over 
individual components.71   
A debate about the development of a radar altimeter for the FS-X fighter 
illustrates how the United States and Japan technical teams negotiated a particular 
instance of U.S.-Japan inter-state dependency.72 In late 1991, the FS-X design group in 
Japan had been considering producing under license a digital radar altimeter built by a 
U.S. firm, Teledyne Ryan. The Japan Defense Agency and its contractors had 
designated this hardware item among several dozen other components as “critical” for 
flight safety and flight testing, thus necessitating, they claimed, suppliers based in Japan. 
With that reasoning, they requested to the United States that they be allowed to 
license-produce these critical items rather than purchase them from vendors in the 
United States, as had been previously assumed by the U.S. technical steering committee. 
The U.S.-Japan memorandum of understanding and associated agreements did not 
address these emergent questions; it was up to the U.S. technical steering committee for 
the FS-X and more specifically, an ad-hoc working group of that committee, to decide 
this issue and negotiate any conditions with Japan.  
                                                 
71 See Green (1995) for an account of U.S.-Japan relations which frames Japan’s foreign policy in 
terms of Snyder’s alliance dilemma of entrapment versus abandonment (1984). 
72 This account is drawn from the account given in Lorell (1996: 316), and Lorell’s account is based 
entirely upon Lorell’s interview work with officials in the United States and Japan. 
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The steering group as a whole found the Japan Defense Agency’s reasoning to 
be unconvincing. In line with the U.S. Government’s concerns about technology flow 
and thinking that Japan’s contractors would have no other alternative, the steering 
committee decided that this component, along with many others, should not be 
co-produced but should be purchased as a hardware item from vendors in the United 
States. Nevertheless, the Japan Defense Agency opted to license-produce a different 
altimeter, an analog altimeter that met different specifications, using technology 
provided by a French firm. Officials at the U.S. Defense Security Assistance Agency 
objected to the Japan Defense Agency bringing in a third country, even if indirectly, into 
the FS-X program; they claimed that such action violated the spirit of the memorandum 
of understanding. The debate over how to interpret the memorandum of understanding 
was never resolved, but Japan went ahead anyway to license-produce from a French 
firm an analog radar altimeter that met their technical specifications and ensured some 
level of domestic production and national autonomy. For this FS-X component, the 
Japan Defense Agency bucked its dependency upon the United States. 
 
U.S.-Japan Collaboration in Space: 
Negotiating with and through “Clean Interfaces” 
 
 In the 1980s and 1990s, U.S.-Japan intergovernmental collaborations in both 
defense and space were confronted with expansive and unruly techno-political 
questions about reciprocity, distribution of project costs, and inter-state 
interdependency. Like U.S.-Japan collaboration in defense, U.S.-Japan collaboration in 
space in the last half of the twentieth century roughly moved from industry-to-industry 
collaborations approved by the two governments, in which Japan’s firms 
licensed-produced technologies from the United States, to more complex arrangements 
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in the 1980s and 1990s in which intergovernmental collaborations were supported by 
firms from each state. Although U.S.-Japan space collaboration has not been studied as 
extensively as the two states’ collaboration in defense, given the extant literature, stark 
differences between defense and space can be documented in how U.S.-Japan relations 
were actualized in the 1980s and 1990s.  
U.S.-Japan intergovernmental collaborations in defense negotiated reciprocity 
on a component-by-component basis in terms of “technology flowback.” Financial 
costs and benefits were negotiated up front, in an explicit manner, in terms of 
government funding percentages and workshares for firms from each state. Negotiating 
interdependency between states was largely constrained to questions about the supply of 
hardware and servicing. In contrast, in U.S.-Japan collaborations in space, technological 
reciprocity and the distribution of financial costs and benefits were both generally 
subsumed into questions of division of labor/expertise and were negotiated primarily in 
the design of the technoscientific system. Questions of interdependency were 
straightforwardly and conspicuously managed by deliberately designing what were 
known as “clean interfaces” between compartmentalized modules, modules for which 
each government was solely responsible. Whereas in defense collaboration “technology 
flow” was conceptualized as needing to be tracked blueprint-by-blueprint or 
component-by-component, in space collaboration the two governments designed their 
joint technoscientific systems so as to discourage, if not eliminate, technology transfer 
altogether. Yet, in space collaboration, unlike in defense, inter-state dependency 
could—and often did—extend beyond hardware and into operations. 
 International collaboration has been a central element of the mission of the 
United States’ National Aeronautics and Space Administration from the organization’s 
beginnings. While NASA was founded as a consequence of the fear and competition 
provoked by the Soviet Union’s launching of its Sputnik satellite, it was also founded 
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amid idealism for international cooperation in science, an idealism inspired by the 
International Geophysical Year to which Sputnik had been a contribution. 73  The 
International Geophysical Year (IGY) was a comprehensive effort to study the earth and 
its atmosphere, involving over 60 national programs and tens of thousands of scientists 
who were coordinated through the International Council of Scientific Unions.74 Arnold 
Frutkin, who directed NASA’s Office of International Programs soon after NASA’s 
establishment and had previously served at the National Academy of Sciences as 
Deputy Director of the U.S. Committee of the IGY, judged it to be an “arresting fact” 
that Congress “plung[ed] the nation into competition for preeminence” with the 
founding of NASA and yet “simultaneously” directed NASA to “establish cooperative 
ties with other countries.”75 Frutkin also noted that “the parallel prosecution of both was, 
of course, entirely conscious. NASA’s Administrator, James E. Webb, said on more 
than one occasion that space, like Janus, looks in two directions.”76 
 Aware of the potential complexities of “looking in two directions,” NASA 
developed a set of guidelines for its international cooperation. First, NASA was to 
cooperate with other states through a single, central civilian agency designated by each 
state, instead of through universities, private contractors, or even ministries that might 
be assigned case-by-case. Second, commitments to cooperate were to be made on a 
                                                 
73 Frutkin (1965: 17-30). The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, in its “Declaration of 
Policy and Purpose” section stated among NASA’s objectives were both “(5) The preservation of the 
role of the United States as a leader in aeronautical and space science and technology and in the 
application thereof to the conduct of peaceful activities within and outside the atmosphere” and “(7) 
Cooperation by the United States with other nations and groups of nations in work done pursuant to 
this Act and in the peaceful application of the results, thereof.” Section 102, subsection c, paragraphs 
5 and 7, respectively, of the "National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958," Public Law #85-568, 72 
Stat., 426. 
74 Sullivan (1961). 
75 Frutkin (1965: 8). Frutkin was NASA’s senior negotiator for its major international programs and 
space agreements from when he was hired by NASA in 1959 as Director of International Programs 
to when he retired at NASA in 1979 as Associate Administrator for External Relations. "Arnold W. 
Frutkin," Biographical File, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA 
Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 
76 Frutkin (1965: 8). 
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project-by-project basis, rather than through programmatic or more general agreements. 
Within each project, governments were to be encouraged to make contributions that, 
while in keeping with NASA’s overall objectives, supported in particular the 
contributing government’s scientific and technological interests. In other words, NASA 
was not to impose elements of a project onto a foreign government as that government’s 
“contribution.” Furthermore, each government was to be singularly responsible for its 
contribution to the joint project with NASA, technically and financially; neither 
technology nor money was to be exchanged between governments. Finally, scientific 
results of projects were to be openly published. 
NASA’s guidelines were explicit and widely circulated, and their language in 
pamphlets, policy statements, and Congressional testimony was relatively consistent 
throughout NASA’s existence in the twentieth century.77 This consistency is likely in 
part a result of Arnold Frutkin’s twenty-year tenure in senior positions at NASA’s 
international affairs office and external relations division. Kenneth Pedersen, who held 
the same positions with NASA in the 1980s as Frutkin did in the 1960s and 1970s, 
explained NASA’s guidelines in a similar way to Frutkin. Yet, Pedersen did elaborate 
upon—and occasionally thoughtfully problematized—NASA’s requirement that 
national contributions be compartmentalized and structured along what Pedersen called 
                                                 
77 See Kash (1967: 40), who cites a 1963 pamphlet by NASA’s Office of International Programs, 
and in addition, see Frutkin (1965: 35) and NASA International Affairs Office (1983). Frutkin 
contrasts NASA’s approach to international cooperation with that of the purported failure of the 
Atomic Energy Commission’s approach. Frutkin explains the “conservative values” behind NASA’s 
philosophy for international cooperation in the following way:  
 
Experience in international programs of assistance, support, and cooperation, 
suggested that a new realism might be appropriate—at least in the special circumstances of 
space activity. A program philosophy was required to minimize both the warranted and the 
unwarranted criticism which had been directed at other cooperation ventures—for alleged 
waste and misdirection of dollars, for investment in training and facilities never used, for 
shoddy performance by cooperating foreign groups, for questionable motivation of our 
own and foreign personnel, and for promise outrunning performance. A program founded 
on conservative values, though not necessarily conservative in scope and objectives, was 
indicated (p. 32, and see more generally, p. 28-36). 
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“clean interfaces.”78 In the 1990s and through until 2004, the bureaucratic language of 
NASA’s guidelines has been slightly revised and qualified.79  Still, in less formal 
presentations, such as in presentations by NASA External Relations personnel to 
scientists interested in proposing international projects to NASA, the guidelines for 
cooperation have been expressed in much the same way as they have been for decades 
(the informal “clean interfaces” jargon that emphasizes the need for clear lines of 
technological and financial responsibility was most likely introduced by Pedersen in the 
1980s and has seemed to have been in use since).80 
NASA’s guidelines were, for the most part, strongly suggested guidelines that 
needed to be taken into consideration, rather than absolute rules that resulted in strict 
adherence. For example, in the early 1960s, NASA first approached scientists in Japan 
to collaborate on space-related projects, reportedly in agreement with a request to do so 
from the U.S. Department of State. 81  But while an advisory body to the Prime 
Minister’s office had been established in 1960 for Japan’s space activities and their 
promotion (namely, the National Space Activities Council), Japan’s space activities 
were not at that time managed by a central government agency as was called for by 
                                                 
78 For Pedersen’s articulation of the guidelines, see Pedersen (1987). For his analysis of the 
quandaries that might arise in their implementation, see Pedersen (1986). 
79 For instance, industrial competitiveness is now addressed explicitly in NASA’s policy directives: 
“Arrangements for cooperative projects must take into consideration the need to protect against the 
unwarranted transfer of technology abroad, in accordance with U.S. export laws and regulations. 
Issues related to U.S. industrial competitiveness will be considered in developing cooperative 
projects.” See NASA Policy Directive 1360.2A, “Initiation and Development of International 
Cooperation in Space and Aeronautics Programs,” section 1, paragraph f. This directive can be 
found at:  
http: //nodis.hq.nasa.gov/displayDir.cfm?Internal_ID=N_PD_1360_002A_&page_name=main, last 
accessed 3 August 2005. 
80 An example of one recent presentation to scientists who were interested in proposing international 
projects is Kirkham (2004). Slide four of Kirkham’s presentation depicts clear lines of responsibility 
as “clean interfaces.” Kirkham emphasized the importance of clean interfaces for NASA programs 
and for proposing programs to NASA, saying: “Clean interfaces is real important with international 
collaboration [sic]. The greater the technical complexity, it’s harder to have clean interfaces, I 
understand, but I think that to the extent that you can have clean interfaces I think your proposal will 
be helped” (NASA 2004: 100). 
81 Kash (1967: 42). 
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NASA’s guidelines for international cooperation.82 It was academic scientists and their 
students, principally from the Institute of Industrial Science at the University of Tokyo, 
who had since 1955 been successfully developing and launching small sounding rockets 
that measured phenomena in the earth’s upper atmosphere.83 Because academic space 
scientists in Japan in the 1950s and early 1960s valued their independence from the 
Government of Japan and because these scientists lacked a working relationship with 
their government beyond receiving funds for their research, the U.S. Department of 
State reportedly interceded on their behalf with the Government of Japan so as to 
establish cooperative ties between NASA and those scientists on a project-by-project 
basis.84 NASA scientists and these Japanese scientists in 1962, 1963, and 1964 launched 
a small number of sounding rockets that carried complementary devices, contributed by 
each party, to measure electron density and temperature in the ionosphere.85 Despite 
these efforts, NASA scientists did not undertake any major intergovernmental 
collaboration in space technoscience with Japan, in small part owing to the changing 
organizational structure of Japan’s governance of space activities during the 1960s.86 
The lack of a central space agency in Japan with which NASA could 
collaborate in accordance with its guidelines was not the primary obstacle to U.S.-Japan 
collaboration in the 1960s. In the name of pragmatism, NASA’s guidelines were 
serviceable and malleable, as the guidelines had been in the collaborative sounding 
rocket experiments and as they would be in the future when Japan would have two 
distinct space agencies. Nor did dramatic differences in the 1960s between each state’s 
expertise and capacity in space technoscience pose insurmountable obstacles to 
collaboration (in the mid 1960s, NASA was in its prime with the Apollo program, while 
                                                 
82 Hachifuji (1983: 13). 
83 Kagaku gijutsu chō (1978: 1). 
84 Kash (1967: 42). 
85 Frutkin (1965: 56). 
86 See generally, Hachifuji (1983) and Kagaku gijutsu chō (1978). 
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Japan was struggling to develop rockets to launch satellites). Rather, for most of the 
1960s, Japan’s dominant space scientists, engineers, and their supporting bureaucracies, 
such as the Institute of Space and Aeronautical Science and the National Space 
Development Center, all wanted Japan to develop its space capabilities independently 
without the crutch of U.S. assistance and without the constraints of licensing from the 
United States, including the prohibition of third-party transfer and sales.87 Whereas, as 
described above, from the early 1950s Japan’s firms had been license-producing 
numerous defense-related technologies from the United States, arrangements for 
U.S.-Japan industry-to-industry licensing and collaboration in space technology were 
not made until 1969, with the U.S.-Japan Exchange of Notes Concerning Cooperation 
in Space Exploration.88 
The 1969 U.S.-Japan agreement was a turning point for Japan’s space program 
in that it formally presented Japan’s emerging space bureaucracies with the option of 
using licensing from U.S. firms to ultimately achieve domestic development and 
national autonomy in space. The agreement had been a few years in the making. It had 
been advanced largely at the initiative of President Johnson’s administration and the 
U.S. Department of State, which wanted to stem the proliferation of solid-fueled rockets 
developed by Japan’s Institute of Space and Aeronautical Science and the Institute’s 
contractors, such as Nissan Motor. Solid-fueled rockets were viewed by the U.S. 
Department of State and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as more of a 
proliferation threat than the liquid-fueled rockets on which NASA’s satellite launch 
systems were based, and Japan’s firms had been selling solid-fueled rockets and 
licensing solid-fueled rocket technology.89 
                                                 
87 Saitō (1992: 20-30); Logsdon (1997: 4); and Satō (2001: 180-182, 189). 
88 U.S. Department of State (1969). 
89 Logsdon (1997: 7) and Satō (2001: 184).  
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While the United States was seeking to collaborate, assist with, and shape 
Japan’s space programs so as to realize U.S. foreign policy goals, Japan was in the midst 
of a major re-organization of its space development effort. Japan’s re-organization of its 
domestic space institutions and the United States’ collaborative proposals to the 
Government of Japan fed off each other. A particularly important and central goal that 
Japan’s space bureaucracy was struggling to achieve in a timely manner was the 
development of rockets to launch meteorological, communication, and broadcast 
satellites. In the late 1960s, the Government of Japan—like the United 
States—maintained a policy that required all of its satellites to be domestically launched, 
thus encouraging rapid domestic development of launch vehicles, but there was a hitch 
in this policy: Japan had not yet successfully put a satellite into orbit.90 To realize this 
goal and to establish space development as a national effort, three new organizations 
were established in Japan. In July of 1968, the Federation of Economic Organizations 
(Keidanren) founded its Space Activities Promotion Council; in August of 1968, 
Japan’s National Space Activities Council—an advisory body to the Prime Minister’s 
Office—was reconstituted into a supposedly more robust policy-making body, the 
Space Activities Commission; and in June 1969, the Japan’s parliament passed 
legislation to create the National Space Development Agency.91   
As a part of this renewed space effort, in July 1969 after the splashdown of 
Apollo 11 in the Pacific, the governments of Japan and the United States agreed to a 
governmental framework in which Japan’s firms would be allowed to license 
liquid-fueled launch vehicle technology from U.S. firms, if the Japan and U.S. firms 
wanted to do so.92 A few months after the signing of the intergovernmental framework 
                                                 
90 Satō (2001: 192). 
91 Hachifuji (1983: 117). 
92 Logsdon (1997: 13-15) and Satō (2001: 190). 
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agreement, the head of Japan’s new National Space Development Agency declared in a 
newspaper interview: 
 
Of course we must consider international cooperation. Insularism does not 
work in the space age, though when and how to engage in international 
cooperation should be decided by what Japanese people think and feel . . . Even 
if we choose to develop independently, I do not sympathize with the view that 
national projects must consist of purely domestic parts and components with 
Japanese flags on them. Necessary materials, components, and technologies 
should be of course introduced and absorbed.93 
 
Following that philosophy, Japan’s National Space Development Agency, as part of its 
mandate to build a commercial space launch vehicle, cancelled its solid-fueled rocket 
projects and began to license U.S. liquid-fueled technology at what were unprecedented 
levels of capability. While the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
regarded this collaborative arrangement as unjustified according to both its guidelines 
for international cooperation and its organizational mission, the U.S. Department of 
State and the White House saw for a time such collaboration as advancing U.S. foreign 
policy goals. 94  The arrangement of unilateral transfer of space launch vehicle 
technology from U.S. firms to Japan’s firms, in exchange for licensing fees, differed 
little in practice or rationale from the aerospace defense assistance agreements 
discussed earlier. 
But that arrangement for U.S.-Japan space collaboration was short-lived. 
Almost as soon as the 1969 arrangement was used, it was contested. In other words, the 
parties still had to work out what they had agreed to. Which technologies the U.S. 
Government had agreed to allow Japan’s firms to license came into dispute. A U.S. 
technical advisory group for launch vehicles noted in 1970 that 
 
                                                 
93 Shima Hideo in Nihon Keizai Shimbun, October 27, 1969, as quoted in Satō (2001: 191). 
94 Logsdon (1997: 8). 
  
 
79
the task of generating an explicit, single faceted and easy to administer 
definition of the level of technology transfer authorized and/or intended under 
the United States/Japanese space agreement [of 1969] is not a simple one. . . . 
The most specific guidance provided [in the agreement] is that of paragraph B 
of the Attachment to the basic agreement which states that “This agreement 
will cover unclassified technology and equipment up to the level of the 
Thor-Delta vehicle systems exclusive of reentry and related technology.”  This 
statement does not limit the Thor-Delta level to a fixed configuration as of a 
specific point in time. The word “level” can be defined in a number of ways 
depending on the specific set of conditions surrounding a particular situation.95 
  
As early as 1972, the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, partly 
through its role in the technical advisory group, re-asserted its position and its 
longstanding guidelines in the U.S.-Japan arrangement regarding space launch vehicle 
technology. NASA was repeatedly able to cast the 1969 agreement as a one-time deal 
for a static configuration of specific technology, rather than as a framework for a more 
general relationship structured along a particular line of technology. Licensing and 
transfer of U.S. technology precipitously gave way to sales of already assembled 
hardware rather than licensing and transfer of upgrades of a given model.96 Although 
contractors for Japan’s National Space Development Agency continued to be able to 
purchase hardware that U.S. firms were not permitted to sell to anyone else outside of 
the United States, U.S.-Japan exchanges of notes about space technology in 1976 and 
1980 reinforced NASA’s traditional guidelines for international cooperation as the 
guidelines relevant for U.S.-Japan collaboration in space. 97 Those guidelines were 
                                                 
95 Letter from Vincent Johnson, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, to John Snipes, 
Director, Office of Munitions Control, Department of State, October 30, 1970, as quoted in Logsdon 
(1997: 29). 
96 See, for example, the discussions that are documented in the collection Kenkyū Chōsei Kyoku 
Uchū Kokusaika (1979), especially the U.S. Department of State “Talking Paper on the Sale of 
Launch Vehicle for Japanese Meteorological Satellite” (1979 [1972]:121-126) and the meeting 
between officials from NASA and Japan’s National Space Development Agency (1979 [1974]: 
167-171). This collection can only be found, as far as I am aware, at the libraries of Japan’s National 
Space Development Agency in Tsukuba and Tokyo. I was not allowed to photocopy these 
documents, owing to uncertainty about their administrative declassification. 
97 Bloom (1984: 102) and the 1976 “Letter from Bloom to Osawa” in Kenkyū Chōsei Kyoku Uchū 
Kokusaika (1979: 200-201). 
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operative for numerous intergovernmental collaborations in space from the late 1970s 
onward.98 
 How those guidelines played out in U.S.-Japan collaboration in space from the 
1980s to the present can be illustrated by their collaborative practices in the most 
expensive and largest intergovernmental technoscientific project in history: the 
NASA-led International Space Station. In addition to the United States, construction of 
the International Space Station has involved Russia, the European Space Agency, Japan, 
and Canada. Brazil and Italy are payload participants. The Government of Japan, 
through its National Space Development Agency, is contributing the Japanese 
Experimental Module, a pressurized and unpressurized (i.e., exposed) space laboratory 
in which material science and life science experiments can be conducted, with the 
ultimate goal of commercialization.99 As of 1996, the module’s projected budget was 
over $3 billion, with about seventy percent of it already spent at that time.100 To 
describe U.S.-Japan collaboration in the space station, which included the integration of 
the Japanese Experimental Module with the space station, I will again turn to the three 
dimensions of technoscientific collaboration that I presented above for U.S.-Japan 
collaboration in defense.  
First, U.S.-Japan collaboration in the space station managed concerns about 
technoscientific reciprocity by minimizing technology transfer and by implementing a 
philosophy of “clean interfaces.”  From exploratory talks in the mid 1980s, to the initial 
intergovernmental agreement and bilateral memorandum-of-understanding in 1988, 
through to the new set of agreements in 1998 and the hardware testing of the flight 
model delivered to the Kennedy Space Center in Florida in 2003, the Japanese 
Experimental Module that will attach to the core structure of the space station has been 
                                                 
98 Logsdon (1997: 42-43). 
99 Ida, Murayama, and Horikawa (1992) and Kawamoto (2004). 
100 Covault (1996: 62). 
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designed, funded, managed, and built by Japan’s National Space Development Agency 
with the support of Japan’s contractors, such as the Japan Manned Space Systems 
consortium. 101  The module’s equipment for crew operations, such as its 
communications system, did need to be standardized across the space station, and some 
of this equipment was consequently procured from U.S. manufacturers (but not as 
technology transferred from NASA). Still, the module’s container, internal systems, 
power systems, environmental controls, and payload support mechanisms have all been 
designed and built by firms in Japan.102 The overriding principle is that the Japanese 
module during its development will be managerially and technically independent from 
the other elements of the space station.103 Eventually, it will plug into a space station 
“node” via a standardized berthing mechanism.104 
 Second, U.S.-Japan collaboration on the space station handled financial costs 
and benefits as matters to be negotiated and worked out through the design and use of 
the technology, rather than as based upon ex ante cost/benefit calculations that might 
possibly require intergovernmental cash payments in order to balance distributional 
issues. At one time in the planning for the space station, a payment of funds was thought 
necessary, so that NASA could recoup the costs of launching other states’ modules and 
of providing common services onboard the space station. Eventually, in the case of 
                                                 
101 [Intergovernmental Agreement] On the Cooperation in the Detailed Design, Development, 
Operation, and Utilization of the Permanently Manned Space Station, September 29, 1988; 
Agreement Among the Government of Canada, Governments of the Member States of the European 
Space Agency, the Government of Japan, the Government of the Russian Federation, and the 
Government of the United States of America Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International 
Space Station, January 29, 1998. 
102 The language in 1998 intergovernmental agreement allows exchange of technical data for 
“interface, integraton and safety” (article 19, paragraph 3). 
103 Kato (1993) describes how Japan’s engineers contested NASA’s standards for the space station’s 
electrical system in an effort to establish “clean interfaces” (Kato’s words) and ensure a stable power 
system for the module. Kobayashi (1986) discusses Japan’s policy of “clean interfaces” vis-à-vis 
NASA for the space station (e.g., p. 11). Not surprisingly, the language of Frutkin’s and Pedersen’s 
guidelines for NASA’s international cooperation made its way to Japan’s engineers.  
104 Mayo, Bolton, and Laurini (1989) discuss this mechanism and other standards, such as those for 
payload racks. 
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Japan, instead of exchanging funds, bartering was employed for offsets. Japan agreed to 
provide the space station with a Centrifuge Accommodation Module, a Centrifuge 
Rotor, and a Life Sciences Glovebox, in exchange for NASA launching and 
transporting the Japanese Experimental Module to the space station. Operational 
allocations were worked out—at least on paper in the intergovernmental agreements 
and memorandum-of-understanding—in terms of “real estate,” i.e., what modules were 
contributed and by whom. Under the terms of the negotiated agreements, Japan would 
have 51% of the use of its experimental module, or, in terms proportional to the entire 
space station, 12.8%. While the latter percentage is said to be roughly in the 
neighborhood of Japan’s percentage of expected development costs for the space station 
(itself a highly uncertain figure), unlike for the manufacturing share of the FS-X fighter 
aircraft collaboration, intricate cost calculations did not drive this allocation of 
resources. If a single factor did, it was the “real estate” that had itself been based upon 
previous technoscientific ambitions and decisions.105 
 As with other U.S.-Japan collaborations in space, and unlike in their 
arrangements in defense collaboration, the United States and Japan in their 
collaboration for the space station once again used compartmentalization, made 
possible by the construction of “clean interfaces,” to manage political and technical 
interdependencies. NASA did not consider the Japanese Experimental Module as a 
“critical path” element; if it were to explode (at launch), fail, or otherwise be eliminated, 
the other modules of the space station could be launched, assembled, and utilized 
without it.106 Thus, the Japanese Experimental Module was non-essential to NASA. Of 
course, NASA’s core space station elements, as well as Russia’s contribution, were 
essential to the functioning of the Japanese module. The United States’ and Japan’s 
                                                 
105 Cline and Gibbs (2003: 923-924). Lynn Cline was involved in the negotiations as a representative 
of NASA’s Office for External Relations. 
106 Ibid., p. 918. 
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techno-political interdependency for the space station was then, for the most part, in one 
direction. This imbalance in power becomes particularly evident when NASA 
“proposes” design changes and delays to which Japan’s National Space Development 
Agency really has no choice but to acquiesce. For the National Space Development 
Agency to cancel what is, at over $3 billion, its single most expensive space project 
would be catastrophic to the agency. Even in the project’s early years, in 1991, when the 
U.S. Congress was threatening to cancel NASA’s efforts in the space station, and thus 
the space station itself, Japan’s foreign minister wrote to the U.S. Secretary of State that 
if the space station were cancelled, “major joint efforts which the international partners 
have made so far would be nullified, Japanese Space Development Programs would be 
significantly impaired, and furthermore, I fear that the credibility of the United States as 
a partner in any major big science effort would inevitably be damaged.”107 
 In contrast to their defense collaboration, U.S.-Japan space station operations 
will breach compartmentalization. In operational matters, interpreting and assessing 
techno-political interdependencies becomes more complex and speculative, given the 
limited nature of the published literature on space station operations and the limited 
activity to describe to date. The Japanese Experimental Module has yet to be launched 
and attached to the space station structure. While compartmentalization was regarded as 
a workable strategy for dividing clear lines of technical and managerial (and thus 
political) responsibility during the space station’s development on earth, once the 
modules are linked together in space via structural nodes and common berthing 
mechanisms, the modules free fall in orbit together. When the space station’s 
orientation and orbital positioning are adjusted, all experiments on-board are potentially 
affected. Likewise, the crew on the space station when the Japanese module will be 
                                                 
107 Letter from Minister for Foreign Affairs Nakayama Taro to Secretary of State James Baker III, 24 
May 1991, as quoted in Logsdon (1992: 299). 
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attached is expected to be limited to an integrated group of seven personnel. One of 
those seven will be the formal commander of the other six. While crew members will no 
doubt take on different roles and functions, the crew will hardly be compartmentalized 
in any strict sense of the term. As an indication of the potential complexity of social life 
onboard, common procedures for prosecuting criminal conduct have even been 
formally agreed upon.108 U.S.-Japan ground operations supporting the space shuttle and 
the Japanese Experimental Module are also interdependent. While ground operations 
and engineering support systems are distributed across Japan and the United States, with 
Japan controlling most of the systems for its module, a few elements—such as the data 
network system—are utterly dependent upon systems in the United States to pass along 
information to the space station.109 Despite the United States’ and Japan’s longstanding 
military alliance, these operational interdependencies do not exist in U.S.-Japan 
scientific and technological collaboration in defense.110 
So far I have argued that since World War II the governments of the United 
States and Japan have used technoscience to undergird and mold their inter-state 
relations, and consequently, technoscientific projects have become a central constitutive 
thread of U.S.-Japan relations. Through examples of collaboration in defense and space, 
I have suggested that important high-level negotiations about the character of the 
U.S.-Japan relationship—questions about reciprocity, partnership, interdependence, 
and power—and that negotiations about the techno-political roles and boundaries of 
                                                 
108 Article 22 of the 1998 Intergovernmental Agreement. 
109 Fawacett (1996) and Outline of Kibo operations system, from the JAXA web site at: http: 
//iss.sfo.jaxa.jp/iss/kibo/ctl_e.html, last accessed 4 August 2005. 
110 That could change, however, with Government of Japan’s December 2003 decision to purchase 
ballistic missile defense systems from the United States which take advantage of U.S. missile 
tracking capabilities. Nevertheless, the Government of Japan has maintained that it will not become 
operationally tied up in U.S. systems. Japan is building its own radar systems, for instance, and it is 
not clear whether or not that information would be shared with a U.S. Navy Aegis cruiser equipped 
with missile defense capabilities which is deployed in the Sea of Japan. See Onishi (2004) and Boese 
(2004). 
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each state have often been conducted by working groups of scientists and engineers, 
rather than just by diplomats from each nation’s foreign policy bureaucracies. In the 
case of the FS-X fighter aircraft, as well as other U.S.-Japan collaborative projects in 
defense, and in the case of the international space station, as well as for other U.S.-Japan 
collaborative projects in space, the U.S.-Japan relationship has been worked out in the 
building of technoscientific machines. 
Furthermore, I have argued that “the” U.S.-Japan relationship has not been a 
single, unified relationship (see table 2.2 below, on page 86). While of course different 
collections of U.S.-Japan scientists, engineers, and bureaucrats living in 
contemporaneous times confronted vaguely similar questions about the U.S.-Japan 
relationship at a given historical moment and can have roughly common anxieties about 
the Cold War, trade, and so on, their particular circumstances and problems were not 
identical. As a result, in order to address these different circumstances and problems, 
they built and actualized U.S.-Japan relations around their particular circumstances and 
problems. This section has described how the practices of U.S.-Japan technoscientific 
collaboration in defense and space have consistently differed in important ways over 
decades of time, even though the building of systems in defense and space has been 
supported by overlapping industrial sectors that focus on aerospace, electronics, and 
communications systems. In defense collaboration in the 1980s and 1990s, issues of 
technoscientific reciprocity, financial costs, and techno-political interdependencies 
have been tracked component-by-component, with economically-explicit ex ante 
decisions. In space collaboration during the same period of time, practices have been 
guided by a general philosophy of “clean interfaces” in which questions of reciprocity, 
financial costs, and techno-political interdependences have been subsumed into and 
negotiated in technical development, and significantly, also in operations.  
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Table 2.2: Comparing U.S.-Japan Technoscientific Relations in Defense and Space 
 
Dimensions Defense Collaboration Space Collaboration 
1. Reciprocity Component-by-component analysis "Clean interfaces" system design 
2. Distribution of 
financial costs 
Ex ante contractual agreement in 
explicit financial terms 
Implicitly follows "clean 
interfaces" and division-of-labor
3. Interdependency Component-level, case-by-case hardware development 
Operations of system in addition 
to hardware development 
 
Most of the available literature that addresses political questions about U.S.-Japan 
technoscientific collaboration—literature from which this section has drawn in part to 
make its argument—has focused on intergovernmental agreements, corporate contracts, 
and such, rather than technoscientific practice, and has overlooked or implicitly 
minimized differences in technoscientific practice as merely lower-level bureaucratic 
differences that do not implicate or complicate U.S.-Japan relations. By using technical 
secondary source material and some primary source material, including 
Japanese-language sources, to describe the working group negotiations and technical 
arrangements regarding the FS-X’s active phased array radar, the FS-X’s radar altimeter, 
space launch vehicles, and the Japanese Experimental Module, I have gone beyond the 
formal documents and have described practices that have built U.S.-Japan relations. In 
sum, I have argued that scientists, engineers, and bureaucrats have negotiated and 
realized distinct U.S.-Japan relations in defense and space.  
 
Re-thinking Collaboration and Explaining U.S.-Japan Technoscientific Relations 
 
 Describing how different collections of U.S. and Japan scientists, engineers, 
and bureaucrats have established different policies and practices for negotiating the 
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U.S.-Japan inter-state relationship in their technoscientific collaborations opens up 
intellectual space for new interpretative explanations of science and technology in 
international affairs and new interpretative explanations of the politics and 
policymaking of intergovernmental technoscientific collaboration in particular. 
Illustrating, as this chapter has done, how the inter-state relationship has been 
differently negotiated begs the question of why: why have different ways of negotiating 
the U.S.-Japan relationship arisen in defense and space?  
To provide a rationale for this long-standing difference in policies and 
practices, explanations are unable to turn to geopolitics or balance-of-power alliance 
politics (e.g., Green 1995; Synder 1997), with their understandings of each state as a 
unified actor, since these collaborations have been conducted between the same two 
states in the same decades. The explicitness of ex ante economic calculations in defense 
collaborations might suggest an economic explanation for the difference in U.S.-Japan 
relations in defense and space, structured by competition on the basis of industrial 
sectors (e.g., Destler, Fukui, and Sato 1979). Yet, owing to Japan’s ban on arms sales 
(albeit a weakening ban), Japan and the United State’s economic rivalry was just as 
salient, if not more so, for space endeavors as it was for defense (see, for example, 
Pekkanen 2003). As the above description of U.S.-Japan collaboration in space launch 
vehicles indicates, NASA officials and their policies have been sensitive to competition 
with Japan since the 1970s. Nor was one project categorically more significant to either 
state’s economy or its contractors. Both the development and production of the FS-X 
fighter aircraft and the development and operation of the space station were complex 
aerospace projects that demanded billions of dollars from the tax payers of each state. 
While the FS-X fighter aircraft was obviously a military weapon and Japan’s space 
station module was a facility for experimentation in space, it is not clear how any 
differences between what might be called the “issue areas” of defense and space would 
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lead deductively to the different ways of negotiating U.S.-Japan relations in 
technoscience.  
Finally, explanations for differences in collaborative policies and practices 
between the United States and Japan which might rest on the involvement of different 
sets of domestic institutions in defense and space collaborations can not account for 
these differences on the sole basis of the structure of domestic institutions, since 
relations between the relevant bureaucracies and their contractors for defense and space 
were similar in each state and the relevant industrial sectors overlap. If an explanation 
that rests on domestic institutions is going to be persuasive, it must explain the 
differences in domestic institutions in terms of their particularistic histories, the 
meaning of their institutional enterprises, and their policymaking. Yet, if that is the 
case—if conventional explanations that place a premium on structure and deduction 
will not suffice—then the differences in U.S.-Japan relations which were described in 
this chapter can be taken as a call for an interpretative account of how the political, the 
technical, and the material are brought together in collaborations such that differences in 
inter-state relations and in policies for intergovernmental technoscientific 
collaborations can be explained. An interpretative account of inter-state relations in 
technoscience might include, but need not be limited to, interactions among institutions 
with particularistic histories and patterns of policymaking. This dissertation strives to 
do just that, using an approach that it argues is more compelling than two interpretative 
alternatives: the epistemic communities approach and actor-network theory. Without 
overlooking the character of various national institutions, the subsequent chapters of 
this dissertation explains the policies and practices of U.S.-Japan intergovernmental 
collaboration in science and technology as “technoscientific diplomacy” in which 
scientists, engineers, and bureaucrats in the United States and Japan effect particular 
U.S.-Japan inter-state relations in their knowledge-making and exercise of state power. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
TWO COMMUNITIES OF REMOTE-SENSING PRACTICE  
AND STATES’ GOALS 
  
This chapter describes the technical practices, institutions, and state goals that 
informed the work of the U.S. and Japan teams of the intergovernmental collaboration 
on the ASTER remote-sensing system. The chapter first argues that geologic 
remote-sensing scientists and engineers in the United States and Japan were, before 
their collaboration, members of two distinct and separate communities, communities 
of practice which differed in their professional interests, in their technical practices, 
and in their institutional relationships to their respective states. The chapter then turns 
to the origins of U.S. and Japan state goals, describing how the governments of the 
United States and Japan wanted their forthcoming remote-sensing systems to achieve 
goals that potentially conflicted. As chapters four, five, and six illustrate, these 
differences in community and state goals were persistent sources of techno-political 
problems that U.S. and Japan scientists and engineers confronted, negotiated, set aside, 
and settled through their technoscientific diplomacy. 
 
Two Geologic Remote-Sensing Communities:  
One in the United States, Another in Japan 
 
 The “U.S. science team” and the “Japan science team” for ASTER were 
constituted from two scientific communities that practiced geologic remote sensing 
quite differently. These two communities of practice not only had different visions of 
what they wanted to do, including different scientific and professional goals. They also 
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differed with each other in the kind of scientific work that they had done and in how 
they typically went about doing that science, particularly with respect to their 
relationships with their government sponsors and with the developers of the 
instrumentation that they used in their scientific investigations. While not strictly 
representative of the deeply diverse remote-sensing, environmental, and earth science 
communities in the United States or Japan, the different perspectives and practices that 
the two teams brought to the negotiating table of their technoscientific diplomacy was 
nevertheless indicative of what it meant to do geologic remote sensing in the United 
States and Japan. They inhabited and sustained distinct forms of techno-political life 
that were bound to—but far from determined by—national bureaucracies that 
themselves were different in mission and in character. 
Before they became members of the U.S. science team that helped develop 
the ASTER remote-sensing system, the members of the “U.S. science team” all shared 
an intellectual interest in the activity of developing techniques to acquire, to process, 
and to analyze remote-sensing data.1 Most, but not all, of the U.S. science team had 
been a part of the same geology and geophysics group at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
in Pasadena, California for at least several years before their future collaboration with 
Japan’s scientists and engineers on the ASTER remote-sensing system. Many had 
worked in the same building and on the same floor, literally down the hall from each 
other for well over a decade. The professional interests of this well-known and 
widely-respected group were principally in the “thermal infrared” region of the 
electromagnetic spectrum.2 In the late 1970s these JPL researchers, who would 
                                                  
1 The use of the term “U.S. science team” here is anachronistic for two reasons. First, the members 
of the U.S. team had not yet been collected together as a team, and second, the “U.S.” label had not 
yet been attached to them. Nevertheless, for the sake of convenience, I will carefully use the term, 
usually with clarification and qualification nearby in the text. The same disclaimer applies to my 
anachronistic use of the term “Japan science team.” 
2 I am using the term “thermal infrared” to refer to the general region of the electromagnetic 
spectrum with wavelengths from about 3 to 13 microns, particularly the 8-12 micron region. 
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become key members of the U.S. ASTER science team, were contracted by NASA’s 
Office of Space Science and Applications to develop and calibrate a satellite 
instrument and to interpret the instrument’s measurements of the thermal infrared 
temperature of the earth’s surface.3  In the early 1980s, these researchers were 
similarly contracted to develop and calibrate another thermal instrument and to 
interpret its data. This instrument, called the Thermal Infrared Multispectral Scanner, 
or TIMS, was an aircraft-based sensor that was able, for the first time, to discriminate 
among, and in some cases identify, important geologic constituents of the earth’s 
surface, such as rocks and minerals. These geologic constituents had been 
indistinguishable when using previous instruments, which were sensitive only to other 
spectral regions (such as visible light and shortwave infrared regions).4  Future 
members of the U.S. ASTER science team, including some members who were in 
JPL’s geology and geophysics group, had also conducted research and development in 
the visible and shortwave infrared regions,5 including assisting in the development of 
two aircraft systems for those regions.6 But the core of the future ASTER science 
team had been focused for decades on developing instrumentation for acquiring 
thermal data, and they were interested in using that instrumentation mainly for such 
scientific applications as geologic analysis and volcanology.7 
                                                  
3 I am referring here to the Heat Capacity Mapping Mission, a thermal satellite instrument 
launched in 1978. See, Kahle, Palluconi, LeVine, Abrams, Nash, Alley, and Schieldge (1982), 
Abrams, Kahle, Palluconi, and Schieldge (1984), and Kahle, Schieldge, and Alley (1984), as well 
as earlier foundational work, such as Gillespie and Kahle (1977). 
4 Kahle and Goetz (1983) and Palluconi and Meeks (1985). 
5 See, for instance, Abrams, Ashley, Rowan, Goetz, and Kahle (1977), and Kahle and Rowan 
(1980). 
6 Namely, the Airborne Imaging Spectrometer and the Airborne Visible and Infrared Imaging 
Spectrometer. For a general overview of these efforts, see NASA (1987a: 4-9). 
7 See, for instance, Abrams, Kahle, Palluconi, and Schieldge (1984), Kahle, Schieldge, and Alley 
(1984), and Kahle, Gillespie, Abbott, Abrams, Walker, Hoover, and Lockwood (1988). 
Occasionally, however, members of this community did involve itself more directly in the 
applications of remote sensing. A prominent example among this group was Michael Abrams, who 
was the principal investigator of the “Joint NASA/Geosat Test Case Project,” a public/private 
cooperative investigation of remote sensing for mineral and petroleum exploration. See Abrams, 
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  These researchers shared more than their scientific interest in thermal 
infrared instrumentation and data analysis, however. They shared practices and 
understandings that regarded remote-sensing research and development as a technical 
activity that demanded acumen for integrating scientific and technological aspects of 
remote sensing, a variety of project management skills, and entrepreneurship. An 
extensive history of collaborating together, a history that spanned over fifteen years in 
many cases and that included proposing and carrying out together “mission-oriented” 
projects for NASA such as those mentioned above, reinforced these shared practices 
and understandings among this community of geologic remote-sensing scientists. 
For the remote-sensing missions outlined above, this community of scientists 
had taken on leadership positions that had involved them at one time or another both 
in scientific work, such as geological field work, and in instrument design and 
development. The term “technoscience” appropriately describes the hybrid nature of 
their work. When NASA awarded a contract to the researchers at JPL for a 
space-based or aircraft-based remote-sensing investigation, these researchers 
sometimes subcontracted outside of JPL for the engineering, instead of doing the work 
in-house. Nevertheless, the JPL scientists, as the “principal investigator,” “co-principal 
investigator,” or “instrument scientist,” managed and were responsible for that work. 
In particular, Dr. Anne Kahle, who would become the team leader for the U.S. science 
team for the ASTER instrument had been both a principal investigator and an 
instrument scientist. Because all of the scientists who would become part of the U.S. 
ASTER team worked on a contract basis, often dividing their time among several 
contracts, and because for many of the scientists these contracts paid for a large 
portion of their positions, tasks such as proposal writing, project management, and 
                                                                                                                                               
Conel, and Lang (1985). He and Alan Gillespie were also vice-presidents in the 1970s of 
GeoImages, Inc., of Altadena, California, a firm that provided mineral and petroleum exploration 
companies with computationally-enhanced satellite data and data interpretation services. 
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keeping patrons pleased were an integral part of their technoscientific practice, 
whether they liked it or not. The character of their work was, as some JPL scientists 
themselves put it, “entrepreneurial.”8  
This way of carrying out their business of remote-sensing research and 
development brought with it a degree of organizational autonomy and professional 
independence. Michael Abrams was a geologic remote-sensing scientist at JPL and a 
core member of the U.S. science team for ASTER. When Anne Kahle retired in 2003, 
he became the team leader for the U.S. science team. In an interview in 2001, I asked 
Abrams if any of the re-organizations at JPL in the 1990s affected his work. He 
replied: 
 
We’re pretty much immune from any re-organizations that happen here [at 
JPL]. It doesn’t matter very much what goes on above us . . . this divison here, 
division 32, is the science division. And it’s different than the rest of the lab. 
Many of the people here are self-supporting, entrepreneurial types like myself. 
I am self-funded, for the most part. 90% of the lab is not that way. Ninety 
percent of the lab punch a time clock and know they are hired by somebody 
to do an engineering job, and they don’t go out and get the money. . . . so we 
are kind of an anomaly here. But because of that we’re sort of isolated from 
managerial changes at the top. Reorganizations [and such]—bla bla bla. And 
it’s been that way for the 30 years since I have been here.9 
 
As Abrams’s use of “we” and as that last remark about 30 years both hint, while the 
way this community of scientists conducted and financially supported their research 
might have provided these scientists with some organizational distinction and 
autonomy vis-à-vis JPL, the individual researchers at JPL were not transient free 
agents who worked alone or relocated their office to wherever they might find work. 
While they did “go out and get the money,” they almost always got the money from 
NASA, albeit through a competitive, peer-reviewed process. In addition, they are part 
                                                  
8 Abrams (2001), Palluconi (2001), and Kahle (2003a). 
9 See Abrams (2001). Abrams’s comments about the group’s autonomy vis-à-vis JPL were in 
agreement with comments made by Palluconi (2001) and Kahle (2003a). 
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of a long-standing community at JPL whose members know each other well and are 
professionally identified as members of the geologic remote-sensing community at 
JPL. Almost all of the U.S. ASTER science team—and not only the dozen or so 
scientists who were or who had been at JPL—previously worked together in some 
significant way at one point or another before the ASTER project. They had together 
authored well-regarded (and widely-cited) joint textbooks and publications. On 
occasion these articles made the cover of a prestigious journal, displaying the latest in 
remote-sensing imagery.10 
 In the late 1980s, when the ASTER collaboration was just beginning, the 
situation was different in Japan. While the central figure in the business of developing 
geologic remote sensing at JPL was the scientist serving as principal investigator,11 
the central “figure” of government-sponsored geologic remote-sensing development 
projects in Japan was the program manager—but in the plural. These program 
managers worked at non-profit corporate consortia (zaidan hōjin) that were established 
under the jurisdiction of a government ministry, Japan’s Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI). The “centrality” of the program managers in Japan, 
                                                  
10 Their tight professional relationships are of course no coincidence. As will be explained below, 
for the most part, Team Leader Anne Kahle and her Deputy Team Leader, Frank Palluconi, invited 
scientists with whom they had worked previously, and with whom they were personally familiar, to 
join what became the U.S. ASTER science team. See Palluconi (2001). For some conspicuous 
co-authored publications, see Abrams, Ashley, Rowan, and Goetz (1977); the textbook Remote 
Sensing in Geology, Siegal and Gillespie (1980); Kahle and Goetz (1983); and chapters 13 and 31 
of Manual of Remote Sensing, Colwell (1983). 
11 This characterization of the central importance of the principal investigator in geologic remote 
sensing at JPL should not be taken too far. In particular, it should not be used to reduce the process 
of research and development to just that individual. Principal investigators could, and did, delegate 
their authority and responsibilities across a team and were, at times, institutionally required to do 
so. For example, principal investigators worked hand-in-hand with individuals who were the 
“project managers” employed by the responsible institutions such as JPL and Goddard Space 
Flight Center. The project manager often was counted upon to keep a closer eye on important 
organizational and administrative matters such as budgeting, documentation, scheduling, and 
compliance with institutional regulations. It is also important to note that not all remote-sensing 
instruments sponsored by NASA were instruments proposed by principal investigators. Some, like 
HIRIS and MODIS, were instruments proposed by NASA facilities which later came to have lead 
instrument scientists. 
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however, was of a much different kind than that of the principal investigator in the 
United States.12 While a principal investigator in the United States was the central 
authority who shaped the character of his or her instrument and scientific investigation, 
program managers at non-profit corporate consortia in Japan were managing an 
enterprise that came to them largely not of their own making. Their authority was 
more circumscribed by the institutions and bureaucratic system of which they were a 
part. 
The remote-sensing research and development project that the program 
manager in Japan found himself overseeing almost always came about through an 
extended committee-based bureaucratic process. This process involved the 
corporations that partly sponsored the relevant consortia, the government ministry that 
funded the project, informal advisors for the ministry or consortia, and the contractors 
who carried out the engineering of the project—contractors who may or may not have 
been members of a program manager’s consortium. If scientists who were not 
employed by one of the consortia or corporations, such as academic scientists, 
participated in this development process, they served as advisors to the consortia on 
behalf of the government ministry. Since these non-corporate scientists were typically 
working at national institutes or national universities, they were already civil servants, 
and consequently, they were not given additional compensation for the significant time 
they spent advising the government’s and corporate consortia’s research and 
development project.13 As civil servants, they were supporting a national project.14 
                                                  
12 This introduction to the institutional circumstances of program managers in MITI’s zaidan hōjin 
in the late 1980s and to how they were advised by scientists and engineers draws upon accounts 
from numerous interviews, mainly conducted in Japanese, including Yamaguchi (2002), Fujisada 
(2003), Ishii (2003), Kudoh (2003), Takenouchi (2003), Watanabe (2003), and Yokota (2004). 
13 This practice was apparently not standard across ministries in Japan. Like MITI, the Science 
and Technology Agency under the Ministry of Education during this time did not compensate 
researchers from national institutes for their support of government projects, but unlike MITI, the 
Science and Technology Agency did provide minimal compensation for consulting carried out by 
researchers at national universities. See, Satō (2005). 
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Program managers took into account the advice of these scientists to the 
extent that these scientists were able to influence the decisions of the formal 
committees of the program manager’s consortium, committees in which these 
scientists might have sat as members or even perhaps chaired. In sum, a program 
manager for a remote-sensing research and development project sponsored by the 
Government of Japan faced a more complex collection of overlapping interests and 
users than the typical principal investigator in the United States, largely by virtue of 
the program manager being embedded in and working for a consortium that was an 
institutional meeting ground for the Government of Japan and various industry 
corporations. 
 One such public interest, non-profit industry consortium was the Earth 
Resources Satellite Data Analysis Center (ERSDAC), which was founded in 1981 
under the jurisdiction of Japan’s MITI.15 It was one of many new organizations 
established in response to the oil shocks of the 1970s. ERSDAC came to play an 
important role in Japan’s geologic remote-sensing community: the consortium 
articulated and advanced the concerns of industrial users in the development and 
operation of remote-sensing instrumentation in Japan. ERSDAC’s founding board of 
directors included executives from oil and mining firms such as the Arabian Oil 
Company (a firm incorporated in Japan), the Dowa Mining Company, the Indonesia 
Oil Company (again, a firm incorporated in Japan), the Japan National Oil Corporation, 
the Japan Petroleum Exploration Company, the Mitsubishi Metal Corporation, the 
Nittetsu Mining Company, and the Sumitomo Metal Mining Company. The board 
included high-level representatives from industry associations such as the Japan 
                                                                                                                                               
14 See, Yamaguchi (2002), Fujisada (2003), and Yokota (2004). 
15 ERSDAC was legally founded as a zaidan hōjin (a juridical foundation), which itself was a type 
of kōeki hōjin (public-interest corporation). ERSDAC’s Japanese name was shigen kansoku kaiseki 
sentā. See Sōritsu jūnenshi henshū iinkai (1993). 
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Machinery Federation, the Japan Petroleum Development Association, and the Society 
of Japanese Aerospace Companies, as well as from government agencies such as the 
Metal Mining Agency of Japan. At its founding, ERSDAC’s board of twenty-three 
directors also included two university professors, both of whom were from the faculty 
of engineering at the University of Tokyo and had former students who worked for 
some of ERSDAC’s corporate sponsors.16 In the 1980s, ERSDAC received grants 
from MITI, government agencies, and industry associations to carry out studies on the 
use of remote-sensing technologies for exploiting non-renewable energy and mining 
resources as well as studies on the development of remote-sensing data processing and 
analysis systems. 
Another public-interest, non-profit industry consortium under the jurisdiction 
of MITI was JAROS, or the Japan Resources Observation System organization.17 
Toshiba, NEC, Hitachi, Fujitsu, and Mitsubishi Electric together established JAROS in 
1986 for the particular purpose of promoting and coordinating, supposedly on behalf 
of MITI’s Space Industry Division, the development of remote-sensing sensors. 
JAROS’s scientists and engineers, with the support of academic and government 
researchers in an advisory capacity, would manage the hardware engineering of 
ASTER. 
ERSDAC and JAROS were both bolstered—in terms of their budgets, 
capabilities, and expertise—by their central involvement in the development and 
operation of Japan’s first land remote-sensing satellite system, a system called the 
Japan Earth Resources Satellite number 1 (JERS-1). The development of JERS-1 in 
                                                  
16 Sōritsu jūnenshi henshū iinkai (1993: 97). 
17 JAROS is an acronym for JApan Resources Observation System organization. A more literal 
translation of the Japanese name of the organization is “earth resource observation systems 
development organization” (the Japanese is shigen tansa-yō kansoku sisutemu kenkyū kaihatsu 
kikō). JAROS was preceded by the Technology Research Association for Resources 
Remote-Sensing Systems. See Kōkōgyō gijutsu kenkyū kumiai kondankai (1991: 102). 
  
 
98
the early-to-mid 1980s illustrates how Japan’s institutions tackled the development of 
geologic remote-sensing systems before the U.S.-Japan collaboration on ASTER came 
onto the scene in the late 1980s. The JERS-1 sensors were built by MITI with two 
mission objectives in mind: the development of remote-sensing sensor technology and 
the geologic investigation and exploitation of non-renewable resources.18 The latter 
objective allowed MITI’s Space Industry Division to fund its primary interest—the 
“nurturing” of remote-sensing technology—from a special account whose source of 
revenue was an import tax on petroleum.19 The petroleum tax account was dedicated 
to expenditures that worked toward maintaining a stable reserve of oil for Japan and 
developing energy-saving technologies.20  
By using funds from this special account to sponsor—through ERSDAC—the 
development of technologies and methods for utilizing data from JERS-1 (e.g., a data 
and information system), MITI was able to assist the same companies upon which the 
petroleum import tax was levied. More important for MITI’s Space Industry Division, 
however, was that its sponsorship of the JERS-1 system also benefited the division’s 
primary sector of industrial responsibility—aerospace and space electronics firms. 
Yokota Makoto, who was Deputy Director of MITI’s Space Industry Division from 
1989 to 1992, recalled that: 
 
                                                  
18 See Ishizawa, Takamura, Saito, Niwa, Kuramasu, and Iwai (1986: 291), Jinkō eisei kaihatsu 
honbu chikyū kansoku eisei gurūpu (1991: 1-1), Kudo, Fujisada, Kato, Hashimoto, and Hino 
(1992: 319), and National Space Development Agency of Japan (1992: 11). The concept of the 
JERS-1 instrument was a union of a concept for a “land satellite” that was to be developed by the 
National Space Development Agency and a “mining and earth resources satellite” that was to be 
developed by MITI. The National Space Development Agency developed the JERS-1 launching 
system and satellite bus and MITI’s consortia developed the JERS-1 mission instruments. For a 
brief account of the compromise that led to the JERS-1, see Nakayama’s “prehistory” (1986: 3). 
19 The Japanese verb sodateru (to rear, to bring up, to raise, to nurture, to foster, to grow), as well 
as the orthographically related word ikusei-suru (to cultivate, to train, to nourish), was used 
overwhelming in primary source materials and by interviewees to describe MITI’s relationship to 
the aerospace industry. See, for example, Fujisada (2003), Ishii (2003), Kudoh (2003), and 
Takenouchi (2003). 
20 See Ishii (2003), Watanabe (2003), and Yokota (2004). 
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The direction of MITI during this time [the mid-to-late 1980s] emphasized 
the development of new instruments but without any adjustments to 
infrastructure. It was the way of thinking in the mid-1980s that MITI would 
develop new instruments, and provided their capabilities were validated, users 
(and here I [Yokota] am assuming private companies) would later probably 
manufacture and operate the earth observation system for themselves.21 
 
If Japanese geologic remote-sensing scientists outside corporations were 
going to be a part of the development of remote-sensing sensors and systems in Japan, 
they would need to do so by involving themselves as advisors for projects that were 
carried out by consortia such as ERSDAC or JAROS. Otherwise, national institute and 
university scientists were confined to just using imagery produced by satellites over 
whose design and operation they had no influence, much as they had been previously 
confined in their use of the U.S. Geological Survey’s Landsat satellites or the satellites 
of other states since the mid-1970s.22 Japanese scientists who in the late 1980s 
became involved with the ERSDAC and JAROS consortia generally conducted 
research that focused on image analyses that were heavily dependent upon 
mathematical techniques and simulations. That is, during the early-to-mid 1980s, these 
scientists rarely carried out empirical investigations that involved intimate knowledge 
of, or coordination with, remote-sensing instrumentation.23 Moreover, as long as 
Japanese scientists were only data users who did not exercise influence over the design, 
development, and operation of instrumentation, not only was their research limited in 
methodological form, but what they could research was also restricted by the design 
                                                  
21 See Yokota (2004). 
22 For a brief of remote-sensing activities in Japan during that time, see Sakata (1980). 
23 See, for example, Tsuchiya, Arai, and Ishida (1982), Yasuoka and Miyazaki (1982), Ishii and 
Rokugawa (1982), Yamaguchi (1984), Arai (1985), Urai, Kōda, Satō, and Tsu (1985), and Ishii, 
Rokugawa, and Katō (1988). The very few exceptions to this generalization typically involved the 
use of aircraft-based sensors rather than space-based sensors. See Suyama, Ishii, Yamaguchi, 
Kamata, Hase, and Ogawa (1982). 
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choices of others—such as the engineers working for the manufacturers who might 
have different priorities for the instrument’s capabilities.24 
Regarding this point, the contrast in the early-to-mid-1980s between the 
practices of geologic remote-sensing scientists in Japan and the scientists at JPL could 
not have been starker. During this time, the remote-sensing scientists at JPL who were 
working under principal scientist arrangements exercised much more control over 
instrumentation, instrumentation that produced the data that they would use to create 
knowledge about the earth. In the 1980s, the JPL scientists were accustomed to being 
major players in deciding what phenomena their instruments could measure and when 
and where “their” instruments would measure the phenomena of interest. Their 
research not only used the instrument to characterize phenomena, but also, owing to 
their control of the instrumentation, they were able to use phenomena to characterize 
the performance of the instrument. Because the geologic remote-sensing scientists in 
Japan, until the late 1980s, had little control or influence over the development and 
operation of the remote-sensing instrumentation that provided the data that they used, 
they were generally relegated to the position of trying to put to use data that had been 
made available by others. Their research practices rarely opened the “black boxes” of 
remote-sensing sensors in the way that the work of the JPL scientists did. 
Control over instrumentation in Japan in the early-to-mid-1980s was 
generally the province of the program managers and manufacturers who were at the 
helm of Japan’s institutions for developing remote-sensing technology, namely Japan’s 
                                                  
24 See Yamaguchi (2002). The importance of integrating matters of instrumentation (presumably 
the domain of “engineering”) into the work of remote-sensing analysis (which was considered a 
“science”) was still an issue worth calling attention to for ERSDAC scientists as late as the early 
1990s. See, for example, Arai Kōhei’s recommendation to train what he called the “sciengineer” in 
ERSDAC News (“sciengineer” was alphabetically written in what otherwise was Japanese text) 
(1992). 
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National Space Development Agency (NASDA) and JAROS,25 and the aerospace and 
electronic manufacturers, such as NEC and Mitsubishi Electric who were regular 
contractors for NASDA and who were founding members of the JAROS consortium.26 
For the JERS-1 satellite, NASDA had been in charge of the design and development of 
the launch vehicle and the satellite bus (the “bus” carries the remote-sensing mission 
instruments in orbit). NASDA had also initially researched JERS-1’s mission 
instruments—that is, the synthetic aperture radar, the visible and near infrared optical 
sensor, the shortwave infrared optical sensor, the data transmitter, and the data recorder. 
The development of the mission instruments was handed off to JAROS’s predecessor 
organization, the Technology Research Association of Resources Remote-Sensing 
System, when that organization was established in 1985, and subsequently to 
JAROS.27 JERS-1’s preliminary design review was held in early 1987 and the critical 
design review was conducted in early 1989. ERSDAC, however, did not become 
involved with analyzing the utility of the instrument for its users until around that time, 
much too late in the development process to have an influence over the instrument’s 
fundamental design.28 Potential industrial users of JERS-1 who were associated with 
ERSDAC and scientists at Japan’s national research institutes (such as at the 
                                                  
25 Including JAROS’s predecessor, the Technology Research Association of Resources 
Remote-Sensing System. See Kōkōgyō gijutsu kenkyū kumiai kondankai (1991: 102). 
26 While firms such as NEC and Mitsubishi Electric were contractors for both NASDA and 
JAROS, NASDA and JAROS were differently involved in remote-sensing system development 
and actually differed in their legal status as institutions. Despite the official English translation of 
its name, NASDA was not a government agency. It was a quasi-public special corporation under 
the jurisdiction of Japan’s Science and Technology Agency and was involved in developing launch 
vehicles, satellite buses, and sometimes, remote-sensing sensors. As has been already discussed, 
JAROS was a private non-profit industry consortium under the jurisdiction of MITI which was 
specifically tasked with developing remote-sensing mission instruments, such as remote-sensing 
sensors. 
27 See Ishizawa, Takamura, Saito, Niwa, Kuramasu, and Iwai (1986: 297-8), Kōkōgyō gijutsu 
kenkyū kumiai kondankai (1991: 102), Kudo, Fujisada, Kato, Hashimoto, and Hino (1992: 319, 
321), and National Space Development Agency (1992: 21). 
28 See Koizumi, Suzuki, Kobayashi, and Kakuichi (1989: 65), Sōritsu jūnenshi henshū iinkai 
(1993: 102), National Space Development Agency (1992: 21), Saitō (1992a: 27), Yamaguchi 
(2002), and Watanabe (2003). 
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Geological Survey of Japan) who were also potential users of JERS-1 remember 
considering JERS-1 in the late 1980s as a satellite heavily influenced by what they 
viewed as the technology development goals of NASDA and NASDA’s engineering 
contractors.29 Over a decade later, one prominent geologist charged that, throughout 
the 1980s, “NASDA was not user oriented” and was more interested in building 
rockets than in designing good remote-sensing satellites.30 
 In the mid-to-late 1980s, prominent geologic remote-sensing scientists at the 
Geological Survey of Japan and at national universities viewed ERSDAC as an 
institutional mechanism through which their voices could influence the development 
and operation of Japan’s remote-sensing satellites.31 They knew that ERSDAC had 
been striving to articulate and advance the voice of users in the development and 
operation of Japan’s remote-sensing satellites. They also reasoned, owing to the fact 
that MITI used the petroleum import tax to fund the development of remote-sensing 
satellites, that the voices of the users from the oil and mining industry—the voices 
whom ERSDAC institutionally represented—would be difficult for MITI to ignore.32 
Thus, while realizing that the scientific and technological interests of oil and mining 
                                                  
29 Yamaguchi (2002) and Watanabe (2003). A research engineer who advised JAROS on JERS-1’s 
hardware also judged that the JERS-1 project had been focused on technology development. See 
Fujisada (2003).  
30 Yamaguchi (2002). While it is not relevant to my description of the geologic remote-sensing 
community in Japan whether or not Yamaguchi’s assessment of NASDA was accurate or not, 
NASDA’s fifty-nine page description of the JERS-1 satellite that was distributed to the press at the 
satellite’s launch did dedicate far more pages to discussing the satellite’s launch vehicle and the 
tracking and control system than it did to the satellite’s mission instruments, such as the 
remote-sensing systems. See National Space Development Agency (1992). Yet, without access to 
the minutes of JERS-1’s specifications committee(s), it is difficult to definitively say to what extent 
the design of JERS-1’s mission instruments did and did not take into consideration the voice of 
users. JAROS officials, as would be expected, have written that “requests from the petroleum 
resource exploration community” were taken into consideration (e.g., Kudo, Fujisada, Kato, 
Hashimoto, and Hino 1992: 321). Still, the design parameters of JERS-1 were, without a doubt, 
established before most of ERSDAC’s studies of the instrument. See, for example, Koizumi, 
Suzuki, Kobayashi, and Kakuichi (1989: 65) and the comments of Saitō (1992a: 27). 
31 Yamaguchi (2002), Yasuoka (2002), and Ishii (2003). 
32 This strategic assessment is most clear in Yamaguchi (2002) but see also Ishii (2003). 
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companies could very well at times diverge from their own33 and that the interests of 
oil and mining companies would likely dominate the institutional environment of 
ERSDAC, many research scientists at Japan’s national institutes and universities who 
had been asked by MITI to support its national projects by providing advice through 
ERSDAC chose to do so and thus to be a part of the system.  
One scientist from the Geological Survey of Japan spoke of the excitement 
(“shigeki”) for him and his colleagues of possibly having the opportunity to contribute 
to the building of what they had hoped would be better remote-sensing systems for 
users.34 What “better” meant at the time was a remote-sensing system that, in 
particular, took more seriously complementarities among multiple sensors, the 
selection of the sensors’ bands of wavelength sensitivity, instrument calibration, and 
data processing and distribution, especially the distribution of calibrated data rather 
than requiring users to calibrate their own data.35 
Although the preferences and practices of researchers and users affiliated with 
ERSDAC in the late 1980s did diverge, at times in specific ways, as a community of 
practice they had much in common, especially when contrasted with the community of 
geologic remote-sensing scientists at JPL during the same period of time. First, as has 
already been discussed, whereas the scientists at JPL had been considerably involved 
in matters of instrument design and operation, the community of geologic 
                                                  
33 For example, some oil and mining firms expressed a preference on occasion to buy data from 
foreign instruments rather than domestically develop instruments that provide data of lesser quality. 
See Ishii (2003) and Watanabe (2003). 
34 The quote is from Yamaguchi (2002). 
35 For example, the three sensors of JERS-1 were, at one time, going to be launched separately 
into different orbits rather than orbit together on the same satellite bus, where they would make 
simultaneous observations. Such a choice, if it had been made, might have been advantageous for 
testing hardware, but it would have been tremendously disadvantageous for drawing conclusions 
about an area of interest which would make use of more than one instrument. Moreover, owing to 
the timing of the studies, the selection of bands of wavelength sensitivity for JERS-1 did not 
benefit from extensive simulations using aircraft based sensors. See Watanabe and Tsukada (1989), 
Watanabe and Tsukada (1992), Saitō (1992a: 27), Watanabe, Mills, Sano, and Tagawa (1993), 
Yamaguchi (2002), Ishii (2003), and Watanabe (2003). 
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remote-sensing scientists associated with ERSDAC generally had not been involved in 
instrument design and operation—although as a community they desired to be. Unlike 
the scientists at JPL in the 1980s, the researchers at ERSDAC in the mid-to-late 1980s 
did not identify with a specific research program or research tool (as many of the JPL 
scientists identified with thermal remote sensing). Rather, the researchers affiliated 
with ERSDAC identified with a particular community of users, users who were a part 
of the natural resources exploration and exploitation industry. 
For a volume put together to commemorate ERSDAC’s tenth-year 
anniversary celebration, a volume which was circulated only in-house to those who 
had been affiliated with ERSDAC during its first ten years, many contributors wrote of 
the importance of ERSDAC for bringing meaning and substance to remote-sensing 
technology by connecting the tool of remote sensing with users. Professor Nakayama 
of Hiroshima Institute of Technology, who served as the chair of an ERSDAC 
advisory committee for research from 1982 into the 1990s, wrote that: 
 
The only problem [with remote sensing in Japan before ERSDAC] concerned 
the various users of [remote-sensing] data. If [remote sensing] does not 
respond to high-level demands from the user, it is meaningless. That is, even 
if we distribute data as [free] allotments, as uniforms passed out to employees, 
I hear that it would not be welcomed by real users. Raising the level of users 
from various fields grows new technologies of earth observation and causes 
these new technologies to become established; furthermore, it has been 
recognized [at ERSDAC] that it is also an urgent policy and is the best policy 
for securing funds.36 
 
Yamazaki Akira, the director of MITI’s Space Industry Division in the early 1990s, 
wrote that ERSDAC was “a central pillar of MITI space policy;” that the consortium 
had raised “expectations for the utilization of remote sensing;” and that ERSDAC was 
“the center of a leap forward” in the use of remote sensing. He, like Professor 
                                                  
36 See Sōritsu jūnenshi henshū iinkai (1993: 72). 
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Nakayama and many other contributors to the volume,37 pushed for ERSDAC to have 
a future research agenda that connected with users: 
 
. . . these things will become necessary [for ERSDAC]: 1) digging up the 
needs of users in industry by accumulating remote-sensing research results 
that university and national research institutes have already come to perform 
and by making clear their effectiveness and availability in industry; 2) 
presenting all sorts of data that a user requires, such as acquisition times and 
acquisition areas concerning the upcoming JERS-1 remote-sensing data, 
together with also offering data related to methods for data use; and 3) to go 
and make a “user oriented” database built from the perspective of the 
industrial user, for the case the case of constructing a database for the purpose 
of the industrial use of future remote sensing.38 
 
In sum, the geologic remote-sensing community of ERSDAC sought to shape the 
development of the remote-sensing instruments and systems that they used, and they 
did so to advance their usefulness to the industrial user community that supported 
ERSDAC. 
 A second commonality of the community of geologic remote sensing which 
was associated with ERSDAC was that this community regularly identified 
themselves as part of the state of Japan and as working together on national projects to 
advance Japan’s state goals in the international arena, such as the exploitation of 
natural resources and the development of remote-sensing technology, which were 
ascribed with the explicit purpose of exploring for natural resources and exploiting 
them effectively. Unlike the community of geologic remote-sensing scientists based in 
JPL in the 1980s, the community in Japan during that time did not imagine themselves 
and their work as tied only tangentially to their state. Geologic remote-sensing 
                                                  
37 See, for further example, the comments of Komatsu Kunio and Fukuhara Genichi at ERSDAC’s 
tenth year anniversary party in the fall of 1991, as recorded in Sōritsu jūnenshi henshū iinkai 
(1993: 7-10). At the time, Komatsu was President of Japan’s National Oil Corporation, and 
Fukuhara was the chairman of ERSDAC’s board of directors and was from the Metal Mining 
Agency of Japan. 
38 See Sōritsu jūnenshi henshū iinkai (1993: 66). 
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scientists conceived of their relationship to the state in more intimate terms than 
contractual arrangements that merely enabled personal research programs. 
Furthermore, whereas before ASTER almost all of the geologic remote-sensing 
scientists at JPL had not worked on international projects on behalf of the United 
States and thus thought of “the international” in terms of geological field sites that 
happened to be abroad,39 for the community of geologic remote-sensing scientists in 
Japan, the state and the international arena—in terms of politics, economics, and 
security—loomed larger in their conceptions of what it meant to do geologic remote 
sensing. 
For example, despite Japan’s economically heady days in the 1980s, the 
importance and legitimacy of calls to technologically “catch up” (oitsuku) and build a 
“nation founded on technology” (kagaku-gijutsu rikkoku) were both assumed. 
Professor Iijima Azuma of the University of Tokyo, who worked with ERSDAC in the 
1980s and who chaired an advisory committee on remote-sensing technology in the 
early 1990s, recalled in his submission to ERSDAC’s in-house tenth year anniversary 
commemorative volume that: 
  
I visited the U.S. for sixteen days in the fall of Showa 58 [1983], the third 
year of ERSDAC’s establishment, and I cannot forget either having 
investigated many times the geology-related remote-sensing technical 
situation with Mr. Ofusa of Nittetsu Mining and with Mr. Sano of the center 
[i.e., ERSDAC]. . . . On an occasion when I visited [in the United States] a 
certain company and a TM image [that is, an image from the United States’ 
Landsat Thematic Mapper remote-sensing sensor] which generally had not 
appeared on the market yet in Japan projected on a television screen, I was 
especially surprised at its clarity. I saw an image-processed picture and a 
partial magnification screen rapidly pop up in an instant, whenever the key of 
the computer was pushed. Although I thought that it would surely be 
interesting if I could do it with my own hand, it was very regrettable that the 
moment passed without a chance.  
My report of my visit to the U.S. nine years ago [in 1983] concluded 
with “Whether or not I feel heartened that our country is rapidly progressing 
                                                  
39 See, for example, Abrams (2001) and Palluconi (2001). 
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depends upon our country’s development of the utilization of satellite 
remote-sensing technology for natural resource inquiry. As soon as possible, 
an independent resources observation satellite will be launched, and I just 
eagerly await its launch, so that analysis may be made with original data.” 
Fuyō-1 [JERS-1]40 successfully launched on February 11th, 1992 and now my 
prayers have come true. ERSDAC has arrived at a new stage, and now I wish 
for more and more development.41 
 
Professor Iijima’s story was told as if it would be shared—as it almost certainly was 
shared—with an audience who would agree with the importance that his story placed 
on the development and use of remote-sensing technology for Japan’s future. 
Moreover, the setting of a trip abroad to the United States, where technology was 
purportedly more advanced, was a circumstance that many in the audience would have 
readily recognized and with which they could have empathized. 
 Nagatani Hirokazu, who was at the time the head of the Geothermal Research 
Department at the Geological Survey of Japan and who had chaired ERSDAC 
advisory committees in the first half of the 1980s, told a similar story of progress as 
Professor Iijima. His tale emphasized not only catching up with the United States, but 
also the legitimacy and responsibilities that came to him and his colleagues who were 
associated with ERSDAC when state projects in which they participated through 
ERSDAC received international attention and involvement: 
 
Because the work that has constituted ERSDAC from the beginning, since its 
establishment, has been that of grasping and acquiring U.S. earth resource 
satellite applied technology that was ahead [of Japan], as it should have been, 
symposiums have often been held that have invited well-known scientists and 
specialists from universities and related organizations, such as the United 
States’ NASA, Geological Survey, and JPL. On those occasions, we used to 
be deeply impressed, knowing that the use of satellite data founded on views 
of the earth were superior in the United States. In our country, in which space 
industry efforts were delayed for the purpose of establishing an early stage of 
independent technology, a developmental system that was led by the 
                                                  
40 Fuyō-1 is the Japanese name for the JERS-1 satellite. Fuyō is a lotus-like flower (Hibiscus 
mutabilis) commonly known as a “Confederate Rose” in the United States. 
41 See Sōritsu jūnenshi henshū iinkai (1993: 71). 
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government was taken. . . . Now, the quality of the satellite image data offered 
by ERSDAC is wonderful. It could be said that we have already reached the 
world-class level in both image-processing and image-analysis technology, 
along with the printing technology which was excellent in our country. . . .  
At the Geological Survey of Japan with which I am affiliated, visits 
from earth resource specialists from developing countries have recently been 
rapidly increasing, and they place much expectation in our country’s resource 
satellite plans. Moreover, the interest in ERSDAC’s performance in data 
processing and analysis is similarly great. . . . How should we, who depend 
upon other countries for resources, contribute to the world, for the purpose of 
living together from now on? The role for an ERSDAC that seizes the precise 
key will no doubt become still larger. The next step [for ERSDAC] is very 
serious.42 
 
Other geologic remote-sensing researchers who, in 1992 and 1993, submitted 
recollections to ERSDAC’s in-house commemorative volume, including Japan’s 
science team leader for the ASTER project,43 told similar stories that lauded their 
efforts at ERSDAC during the 1980s in assisting with Japan’s quest for natural 
resources, in advancing Japan’s technological development vis-à-vis the United States, 
in bringing international recognition to Japan, and in contributing to the international 
community.44 
 A third commonality of the community of geologic remote-sensing scientists 
who were associated with ERSDAC was that much of this community’s research in 
the mid-to-late 1980s focused on the shortwave infrared region of light, owing to its 
expected utility for oil and mining exploration and exploitation, which was after all the 
activity that ERSDAC had been funded to support.45 The optical sensor of JERS-1, 
which was developed in the 1980s by NASDA and then JAROS, had three different 
                                                  
42 Ibid., p. 73. 
43 Ibid., p. 74. 
44 For further examples including, but not exclusive of, geologic remote-sensing researchers, see 
Ibid., p. 5, 6, 10, 66, 72, 76, and 89. 
45 Yamaguchi (2002) and Watanabe (2003). And see Arai (1985), Yamaguchi (1987), Watanabe 
and Tsukada (1989), Urai, Satō, Ninomiya, Kōda, Miyazaki, and Yamaguchi (1992), and Satō 
(1992). ERSDAC researchers did sponsor hyperspectral work to simulate the bands that had 
already been selected for JERS-1. See, for example, Watanabe and Tsukada (1989), Watanaba and 
Tsukada (1992), Okada and Iwashita (1992), and Watanabe, Mills, Sano, and Tagawa (1993). 
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bands of sensitivity in the visible and near infrared region, four in the shortwave 
infrared region, and none in the thermal region of electromagnetic radiation. The 
visible bands, with stereo capability in one band, were anticipated to be used for 
geographic reference and mapping, and the shortwave infrared bands would be used 
for geologic analysis.46 In contrast, as has been discussed, the research of the geologic 
remote-sensing scientists who were based out of JPL generally investigated remote 
sensing techniques in the thermal region.47 
 In sum, those scientists and engineers who would become members of either 
“U.S. science team” or the “Japan science team” shared in the mid-to-late 1980s with 
most of the other members of their future national team a coherent bundle of 
techno-political practices, understandings, and commitments which contrasted with 
those of the other team. These two forms of life were to some extent indicative of the 
different institutional arrangements for doing geologic remote-sensing science in each 
state. The two sets of future members generally sought to craft remote-sensing 
techniques in different electromagnetic regions, one in thermal infrared and the other 
in shortwave infrared, in order to make different types of remote-sensing knowledge, 
knowledge that would in turn draw recognition from and serve different users and 
government patrons. What they researched and how they went about their research 
reflected and maintained different techno-political arrangements. A contract-based, 
entrepreneurial principal investigator in the United States—even one who, after being 
vetted through peer-review was largely at the mercy of one set of administrators and 
one basic source of funding—has a form of life that allows for technoscientific 
practices that open up the “black box” of technology to redesign and tweak 
                                                  
46 See Jinkō eisei kaihatsu honbu chikyū kansoku eisei gurūpu (1991: 1-1) and Kudo, Fujisada, 
Kato, Hashimoto, and Hino (1992: 319, 321). Also see note 18. 
47 This is not to say that geologic remote-sensing scientists associated with ERSDAC did not 
occasionally conduct research in the thermal region (see, e.g., Ninomiya and Satō 1992), just that 
as a community they had built up much greater expertise in the shortwave infrared region. 
  
 
110
instrumentation and operations in the name of better results for “science.” These 
results in the name of science presumptively lead to, among other things, increased 
recognition from a scientific community and a funding agency which have particular 
(but changing) ideas of what is scientifically interesting, significant, and credible.  
The form of life of a university or government scientist in Japan who sits in 
an advisory capacity to industry consortia that develop and operate instruments in the 
name of serving national goals allows for, and encourages, practices that either 
distance the scientist from instrumentation (such as calculation and simulation) or 
foster cooperation with those who are more immediate to the instrumentation (such as 
committee-based analyses and team investigations undertaken with consortia program 
managers and contractors). Given the long-standing, specific goals of MITI’s Space 
Industry Division, the particular funding source that it draws from to support remote 
sensing, and the mission of the industry consortia under its jurisdiction, a researcher in 
this latter form of life exercises and expands his influence over a project by working 
with program managers in the consortia, or perhaps in MITI, and appealing to and 
advancing their goals. Owing to the interdependencies associated with the authority of 
program managers, their goals typically take into account the national goals and the 
goals of corporate members. After all, while the expertise of the scientist from the 
university or national lab might be compelling for many reasons, the consortia and its 
member corporations employ many researchers who are integral to the development 
and operation of an instrument and who outnumber the academic and government lab 
researchers within a given remote-sensing project. 
In contrast, in the form of techno-political life shared by the group centered 
around JPL, a principal investigator arrangement already has delegated to that research 
group considerable authority. How power within that group is exercised can be 
contingent upon factors that are very particular to the dynamics of that group and the 
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management of the principal investigator. National goals and the goals of users who 
are not professionally (i.e., socially) connected to that group, although they typically 
need to be taken into consideration—especially when government funding agencies 
call the principal investigator to account for his or her work—are not necessarily 
strongly-held commitments shared by researchers within the group and do not 
necessarily serve as resources for action. These were the two forms of techno-political 
life that the members of the U.S. and Japan teams lived in the mid-to-late 1980s. When 
pushed together, how the members of these two teams would work as a joint team was 
far from determined by their past practices, understandings, and commitments. Yet, 
even if these team members desired as individuals to cast off their respective forms of 
techno-political life to single-mindedly serve some designated national interest or to 
effect international cooperation, they would likely find it difficult to do so. To achieve 
something new, they first needed to work with what they knew. 
 
The Origins of States’ Goals 
 
To realize state goals, the United States’ NASA and Japan’s MITI enlisted the 
above two geologic remote-sensing communities into a collaboration. This 
collaboration would build and operate what would become the ASTER remote-sensing 
system. Before core members of these communities met together in Tokyo in March of 
1989 and presented their instrument concepts to each other, these two communities 
had not worked together to forge common understandings about their instrument’s 
purpose, design, and capabilities. The two communities had not even shared or 
discussed with each other in a general way their previous work (at, say, international 
scientific conferences). Before the ASTER collaboration, while the research of the U.S. 
scientists was very well-known and was almost canonical to many of the scientists 
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who would constitute the Japan science team,48 the Japanese scientists (and engineers) 
were simply unknowns to the U.S. scientists.49 What the U.S. scientists did know, 
however, was that the Japanese organizations, on whose behalf the Japanese scientists 
worked, seemed to have had acquired a slot to fly an instrument on a NASA earth 
observing satellite,50 a slot that they wished they had themselves received, but had not. 
The JPL scientists and other scientists from the United States would need to work with, 
what were to them, relatively unknown Japanese scientists if they were going to take 
advantage of the opportunity that NASA’s plans for a massive earth observing system 
offered for advancing their research objectives and their individual careers. Likewise, 
by flying an instrument on a NASA earth observing satellite, the Japanese 
scientists—and the earth resource bureaucracies that they advised and served—would 
need to be integrated in some to-be-determined way with NASA’s earth observing 
system. To carry out this international cooperation and integration in a politically 
justifiable way, the U.S. and Japan scientists addressed, re-articulated, and in some 
cases, re-defined the state goals that they would work to realize through their 
development of the ASTER system. The state goals with which the U.S. and Japan 
science teams had initially been charged were not necessarily complementary or 
mutually-supporting; in practice, the goals of each state at times clashed. 
 
EOS and the Origins of U.S. State Goals 
 
The United States’ goals for the ASTER collaboration largely followed from 
the instrument’s importance to the success of a national “big science” project, NASA’s 
                                                  
48 Interviews with Yamaguchi (2002) and Matsunaga (2003). 
49 Interviews with Abrams (2001), Biggar (2001), Hook (2001), Palluconi (2001), Thome (2001), 
Kahle (2003a), and Pieri (2003). 
50 At that time, the earth observing “satellite” was conceived to be of such a size that it was 
considered a “platform” rather than a satellite. 
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earth observing system (EOS). In the late 1980s, NASA’s plan for an earth observing 
system was the centerpiece of NASA’s proposal for a “Mission to Planet Earth.” In 
1990, both EOS and the Mission to Planet Earth became classified as part of the U.S. 
Global Change Research Program. In the U.S. Global Change Research Program’s 
fiscal year 1990 budget, spending on EOS comprised about seventy percent of the 
$660 million that was “focused” on global change research.51 Although in the early 
1990s, EOS became associated with climate change research and was typically 
discussed within the context of umbrella programs such as the Mission to Planet Earth 
and the U.S. Global Change Research Program, to think of EOS as something driven 
by high-profile and high-level programs would be historically inaccurate and would 
risk misunderstanding the United States’ goals for EOS and, ultimately, the United 
States’ goals for ASTER. 
Planning for EOS pre-dated ASTER, the Mission to Planet Earth, the U.S. 
Global Change Research Program, and the United States’ public discussion and 
national policy formulation regarding global change. More specifically, EOS was 
conceived before the national debate in the United States about the causes and 
significance of ozone depletion and global warming, and before the administrations of 
President Reagan or Bush confronted the issue of global climate change in terms of 
policymaking. In brief, unlike the ASTER collaboration, EOS—of which ASTER 
would be just a part—was not originally conceived to fulfill specific, pre-determined, 
and explicit goals of the United States as a state. The ASTER collaboration was in fact 
initiated by NASA and MITI for specific scientific and political purposes, purposes 
                                                  
51 U.S. Global Change Research Program, Committee on Earth Sciences (1990). The Committee 
on Earth Sciences’ compilation of budgets distinguished between funds “focused on” global 
change research and funds that “contributed to” global change research. The Committee on Earth 
Sciences was an interagency coordinating body for global change research which was established 
in 1987 under the Executive Branch’s Office of Science and Technology Policy’s Federal 
Coordinating Committee on Science, Engineering, and Technology. 
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which—for the United States—were intimately tied to bolstering the Earth Observing 
System. In 1989, however, the EOS concept itself was still very much evolving 
scientifically, technically, and politically. To understand the meaning and significance 
of the ASTER project for the United States’ goals, we must understand how and when 
ASTER was tied to the United States’ goals for EOS and to the evolution of EOS from 
a concept to a project. 
EOS had been in the sights of NASA scientists and engineers as early as 1981, 
when an ad hoc NASA study group met to discuss how the Earth—including its land, 
ocean, and atmospheric environments—could be measured and characterized in a 
systematic, integrated, and synergistic way.52 At the time, NASA’s new managers, 
who had come in with the Reagan administration, were actively searching for and 
examining new missions for NASA. Burton Edelson, the new director of NASA’s 
Office of Space Science and Applications under whose auspices the 1981 ad hoc study 
had convened, was attracted to the study’s idea of a space-based global monitoring 
system both for its research value and for its potential as a way to shore up and 
advance his office’s and NASA’s mission. His boss, James Beggs, the new NASA 
administrator, was interested too. The space shuttle was supposed to shift soon to 
operational use, and while the space station as a presidentially-approved program was 
still years away, it was anticipated that if the platforms for earth observing instruments 
were tied to the space station program, EOS could then be seen as part of the space 
station program rather than as competing with it for funding dollars. Tepid support 
from the scientific community for the costly space station program could be 
strengthened. The collections of earth observing instruments on these large platforms 
would also require the space shuttle in order to be serviced. Finally, EOS as a new 
                                                  
52 This study group was known in NASA parlance as “System Z” (Greenstone 1989:2). Anne 
Kahle, a future leader of the United States’ science team for ASTER, was a participant in this study 
group. See, Kahle (2003a). 
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multibillion dollar program might have a better chance of getting off the ground if it 
were integrated with existing programs such as the space station.53 
Other study groups sponsored in the early-to-mid 1980s by NASA and its 
Office of Space Science and Applications—study groups that had been organized 
under diverse charges but which had overlapping membership and interrelated 
ideas—endorsed concepts of a space-based earth observation system which were 
similar to those discussed by NASA’s ad hoc group in 1981. The cluster of these study 
groups included: a NASA-sponsored conference at Woods Hole in 1982 on the earth’s 
“habitability;” a study of the National Academy of Sciences’ Committee on Earth 
Sciences in 1982 that recommended an EOS concept in its “Strategy for Earth Science 
from Space;” an internal NASA study in 1983 and 1984 of the science and mission 
requirements for the EOS concept that had been proposed by the other study groups; a 
large National Academy of Sciences Space Science Board study commissioned by 
NASA in 1984 to define the future of space science disciplines, including planetary 
and earth sciences; a NASA advisory group formed in 1983 called the “Earth Systems 
Science Committee” that operated in parallel with the National Academy of Sciences – 
Space Science Board study; and a working group of NASA, called the “EOS science 
steering committee,” that built upon the EOS concept advanced in NASA’s earlier 
1984 internal study and that also drew upon the work of the “Earth Systems Science 
Committee.”54 All of the “earth observing system” concepts endorsed by these 
studies—studies backed by the names of the many well-regarded scientists who had 
                                                  
53 See Edelson (1988: 6-7), Stevens (1990: C1), Taubes (1993: 912), and Lambright (1994: 99). 
54 Those studies were, respectively, Goody (1982), National Research Council (1982), NASA 
(1984), NASA Advisory Council (1986, 1988), National Research Council (1988), and NASA 
(1987b). Working groups of the International Council of Scientific Unions also authored studies in 
the mid-1980s supporting EOS as a concept (e.g., International Council of Scientific Unions 1986, 
1988). 
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participated in them—sought to globally measure, monitor, research, and assess the 
earth as a holistic system. 
NASA’s science steering committee for EOS described in 1987 the 
over-arching objective of EOS as helping scientists “to quantitatively characterize our 
planet and provide the basis for a scientific understanding of the global system which 
is the Earth.” 55  The science steering committee further asserted that “this 
understanding will enable us to predict the future state of the environment and how it 
will respond to natural events and human activities.”56 In 1988, after global climate 
change and its relationship to “human activities” had become subjects of congressional 
hearings and were prominently reported in the news,57 the National Academy of 
Sciences study that NASA had commissioned in 1984 opened its final report not by 
focusing on just climate change, but rather by declaring in the broadest terms of all the 
previous studies its hopes for EOS and the Mission to Planet Earth concepts: 
 
We now have the technology and the incentive to move boldly forward on a 
Mission to Planet Earth. We call on the nation to implement an integrated 
global program using both space-borne and earth-based instrumentation for 
fundamental research on the origin, evolution, and nature of our planet, its 
                                                  
55 NASA (1987b: v). 
56 Ibid. 
57 NASA scientist James Hansen testified to a Senate committee in 1988 that “it is time to stop 
waffling so much and say that the evidence is pretty strong that the greenhouse effect is here” and 
that he was ninety-nine percent certain that global warming was not a natural occurrence but what 
was caused by human activity. See, U.S. Senate (1988) and Shabecoff (1988a, 1988b). The New 
York Times reported in the first sentence of their cover story of Hansen’s testimony that “the earth 
has been warmer the first five months of this year than in any comparable period since 
measurements began 130 years ago . . .” (Shabecoff 1988a: A1). The spring and summer of 1988 
also had been experiencing “record-breaking” temperatures and droughts; because of which, forty 
percent of the counties in the United States had been declared disaster areas. These circumstances 
were of course noted in the national news coverage about global change research (e.g., Shabecoff 
1988b: 1). With less publicity, NASA scientists James Hansen and Robert Watson had testified 
about global warming in 1986 before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Environment 
and Public Works in which Robert Watson stated that “I believe global warming is inevitable. It’s 
only a question of magnitude and time.” See, U.S. Senate (1986) and Peterson (1986: A1). Robert 
Watson would later lead the United States’ delegation in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change. 
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place in our solar system, and its interaction with living things, including 
mankind.58 
 
With this broad scientific objective of studying the earth as a system by using EOS to 
take simultaneous, continuous, and synergistic measurements over the course of 
approximately fifteen years, NASA distributed in early 1988 its call for proposals for 
instruments and investigators that would compose its earth observing system.59 
 Whereas the broad and ambitious goals of EOS as a concept had been 
thoughtfully developed and outlined for the better part of a decade, for EOS to become 
something real in the world required more than a loose consensus among a cluster of 
study groups, even study groups that had involved dozens of prominent NASA and 
academic scientists. NASA’s Office of Space Science and Applications and that 
office’s recently-established Earth Sciences and Applications Division had been 
nurturing EOS through the planning process. But, as late as March 1989—one year 
after the call for proposals for EOS and a month after instruments and teams had been 
selected for the “definition” phase of EOS—the head of NASA’s Office of Space 
Science and Applications still described to NASA’s Senate oversight committee the 
Mission to Planet Earth as well as EOS as “just a NASA internal concept study” that 
“is clearly not part of the current U.S. Global Change Research Program, nor is it clear 
that we would ever implement it in its current conceptual framework.”60 Would 
NASA as an agency, the President of the United States, and Congress, support the 
funding of EOS? What would their goals be for EOS and its associated components, 
such as ASTER, and in what form would they support EOS? Up to this point in the 
almost decade-long existence of EOS as an “internal concept,” NASA officials and 
earth scientists had not been required to explicitly and formally explain why either 
                                                  
58 National Research Council (1988: iii). 
59 NASA (1988b). 
60 Prepared statement of Dr. Lennard Fisk in U.S. Senate (1989a: 10). 
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EOS—or the Mission to Planet Earth proposal within which EOS was being 
wrapped—should be of interest to the nation, the national treasure, and American 
society, rather than just of interest to NASA and earth scientists. NASA officials, 
however, began to make the case for both EOS and the Mission to Planet Earth as 
national programs in 1989.61 
In forums in which the United States’ national interests and goals were 
addressed and were spoken for—such as in Congress, in interagency and White House 
working groups, and in Presidential speeches—throughout the first few years of EOS 
as a formal component of the U.S. Global Change Research Program (i.e., from 1990 
to 1992) 62  policymakers and NASA officials consistently portrayed EOS as 
contributing to three state goals: 1) the national and international demonstration of U.S. 
leadership in space; 2) the understanding and prediction of natural and human induced 
global change (and eventually, global climate change more specifically, which was 
increasingly being emphasized); and 3) promotion of substantive international 
cooperation in space, when such cooperation was deemed to be in accordance with 
other U.S. national interests.  
The first goal of demonstrating U.S. leadership in space to national and 
international audiences was largely an outgrowth of several major evaluations of the 
United States’ civil space program in the mid-1980s which had been charged with 
proposing a future vision for NASA after the completion (or termination) of its 
post-Apollo infrastructure projects that included the development of space 
communications networks, the space shuttle, and the space station.63  The most 
influential of these reports with the Bush Administration and the U.S. Congress, 
                                                  
61 The concurrent development of EOS and Mission to Planet Earth are addressed below. 
62 How EOS comes to be counted as part of the U.S. Global Change Research Program is 
described below. 
63 These evaluations include: National Commission on Space (1986), American Institute of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics (1987), and Ride (1987).  
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judging from the degree to which it was cited and its formulations were employed,64 
was the “Ride Report” in 1987.65 Ride and her staff wrote that: 
 
“For two decades, the United States was the undisputed leader in nearly all 
civilian space endeavors. However, over the last decade the United States has 
relinquished, or is relinquishing, its leadership in certain critical areas . . . 
Leadership does not require that the U.S. be preeminent in all areas and 
disciplines of space enterprise. In fact, the broad spectrum of space activities 
and the increasing number of spacefaring nations make it virtually impossible 
for any nation dominate in this way. Being an effective leader does mandate, 
however, that this country have capabilities which enable it to act 
independently and impressively when and where it chooses, and that its goals 
be capable of inspiring others—at home and abroad—to support them. . . . 
Leadership results from both the capabilities a country had acquired and the 
active demonstration of those capabilities.”66 
 
In the view of the Ride Report, “a U.S. space leadership program” must not only 
“contain a sound program of scientific research and technology development” but 
must also “incorporate visible and significant accomplishments.”67 The report further 
continued to explain that “the United States will not be perceived as a leader unless it 
accomplishes feats which demonstrate prowess, inspire national pride, and engender 
international respect and a worldwide desire to associate with U.S. space activities.”68 
As one of its four “leadership initiatives,” the report recommended the “Mission to 
Planet Earth” and EOS. 
The demonstration of U.S. leadership in space was, of course, a state goal that 
had motivated and directed national projects and policymaking for decades previous to 
EOS, especially at NASA. In the United States’ all-consuming competition with the 
Soviet Union, space technology had served as symbols of the two polities and social 
                                                  
64 See, for example, U.S. Senate (1989a:1-6) and U.S. Senate (1992: 2). 
65 Ride (1987). Dr. Sally K. Ride was a physicist, a space shuttle mission specialist, and the first 
American woman in space. 
66 Ibid., p. 12. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
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systems, and space achievements had served as benchmarks.69 The Ride Report itself 
noted that the National Space Policy of 1982 [the last national space policy document 
of the executive branch prior to the Ride Report], a document which “establish[ed] the 
basic goals of United States policy,” included in it the mandate to “maintain United 
States space leadership.”70 In 1989, the National Space Council was reconstituted to 
invigorate the United States’ space programs; the President tasked the Vice President 
with chairing the council. The national space policy document that that council 
authored, called “National Space Policy Directives and Executive Charter,” reaffirmed 
that a “fundamental objective guiding United States space activities has been, and 
continues to be, space leadership.”71 While other national space policy directives of 
the 1980s had highlighted “leadership” as an objective,72 this national space policy 
document used language that closely resembled that of the Ride Report of two years 
earlier. The national space policy document stipulated that the U.S. civil space 
activities “shall contribute significantly to enhancing the Nation’s science, technology, 
economy, pride, sense of well-being and direction, as well as United States world 
prestige and leadership.”73 Like other NASA programs from the mid-1980s through 
the early 1990s, policymakers in the White House and in NASA, and to a lesser extent, 
in Congress, drew upon the rhetoric of U.S. leadership to explain and to justify the 
Mission to Planet Earth and EOS as programs that would bolster U.S. leadership. In 
his testimony before a Senate oversight committee in 1989, an associate administrator 
of NASA listed five benefits of the Mission to Planet Earth and EOS; two of those five 
                                                  
69 McDougall (1985), and see also Ezrahi’s interpretation of a presentation of a Saturn 5 rocket at 
the United States’ Kennedy Space Center (1990: 41-2). As mentioned in chapter two, the 
maintenance of U.S. leadership in aeronautics and space was listed as an objective for NASA in its 
founding legislation. 
70 As quoted in Ride (1987: 12). 
71 National Space Policy Council (1989). 
72 In addition to the Presidential Directive on National Space Policy of 1982, noted in the Ride 
Report, see for example, Bush (1988: 1). 
73 National Space Policy Council (1989: 2). 
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were that they were an “international effort in space demonstrating U.S. leadership” 
and that they were an “idea which stirs popular ideals, continuing the inspirational 
tradition of space activities.”74 
                                                  
74 Prepared statement of Dr. Lennard Fisk in U.S. Senate (1989a: 11). Of the remaining three 
benefits that Associate Administrator Fisk listed, one spoke to “preserving the global 
environment,” another to “investing in space research for a purpose which everyone can see and 
appreciated,” and the third to the “demonstration of U.S. commitment to investment in a better 
global future.” Taken as a set, the five benefits listed by Fisk both presume and justify the three 
state goals for EOS described above. Because in March 1989 Fisk was still emphasizing that EOS 
was an “internal concept” (along with the Mission to Planet Earth), the benefits of EOS which Fisk 
enumerated in his testimony were rhetorical trial balloons. Neither EOS nor the Mission to Planet 
Earth were yet Congressionally-approved programs. Fisk was stating, in effect, that “if EOS and 
the Mission to Planet Earth were official NASA programs, these would be their benefits for the 
nation.” In this testimony, Fisk was laying a rhetorical and political foundation for EOS and the 
Mission to Planet Earth as future NASA programs. 
At this point, although the matter is tangential to this chapter’s argument, some readers 
might want to know in detail how EOS and Mission to Planet Earth—two closely-related ideas that 
were intertwined in the late 1980s and early 1990s—did and did not overlap in terms of the NASA 
bureaucracy and Congressional funding. Previous to Congressional deliberations in 1989 over 
NASA’s budget for fiscal year 1990, neither EOS nor Mission to Planet Earth was recognized in 
the line items of Congressional budgets. They were considered as plans that were bureaucratically 
“internal” to NASA. As of March 1989, the development of EOS was subsumed within NASA’s 
space station program, and funding for the development of EOS would draw from anticipated 
increases in that program’s line item in the NASA authorization bill (in the fiscal year 1990 
appropriations bill, that funding was specified as allocations to the “polar platform” within the 
space station program. See Title III of H.R. 2916 in U.S. House 1989a). On the other hand, science 
projects that would use the Earth Observing System to conduct the Mission to Planet Earth were 
provisionally slated to be managed by the Earth Sciences and Applications Division of the Office 
of Space Science and Applications, drawing upon expected increases in that office’s budget, the 
“Space Science and Applications” line item in the authorization bill (in terms of the appropriations 
bill for fiscal year 1990, that funding was specified as allocations for “earth sciences,” see U.S. 
House 1989a). Unlike EOS, which in 1989 had a specific bureaucratic home, the “Mission to 
Planet Earth” umbrella plan—a plan that included EOS—was a broad theme that cut across 
NASA’s bureaucracy. While the Office of Space Science and Applications was generally 
responsible for articulating that theme for NASA (as part of, for instances, NASA’s preparations 
for the International Space Year in 1992), the implementation of the Mission to Planet Earth was 
not planned to completely fall under the authority of that office. 
It was not until the fall of 1989, after President Bush called for the Mission to Planet 
Earth “initiative” in July, that either EOS or the Mission to Planet Earth was identified in the 
budget outline of a NASA authorization act (authorization bills authorize the government and its 
activities, provide policy guidance, and set maximum limits on spending for subsequent 
appropriations bills). How EOS and the Mission to Planet Earth would be recognized in the NASA 
authorization act was a matter that was not resolved by Congress in 1989. Congress was ultimately 
unable to pass into law a NASA authorization act for the upcoming year. The names of the line 
items in the different versions of the NASA authorization act—versions which the House and 
Senate sent back and forth to each other in their unsuccessful effort to pass a bill in the fall of 
1989—indicate how for Congress in 1989 EOS was the core of the broad “Mission to Planet 
Earth” initiative.  
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In suggesting to the Senate that Mission to Planet Earth and EOS were 
inspirational activities, the NASA associate administrator was not being naïve, blindly 
optimistic, or maudlin about saving what the cover of Time magazine had called 
“Endangered Earth.”75 The administrator’s rhetoric was reflecting the politics of the 
time. He was reminding Senators of what they already knew: understanding and 
predicting global change was a fast emerging national goal of the United States. 
Before the administrator’s remarks, the chairman of the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Senator Ernst Hollings of South Carolina, 
had framed the committee’s hearing on what the administrator called “just a NASA 
                                                                                                                                               
In the House’s first version of the 1989 multi-year authorization act for NASA, an act 
that would outline NASA’s funding for fiscal years 1990, 1991, and 1992, neither EOS nor Mission 
to Planet Earth was recognized in line items in the budget. As “internal” NASA plans, the funding 
for those activities were subsumed under the line items for “space station” and for “space 
applications” (see, section 4(1)(F) of H.R. 1759 in U.S. House 1989c). That act was passed in the 
House in September. On the other hand, in the Senate’s first version of the NASA authorization act 
in November, funding for EOS and for the Mission to Planet Earth was listed. The two were named 
together as “Earth Observing System of Mission to Planet Earth, $24,200,000 in order to complete 
Phase B activities [i.e., the definition phase] and to initiate Phase C/D of this program in fiscal year 
1990” (the Mission to Planet Earth was not listed in any other line items, see Title I, section 
101(a)(7) of S. 916 in U.S. Senate 1989b). Responding to the Senate’s version, the House 
discussed a second version of the NASA authorization act, which was passed in November. As it 
was discussed in the House, it initially did not mention Mission to Planet Earth, but it did list EOS, 
with a line item of $24.2 million for “Global Change/EOS.” In the engrossed version of the bill, 
more formal language was inserted which referenced the Mission to Planet Earth (see section 
4(1)(G) of H.R. 3729 in U.S. House 1989d). Finally, the Senate’s second version, which for 
procedural reasons was offered as an amendment to the Senate’s first version of the act, took the 
words “global change” from the House’s second version and inserted them before the line item that 
was listed in the Senate’s first version, to finally read “Global change, $24,200,000 for the Earth 
Observing System of Mission to Planet Earth in order to complete phase B activities and to initiate 
phase C/D of the program in fiscal year 1991” (see section 4(1)(G) of S. 916 as amended by 
Amendment No. 1208 in U.S. Senate 1989c). Although the Senate—in particular, Senators 
Hollings and Gore who offered the amendment—were able to have the last word and included the 
“Mission to Planet Earth” language, global change and EOS were at this point the common 
denominators for the Congress, in terms of the politics of naming. In the end, for reasons much 
more significant than these semantics, the House and the Senate were unable to reconcile their two 
versions of a NASA authorization act. An authorization act for NASA was not passed into law for 
fiscal year 1990.  
75 In place of its annual “person of the year” issue, for the year of 1988, Time named “Endangered 
Earth” the “planet of the year.” See “Planet of the Year” (1989). 
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internal concept” by testifying to that concept’s manifest importance and broad 
scientific and political support: 
 
For nearly twenty years, since the first American left his footprints in the dust 
of the moon, this Nation has been in search of major goals for its civil space 
program. Many goals have been proposed, but none has succeeded in 
capturing the imagination of the American people and the world community 
as much as the Mission to Planet Earth. Maybe that’s because of the renewed 
worldwide interest in global change and our fragile planet Earth, or maybe it’s 
because of our basic desire to know more about ourselves and the planet we 
inhabit. Be it the timing, the proposed goals and objectives of the Mission, or 
its basic appeal, the concept of a Mission to Planet Earth has been recognized 
as a goal worthy of pursuit and as a priority within the civil space program’s 
agenda. The concept of the Mission to Planet Earth has been endorsed by a 
broad range of scientific organizations and advisory groups with domestic and 
international composition, and it was endorsed by President Bush and 
Governor Dukakis during the 1988 presidential campaign.76 
 
Indeed, later that year in July 1989 on the 20th anniversary of the Apollo 11 moon 
landing and on the steps of the National Air and Space Museum, when President Bush 
declared that the United States should commit itself to manned missions to the Moon 
and Mars, the President did not overlook the Mission to Planet Earth, even on such an 
occasion celebrating manned space exploration: 
 
As I said in Europe just a few days ago [at the Paris G-7 Economic Summit], 
environmental destruction knows no borders. A major national and 
international initiative is needed to seek new solutions for ozone depletion 
and global warming and acid rain. And this initiative, “Mission to Planet 
Earth,” is a critical part of our space program. And it reminds us of what the 
astronauts remember as the most stirring sight of all. It wasn’t the Moon or 
the stars, as I remember. It was Earth—tiny, fragile, precious, blue 
orb—rising above the arid desert of Tranquility Base.77 
 
The Moon and Mars manned exploration “leadership initiatives”—to reprise a term 
from the Ride Report—were ultimately not supported by Congress because of 
                                                  
76 U.S. Senate (1989a: 1-2). 
77 Bush (1989). The Senate also endorsed the President’s statement with a “sense of the Senate” 
resolution. See U.S. Senate (1989d). 
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numerous competing domestic spending priorities for fiscal year 1991, but Congress 
did follow through at that time and support the bulk of the Mission to Planet Earth and 
EOS.78 
Congress was not only a supporter of research on global environmental 
change but, unlike the Reagan and Bush administrations, a clear majority of the 
Congress was also supportive of policymaking that addressed, and that aspired to 
respond to, what was already known about global change and what could be known 
about global change in the near future. Back in December 1987, Congress had passed 
the Global Climate Protection Act to try to spearhead the development of climate 
change policy by authorizing the State Department and the Environmental Protection 
Agency to develop such policy (the Reagan Administration had opposed, but signed, 
the bill).79 When that proved ineffective at instigating executive action, in 1989 and 
1990 the Congress deliberated upon and eventually passed the Global Change 
Research Act. The act required “the establishment of a United States Global Change 
Research Program aimed at understanding and responding to global change, including 
the cumulative effects of human activities and natural processes on the environment, 
to promote discussions toward international protocols in global change research, and 
for other purposes.”80 While it would have been inappropriate for this legislation to 
mention Mission to Planet Earth or EOS by name since those concepts were not yet 
official programs when the language was drafted, the act did require the new 
interagency coordinating body that it established to develop a “National Global 
Change Research Plan” that included “global measurements, establishing worldwide 
observations necessary to understand the physical, chemical, and biological processes 
                                                  
78 See Rogers (1990), U.S. House (1990a), and U.S. Senate (1990b) 
79 U.S. General Accounting Office (1990a: 19). 
80 Preamble of U.S. House (1990b). 
  
 
125
responsible for changes in the Earth system on all relevant spatial and time scales.”81 
The Global Change Research Act of 1990 and other legislation, including 
appropriations, affirmed the concept of EOS as a system to study global change. 
The White House, Congress, NASA, interagency coordinating committees, 
and prominent scientists who held positions on key advisory committees all agreed 
that NASA should deploy numerous space-based instruments to observe the earth for 
the purpose of learning about global change, especially global climate change. 
National Research Council Chairman Frank Press was reflecting, not building, a 
national consensus when he stated in a letter to the President’s science advisor in 
September 1990 that “continuous, long-term, space-based observations of fundamental 
environmental parameters are essential.”82 In a June 1990 article that surveyed the 
EOS program, including the concerns of its critics, the New York Times was able to 
judge that “the project has attracted broad political support, including the strong 
backing of President Bush.”83 This national consensus of course did not preclude 
extensive debate on the technological design of EOS and funding for the system. The 
New York Times article went on to quote John Logsdon, the director of the Space 
Policy Institute at George Washington University, as saying that “In principle, I think 
it’s beyond criticism. We have the tools to understand the planet on an earthwide basis 
as a system, and that’s an understanding we need to have. The criticism focuses on 
how you go about doing that.”84 
                                                  
81 Section 104(c) of U.S. House (1990b). 
82 Asker (1990). 
83 Stevens (1990: C1). In December 1990, the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. 
Space Program, more commonly known as the “Augustine Commission” after it chair, also 
endorsed in its final report the importance of the concept of Mission to Planet Earth and EOS for 
NASA and the United States. See, Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program 
(1990). 
84 Quoted in Stevens (1990: C1). 
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Aside from this debate among experts regarding the proper scientific and 
technological means to realize the national goal of studying global change,85 there 
was the blunt matter of funding, a matter which was largely to be determined by 
Congress. Between the summer of 1990, when appropriations for fiscal year 1991 
were debated, and September 1992, when NASA spending for 1993 was approved, 
EOS directly competed against—and lost a sizeable proportion of its budget 
to—specific domestic spending priorities that were under the purview of the same 
Senate appropriations subcommittee, such as the rising costs of veterans’ health care. 
EOS also indirectly competed against general national spending during that time, such 
as that for the first Gulf War, Operation Desert Storm. Unlike many other high-profile 
NASA initiatives, EOS did survive the cost-cutting, yet it nevertheless became 
recognized by its NASA program office as a “cost-driven project” which was to be 
done “faster, better, cheaper,” under the managerial philosophy of the new NASA 
administrator, Daniel Goldin, who had just joined NASA in the spring of 1992.  
In about two years, the concept of EOS went from being two massive orbiting 
platforms carrying dozens of instruments charged with studying global change at its 
broadest, with a projected decadal cost of $17 billion, to an overlapping series of six 
satellites, each carrying several instruments, that, if considered on the whole, were 
focused on climate change, at a projected cost of $8 billion.86 From the standpoint of 
specific scientific objectives, the focus on global climate change came at the expense 
of solid earth geophysics and stratospheric chemistry. 87  Amid this radical 
restructuring of EOS between 1990 and 1992, the state goal of understanding and 
predicting global change, particularly global climate change, proved itself rhetorically 
                                                  
85 For the public face of those debates, see U.S. House (1991), U.S. Senate (1992), and Taubes 
(1993). 
86 See Rogers (1990), Dozier (1992), King (1992), and Taubes (1993). 
87 See the testimony of NASA Associate Administrator Lennard Fisk in U.S. Senate (1992: 5) and 
the EOS Payload Advisory Panel’s recommendations in Moore and Dozier (1992a, 1992b). 
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as a national goal that directed EOS as a concept, and moreover as a goal of enough 
importance to justify a multi-billion dollar earth observing system, which was to be 
developed and operated over the course of a minimum of 15 years.88 
The White House, Congress, and NASA were not planning to accomplish this 
goal alone. NASA officials as well as scientific advisory committee after scientific 
advisory committee conceived of EOS as a U.S.-led enterprise with a techno-political 
infrastructure that would extend beyond the borders of the United States and 
incorporate international participation. In 1983 the NASA Advisory Council appointed 
an “Earth System Sciences Committee” and charged it with, among other things, 
outlining and recommending how NASA should enable, promote, and support the 
study of the earth as a global system, particularly through the development and 
operation of an earth observation system. While the committee noted in their 1988 
report that their report was “restricted to consideration of scientific issues” and that 
“discussion of economic, social, or political factors” was “explicitly excluded,” they 
did nevertheless comment in their report, as other reports did,89 that “the study of the 
Earth is inherently international” and that their recommended research program “will 
require increased international cooperation to further U.S. partnership in a worldwide 
research effort.” 90  The committee also recommended, “beginning at once,” the 
“strengthening of the international agreements and cooperation necessary for a truly 
                                                  
88 President Bush also further affirmed EOS in his May 1992 National Space Policy Directive on 
Space-Based Global Change Observation. EOS not only inspired this White House program, but 
was incorporated into it as well. The directive appointed NASA as the lead agency and, among 
other things, directed NASA to “continue with the Mission to Planet Earth by conducting the 
ongoing development, operation, and scientific use of instruments and satellites designed to 
observe and monitor processes that govern key aspects of global environmental change.” See Bush 
(1992). 
89 NASA (1987b). 
90 The Earth System Sciences Committee came out with two reports, an “overview” in 1986 and a 
“closer view” in 1988. The quotes are from the latter report, NASA Advisory Council (1988: 21, 
171, respectively). 
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worldwide study of the Earth.”91 NASA management agreed with the committee’s 
assessment of the importance of international cooperation.92  In 1989, a NASA 
associate administrator explained to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, 
and Transportation that: 
 
Due to the global nature of the problem this research effort addresses and the 
interest of most of the world in the goals of this effort, Mission to Planet 
Earth would require cooperation and cost-sharing by many of the major 
spacefaring nations of the world under the leadership of the U.S.93 
 
As that statement’s allusion to the international arena suggests, by 1989 international 
cooperation was required to realize the Mission to Planet Earth and EOS for reasons 
beyond the asserted scientific and economic necessity of international cooperation. 
International cooperation had become, for the U.S. Government, an inherent aspect of 
the concept of EOS and Mission to Planet Earth as well as a necessary political goal 
for the EOS and Mission to Planet Earth programs.94 
“International cooperation” had been a part of NASA’s plans for the earth 
observing system from the beginning. The concepts of Mission to Planet Earth and 
EOS and the goal of international cooperation were never quite separable. NASA 
officials took for granted that the “Mission to Planet Earth,” with all the inspiration 
                                                  
91 NASA Advisory Council (1988: 5). 
92 For an example of how the conclusions of the Earth System Science Committee regarding 
international cooperation were explicitly used by NASA to justify its international efforts, see the 
prepared statement of Dr. Shelby G. Tilford in U.S. House (1990c: 2). 
93 Prepared statement of Dr. Lennard Fisk in U.S. Senate (1989a: 11). 
94 International cooperation had for centuries been an important aspect of the complex 
development and synthesis of a diverse set of fields which came to be called in the twentieth 
century the “earth sciences.” The International Geophysical Year from July 1957 to December 
1958 is regularly cited as an event that “began an era of international observation and regulation 
involving the Earth’s environment” (Doel 1997: 404). See also Sullivan (1961). This 
internationalism in the earth sciences and more specifically in the environmental sciences should 
not be equated with an apolitical universalism. For instance, in the second half of the twentieth 
century, the earth sciences and their internationalism owe much of their development and synthesis 
to the Cold War. See Mukerji (1989), Elzinga (1993), Cloud (2000), Hamblin (2002), and the 
special issue of Social Studies of Science on “The Earth Sciences in the Cold War,” edited by 
Cloud and Reppy (2003), particularly the commentary of Dennis (2003).   
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and appeal that such name might provoke, the program could not be identified as just 
the United States’ Mission to Planet Earth. In the eyes of its advocates, if a Mission to 
Planet Earth and an EOS were to be politically credible concepts, they would need to 
be seen by NASA, the White House, Congress, and maybe at times by other nations, 
as no more than efforts in which NASA and the United States were leading the world 
on a Mission to Planet Earth, as opposed to unilaterally dictating to other nations 
knowledge about the globe.95 It made little sense to NASA planners for NASA to 
have a Mission to Planet Earth and an Earth Observing System if other countries were 
not conspicuously involved, especially if any tangible drawbacks of such cooperation 
were years away from the positioning of Mission to Planet Earth and EOS as rhetorical 
and political concepts in the mid-1980s. If NASA had wanted not to involve other 
governments, it might have advocated a constellation of environmental satellites, but 
not a Mission to Planet Earth or an Earth Observing System. By the time the Mission 
to Planet Earth and the Earth Observing System concepts were approved by Congress 
in 1990, international cooperation had become so intertwined with those concepts that 
if NASA could not point to significant international cooperation in the implementation 
of those concepts, especially before Congress, then the program would be seen as at 
least a partial failure.96 
                                                  
95 See, for instance, NASA Associate Administrator Edelson’s emphasis on international 
cooperation in his unveiling of the “Mission to Planet Earth” concept in his commentary inside the 
cover of Science (1985). He explicitly used the rhetoric of “Mission to Planet Earth” in his 
announcement. Compare this rhetoric of internationalism with that of the response to the “Global 
Habitability” program proposed by NASA and the United States at the United Nations Conference 
on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in Vienna in 1982, as reported in Edelson (1988: 6-7) and 
Lambright (1994: 99). As reported in Edelson (1988: 7), Associate Administrator Edelson recalled 
that the “Global Habitability” program “came across like NASA was trying to take over the 
world.” 
96 See the discussion in U.S. House (1990c) and, in particular, the testimonies of Dr. J. Thomas 
Ratchford, Associate Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and Dr. Shelby G. 
Tilford. 
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In the mid-1980s, when NASA was nurturing the concept of a Mission to 
Planet Earth and EOS, it would have been more difficult for NASA to have rejected 
the idea of international cooperation than to have worked to accommodate it, not just 
for rhetorical and political reasons, such as being seen by the White House and 
Congress as advancing a popular and promising program, but also for bureaucratic and 
logistical reasons as well. International cooperation had after all been an objective of 
NASA since NASA’s founding, and that goal had been reflected in the designs of the 
programs and in the hardware in which EOS was being integrated. As was discussed in 
chapter two, NASA had designed the space station program and the space station’s 
architecture as international endeavors. In the 1980s, NASA and its international 
partners had in fact managed the planning and coordination for EOS as an outgrowth 
of their cooperative efforts for the international space station.97  
NASA’s management in particular handled EOS as an “international program 
because the space station was an international program,” and consequently, NASA’s 
standard guidelines for international cooperation were used for EOS because they 
were used for the space station.98 In accordance with the guidelines’ philosophy of 
“clean interfaces” and clear lines of responsibility, it was provisionally thought that 
NASA would provide two large frames for EOS instruments, frames that were known 
as “platforms.” The European Space Agency would provide an additional platform, 
and Japan’s National Space Development Agency would provide another.99 By the 
summer of 1989, representatives from the space agencies of the United States, Europe, 
and Japan had met together several times since 1986 as an “international coordination 
                                                  
97 See their [Intergovernmental Agreement] On the Cooperation in the Detailed Design, 
Development, Operation, and Utilization of the Permanently Manned Space Station, September 29, 
1988. 
98 U.S. Senate (1989a: 17-18, and quoted from 46). See also Shaffer (1989: 1). On NASA’s 
standard guidelines for international cooperation, see chapter two. 
99 Prepared statement of Dr. Lennard Fisk in U.S. Senate (1989a: 9). 
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working group” for the purpose of coordinating and harmonizing calls for instrument 
and research proposals, data policies, and designs of platforms, although the 
international coordination working group had not yet agreed upon many hard 
decisions—for example, commitments concerning hardware interdependencies, the 
sharing of resources, or the allocation and scheduling of instruments.100 
While NASA held out international cooperation as a goal for Mission to 
Planet Earth and EOS in a large part because Mission to Planet Earth and EOS had 
become rhetorically and institutionally tied to international cooperation, international 
cooperation became not just a NASA goal but a state goal for additional reasons. First, 
the White House, Congress, and NASA desired international cooperation for the 
significant scientific, technical, and economic benefits that cooperation seemed to 
promise, such as internationally calibrated data, internationally validated data, and 
especially, cost-sharing among states. International cooperation was recognized by 
most everyone as a mode of operation through which those benefits could be 
efficiently and effectively secured.101 Second, Mission to Planet Earth, EOS, and the 
international cooperation that was to be a part of those programs enabled the Bush 
administration to respond to national and international criticism that they were 
exaggerating the uncertainty of scientists’ knowledge of global climate change and 
using uncertainty as an excuse for inaction, rather than crafting policy that would 
mitigate the probable implications of climate change, as it was argued other nations 
were trying to do. 
For example, in President Bush’s opening remarks to a two-day international 
conference on the science and economics of global change held at the White House in 
                                                  
100 Shaffer (1989: 1). 
101 See U.S. House (1990c) and, in particular, the testimonies of Dr. J. Thomas Ratchford, 
Associate Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and Dr. Shelby G. Tilford 
before those subcommittees. Also see U.S. Senate (1989a: 17-18, 46). 
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April 1990, Bush told an anecdote about two scientists vehemently debating the extent 
of future global warming on a recent Sunday morning news show. Bush commented in 
his speech: “two scientists, two diametrically opposed points of view—now, where 
does that leave us?”102 Bush’s speech was subsequently criticized by delegates from 
other nations, particularly those from European nations; West Germany’s Minister for 
the Environment released a statement later that day after Bush’s speech that declared 
that “gaps in knowledge must not be used as an excuse for worldwide inaction.”103 In 
response to that kind of criticism, President Bush held up as his administration’s action 
the U.S. Global Change Research Program and the increase in the program’s spending, 
an increase that was largely the result of funding for Mission to Planet Earth and 
EOS.104 
President Bush’s plenary speech at the second session of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change two months earlier also had emphasized 
the increase in the United States’ spending on global change research. Furthermore, 
this speech had explicitly tied together Mission to Planet Earth, EOS, and international 
cooperation as part of the United States’ commitment to “aggressive and thoughtful 
action on environmental issues”: 
 
I have just submitted a budget to our Congress for fiscal 1991. It includes 
over a billion in new spending to protect the environment. And underscoring 
our commitment to your efforts, I am pleased to note that funding for the U.S. 
Global Change Research Program will increase by nearly 60 percent, to over 
a billion. That commitment, by far the largest ever made by any nation, 
reflects our determination to improve our understanding of the science of 
climate change. We are working with our neighbors around the world to 
enhance global monitoring and data management, improve analysis, reduce 
                                                  
102 Bush (1990b). The conference was held several days before the twentieth anniversary of Earth 
Day. 
103 As quoted in Shabecoff (1990). 
104 Bush (1990b). His remarks at the closing session also emphasized that research was a form of 
action, even if not a substitute for policy. See Bush (1990a). Shabecoff (1990) reports that other 
administration officials noted the U.S. commitment to global change research in response to 
criticisms of inaction. 
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the uncertainty of predictive models, and conduct regular reassessments of the 
state of science. Our program allows NASA and her sister agencies and all 
our international partners to move forward with the Mission to Planet Earth. 
That will initiate the U.S. Earth Observing System, in cooperation with 
Europe and Japan, to advance the state of knowledge about the planet we 
share.105 
 
In sum, along with nationally and internationally demonstrating U.S. space leadership 
and helping scientists (and nations) around the world better understand global change, 
international cooperation was also a U.S. goal for its Mission to Planet Earth and Earth 
Observing System. For the White House, Congress, and NASA—that is, for the 
United States as a state—the EOS and the Mission to Planet Earth enterprise came into 
being in part because that enterprise was a form of international cooperation. In 
addition to the domestic and international political benefits that international 
cooperation could facilitate, the White House, Congress, and NASA feared that a 
Mission to Planet Earth and an EOS without a substantial and conspicuous component 
of international cooperation would be scientifically and politically vulnerable to 
charges of being an expensive but incomplete endeavor. 
 
Japan’s State Goals and ITIR 
 
Despite their global ambitions, Mission to Planet Earth and EOS were 
programs initiated and sponsored by the United States, and the rhetoric, politics, and 
goals of the development of earth observing satellites in Japan can not be assumed to 
be those of the United States. In this chapter’s earlier description of the community of 
geologic remote sensing which surrounded and partly constituted ERSDAC and 
JAROS in the 1980s, it was argued that the scientists and engineers of that community 
regularly identified themselves as a part of the state of Japan. They saw themselves as, 
                                                  
105 Bush (1990c). 
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and indeed acted as if they were, working together on national projects to advance 
Japan’s state goals in the international arena, such as the exploitation of natural 
resources and the development of remote-sensing technology to realize that goal. As 
Professor Iijima’s words written in commemoration of ERSDAC’s tenth-year 
anniversary especially make clear, Japan’s first earth resources satellite, 
JERS-1/Fuyō-1, embodied for him, and for others who were associated with ERSDAC, 
the Japanese state’s energy resource and developmental goals, even if many 
acknowledged that much work remained for the satellite to effectively support the 
industrial user.106  
While undoubtedly the corporate members of the ERSDAC and JAROS 
consortia looked to those public-interest non-profit consortia as organizational devices 
to channel lucrative MITI contracts to corporations, contracts that those firms could 
perhaps leverage to develop their general technological capabilities for other business, 
ERSDAC and JAROS were founded under the jurisdiction of MITI with corporate 
charters that explicitly specified organizational missions to promote and develop 
remote-sensing analysis and remote-sensing technologies for the purpose of exploiting 
natural resources, especially non-renewable resources. As long as the MITI Space 
Industry Division supported the marriage of its technology development ambitions 
with that goal—which they did throughout the 1980s—no one on the “development” 
side of this institutional complex (vis-à-vis the industrial users of the technology) 
appeared to have contested that overarching goal in any concrete way.107 JERS-1, 
                                                  
106 Professor Iijima’s words are on p. 106-107, from Sōritsu jūnenshi henshū iinkai (1993: 71). 
This is not to say that all geologic remote-sensing scientists during the 1980s supported, agreed 
with, or otherwise went along with, the developmental goals of MITI. My claim is merely about 
those scientists who were associated—and had associated themselves—with ERSDAC. Those 
scientists included prominent academic scientists (for instance, at the University of Tokyo) who 
also held key positions in Japan’s remote-sensing professional societies (such as the presidency of 
the Remote Sensing Society of Japan). 
107 A developmental ideology with regard to technology extended in Japan to policymaking bodies 
outside of MITI’s jurisdiction as well (for a history of a particularly “techno-national” 
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which was developed throughout the 1980s, was supposed to be, as the “1” signified, 
just the beginning of Japan’s efforts in earth resource remote sensing.108 
 The MITI Space Industry Division looked at the United States’ EOS as an 
opportunity to further its state goal of developing space-based remote-sensing 
technology for the exploitation of natural resources. But this opportunity was not the 
only path to realize that goal, nor was it self-evident that it was the best path. Whether 
or not even to propose an instrument to NASA for incorporation into EOS, and if an 
instrument were to be proposed, what instrument to propose, were questions that were 
thoroughly debated by the relevant parties in Japan. Even if one accepts the contention 
that Japan’s industrial institutions were “techno-national” in their ideological outlook 
in the 1980s,109 there was no technological imperative that eliminated the politics of 
technical decision-making. The goal of promoting the exploitation of natural resources 
through the development of remote-sensing technologies was definitely clear enough 
on paper. Moreover, that goal—which was the raison de’tre of JAROS and 
                                                                                                                                               
developmental ideology in Japan’s industrial policymaking, see Samuels (1994)). In the mid and 
late 1980s, Japan’s Space Activities Commission, the intergovernmental body nominally 
responsible for guiding, harmonizing, and integrating the space policy and activities of Japan’s 
various ministries and agencies, called for increases in expenditures both for developmental 
activities in remote-sensing technology and for commercialization activities. The commission also 
suggested that Japan engage in more international projects (see, for example, Uchū kaihatsu iinkai 
1989). Partly in response to this suggestion, Japan’s Federation of Economic Organizations 
(Keidanren), a central advisory and lobbying group of industry, issued a report in October 1988 
that advocated international cooperation in space only as a part of an overall program for 
developing an “autonomous” position in space activities: 
  
As Japan seeks to contribute to the international community, it must exercise every 
opportunity for international cooperation in its space program. To this end, Japan must 
possess original, superior technology essential to the tools and methods for exploring and 
using space. Japan should upgrade its space program to a level high enough to establish 
genuine design authority—to invest its space effort, that is, with a technological validity 
independent of activity in other nations with advanced space programs (Federation of 
Economic Organizations (1988); here I have used their official translation). 
 
108 Sōritsu jūnenshi henshū iinkai (1993), Yamaguchi (2002), and Ishii (2003). 
109 I am referring to a developmental ideology of “techno-nationalism” such as that which was 
described in Samuels (1994). 
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ERSDAC—was intellectually and institutionally more focused than, say, the charge of 
the United States’ EOS to study the earth as a system. Nevertheless, different technical 
decisions could all be construed as advancing Japan’s technological capabilities. There 
were a variety of ways of realizing the goal of developing remote-sensing technologies 
that would be helpful for natural resource exploration and exploitation. 
A debate arose among the relevant study groups about how to best realize that 
goal. How that state goal was to be pursued was critical for many parties in 
determining whether or not that goal was worth pursing in any given particular 
instance. A director of the MITI Space Industry Division in the mid-1980s had 
proposed developing a thermal infrared instrument, reasoning that MITI—together 
with the Science and Technology Agency’s NASDA—had already sufficiently 
nurtured the technological development of Japan’s firms in the visible and shortwave 
infrared regions through the development of JERS-1 and other remote-sensing 
instruments.110 The MITI Space Industry Division at this time was interested in 
building “tools” for industry and wanted to develop a portfolio of various 
remote-sensing tools; a thermal sensor would fill out that portfolio.111 The Space 
                                                  
110 Space-based remote-sensing sensors other than MITI’s JERS-1 which were either operational, 
planned, or under development in Japan during the mid-1980s, include the MOS series of satellites 
and the planned ADEOS satellite. 
111 My understanding of these mid-1980s deliberations is based almost entirely upon recollections 
and understandings recounted for me during interviews. See Yamaguchi (2002), Ishii (2003), 
Yokota (2004), and to a lesser extent, Fujisada (2003) and Watanabe (2003). I was not able to 
obtain access to any internal MITI planning documents from that time regarding these 
deliberations, assuming that such documents even existed (such as the minutes of meetings). The 
three key interviews concerning these deliberations noted above are in agreement with each other 
about the matters that I discuss, but two interviews offered only second-hand accounts—one from 
a bureaucrat, Yokota, and another from a scientist, Yamaguchi. Their accounts referenced similar 
sources for their knowledge of the deliberations. One of my interviews did offer a first-hand 
account. Ishii was a senior academic scientist at the time of these deliberations in the mid-1980s, 
was deeply involved in them, and was a key participant. In my interview with him, he greatly 
emphasized that during this time MITI was interested in supporting the development of 
remote-sensing technologies as “tools” for general industry and not only as technologies for natural 
resource exploitation. Yet, in his judgment, the MITI Space Industry Division recognized that 
natural resource exploitation was at that time its most compelling use. In the policymaking rhetoric 
of the MITI Space Industry Division, including but not limited to the rhetoric of its policymaking 
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Industry Division also had heard at some point—possibly directly from a NASA 
representative—that EOS would be in need of a thermal infrared sensor.112 NASA’s 
publicly-distributed planning documents for EOS in the mid-1980s noted that a 
high-resolution thermal instrument was desired to make measurements of surface 
temperature over land and to complement another high-resolution instrument that 
sensed in the visible and shortwave infrared regions but not in the thermal.113 The 
success of the JPL group’s airborne thermal infrared multispectral scanner (TIMS) in 
the early and mid-1980s had shown thermal remote sensing to be promising.114 The 
capacity of Japan’s firms to develop a useful thermal infrared earth observation sensor 
had yet to be demonstrated, however. In the assessment of the MITI Space Industry 
Division, Japan’s firms—and the state of Japan—needed such a capability. If NASA 
would launch a thermal sensor as a part of EOS—freeing MITI of any need to 
collaborate with NASDA as MITI had needed to do for JERS-1—all the better.115 
                                                                                                                                               
concerning remote-sensing development, “space utilization” (uchū riyū) and “space 
industrialization” (uchū sangyōka) were ubiquitous goals. See, for instance, the MITI Space 
Industry Division presentation, Obara, Yoshida, and Yokota (1990). 
112 Yamaguchi (2002), Watanabe (2003), and Ishii (2003). While few commitments had been made, 
NASA’s need for a thermal instrument and the potential opportunity for MITI to provide one were 
no doubt discussed in the meetings of the International Coordination Working Group for the EOS 
Space Station platform in late 1986 and in 1987. A slot for an intermediate thermal infrared 
instrument that was sponsored by the Government of Japan had already been included in the EOS 
baseline planning scenario by May 1987, which was several months before the description of the 
MITI facility instrument was released as a part of the Announcement of Opportunity for EOS 
instrument proposals. See the overhead slides of Fisk (1987). 
113 The instrument that I am referring to here is the HIRIS instrument. See NASA (1987a) and 
Goetz and Herring (1989). The NASA planning documents are NASA (1984, 1987b: 13-20; 32-37; 
56-64). 
114 See Kahle and Goetz (1983) and see that article’s and the TIMS instrument’s citations in NASA 
(1987b: 13-20, 32-27; 56-64) and NASA Advisory Council (1988: 192-3). It is clear from my 
interviews as well as from numerous documentary sources that JAROS, ERSDAC, and the 
academic scientists and engineers associated with JAROS and ERSDAC followed the development 
of TIMS. And see references to TIMS in Ishii (1991) and the articles therein that special issue. 
115 This MITI/NASDA rivalry was mentioned especially by Yamaguchi (2002). NASDA was 
responsible for the launch vehicle for JERS-1 and for the satellite bus. The mission instruments 
(i.e., the observation sensors) were funded and built by MITI, its consortia, and its contractors. 
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Study groups made up of representatives from the MITI Space Industry 
Division, JAROS, and to a lesser extent, ERSDAC, as well as from representatives 
who were directly from the firms that constituted those two consortia, debated whether 
or not MITI should fund sensors that would be successors, known as “follow ons,” to 
those that were onboard JERS-1, in addition to a thermal sensor. If follow-on sensors 
were to be supported, as the makers of the previous sensors wanted, would it not make 
better sense, some study group members asked, to have those follow-on visible/near 
infrared and shortwave infrared sensors on the same platform as the proposed thermal 
sensor, so as to enable simultaneous measurements in diverse spectral bands?116 A 
few scientists from the Geological Survey of Japan, a national lab under the 
jurisdiction of MITI, pressed this point in particular and were given the opportunity to 
assist the MITI Space Industry Division with the writing of its “facility instrument” 
proposal to NASA.117  Building a visible/near infrared sensor capable of stereo 
imaging for topographic analysis and building a shortwave infrared sensor for mineral 
discrimination would also appease the primary intended users of instrument’s 
data—the natural resource exploration and exploitation firms.118 
Study groups also explored other options for sensor development that were 
not in line with the MITI Space Industry Division’s original trial-balloon proposal of 
developing a thermal instrument for EOS. Some of the natural resource firms had 
already been pressing that “their” funds, funds that the Government of Japan had 
                                                  
116 Yamaguchi (2002), Fujisada (2003), Ishii (2003), and Watanabe (2003). 
117 Tsu Hiroji from the Geological Survey of Japan’s Department of Geothermal Research was 
purportedly an influential advocate for bands in the visible and shortwave infrared region. See 
Yamaguchi (2002) and Fujisada (2003). “Facility instruments” were EOS instruments that 
organizations themselves were offering to sponsor. They were proposed to the Office of Space 
Science and Applications at NASA Headquarters for the purpose of proposing their incorporation 
into the EOS system but not for the purpose of proposing that NASA fund the instrument’s 
development (as principal investigators would). The “facilities” that proposed facility instruments 
for EOS included NASA centers (such as the Goddard Space Flight Center), the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration, and international (i.e., foreign) organizations. 
118 Ishii (2003) and Watanabe (2003). 
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collected by taxing oil and gas imports and placed into a special petroleum account, 
could be more wisely spent by contracting the building of MITI’s future space-based 
remote-sensing instruments to General Electric in the United States, or by otherwise 
simply purchasing data that were acquired by foreign satellites, rather than by 
contracting with Mitsubishi Electric, NEC, and the other firms, as was being done at 
the time for JERS-1. The “domestic production faction,” however, wanted nothing to 
do with contracting instruments to GE or purchasing data from abroad, and that faction 
included the MITI Space Industry Division among its ranks.119 But if the MITI Space 
Industry Division wanted to fund technology development using funds from the 
petroleum tax—as they were doing at the time for JERS-1—it could not ignore the 
concerns of those firms who bore the brunt of this import tax.120 In this debate, as was 
arguably characteristic of MITI industrial policymaking, 121  a compromise was 
reached which had a little bit in it for everyone, with no clear winner or loser. The 
MITI Space Industry Division would sponsor the domestic development of an 
instrument for launch with, and incorporation into, a NASA EOS platform, but the 
instrument would not be only a thermal instrument. 
 The instrument outlined as the MITI facility instrument in NASA’s January 
1988 Background Information Package for the EOS call-for-proposals reflected that 
compromise and also indicated what had yet to be settled.122 The advocates of 
                                                  
119 Ishii (2003) and Yokota (2004). 
120 According to legislation, funds in the special petroleum account were to be used to stabilize 
and develop Japan’s supply of oil. Why firms whose oil and gas imports were taxed in order to 
maintain this account were apparently able to shape how MITI used funds from this governmental 
account, I do not seek to explain. According to numerous interviews, however, they were able to do 
so. What is important for the purposes of this chapter is outlining what was advocated by whom 
and how the goals of the state of Japan materialized. 
121 This apparent deference to those firms that bore the brunt of the importation tax, and likely this 
history of the special petroleum account itself, is yet another example of what Richard Samuels has 
called “reciprocal consent” between the government bureaucracy and industrial firms in Japan 
(1987). 
122 NASA (1988a: 180-87). 
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including follow-on sensors to those that would be onboard JERS-1 seemed to have 
prevailed to some extent.123 The MITI facility instrument, called the Intermediate 
Thermal Infrared Radiometer (ITIR), was described in the Background Information 
Package as a “second generation” optical instrument that built upon the experience and 
instrument designs of the JERS-1 optical system (which had instruments for the 
visible/near infrared and shortwave infrared regions, but not for the thermal). The 
provisional description further noted that “to lower development cost, system designs 
will be derived from previous spacecraft programs (i.e., MOS, JERS) and available 
system hardware will be used with a minimum amount of modification.”124 The 
instrument was described as including one band in the near infrared, five bands in the 
shortwave infrared region, and bands in the thermal infrared region, but the description 
left unspecified the number of bands in the thermal region. A stereo optical system (i.e., 
two telescopes) for the near infrared band was also stated as being under consideration, 
which in addition to providing more work for the chosen contractor, was expected to 
be useful for surveying sites for drilling and mining operations and for laying pipeline. 
But what came of the purported original interest of the MITI Space Industry 
Division—its (and NASA’s) need for a sensor in the thermal region? The name of the 
proposed instrument, the Intermediate Thermal Infrared Radiometer, suggested that 
the thermal region was the proposed instrument’s emphasis, as the MITI Space 
Division had originally suggested to its consortia and contractors. Yet, according to the 
instrument’s provisional description, the expected performance of the instrument in the 
thermal region seemed questionable. The instrument’s description noted that “the 
linear [sensing] array in the thermal band[s] and its heat rejection are major tradeoff 
                                                  
123 My interpretation here is based upon my interviews with Yamaguchi (2002), Ishii (2003), and 
Yokota (2004), as well as the instrument’s description in the EOS Background Information 
Package. 
124 NASA (1988a: 183). 
  
 
141
items.”125 This “tradeoff” qualification meant two interrelated things, both of which 
did not bode well for the performance of the instrument in the thermal region. First, 
that qualification indicated that MITI, its science advisors, and its JAROS engineers 
expected an ambitious thermal-sensing array to produce lots of heat, and that level of 
heat would be difficult to manage. Consequently, the “tradeoff” between these 
competing performance characteristics was expected to be especially troublesome 
(hence, the description’s highlighting of the tradeoff as “major”). Second, and more 
ominously, that qualification also signaled that if the instrument’s performance needed 
to be decreased for any number of a variety of reasons (weight, cost, etc.), the 
performance of the thermal-sensing array (such as the number of sensors in the array) 
would be one of the first characteristics of the instrument as a whole to be “traded 
off.” It was thought that building the thermal-sensing array would be more demanding 
than building the others, and thus, it was also projected to be relatively more costly. If 
the number of sensors in the charge-coupled device array for the thermal sensors was 
decreased either because of problems relating to their heat production or because of 
cost (or both), the instrument’s spectral or spatial capability (or both) in the thermal 
region would decrease. Thus, although the instrument was identified in NASA’s 
conceptual planning as a functional substitute for a space-based version of the JPL 
group’s then-operational airborne thermal infrared multispectral scanner (TIMS),126 
and although the word “thermal” was prominent in the name of the MITI instrument, it 
was not at all clear in the provisional description of the instrument that the 
performance of the instrument in the thermal region was in fact a priority. 
Given this potential mismatch between the instrument’s name and the 
description of its proposed performance, the instrument description could be read as a 
                                                  
125 Ibid., p. 187. 
126 NASA Advisory Council (1988: 194). 
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political document to suggest that the MITI Space Industry Division had been 
persuaded by its consortia or contractors to propose an instrument different than what 
the division had originally intended when it had named the instrument an 
“Intermediate Thermal Infrared Radiometer.”127 More cynically, the description could 
be read to suggest that MITI was trying to pull a bait and switch with NASA, 
advertising one thing but delivering another under the hood. If judged according to its 
projected performance, the instrument’s emphasis did seem to be on the shortwave 
infrared region, in keeping with the emphasis of the optical system of the JERS-1 
instrument and in keeping with the research interests of researchers at ERSDAC and 
of scientists at the Geological Survey of Japan.128  But such a purely strategic 
interpretation of the motivations behind the instrument’s design, based upon the 
instrument’s expected performance and upon deductions of actors’ supposed interests, 
misses an important point: for the MITI Space Industry Division, the salient point was 
the development of a thermal capability, and ITIR allowed for that development. That 
was probably why the instrument’s title focused on the “thermal,” even though to 
many observers, the instrument seemed to be focused on the shortwave infrared.129 
What was not written about the instrument in its description was just as 
revealing—and intriguing—as what was written. ITIR’s technical description was 
remarkably tentative, especially considering that the description was included in the 
Background Information Package for the expressed purpose of allowing other 
potential EOS scientists to use it to inform their proposals for EOS instruments and 
                                                  
127 Judging from documentary sources, it is likely that the name of the MITI instrument had been 
submitted to NASA for reference in general planning discussions at least several months in 
advance of the instrument description, maybe as much as a year in advance. Compare Fisk (1987) 
and NASA Advisory Council (1988: 194). 
128 Yamaguchi (2001), Fujisada (2003), and Watanabe (2003). 
129 This interpretation is implicitly supported by, and alluded to, in Fujisada (2003) and Ishii 
(2003). The distinction between developmental goals and utility is a central point in the analysis of 
Samuels (1994). The “observers” I reference are U.S. scientists whom I will discuss below. 
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science investigations. The instrument’s provisional description stated explicitly that 
much remained to be settled.130 As has already been mentioned, the number of 
sensing bands in the thermal region went unspecified. Unlike the provisional 
descriptions of other facility instruments, such as HIRIS, the instrument description 
for ITIR did not include plans for how the various spectral region sub-instruments 
would be coordinated to take measurements (i.e., the instrument’s “data acquisition 
modes”). It did not even include a brief description of the calibration of the instrument, 
which was a scientific matter that EOS’s proponents argued was of crucial importance 
for EOS’s long-term, synergistic approach.131  The HIRIS instrument description 
specified the potential pointing angles of the instrument’s telescope (and thus the 
width of the potential “swath” of the earth which it could view), the anticipated 
performance of its sensors’ abilities to quantify light (such as signal to noise ratios and 
modulation transfer functions), and how the data were to be distributed to users.132  
It is reasonable to assume that all of these specifications would be important, 
albeit to a varying degree, for scientists who would respond to the EOS 
call-for-proposals with proposals for complementary instruments or with scientific 
investigations that would use these baseline facility instruments. The ITIR description, 
however, included none of these specifications. To a trained eye, or to an untrained eye 
willing to engage in some comparison, even if the authors of the description had not 
described the status of the instrument design as “in a conceptual stage” and in need of 
“a more detailed study,” which they indeed did, the design’s tentativeness would have 
                                                  
130 NASA (1988a: 187). 
131 The production of calibrated data was an EOS requirement for proposed instruments. See 
NASA (1988b: 7). 
132 NASA (1988a: 28-50). 
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likely been assumed, given its lack of specification.133 The design’s tentativeness, as 
we will see, implied for some that the design was open to being shaped. 
While the description of the ITIR instrument in the EOS Background 
Information Package strongly suggested that much remained to be settled in its design, 
the objectives of the instrument’s use were definitively expressed. The instrument was 
to be used to map the distribution of rocks and minerals, primarily—but not 
exclusively—for the purpose of mineral, petroleum, and geothermal exploration and 
exploitation.134 The five bands of the shortwave infrared radiometer (SWIR) were 
stated as being “helpful” for studying “volcanic systems and mineralization 
mechanism[s]” and as “important for mineral and geothermal exploration.” 135 
“Carbonate rocks” were listed as “another possible target to be delineated by the 
SWIR bands, whose distribution may help to find petroleum reservoirs.”136 With the 
unspecified number of bands of the thermal infrared radiometer (TIR), the description 
asserted that it will be “possible to differentiate certain rock types,” but the rock types 
of interest in this spectral region went unspecified, as well as did the bands. The 
description did note, however, that the thermal sensor “should be quite useful for 
mapping the thermal anomalies which sometimes show the location of a promising 
                                                  
133 To be clear, I do not argued that, in comparison to the description of the HIRIS instrument, the 
ITIR instrument description was a poor or otherwise inadequate description. Given HIRIS’s 
substantial, and perhaps exceptional, conceptual development early on, dating back to years before 
the beginning of the EOS definition process, the instrument description for HIRIS could perhaps be 
argued as being too high of a bar by which to judge the scientific merits of the description of the 
ITIR instrument. But I am not judging the scientific merit of the ITIR instrument description. My 
argument is that it was likely that the intended audience of the instrument description judged the 
ITIR description to be general and technically tentative, with many issues still to be settled. I 
compare ITIR’s description with the description of the HIRIS instrument to demonstrate the 
possibility for, and the likely expectation of, thoroughness and specification in the description of 
EOS facility instruments. Later, I will describe how a particular reader interpreted the description 
of the ITIR instrument. 
134 Geothermal energy is energy, such as that contained in steam, which cycles to the earth’s 
surface as a result of the earth’s internal heating. This energy can be harnessed for producing 
electricity. 
135 NASA (1988a: 182). 
136 Ibid. Petroleum, commonly called a “fossil fuel,” is a carbon-based substance. 
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geothermal area.”137 Under the heading “Description of the [imagery] Scenes to be 
Acquired,” the authors of the ITIR instrument description wrote just two sentences: 
“The ITIR can provide detailed local maps of non-renewable resources. Specific goals 
will be determined by the Announcement of Opportunity (AO) selection [that is, by 
the selection of proposals which were submitted by potential investigators in response 
to this call for proposals].”138 
While the MITI Space Industry Division, MITI’s supporting consortia and 
advisory committees, and MITI’s Geological Survey of Japan had left much to decide 
in terms of the design of ITIR, the MITI Space Industry Division’s deliberative 
process had established that the expressed goal of its ITIR instrument was first and 
foremost to explore for and exploit natural resources as an instrument of the state of 
Japan. While neither that primary goal nor the less explicit secondary goal of 
technological development definitively determined the instrument’s conceptual design, 
those goals largely gave the instrument’s design meaning for the group of bureaucrats, 
scientists, and engineers who described and spoke for the instrument’s design on 
behalf of the MITI Space Industry Division, its consortia, the Geological Survey of 
Japan, and ultimately, the state of Japan. Although MITI and the Government of Japan 
had proposed to NASA that ITIR become a part of NASA’s Earth Observing System, 
which NASA was justifying as a scientific tool for understanding global change, the 
group of bureaucrats, scientists, and engineers clustered around the MITI Space 
Industry Division justified ITIR’s tentative conceptual design not in those terms, but in 
terms of the instrument’s ability to explore for and exploit natural resources while also 
allowing for the development of Japan’s technological capacity in remote sensing. 
 
                                                  
137 NASA (1988a: 182). 
138 Ibid., p. 187. Under this heading, the authors of other instrument descriptions had written 
paragraphs. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has described two communities of geologic remote-sensing 
practice in the 1980s and the goals of their respective states. The techno-political form 
of life of the community that was anchored around the research and technologies of 
the JPL group was accustomed to mission-oriented, NASA-sponsored investigations 
that were governed under a principal-investigator arrangement. In this community, 
principal investigators typically led scientific investigations that they had proposed to 
NASA which NASA had subsequently selected for contract. Consequently, this 
community usually presumed that the driving force behind their investigations would 
be the visions of the principal investigators, their co-investigators, and the members of 
their teams. By the mid-1980s, the vision and expertise of the group of geologic 
remote-sensing researchers at JPL was primarily, but not exclusively, aligned with the 
science and instrumentation of remote sensing in the thermal region. For many of the 
researchers at JPL, the science and the instrumentation went hand-in-hand; to do 
innovative science required pushing innovative instrumentation. In the 1980s, this 
community’s primary patron, NASA, was in the process of planning for a “Mission to 
Planet Earth.” The heart of this mission’s concept was to use an “Earth Observing 
System” to understand global change, an endeavor that was also promoted to 
demonstrate U.S. leadership in space and the United States’ commitment to 
international cooperation. By 1990, using the Earth Observing System to achieve these 
three broad goals was supported by Congress and the White House. These goals were 
state goals. As the next chapter will explain, to harness the potential of the Earth 
Observing System for their research and to take advantage of these three emerging 
state goals, the geologic remote-sensing group at JPL embarked upon a collaborative 
project with Japan’s MITI and MITI’s consortia. 
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But MITI, its consortia, and their scientific and engineering advisors had their 
own coherent bundle of professional interests, scientific and technical practices, and 
state goals. In response to the oil shocks of the 1970s and incited by the success of the 
U.S. Landsat civilian remote-sensing program, the MITI Space Industry Division 
started promoting the development and use of remote-sensing technologies for the 
exploration and exploitation of energy and mining resources. While the division’s 
primary mission was to “nurture” the space industry by helping it to develop 
technologies for broader industry use, promoting the development of remote-sensing 
technologies for the purpose of exploiting energy and mining resources was an 
objective that served as a compelling justification for its primary mission. In addition, 
it would also allow the Space Industry Division to tap into a source of funding: the 
special petroleum tax. With plans for Japan’s first earth resources satellite in the works, 
MITI and a dozen or so firms chartered two industry consortia, ERSDAC and JAROS 
(more precisely, JAROS’s predecessor), which would help MITI achieve its goals and 
spend its money. Scientists and engineers at MITI’s research institutes, such as the 
Electro-technical Laboratory and the Geological Survey of Japan, were enlisted to 
advise these consortia. Their research interests tended to complement MITI’s goals, 
focusing for instance on the shortwave infrared region. Since the institutional 
arrangement of MITI and industry consortia was the only game in town for the 
development of geologic remote-sensing instrumentation, only those few university 
scientists who wanted to, and were allowed to, work in this institutional arrangement 
and support its goals acquired any experience with harmonizing the design and 
operation of geologic remote-sensing instrumentation with the requirements of 
scientific investigations. Even by the late 1980s, however, most of that experience was 
limited at best. The contrast between these two communities’ techno-political forms of 
life was stark. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
TRYING TO SHARE SEPARATELY 
 
A year after the National Aeronautical Space Administration’s 1988 call for 
proposals for instruments for its Earth Observing System, NASA Headquarters wrote 
an acceptance letter to a proposing team based out of the geologic remote-sensing 
group at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. The team leader and the deputy team leader 
later described the acceptance letter as the “strangest one [they] had ever seen.”1 
NASA explained in the letter that NASA had selected the team leader and her 
proposed team as a provisional EOS team, but that NASA had not selected the thermal 
instrument that they had proposed to develop in support of EOS science goals. Instead, 
NASA Headquarters asked Dr. Anne Kahle and her team to somehow realize their 
thermal instrument and their proposed science “by influencing the Japanese design” of 
an instrument that had been proposed by Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry.2 This instrument was MITI’s Intermediate Thermal Infrared Radiometer 
(ITIR). 
What was implicitly suggested by NASA’s “partial selection” letter, and what 
was later confirmed explicitly, was that NASA wanted Kahle’s team to serve as a 
means to NASA’s end of cost-effective international scientific cooperation by helping 
to ensure that U.S. cooperation with Japan could be scientifically and technically 
justified as a legitimate and important element of EOS to potential detractors in 
Congress or NASA advisory committees.3 In the contemporary words of NASA 
                                                  
1 Palluconi (2001) and Kahle (2003a). The exact quote is from the interview with Palluconi, who 
was the deputy team leader, but the team leader, Kahle, voiced the same opinion in her interview 
and explicitly agreed with Palluconi’s characterization of the letter, when asked. 
2 Fisk (1989: 1). 
3 See Kahle (2003a) and Butler (2005). 
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Headquarters’ chief project scientist for EOS, the MITI instrument was “the essence of 
cooperation between Japan and NASA.”4  The stakes of effecting scientifically- 
credible international cooperation with Japan in the Earth Observing System became 
even more important for NASA Headquarters because there was less international 
cooperation elsewhere, such as with the European Space Agency.5 What international 
cooperation with Japan meant for Kahle was that she needed to be, as she would later 
remark, not only a “geophysicist” but also a “geopolitician.”6  
The instrument that MITI’s consortia ultimately developed with the guidance 
of Kahle’s team and a team of scientists and engineers from Japan was not named 
ITIR, but ASTER, the Advanced Spaceborne Thermal Emission and Reflection 
radiometer (see figure 4.1 on the next page). The “U.S. ASTER team” and the “Japan 
ASTER team,” as the two teams later came to be called, set out in the initial years of 
their collaboration to achieve the goals of their states by trying to build the 
ITIR/ASTER instrument as an instrument that would accomplish both teams’ goals 
without either team having to embrace the other team’s goals and their state’s goals. 
The two teams—especially the U.S. team—wanted to share ITIR/ASTER separately 
so that the instrument would serve as what scholars in Science and Technology Studies 
call a “boundary object.”7 
 
 
 
                                                  
4 Butler (1989). 
5 Butler (2005). The history of another EOS instrument, the Advanced Microwave Scanning 
Radiometer, is especially relevant here. Around this time the contributor of the Advanced 
Microwave Scanning Radiometer shifted from Japan’s National Space Development Agency to 
Italy and the European Space Agency. After some controversy with the European Space Agency, 
however, the instrument eventually was allocated back to Japan’s National Space Development 
Agency. See also Butler (2005). 
6 Kahle (2005). 
7 What a “boundary object” is—and is not—is addressed below. 
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Terra is the flagship of NASA's ESE (Earth Science Enterprise). 
Terra Satellite
MODIS
ASTER (TIR)
ASTER (SWIR)
ASTER (VNIR)
MISR
MOPITT
CERES
ASTER is the zoom lens of Terra!
 
 
Figure 4.1: A Standard Depiction of the ASTER Instrument 
Onboard the First EOS Satellite 
(here from Yamaguchi 2003) 
 
NASA’s Terra satellite (which was formerly called EOS-AM1 and EOS-AM) hosted 
five instruments. MODIS was a MODerate-resolution Imaging Spectrometer, with 
spatial resolutions of 250 meters, 500 meters, and 1000 meters, depending upon the 
wavelength band. It was a facility instrument of NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center. 
MISR was a Multi-angle Imaging Spectrometer, with resolutions of 250 meters and 
275 meters, depending upon the camera. It was a facility instrument of the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory. MOPITT takes Measurements Of Pollution In The 
Troposphere, with a spatial resolution of 22 kilometers. The instrument was sponsored 
by the Government of Canada and was tested at the University of Toronto. The 
CERES instrument characterizes Clouds and the Earth’s Radiant Energy System. It is 
a facility instrument of NASA’s Langley Research Center. The ASTER instrument has 
three sub-instruments, a thermal infrared radiometer (TIR) with 90 meter resolution, a 
shortwave infrared radiometer (SWIR) with 60 meter resolution, and a visible 
near-infrared radiometer (VNIR) with 30 meter resolution. Because ASTER is a 
high-resolution instrument that could complement the other instruments in some ways, 
NASA described it as the “zoom lens” of the Terra satellite. 
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This chapter describes the emergence of U.S.-Japan bilateral diplomacy, how 
NASA and MITI positioned members of the U.S. and Japan teams as liminal state 
actors, and how these liminal state actors enacted technoscientific diplomacy and 
attempted to negotiate the design of the ITIR instrument so that it could serve as a 
“boundary object.” In particular, the chapter accounts for the design specifications of 
an instrument sensor, and it highlights how the explanatory sketches of epistemic 
communities and Latourian actor-network theory offer inadequate accounts compared 
to interpreting the two teams’ technoscientific diplomacy.  
  
The Politics of Boundary Objects 
 
The concept of “boundary objects” has been much used and abused in the 
literature of Science and Technology Studies, as well as in other fields in which the 
concept has been taken up. It was originally developed to account for “coherence” in 
“ecological” analyses of “social worlds.”8 Boundary objects were defined as: 
 
“ . . . scientific objects which both inhabit several intersecting social 
worlds . . . and satisfy the informational requirements of each of them. 
Boundary objects are objects which are both plastic enough to adapt to local 
needs and the constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust 
enough to maintain a common identity across sites. . . . They have different 
meanings in different social worlds but their structure is common enough to 
more than one world to make them recognizable, a means of translation” 
(emphasis in original).9 
 
Unfortunately, when employing the term “boundary object,” much of the literature 
asserts the efficacy of an object as a boundary object without describing its creation. 
Even when an analysis does describe the creation of a boundary object, it generally 
neglects the diplomacy that led to the creation of the boundary object, including the 
                                                  
8 See Star and Griesemer (1989) and Star (1989). 
9 Star and Griesemer (1989: 393). 
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possible pulling-and-hauling of politics among the coherent collectivities through 
which the boundary objects circulate, such as communities, organizations, states, or 
“social worlds.”10 In contrast to other examples of “boundary work” analyses in 
Science and Technology Studies, boundary objects, as well as their cognitive 
descendants such as “boundary organizations,” have been assumed to be stable by 
virtue of their function as politically-neutral elements that serve as passage points, 
buffer devices, or common tokens among coherent collectivities. Coherent 
collectivities, however, may compete or conflict as well as collaborate. Allowing 
boundary objects to operate as quasi-functional dei ex machina misses an opportunity 
to understand and take seriously collaboration, competition, and conflict in the 
creation of techno-political order.  
This chapter as well as the next will use the general notion of a boundary 
object in a more sophisticated manner by conceptualizing politics as endogenous to the 
construction and use of boundary objects.11 Unlike the work to date on boundary 
                                                  
10 See footnote 66 in Star and Griesmer (1989: 413 and that note’s referenced text. That discussion 
called attention to the strong presumptions of cooperation in Star and Griesemer’s account. For 
example, Star and Griesemer does not account for how Grinnell and Alexander were able to 
convince the amateur collectors and Berkeley’s administrators to adopt Grinnell and Alexander’s 
preferences regarding the boundary objects. Star and Griesemer allude that Grinnell’s position of 
authority had, in their words, a “price,” but they do not describe what that price was and why it 
was paid (see p. 407). Diplomacy over competing preferences was suggested by Star and 
Griesemer, but not described. In fact, Star and Griesemer’s description actually implies that the 
amateur collectors and administrations initially had little or no objection to Grinnell’s and 
Alexander’s goals. In other words, there seemed to be no substantive disagreement. At most, Star 
and Griesemer show how actors who arguably lived in different social worlds, and aspired to 
different identities, could nevertheless agree—for reasons that Star and Griesemer do not 
explain—on the particulars of a boundary object and then were able to institutionally build upon 
those particulars. Judging from their empirical account, it seems that the boundary object as an 
historical entity had never itself actually been a site of contestation. Over all, Star and Griesemer’s 
account is quasi-functional (a use “quasi” because the account does not incorporate the causality 
claims of strong functionalism). See Star and Griesemer (1989: 404-410). 
11 The types of boundary objects that Star and Griesemer (1989) call attention to—namely, 
repositories, ideal types, coincident boundaries, and standardized forms—all facilitate trading, 
translation, and coherence across boundaries because the boundary objects are abstracted from 
contestation in their analysis. Their assumption of political neutrality can also smuggle in historical 
stability without warrant: social worlds are presumed to be institutionalized from the beginning of 
analysis, much in the same way that uses of the concept of “trading zones” have presumed 
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objects, boundary organizations, and most recently, “boundary infrastructures,” this 
dissertation’s analysis does not make a presumption in favor of cooperation, political 
neutrality, and stability in its account of how the U.S.-Japan teams attempted to design 
ASTER as a U.S.-Japan boundary object. The previous chapter described the breadth 
and depth of difference between the two communities of practice from which the U.S. 
and Japan teams were assembled. It spelled out and substantiated the distinct state 
goals of the governments for whom they would work. This chapter and the next 
illustrate in detail that, mainly because of these differences, the U.S.-Japan team 
struggled over ASTER’s specifications as a potential boundary object, engaging in 
power-laden negotiating tactics that were predominantly bilateral in social form in an 
effort to crystallize their goals in the ASTER instrument itself. In this account, unlike 
in that of Star and Griesemer, if ASTER had been realized as a boundary object for the 
two teams, it would have not been the result of merely some functional consequence 
but rather the result of intentional strategy.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
institutional stability (for the former point, see, for instance, Star and Griesemer’s discussion of the 
state of California as a boundary object, p. 407-410; for the latter point, see Galison 1996). 
Guston’s principal-agent explanation of “boundary organizations,” an explanation that 
characterizes a boundary organization as stable as far as it can serve two masters 
equally—especially equally vis-à-vis each other—highlights the importance of the assumption of 
political neutrality for boundary entities and also the assumption of stability for the 
institutions/social worlds being served (2001: 401-402). One “master” never gains an upper hand 
through the design or use of the boundary object or in other ways that implicate the boundary 
object. Earlier rhetorical and institutional ideas of “boundary work” in S&TS did not neglect the 
pulling-and-hauling of politics; they did not make problematic assumptions of equal power 
relations as the literature on boundary objects and boundary organizations has done (see, for 
instance, Gieryn 1983, 1995, 1999; and Jasanoff 1987). 
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The TIGER Team 
 
MITI’s ITIR and Kahle’s Two Proposals 
 
In response to the description of MITI’s ITIR instrument which was included 
in the 1988 EOS call for proposals, Dr. Anne Kahle of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory’s 
geologic remote-sensing group proposed along with two colleagues to develop and the 
instrument.12 They proposed to become what the call for proposals called “team 
members” for the ITIR “research facility instrument.”13 This proposal, which I will 
call the “ITIR team member proposal,” was the first of two proposals that groups led 
by Kahle submitted to constitute at least part of a team for an EOS instrument. The 
second proposal was the “TIGER team proposal.” A comparison of the fates of these 
two proposals highlights the stakes of the organizational arrangements of international 
collaboration for NASA and Kahle’s team. For NASA and Kahle’s team, the ITIR 
team proposal did not offer the opportunity of turning ITIR into a boundary object. A 
revision of the TIGER team proposal did, provided that MITI and its consortia 
accepted it. The feasibility of designing the ITIR instrument as a boundary object 
hinged upon a key difference between the two proposals with respect to how a “team” 
of American and Japanese scientists and engineers would be politically constituted: the 
ITIR team member proposal did not allow for collaboration between a “U.S.” team 
and a “Japan” team; the TIGER team proposal did.   
                                                  
12 Her two colleagues were Frank Palluconi and Dr. Alan Gillespie. Kahle was principal 
investigator and Palluconi and Gillespie were co-investigators. Both Kahle and Palluconi worked 
in the Geologic Remote-Sensing Group at JPL, which was part of JPL’s Geology Program. Kahle 
was supervisor of the group and manager of the program. Gillespie had worked for several years in 
the same program at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory as Kahle and Palluconi, but at this time he was 
at the University of Washington (Kahle et al. 1988: vi). 
13 NASA (1988b: 18) and Fisk (1987: slides 16-17). 
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In their “ITIR team member” proposal, Kahle and her two colleagues 
presumed a “team” organizational arrangement for governing the development of ITIR. 
This team arrangement was stipulated in the EOS call for proposals for all EOS 
instruments. It was a common organizational form for NASA and was almost 
taken-for-granted in the principal investigator system, with co-investigators (i.e., team 
members) organized under a principal investigator (i.e., a team leader). But ITIR was 
an instrument sponsored by Japan’s MITI. Previous development projects of the MITI 
Space Industry Division and the geologic remote-sensing community surrounding 
MITI’s consortia had no precedent for such a “team” arrangement, especially an 
international team. As discussed in the previous chapter, Japan’s geologic 
remote-sensing community was not organized along the lines of principal investigator 
and co-investigator team. The “team” arrangement, however, was a condition for every 
agency that wanted to incorporate an instrument into NASA’s EOS platforms, so if 
MITI wanted to “fly” ITIR as part of an EOS platform, it would have to create 
something it could call a “team.”  
How would the management of the MITI Space Industry Division form a 
team (either domestic or international) and integrate or not integrate it into its usual 
way of going about the business of geologic remote sensing? What would be the roles, 
the division of labor, and the allocation of responsibilities? How would disagreements 
be managed? Whose expertise would be trusted and who would have decision-making 
authority? In 1988, these questions were just starting to be discussed within MITI.14 
When Kahle and her colleagues proposed work to MITI in their ITIR team member 
proposal, which they described in terms of NASA’s mundane bureaucratic categories 
such as working as a “team member,” those NASA bureaucratic categories likely had 
                                                  
14 This claim is based on the understanding of, but not the direct experience of, Yamaguchi (2002) 
and Yokota (2004). 
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little explanatory value for the MITI Space Industry Division and its contractors. The 
labels of those categories did not communicate the assumptions behind those 
categories, such as what the “team” concept meant, nor did they structure the roles of 
Kahle and her colleagues in relation to the development of ITIR. While advisory 
committees and study groups, along with the chairpersons for those committees and 
groups, were tried and true organizational forms for MITI and its consortia, a “team” 
as such had not been. What it meant to be a “team” and a “team member” needed to be 
worked out. But these questions were not worked out—nor arguably could they have 
been worked out—by the time the MITI Space Industry Division had proposed in 
1987 to NASA that ITIR be incorporated into NASA’s EOS. The international 
relations that were emerging among MITI, its consortia, and the Kahle team were not 
highly structured by diplomatic protocols or shared bureaucratized practices. A 
relatively small group of scientists and engineers were largely making up their 
“international relations” as they went along.  
There is another reason to think that the bureaucrats of the MITI Space 
Industry Division and its consortia likely did not work through the possible 
implications that the “team” concept could suggest for their governance of 
remote-sensing development: MITI was not the lead agency in Japan’s interagency 
process for soliciting and managing foreign EOS proposals. Kahle and her colleagues 
technically did not submit their “team member” proposal directly to the MITI Space 
Industry Division, but rather to NASA’s Office of Space Science Applications and to 
the Research and Development Bureau of the Science and Technology Agency of 
Japan. The latter office was the designated point of coordination in Japan for foreign 
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proposals to contribute to the design or utilization of instruments that were sponsored 
by agencies or ministries in Japan.15  
As had been pre-arranged by the international cooperation working group for 
EOS, which was an international interagency working group convened by NASA 
Headquarters, if a researcher affiliated with an agency or ministry in one state wanted 
to apply to become a part of a future “team” for an instrument that was sponsored by 
an agency or ministry in another state, that scientist or engineer submitted a copy of 
his or her proposal to the agency of the “home state” as well as to the agency of the 
state that sponsored the instrument.16 If the agency or ministry of the home state 
endorsed the proposal, the foreign agency or ministry that was sponsoring the 
development of the instrument would have the option of selecting the researcher’s 
proposal to join the future team. The general arrangement was that the “home state” 
would then fund the work of those researchers.17 Thus, by allowing international 
                                                  
15 Kahle et al. (1988). Japan’s Science and Technology Agency, and specifically its Research and 
Development Bureau, was the official point of contact for international science proposals because 
academic scientific research was in their bureaucratic jurisdiction. Moreover, Japan’s Science and 
Technology Agency was the agency under whose jurisdiction the Japan’s National Space 
Development Agency (NASDA) operated. 
16 “Home state” is my terminology, chosen for convenience and clarity. The international 
interagency working group, formerly called the “Earth Observation International Coordination 
Working Group on the Use of Polar Platforms and Space Station Elements,” was established in 
1986 and included the U.S., European, Japanese, and Canadian space and weather agencies. The 
working group met about a half dozen times before the release of the EOS announcement of 
opportunities (i.e., what I have called, for clarity, the EOS call for proposals). The group 
concentrated on issues such as the number, sponsorship, and general functionality and design of 
five earth observing platforms, which were planned to be sponsored by NASA (two platforms), the 
European Space Agency (two platforms), and Japan’s space-related ministries and agencies (one 
platform). By early 1988, the group had not made any agreements about the configuration of the 
instruments onboard those platforms, although the group had a tentative baseline scenario that they 
were discussing. The group outlined its charter in June 1988, about the same time scientists were 
submitting proposals in response to each state’s EOS announcements of opportunity. See Fisk 
(1987: slides 15-17). Charter of the Earth Observation International Coordination Working Group 
(EO-ICWG) on the Use of Polar Platforms and Space Station Elements, 8 June 1988. In 1990, the 
entire idea of polar platforms associated with the Space Shuttle program was thrown into question. 
Ultimately, the platform architecture was abandoned, but many of the constitutive instruments 
were not. 
17 Fisk (1987). 
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participation, Japan’s Science and Technology Agency and MITI’s Space Industry 
Division had the opportunity of taking onboard additional, and possibly different, 
expertise at NASA’s expense. But to do this, MITI would need to have a “team” of 
investigators, whatever that might come to mean in practice. 
In their ITIR team member proposal, Kahle and her co-investigators did 
explain what being a “team member” of a future ITIR team meant for them. They 
proposed, in accordance with the practices and expectations of the community of 
geologic remote sensing of which they were a part, to do much more development 
work than would academic scientists who just wanted to receive processed data from 
the instrument to use in investigations of particular geologic phenomena. They did not 
propose to be merely particularly influential science users who would shape what 
regions the instrument targeted or how the instrument’s raw data would be processed 
into “high level” data products.18 Their proposal was much more comprehensive, and 
it proposed to open the figurative “black-box” of instrument design and 
remote-sensing data production.  
The overarching objective of their proposal was “to use our expertise gained 
with development of NASA’s airborne Thermal Infrared Multispectral Scanner 
(TIMS) to maximize the capability and utility of the ITIR for meeting the goals of the 
EOS mission.”19 They broke down their proposed contribution “toward the wise 
development and utilization of the ITIR” into five major areas: 
 
1. formulation and selection of the operation and functional requirements [of 
the instrument’s hardware]; 
2. algorithm development, for the derivation of geophysical parameters and 
data utilization; 
3. operational planning; 
                                                  
18 “High level” data products are down stream in a processing chain and are the results of 
algorithmic calculations made with data that are closer to the measurements made by the 
instrument. 
19 Kahle et al. (1988: iv). 
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4. data verification; and 
5. utilization of the data for geologic research.20 
 
During the “definition phase” of the instrument, they expected to participate in the 
design of the instrument, deliberate along with counterparts from Japan about 
engineering and scientific trade-offs, and to use their substantial experience with the 
NASA/JPL TIMS instrument—for which Kahle had been the instrument scientist—to 
inform those discussions. They pitched this work to Japan’s Science and Technology 
Agency and to NASA as a “significant contribution to the design of an ITIR which 
fulfills EOS science goals.”21 Borrowing from, editing, and adding to articulations of 
the science goals that had been already outlined in the “solid earth” section of the lists 
of major “EOS science goals” which circulated during 1987 and 1988,22 Kahle and 
her colleagues set forth specific goals, which they called “EOS science tasks,” which 
they would address, including mapping continental rock units, investigating changes 
in soils and rock in response to climate, and studying young volcanoes.23 To MITI, 
Kahle and her two colleagues offered experience and expertise, especially with 
thermal instruments and thermal data. To NASA, they offered a way to integrate and 
leverage a Japan-sponsored instrument to advance NASA’s science goals for EOS. 
In addition to the ITIR team member proposal, Kahle and her two 
co-investigators submitted another proposal to NASA to become an EOS team for an 
instrument—the TIGER team proposal. Joined by about a dozen other co-investigators, 
they proposed as a team their own thermal instrument, which they called TIGER.24 
                                                  
20 Ibid., p. iv, 8. 
21 Ibid., p. v, 12. 
22 E.g., NASA (1987a: 56-64); Fisk (1987: slides 7-8); and NASA Advisory Council (1988). 
23 Kahle et al. (1988: iv, 4-5). 
24 The acronym stands for Thermal Infrared Ground Emission Radiometer. Kahle and Palluconi 
(1988). The co-investigators were chosen by the core members of the team at JPL and by Kahle in 
particular. Most of the core members at JPL had worked previously with those members of the 
team who had never spent time in JPL’s Geologic Remote Sensing Group or its Geology and 
Planetology Section. The proposed Deputy Project Scientist, Frank Palluconi, remembered that:  
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Kahle and her team, several of whom were or had been affiliated with the Geologic 
Remote Sensing Group and Geology and Planetology Section at JPL, wanted to push 
the field of thermal geologic remote sensing with instrumentation that went beyond the 
capability of the JPL airborne TIMS instrument. The instrument that they proposed 
was far more ambitious in the thermal region than the thermal sub-instrument of ITIR 
which had been tentatively outlined by MITI. While Kahle and her proposed TIGER 
team cast their TIGER instrument in service of the same EOS science tasks that they 
articulated in their ITIR team member proposal, the TIGER team’s proposed means 
for accomplishing those goals were dramatically different. The TIGER instrument that 
they proposed was actually two instruments. One sub-instrument was a Thermal 
Infrared Mapping Spectrometer, which, although it had a different name, went by the 
same acronym as the airborne TIMS. The second sub-instrument was a profiler, which 
pin-pointed particular spots (rather than mapping an area) and measured the thermal 
electromagnetic emission over a wide spectrum of thermal wavelengths (rather than 
focusing on just several wavelength bands in that spectrum, as an imaging mapper 
would). “The synergism between an imager and a profiling spectrometer,” the TIGER 
team argued, “is exceedingly powerful, greatly enhancing the value of either data set 
taken separately.”25 
Although Kahle and her co-investigators were not, and did not expect to be, 
directly involved in deliberations about whether to accept ITIR for a NASA EOS 
platform, these types of presumably “high level” techno-political decisions between 
states were not divorced from their world, and they apparently did not regard them as 
                                                                                                                                               
I had worked closely with Hugh Kieffer at USGS at Flagstaff and with Phil Christensen, 
and I suggested that they both would be useful complements to the team. So, [the team] 
was put together in a collaborative way starting with a core group here at JPL, and then 
looking at the range of problems we wanted to cover and people who we knew who did 
good work in those areas who might be interested (Palluconi 2001). 
 
25 Kahle and Palluconi (1988: iii). 
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beyond their influence. They judged it worthwhile to make their opinions about the 
matter known to NASA Headquarters. In their proposal, they stated that they 
“recognized that the TIGER appears to be in competition” with ITIR.26 They argued 
that while both instruments took on the “thermal” label, underneath the hood were 
vastly different instruments, capabilities, and potential benefits for EOS science. 
Although the number of thermal bands that ITIR would propose to offer was still 
unclear, they were confident that MITI would be proposing fewer bands in the thermal 
region than the TIGER team had proposed. Their proposed TIGER instrument, 
through its TIMS sub-instrument, would offer ten thermal bands, whereas in 
comparison, ITIR’s shortwave infrared sensor—which arguably was the focus of ITIR 
in terms of performance—proposed five bands. It was unlikely that ITIR would be 
offering many more bands than that for its thermal sensor, and it was much more likely 
that they would be offering fewer. Since TIGER would probably offer more bands in 
the same thermal spectral region than would ITIR, TIGER’s spectral resolution was 
expected to be greater. Furthermore, the thermal noise in the TIGER instrument’s 
TIMS was proposed to be one third of that proposed for ITIR. TIGER, having no 
bands in the shortwave infrared region, was a better complement to another proposed 
facility instrument for the EOS platform, the HIRIS instrument. ITIR’s shortwave 
infrared sensor overlapped with the shortwave infrared capability that HIRIS was 
proposing, and therefore could be argued to be redundant (as it eventually was argued). 
In sum, the team argued, “only TIGER has been specifically designed to exploit . . . 
the [scientific] potential of the thermal infrared wavelength regions.”27  
In light of this apparent competition, and knowing that NASA would need to 
pay for the development of TIGER whereas the Government of Japan would be 
                                                  
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
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funding the development of ITIR, the TIGER team appealed to EOS science 
objectives and suggested that: 
 
“both ITIR and TIGER proceed through the definition phase, during which 
time the Japanese be requested to consider upgrading the proposed ITIR to 
increase significantly the signal-to-noise and to include additional spectral 
bands. If these modifications prove feasible, JPL could then build only the 
profiling spectrometer part of TIGER as a significant and complementary 
adjunct to ITIR. If, however, the Japanese do not desire or are unable to 
achieve the signal-to-noise requirements, JPL could proceed to build the 
entire TIGER as proposed in order to reach the EOS science objectives.”28 
 
By suggesting to NASA that it select both instruments to better ensure the fulfillment 
of EOS science goals, Kahle and her colleagues opened the door for a response from 
NASA that they had not anticipated. 
 Over six months later, in early 1989, NASA came back with an offer for the 
TIGER team, which, if the team accepted, would thrust them into technoscientific 
diplomacy. The offer from NASA charged these researchers with conducting 
international relations on behalf of the state through activities that would be 
thoroughly scientific and technological in character. NASA Headquarters offered 
Kahle and the TIGER team “partial selection” of their proposal for the definition 
phase of EOS and EOS instruments. NASA “selected” the TIMS sensor of TIGER and 
declined the profiler. But, as NASA explained in its selection letter to Kahle, NASA 
did not actually select the TIMS sensor that Kahle and her team had proposed to 
NASA as a part of TIGER. NASA selected the TIMS sensor and the full TIGER team 
in the sense that NASA asked them “to try to implement the design advances in [their] 
TIMS concept by influencing the Japanese design for ITIR.”29 NASA wrote in its 
selection letter to Kahle that “TIMS is being considered . . . as an integral technology 
                                                  
28 Ibid. 
29 Fisk (1989: 1). 
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improvement for ITIR.”30 That is, NASA would not be competing TIGER’s TIMS 
against ITIR’s thermal capabilities, as Kahle and her team had suggested in their 
TIGER proposal. Furthermore, the letter explained that, while ITIR and, separately, 
the TIGER team, would both still be subject to selection processes two years later 
when EOS was scheduled to enter into its execution phase, and at that time one or the 
other or both could possibly be dropped from EOS, ITIR would not be competing 
against any other specific instrument, as some other EOS instruments would be.31 
This whole arrangement came as a bizarre surprise to Kahle and her deputy team 
leader.32 
 Nevertheless, as was suggested in their TIGER proposal, Kahle and her core 
co-investigators had speculated—and maybe even had heard—that NASA 
Headquarters had concerns about the degree to which ITIR and its implementation 
would realize EOS science goals.33 Both in their ITIR team member proposal to 
NASA and Japan’s Science and Technology Agency and in their TIGER proposal to 
NASA, Kahle and her co-investigators had asserted that any MITI-appointed science 
and engineering group to support the ITIR instrument would likely need assistance to 
meet the EOS science objectives that Kahle and her co-investigators had enumerated 
and to which they had rhetorically appealed. NASA, as it turned out, agreed with their 
judgment.  
Yet, NASA Headquarters did not indicate—nor even allude to—how Kahle 
and her team were to go about “influencing the Japanese design” to achieve what 
NASA Headquarters interpreted to be the TIGER proposal’s goal of “significantly 
                                                  
30 Ibid., p. 2. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Kahle (2003a) and Palluconi (2001). 
33 Kahle (2003a). An interview with a NASA official involved in the selection decision at 
headquarters, who wished to remain unnamed, confirmed for me in 2001 that the EOS program 
office did in fact have such concerns when they selected ITIR. 
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improved thermal infrared high spatial resolution imaging for Eos.” 34 Nor did NASA 
Headquarters indicate in its partial selection letter what its particular goals were for 
this “challenging effort in international cooperation” which it hoped Kahle and the 
TIGER team would be willing to take on. What was implicitly suggested was that the 
TIGER team would serve as a means to NASA’s end of enabling international 
cooperation with Japan in a way that could be scientifically and technically justified as 
a legitimate and important element of EOS. Consequently, for any renewal of funding 
for Kahle and her team, NASA would evaluate Kahle on how well she performed in 
that role. NASA Headquarters informed Kahle that: 
 
the key product of your definition phase study will be a cohesive and 
technically sound plan demonstrating the feasibility of improved ITIR 
capabilities and an approach whereby the Japanese agree to implement this 
improved approach to ITIR with your advice and U.S. hardware assistance 
only where absolutely necessary. Among the results of your definition phase 
effort will be improved science, management, data, calibration, and cost plans 
for your investigation.35 
 
But the investigation that NASA Headquarters referred to as “your investigation” was 
not just Kahle’s investigation, of course. The ITIR remote-sensing system was 
proposed by, and was being developed by, the MITI Space Industry Division and its 
consortia. NASA inserted the proposed ITIR instrument between, on one end, itself 
and the TIGER Team and, on the other, MITI and its consortia. This positioning was 
precarious, however, without the willingness of Kahle’s team to develop the 
instrument as a boundary object between the United States and Japan and without the 
willingness of MITI and its consortia to incorporate a TIGER team into its team for 
the ITIR instrument. 
 
                                                  
34 Fisk (1989: 4). 
35 Ibid., p. 3. This passage is punctuated as it was in the original. 
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Advancing Bilateralism as Liminal State Actors 
  
 Kahle and the TIGER team decided to make the most of any possibilities that 
they thought they might have for shaping the ITIR instrument through this revised 
TIGER team arrangement. The description of the ITIR instrument which MITI had 
submitted for the EOS Background Information Package had emphasized that the 
instrument design was in a “conceptual stage” and that, regarding data processing, 
“specific goals will be determined by” those scientists and engineers who were 
selected through the call for proposals.36 The strategy that Kahle and her colleagues 
adopted to influence the ITIR instrument was to advocate that the ITIR instrument be 
designed in such a way that it would be shared separately between the United States 
and Japan and between the science goals of those two states. They sought to design 
ASTER so that it could serve as what scholars in Science and Technology Studies call 
a “boundary object.”  
But boundary objects do not come into being on their own accord. They are 
products of power, even if this aspect of their construction has often been overlooked 
in the literature. Kahle and her TIGER team strove to build ITIR, and later ASTER, as 
boundary objects by exercising power from the position of the state, as the “U.S. 
team,” and not just as international members of a Japan team. They worked to enact a 
bilateralism in which they would be half of a dyad that shaped ITIR and ASTER. 
Nevertheless, they walked into bilateral negotiations not as state actors but as liminal 
state actors—working on behalf of their state, supported by their state, but without an 
authority that could be presumed to speak for their state. Without clear authority to 
speak for the United States, in their negotiations over ITIR Kahle and her team made 
the most of their authority as scientists to speak for science. This authority to speak for 
                                                  
36 NASA (1988a: 187). 
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“science,” however, pushed up against the authority of others, such as that of NASA 
and MITI’s JAROS, to speak for “technology.” 
The TIGER team’s strategy of designing ITIR as a boundary object was just a 
step from what they had recommended earlier to NASA in their TIGER team proposal 
in the summer of 1988. In that proposal, they had suggested to NASA that NASA ask 
“the Japanese” to “upgrade” the ITIR instrument so that it would better satisfy the 
TIGER team’s needs, as well as—the TIGER team had argued—better satisfy what 
they articulated to be NASA’s science goals for EOS.37 NASA’s selection of the 
TIGER team, NASA’s charge to the team to try to implement an “improved approach 
to ITIR,” and NASA’s willingness to provide a minimal amount of hardware 
assistance all implied that NASA, at least provisionally, found the proposed goals of 
the TIGER team to be compatible with their own goals and also worth paying for.38  
At this point then, judging from the selection letter that the TIGER team had 
received from NASA, NASA seemed ready to support the efforts of the TIGER team 
to make ITIR a boundary object. It would be the TIGER team, working as liminal state 
actors on behalf of NASA and the United States, and not NASA, who would negotiate 
and realize ITIR as a boundary object. Kahle and her colleagues from the TIGER team 
did not, of course, use the term “liminal state actors” to describe themselves or their 
role (they generally called themselves “scientists,” “engineers,” and “the TIGER 
team”). They did not use the term “boundary object” to describe what they wanted to 
build (they used the term “instrument,” “sensor,” and sometimes “international 
remote-sensing system”). Nor did they use Star’s and Griesemer’s language of “social 
worlds” to account for what they had then only strongly suspected to be different 
visions and goals between MITI and JPL for geologic remote sensing. Nevertheless, 
                                                  
37 Kahle and Palluconi (1988: iii). 
38 Fisk (1989). 
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Star’s and Griesemer’s language of mutually satisfying “informational requirements” 
would have been quite intelligible and even familiar to them.39 Kahle, Palluconi, and 
the rest of the TIGER team pushed for ITIR to satisfy their informational requirements, 
not as a substitute for MITI’s requirements—i.e., not using a Latourian strategy of 
translation—but in support of and in addition to MITI’s requirements—i.e., trying to 
share separately by making ITIR a boundary object. Yet, if the TIGER team was going 
to achieve this balance, they would not be able to dictate it; they would need instead to 
conduct technoscientific diplomacy. 
 Kahle’s and the TIGER team’s first opportunity for technoscientific 
diplomacy came almost immediately after they received their partial selection letter 
from NASA in February 1989. In an interview, the deputy team leader of the TIGER 
Team, Frank Palluconi, summarized how they explored what they could make of the 
hand that NASA had dealt them: 
  
When we got the letter of acceptance that suggested we cooperate with the 
ITIR experiment in Japan, we immediately asked how we should do that, and 
the idea that was settled upon was to contact JAROS as the implementing 
organization for the instrument and as the first point of contact. So we got a 
letter of reference from NASA Headquarters . . . which served as the 
introduction to JAROS and then we just got on a plane and went to Japan and 
knocked on their door. They knew we were coming but they did not know 
what to expect, and that first meeting was a little bit awkward, although both 
sides essentially described the instrument that they had proposed and were 
thinking of building. And then we went out to Tsukuba [which is a “science 
city” outside of Tokyo where many of MITI’s national research institutes 
were] and talked to people out there at the metrology lab, among whom was 
Dr. Ono. He spoke English rather well, which maybe one of the reasons why 
we were referred to him, but he also was head of the section for radiation 
standards and had been an integral part of instrument development in Japan. 
And based on conversations there we realized that one of the principal 
scientific people involved was a fellow, a Professor Ishii. So at Tsukuba, we 
                                                  
39 My judgment here draws upon my reading of the TIGER proposal, contemporary 
correspondence among MITI, JAROS, ERSDAC, the TIGER team, and NASA, all of which will 
be cited below, and retrospective interviews, particularly, Abrams (2003), Kahle (2003), and 
Palluconi (2001). 
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arranged to meet with him [Professor Ishii was back in Tokyo]. And we did 
meet with him [in Tokyo] and talked about our interests, and talked about 
what benefits there would be for beefing up the thermal portion of ITIR and, 
ah, the benefits that a U.S. team might bring to this enterprise. And we felt 
when we left that we had made a good impression and things sort of grew 
from there.40 
 
As was typical of Frank Palluconi’s speaking style,41  in this interview excerpt 
Palluconi’s language is considered, cautious, and matter-of-fact. Others who tell this 
story first-hand, or who re-tell it second-hand as part of the lore of the team, have 
more colorfully emphasized that NASA purportedly provided very little guidance to 
the team, that NASA had done minimal advance work, and that, under the pressure of 
the EOS development schedule, it was a core group from the TIGER team who took 
the initiative and “knocked on the door” of MITI and JAROS without any detailed 
agenda planning between MITI and NASA, or for that matter, between MITI and the 
TIGER Team.42  
Palluconi’s account, as well as accounts of others, notes that the leadership of 
the TIGER team was not going over to Japan in March 1989 merely to see how they 
could be of assistance as members of some future international science team. The 
TIGER team had their own ideas about what kind of instrument they wanted to build 
and what kind of organizational arrangements might most effectively realize that 
instrument. That is, the TIGER team leadership was not going to Tokyo just to 
advocate for particular instrument specifications. They went there to lay the ground 
work for political arrangements as well. They wanted to make clear, as Palluconi put it, 
“the benefits that a U.S. team might bring to this enterprise”—a “U.S. team,” not a few 
team members, but a “U.S. team.” Although NASA had provisionally accepted the 
                                                  
40 Palluconi (2001). 
41 I make this generalization based upon my interview with him and from my observations of his 
style of talking with Japanese and American colleagues at team meetings. 
42 Abrams (2001) and Kahle (2003). 
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TIGER team (but without its proposed instrument), MITI, its consortia, and its key 
advisors had not yet agreed to incorporate the TIGER team members into their ITIR 
team, much less to call the TIGER team the “U.S. team.” A “U.S. team” did not yet 
exist, and its creation was not assured. Demonstrating the benefits of a “U.S. team” 
was a significant reason for why it might have been important to make a “good 
impression.” 
There was also another, less important, reason to make a “good impression”: 
the verdict was still out on the ITIR team member proposal, which was the proposal 
submitted before the TIGER team as a group had been charged with collaborating with 
Japan’s future ITIR team. While the ITIR proposal had been endorsed by NASA, it 
had not yet been accepted by Japan’s Science and Technology Agency and MITI.43 It 
is reasonable to assume that, of the three members from TIGER team on this trip, the 
two members who also had proposed to be ITIR team members, Kahle and Palluconi, 
wanted their separate ITIR team member proposal to be accepted. Making a poor 
impression at this first meeting with MITI and its consortia might conceivably 
jeopardize that acceptance.  
Yet, the “ITIR team member” arrangement by itself was not the preferred 
arrangement for collaboration. If the ITIR proposal had been accepted, its three 
proposers—with Kahle as the principal investigator for the three—would likely have 
become individual members of some future ITIR international science team, a team 
that had yet to be defined or constituted, but which Kahle would not have led. This 
team would have been populated largely by scientists and engineers from Japan whom 
Kahle and Palluconi did not expect to share the goals of the TIGER team. Under this 
“ITIR team member” arrangement, the American ITIR team members would not have 
the support of the numerous experts who were a part of the TIGER team effort but 
                                                  
43 Kahle et al. (1988). 
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who were not ITIR team members, experts with whom they were already colleagues. 
Those non-ITIR team colleagues would only be accepted onto the ITIR team if the 
TIGER team in which they were members was, as a whole, incorporated into the ITIR 
science team.44 Moreover, the three American scientists of the ITIR team member 
proposal, as individual ITIR team members, would not have been able to act with the 
weight that the label of a “U.S. team” might afford, assuming that the TIGER team 
became the “U.S. team” for ITIR.45 Without the recognition that a “U.S. team” was 
involved in the development of ITIR, it would be more difficult for those team 
members to convincingly deploy the rhetoric of speaking for a state in order to 
influence decisions.46 The “U.S. team” label might prove to be a useful resource, if 
they could get it.  
For their first meeting in Japan, it was uncertain what political resources were 
available (or were going to be made available) to the three members of the provisional 
TIGER team to help them realize their preferred instrumentation, their science goals, 
and the TIGER team itself, possibly as a “U.S. team.” There had been some 
correspondence prior to their visit which had introduced them to their counterparts. In 
the above interview excerpt, Palluconi mentioned that the managers at JAROS, as “the 
first point of contact,” did not know what to expect. Anne Kahle had written the 
Executive Managing Director of JAROS a brief introductory letter, requesting that she 
and two colleagues visit to “discuss the developing plans for ITIR” and to familiarize 
                                                  
44 One could argue that some ad-hoc arrangement for adding NASA-funded scientists to the ITIR 
team could have been worked out, but since it would have not gone through the standard review 
process that NASA had established years in advance, such an ad-hoc arrangement would have been 
highly exceptional. It is extremely doubtful that NASA Headquarters would have selected 
scientists through a bureaucratic procedure that circumvented their public “announcement of 
opportunity” and peer-review process. 
45 I write “might” because this weight can not be assumed. It needs to be demonstrated or, at least, 
illustrated. That is, Japan’s project managers would need to interpret how this group of American 
scientists was or was not speaking for NASA and the United States. 
46 A “U.S. team” label would probably also confer more status, discretion, and funding to its 
members with respect to NASA, particularly in the case of Kahle as the “U.S. team leader.” 
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themselves “with all technical aspects of the current design, calibration, and data 
utilization.”47 The letter parenthetically explained that “(NASA has accepted our 
proposal, TIGER, and requested that we collaborate with you).”48  
The Director of NASA’s Earth Science and Applications Division had also 
written a letter to introduce the team to the Executive Managing Director of JAROS 
(this letter of introduction is included in the Appendix). But Kahle and her two 
colleagues did not at the time find the letter of introduction to be particularly clear or 
helpful for laying out the terms of their cooperation with MITI and JAROS.49 Neither, 
apparently, did their Japanese counterparts. In the first meeting of their visit to Japan, 
in a meeting with JAROS managers and with a MITI representative, the Executive 
Managing Director of JAROS explained to Kahle and her colleagues that the letter of 
introduction did not clarify for them “what form a cooperative effort could take.”50 
The letter of introduction from NASA Headquarters did seem to state that, if 
MITI and its consortia wanted to incorporate ITIR into NASA’s EOS, MITI and its 
consortia would be required to cooperate to some extent with the TIGER science team 
for the definitional phase of the instrument, which was expected to be about two 
years.51 Beyond this general understanding, the critical aspect of NASA’s letter of 
introduction was how it cast the TIGER team—what kind of authority and importance 
                                                  
47 Kahle (1989b). 
48 Ibid. 
49 See the two trip reports, Chase (1989a) and Kahle (1989c). The latter included a copy of Kahle 
and Palluconi (1989). 
50 Kahle and Palluconi (1989), which was written to Shelby G. Tilford and Dixon M. Butler. The 
last two individuals were, respectively, the Director of NASA’s Earth Science and Applications 
Division and the EOS Program Scientist. 
51 I write “seem” because my interpretation of the subtle letter of introduction from NASA 
Headquarters is not informed by specific comments from its readers about how they read, or did 
not read, the letter. In interviews, I asked interviewees to discuss the first several meetings between 
the TIGER Team and ITIR’s developers in Japan, but I did not ask those individuals who might 
have taken the letter into consideration and used it as a resource during those meetings how they 
specifically interpreted the letter of introduction (or, more accurately, how they remembered 
interpreting the letter of introduction, if they would have at all). 
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it granted the team and how decidedly it portrayed the TIGER team as expressing the 
will of NASA Headquarters. The TIGER team leadership might have been able to use 
a compelling portrayal of a tight relationship between NASA Headquarters and the 
TIGER team as a resource in their negotiations. In the circumstances of these initial 
meetings, with little or no history and previous interaction between the TIGER team 
on the one side and MITI and its advisors on the other, the more aligned NASA 
seemed to be with the TIGER team, the stronger the TIGER team’s negotiating 
position vis-à-vis MITI was likely to be.52 NASA, after all, was providing the rocket 
and the satellite bus for the ITIR instrument. 
Nevertheless, the letter of introduction did not portray the TIGER team as 
representing NASA Headquarters. The letter explained matter-of-factly that “NASA 
has asked Ms. Kahle to try to implement the design advances of her TIMS concept by 
working with you, and your design for ITIR.” Alone, such a statement did not indicate 
how much “backing” Dr. Kahle and her team had, or would have, from NASA in their 
dealings with MITI and its consortia. The statement certainly did not suggest that the 
TIGER team leadership represented NASA in this collaboration. Moreover, the letter 
of introduction’s author, the Director of NASA’s Earth Science and Application 
Division, used qualifying language such as “try” and conditional phrases such as “if 
her proposal if [sic] accepted by you” to suggest that the full acceptance of the TIGER 
team and all of its recommendations might not have been strict requirements for 
U.S.-Japan cooperation regarding ITIR.53  
In particular, NASA cast the TIGER team as having less sway over the fate of 
the ITIR remote-sensing system on matters of “technology” (i.e., hardware), writing 
                                                  
52 This judgment is loosely based upon after-the-fact interpretations of these initial meetings 
offered by Ishii (2003), Kahle (2003), and upon my general familiarity with these two communities. 
A closer analysis is below. 
53 Tilford (1989: 1). 
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that “NASA remains firmly committed to flight of ITIR on NPOP-1 even if 
technology improvements such as those proposed by Ms. Kahle cannot be achieved.”54 
That statement would have made much less compelling any attempt in these meetings 
on the part of Kahle and the TIGER team leadership to rhetorically tie MITI’s 
acceptance of the TIGER team’s recommendations in the realm of technology to 
NASA’s acceptance of ITIR for the execution phase of EOS, and thus, to the NASA’s 
launch of ITIR (ITIR and the other instruments that would constitute EOS had so far 
only been selected for the definition phase). Especially in the realm of technology 
vis-à-vis science, the TIGER team was by no means in a rhetorical position to practice 
any kind of brinksmanship in which the team would insinuate that if their needs were 
not met they would withdraw from the collaboration and take ITIR out of EOS with 
them. 
 The letter suggested to its readers in Japan three deductions about the 
relationship between the TIGER team and NASA which likely influenced the weight 
that MITI and its consortia would give to the TIGER team and to the team’s 
recommendations.55 First, NASA Headquarters supported the goals of the TIGER 
team. Second, NASA’s launching of ITIR was conditioned on MITI’s, and its 
consortia’s, cooperation with the TIGER team in some significant but vague way, at 
least in the short-term. Third, NASA was willing to go out of its way to help the 
TIGER team achieve its goals. Even if MITI ultimately did not need to implement the 
TIGER team’s recommendations concerning “technology improvements” for the ITIR 
                                                  
54 Ibid., p. 2. 
55 The key readers of the letter with whom the TIGER team leadership interacted during this first 
trip to Japan were mentioned or alluded to in the Palluconi interview excerpt: namely, the 
Executive Managing Director of JAROS (the formal recipient of the letter of introduction), the 
Director and Deputy Director of the MITI Space Industry Division, Dr. Ono Akira of the National 
Research Laboratory of Metrology, and Professor Ishii of the University of Tokyo. Also in 
attendance were Dr. Fujisada Hiroyuki from MITI’s Electro-technical Laboratory, and Dr. Tsu 
Hiroji, Dr. Satō Isao, and Dr. Yamaguchi Yasushi from the Geological Survey of Japan. All of these 
individuals were named in trip reports (Chase 1989a and Kahle and Palluconi 1989) 
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instrument (whatever those recommendations might have turned out to be), the letter 
of introduction was a first step in convincing MITI and its consortia that NASA 
Headquarters needed the involvement of the TIGER team to ensure that NASA’s 
cooperation with MITI was conducted in a manner that could be scientifically justified. 
Given that need, there was no reason for anyone to think that NASA Headquarters 
would not agree with changes to the ITIR remote-sensing system which stemmed from 
the recommendations of the TIGER team, even those in the realm of “technology” 
which might come at some inconvenience or cost to NASA. While NASA 
Headquarters conceded that it was their expectation that the TIGER team might have 
less sway over “technology,” NASA still wanted “technology” on the negotiating table. 
NASA’s Director of Earth Science and Application explained in the letter of 
introduction that, “in light of [NASA’s] current desire to see the best possible ITIR 
developed under Japanese leadership, NASA is willing to reconsider [NASA’s earlier 
stance concerning] the question of export licenses” and would also “consider a limited 
hardware contribution . . . to enable increases in ITIR performance.”56  
For matters other than technology, NASA cast the TIGER team with much 
more authority. Although the NASA Director had written only a paragraph earlier that 
NASA was “firmly committed” to the flight of ITIR, he took two paragraphs to 
emphasize that ITIR was still in a definition phase, that ITIR had not yet been selected 
for flight, and that “all instrument investigations will require confirmation for 
execution phase.” The confirmation decision, the author wrote, “will depend on many 
factors including successful progress between Ms. Kahle and you on the ITIR 
effort . . . .” What constituted “successful progress” from the perspective of NASA 
Headquarters, however, went unspecified. Using language grafted from NASA’s 
earlier partial acceptance letter to the TIGER team, the NASA Director noted that: 
                                                  
56 Tilford (1989: 1-2). 
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The key product of a combined definition phase study would be a cohesive 
and technically sound plan demonstrating the feasibility of improved ITIR 
capabilities and an approach to ITIR whereby the Japanese agree to 
implement this improved approach to ITIR with Ms. Kahle’s advice . . . . 
Among the results of this definition phase effort will be improved science, 
management, data, calibration, and cost plans for the portion of the combined 
investigation.57 
 
Whereas such a letter can always in theory be open to differing interpretations, and 
while different interpretations could have been offered at the time it was initially read 
and discussed, there is no evidence that differing interpretations were consequential. 
NASA’s awkward beating around the bush seems to have suggested to its readers in 
Japan that NASA was not going to insist that MITI implement the TIGER team’s 
hardware recommendations in order for ITIR to be incorporated into EOS, but that 
NASA did have some ill-defined yet substantive expectation—an expectation that was 
probably assumed to verge on a non-negotiable requirement—that MITI and its 
consortia allow the TIGER team to help “the Japanese” implement an “improved 
approach to ITIR.” This was the negotiating position in which NASA placed the 
TIGER team. Although it was never made explicit, the letter of introduction conveyed 
that NASA had delegated some authority to the TIGER team as liminal state actors, 
but their authority to speak for NASA and the United States in bilateral negotiations 
with MITI and its consortia lessened as the issues under discussion came increasingly 
under the realm of “technology.” Finally, in no way did NASA’s letter of introduction 
label anywhere the TIGER team as a “U.S. team.” The TIGER team eventually 
acquired that label themselves, formalizing the bilateral practices of their negotiations 
with Japan. As liminal state actors, they nurtured and advanced state vis-à-vis state 
bilateralism.   
 
                                                  
57 Ibid., p. 3. 
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The Practice of Bilateral Technoscientific Diplomacy:  
The Thermal Infrared Radiometer, 1989 
 
Positioned by NASA as liminal state actors, the TIGER team set out in March 
1989 in their first round of meetings with the MITI Space Industry Division, JAROS, 
and JAROS’s advisors to negotiate ITIR so that they could share the instrument 
separately as a boundary object. The TIGER team pushed for ITIR, later named 
ASTER, to meet their “informational requirements” by working for changes in the 
instrument’s technological design. 58  While hardware (i.e., what NASA called 
“technology”) was precisely the realm in which the TIGER team had the weakest 
negotiating position, it was commonly understood that these matters of technological 
design needed to be settled first, owing to ITIR’s and EOS’s development schedule 
and because of the significance of the instrument’s design for shaping the kind of 
science that the instrument could support. Negotiations about the design of the 
instrument continued from 1989 through 1994.  
In these negotiations, the two teams—and especially the JPL-based 
team—worked to make the ITIR instrument a U.S.-Japan boundary object. As liminal 
state actors, they carried out scientific analyses of the instrument and attempted to 
design it to realize both states’ goals as well as the goals of individual team members. 
This technoscientific diplomacy enacted negotiations that were generally bilateral in 
                                                  
58 In April, Kahle’s statement of work to NASA for the definition phase of ITIR (Kahle 1989e) 
included the following objectives: 
  
a. Attempt to integrate into the design of the ITIR the capability improvements 
proposed for TIMS. 
b. Develop a cohesive and technically sound plan demonstrating the feasibility of 
improved capabilities consistent with the Eos [i.e., EOS] mission and an approach 
which the Japanese agree to implement. 
c. Determine the level of technology readiness for the performance enhancements in 
the TIMS concept acceptable in ITIR. . . .  
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their socio-political form, pitting a “U.S.” team and a “Japan” team against each other. 
Despite numerous and detailed discussions, both teams’ “informational requirements” 
were not equally satisfied in the design of the ITIR/ASTER instrument. For these 
bilateral negotiations, neither solidarity among scientific expertise (per epistemic 
communities) nor the power of material networks (per Latourian actor-network theory) 
provide satisfying explanations for the outcomes of the negotiations, that is, for the 
complex weighing of which side’s preferences would be built into the instrument. 
Through their technoscientific diplomacy, U.S. and Japan scientists and engineers 
crafted pragmatic compromises that took into account both how they asserted and 
ascribed “science,” such as claims of scientific knowledge, and political power, 
particularly state power. 
Discussions and debate generally emerged as members of the TIGER team 
were confronted with designs that had already been proposed by Japan’s scientists, 
engineers, and managers. These designs usually represented, at a minimum, tentative 
decisions. Frequently, however, these decisions were much closer to already being 
settled rather than to being just tentative. By no means was the TIGER team presented 
with a “clean slate” from which to work. MITI was financing the ITIR instrument; a 
MITI consortium and its advisors had originally proposed the instrument to NASA and 
were managing its development; and Japanese contractors were building the 
instrument. Given this established division of responsibilities and the TIGER team’s 
letter of introduction from NASA, the TIGER team could not simply demand design 
changes, assuming that if these changes were not accommodated the TIGER team 
would then be able to implement the changes themselves. Although the TIGER team 
could resign from the collaboration, its members had no clear-cut options for “going it 
alone” and building their own instrument. NASA had placed the TIGER team in a 
position vis-à-vis MITI that did not provide the team with the financial and material 
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resources for pursuing alternatives to collaboration with Japan. Thus, the TIGER team 
needed to negotiate their recommendations by persuading their Japanese counterparts. 
The number of thermal infrared bands that ITIR would measure was a 
specification of central importance to the TIGER team. Dr. Kahle and the TIGER team 
had proposed to push their field of geologic remote sensing by building a space-based 
instrument that would make thermal measurements to distinguish, and in some cases, 
identify, “geologically important materials” and to facilitate “global studies of 
volcanic provinces, sedimentary basins, and weathering history of soils and rocks 
related to paleoclimate.”59 The design of their proposed TIGER instrument promised 
a capability for mapping thermal radiation in fourteen different spectral bands. 
The question of how many thermal infrared bands ITIR would have, and 
should have, was discussed in the first meeting of the first trip that the TIGER team 
leadership took to Japan, the March 1989 trip that Palluconi outlined in the interview 
excerpted above. On the morning of their first day in Japan, TIGER team members 
Kahle, Palluconi, and Chase, met in Tokyo with the Executive Director of JAROS and 
a MITI official to explore how they might cooperate as NASA had requested in its 
letter of introduction. According to trip reports written by the TIGER team delegation, 
the “key message” of the TIGER leadership in that first meeting was that “ITIR did 
not satisfy the requirements of the TIGER team because there were too few spectral 
bands in the thermal IR [infrared].”60 The TIGER team leadership was under the 
impression that just five thermal bands had been planned for ITIR. That was not 
enough for the research that the TIGER team wanted to conduct. In response to the 
TIGER leadership’s “key message,” the representative at the meeting from MITI 
pointed out that MITI was “responsible for promoting the industrial use of space and, 
                                                  
59 Kahle and Palluconi (1988: iii). 
60 Chase (1989a: 2). 
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while the thermal infrared was of interest to Japanese geology users and scientists, 
ITIR placed major emphasis in the visible and near infrared and short wavelength 
infrared . . . .”61 Given the technology that was available to MITI’s preferred 
contractors, it was simply too expensive to do everything, the MITI representative 
explained, and difficult choices had to be made. In this conversation, Kahle conceded 
that ITIR’s thermal bands were “sufficient for operational assessment,” but she still 
impressed upon JAROS management and MITI that ITIR’s proposed thermal bands 
were not sufficient for the “scientific purposes” intended for the TIGER instrument, 
scientific purposes that Kahle and much of her team had been refining for years at 
JPL.62  
To reprise here “boundary object” terminology, ITIR’s five bands did not 
meet the TIGER team’s “informational requirements.” Kahle asserted, and MITI and 
JAROS management seemed to have agreed, that there were two different sets of goals 
proposed for the instrument—operational goals for natural resource exploration and 
the scientific goals of the TIGER team. These two sets of goals were each side’s 
particular articulation of broader state goals that were pushed by their respective 
bureaucracies, such as MITI’s interest in space industry development and energy 
security and NASA’s interest in demonstrating U.S. leadership in global change 
research. How these two sets of goals would be brought together and even reconciled 
in ITIR’s design concept was still far from apparent. 
 That afternoon the TIGER team leadership traveled to Tsukuba to meet with 
the scientists and engineers who worked at the national research institutes in the 
                                                  
61 Kahle and Palluconi (1989: 1). Without a doubt, however, for the key geologists and scientists 
in Japan who had already been consulted about the design of ITIR, the shortwave infrared region 
was of much more interest than the thermal infrared region. 
62 Chase (1989a: 2). 
  
 
180
“science city” and who had advised MITI and JAROS on ITIR’s design.63 During this 
meeting, the TIGER team leadership was presented with changes in the ITIR design 
that “came as a complete and unpleasant surprise;” these changes underscored the 
difference in preferences that had been expressed in the morning.64 The Deputy 
Director of the MITI Space Industry Division provided a design update that took into 
consideration, he explained, a number of advisory consultations. These consultations 
included: discussions that were carried out in the fall among the user community in 
Japan (i.e., the natural resource industry); the work of other committees and 
instrument working groups; and conclusions from a research trip to the United States 
which had been made that past fall, during which, among other things, JAROS 
managers and scientific advisors consulted with Hughes Aircraft’s Santa Barbara 
Research Center, the maker of the U.S.’s Landsat series of remote-sensing satellites, 
about remote-sensing technology.65  
The design changes that the Deputy Director presented were the following: a 
decrease in the number of thermal infrared sensing bands from five to three; a 
relaxation of the spatial resolution of those bands from sixty to as much as ninety 
meters; an increase in the number of shortwave infrared bands from five to six; a 
decrease in the spatial resolution of those bands from fifteen to as much as thirty 
meters; and an increase in the number of visible / near infrared bands from one to three. 
Just as a head of state might say his or her hands were tied by parliamentary politics 
and that some less-than-ideal position would need to be accepted, MITI was saying to 
                                                  
63 Included in this group were the Deputy Director of the MITI Space Industry Division (Mr. 
Tomita), Dr. Ono Akira who was the head of the thermal measurement section of Japan’s National 
Research Laboratory of Metrology, Dr. Fujisada Hiroyuki from Japan’s national Electro-technical 
Laboratory, and Dr. Satō Isao and Dr. Yamaguchi Yasushi from the Geological Survey of Japan. All 
of these individuals were named in trip reports (Kahle and Palluconi 1989: 2; Chase 1989a: 2). 
64 Kahle and Palluconi (1989: 2). 
65 Ibid., p. 2 and Chase (1989a: 1). The Landsat series of remote-sensing satellites was a 
workhorse for the geologic remote-sensing worldwide and was in many ways the de facto standard 
for geologic remote-sensing instruments, certainly in the United States (Mack 1990).  
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the TIGER team leadership that important discussions had already been completed, 
that these discussions had reached beyond MITI, and that the participants in these 
discussions had—as a group—decided what MITI’s priorities were for ITIR’s design 
concept. 
The TIGER team leaders were disappointed, especially in the reduction of the 
number of thermal infrared bands, and their disappointment was “obvious” during the 
meeting, in Kahle’s estimation. The Deputy Director of the MITI Space Division 
explained to the TIGER team that the reduction in thermal bands as well as the other 
changes was the result of a broad assessment that involved four factors: funding; other 
instrument requirements such as weight, size, and power; the state of sensor 
technology in Japan; and the needs of natural resource exploration firms in Japan. The 
Deputy Director also explained that at the top of the list of the requirements of the 
natural resource industry and their geologists were high-resolution stereo images and 
images in the shortwave infrared region.66 When Kahle was asked by a senior 
scientific advisor to MITI and JAROS to list the most important differences between 
the revised ITIR design and TIGER, which was a question that basically invited Kahle 
to indicate what instrument characteristics she would prefer added or changed, Kahle 
noted five instrument characteristics. These characteristics included specifications 
such as the signal-to-noise ratio of the thermal radiometer and the spectral location of 
the sensing bands. At the top of Kahle’s list was the number of bands in the thermal 
region.67 
                                                  
66 In particular, in the 2.0-2.4 micrometer region (Kahle and Palluconi 1989: 2). 
67 Ibid., p. 3. To be more precise, at the top of her list was the number of bands in the 8-13 
micrometer thermal region (and the spectral width of those bands) and the importance of at least 
one band in the 3-5 micrometer thermal region. The updated design of ITIR not only had fewer 
total bands in the thermal than the previous design had, but it also did not have a single band in the 
3-5 micrometer region, which the TIGER team valued. 
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In subsequent meetings over the next two days, the TIGER team leadership 
met with key scientists who advised MITI and JAROS on the design of the ITIR 
instrument and explored how much leeway there was to implement design changes. Dr. 
Ono, who was head of the thermal measurement section of Japan’s National Research 
Laboratory of Metrology, explained that the user committee had settled on two options, 
and a request for proposals had already gone out to contractors based upon those two 
options. The details of those two options were not shared with the TIGER team 
leadership. In her meeting with Ono, Kahle inquired “if it would be possible, in light 
of the additional goals of Eos [i.e., EOS] and the international community represented 
by the TIGER team, to convince [Japan’s] user groups to add capability to ITIR in the 
thermal infrared and get that capability implemented.”68 With this rhetorical move, 
the TIGER team’s goals were being asserted not only as the goals of the TIGER team, 
but also as the goals of EOS (and thus, by implication, the goals of NASA), and then, 
on top of that, as the goals of an international community. This was foreign pressure in 
the making—what politicians, diplomats, and political commentators in Japan 
commonly call gaiatsu (literally, outside pressure).69 According to Kahle’s trip report, 
Ono replied that “it was late, and strong user support would be needed.”70 With that 
response, Kahle, Palluconi, and Chase set up an appointment for the next day with a 
Dr. Ishii. The TIGER team leadership had learned from Ono that Dr. Ishii was the 
chair of JAROS’s user committee and that he was a Professor of Geophysics at the 
University of Tokyo in the College of Engineering. So, in search of ways to influence 
the design of ITIR, the TIGER team went back to Tokyo. 
 While Kahle and the TIGER team had just come across Professor Ishii’s name 
for the first time, Ishii was at that point a very prominent figure in Japan’s geological 
                                                  
68 Ibid. 
69 Schoppa (1993) and Johnson (1995). 
70 Kahle and Palluconi (1989: 3). 
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remote-sensing community. He had become an associate professor and then a 
professor of geophysics at the University of Tokyo after working over fifteen years in 
the oil industry.71 When the TIGER team leadership met him, he was serving a second 
non-consecutive term as the President of the Society of Exploration Geophysics of 
Japan. He had already served a few terms as the Vice-President of the Remote Sensing 
Society of Japan and would become the society’s President the next year. When the 
TIGER team leadership talked with him in 1989, he was a member of the Science 
Council of Japan, an advisory body to Japan’s Prime Minister.72 Kahle and her 
colleagues, however, likely knew none of this, other than that Ishii was chair of the 
user committee for ITIR and a professor at the University of Tokyo.73 
 The TIGER team leadership debated with Ishii the pros and cons of what the 
TIGER team thought was the too small number of thermal bands in ITIR.74 According 
to Chase’s trip report, Kahle “advanced several arguments for having at least five and 
preferably six bands while Prof. Ishii argued for four bands max. Dr. Kahle did admit 
that the ITIR probably would satisfy the needs of the operational community but not 
                                                  
71 Professor Ishii’s field at the University of Tokyo was “natural resources development 
engineering” (shigen kaihatsu kōgaku). His undergraduate degree was in physics, with a 
concentration in geophysics, and he preferred to describe himself in English as a “geophysicist.” 
His doctorate was awarded by the department in which he was a professor at the University of 
Tokyo, natural resources development engineering. 
72 A brief biography of Ishii can be found at his personal website (in English, as well as in 
Japanese) which can be found at: http://ecosocio.tuins.ac.jp/ishii/myenvironmentalism/ishii.html, 
last accessed September 17, 2006. In the 1990s, Ishii became the Deputy Director General and then 
Director General of Japan’s National Institute for Environmental Studies. 
73 Kahle and Palluconi noted in their trip report that “it was evident that Ishii was held in great 
respect,” but they did not explain why he was held in such respect (1989). 
74 Tsu Hiroji, who at the time was the Chief of the Applied Geophysics Section of the Geological 
Survey of Japan, also attended this meeting, but judging from Kahle’s and Palluconi’s trip report 
and from Chase’s trip report, he did not assume much of a role in the meeting. Again, while this 
was unknown to the TIGER team at the time, Tsu was then a Ph.D. student of Ishii’s. Tsu and his 
colleagues at the Geological Survey of Japan were among those who had advised MITI on ITIR’s 
conceptual design. Tsu would later become the chair of ERSDAC’s advisory committee on the 
EOS science mission, and with that position, he would serve as Japan’s science team leader for the 
ASTER instrument. 
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the international science community represented by her team.”75 This discussion 
could be interpreted as merely the deployment of haggling tactics over the number of 
bands, in which one side starts from a “low price” and the other from a “high price” in 
their attempts to arrive at a “middle price” that is closer to their preconceived 
preferences. That was certainly going on. Kahle had said on the first day of their trip 
that five bands would not satisfy the TIGER team’s requirements. Now in day three, 
the TIGER team leadership was in the position of having to argue for, at a minimum, 
the restoration of five bands. Yet, this discussion was more than just an exchange of 
preferences about the desirable number of bands for the thermal infrared radiometer. 
After all, the relevant parties already knew the basics of each other’s preferences by 
the first day. Ishii and Kahle were ascribing political meaning and stakes to their 
preferences, e.g., “operational” goals vis-à-vis “science” goals. Kahle asserted that the 
TIGER team’s goals were not just science goals, or even just the goals of her team, but 
the science goals of an “international community” that her team represented. Ishii was 
advising an organization and users who needed to justify the instrument in terms of 
what it could do for Japan’s pursuit of energy and mineral resources. Each of the two 
sides of these negotiations was politically explaining themselves and characterizing 
the other. 
While reports of these particular discussions did not indicate in what way 
Kahle’s team was said to have represented an international community, such 
representation was likely largely asserted by virtue of the international ambitions of 
EOS. Kahle’s claim to representation can not be easily justified with reference to the 
national composition of the TIGER team. When Kahle had proposed her TIGER team, 
twelve of the fourteen investigators were of U.S. nationality. Before this meeting, one 
of the two who were not of U.S. nationality—an Australian national—had withdrawn 
                                                  
75 Chase (1989a: 4). 
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from the TIGER team.76 Was the anticipated participation of a single Frenchman 
among a dozen Americans enough for Kahle to say that the TIGER team represented 
an “international community?” Since Ishii, as well as MITI’s other advisors, was 
perhaps already aware of the composition of the TIGER team—or at the very least was 
expected to soon become aware of its composition as consultations 
proceeded—Kahle’s rhetorical framing of Japan’s operational interests versus the 
interests of the international science community did not likely rest upon a mere 
willingness to strategically deploy the word “international” on the basis of one 
non-American among a dozen team members. Such a literal interpretation of 
“international” too narrowly captures this rhetoric. Amid the contemporary EOS 
rhetoric of “global” studies of the earth, and considering the explicitly “global” 
ambitions of the TIGER team’s proposal,77 it is just as conceivable, if not more so, 
that Kahle and the TIGER team leadership saw themselves as spokespersons for the 
international science community, especially in this situation of contrasting their 
“science” interests against the “operational” interests of their Japanese counterparts.  
Neither the more exclusive interpretation, the one that accounts for Kahle’s 
claim of international representation as only the deployment of strategic rhetoric, nor 
the more inclusive interpretation, the one that also allows for Kahle’s own 
understanding of the identity of her and her team, can be conclusively justified over 
the other on the basis of this single exchange. The rhetorical framing of national 
operational goals versus international scientific goals, however, was persistent 
throughout the negotiations, even in circumstances in which it was obvious to all 
participants that the TIGER team was populated almost entirely of Americans and was 
sponsored only by NASA and the U. S. Government. 
                                                  
76 Green (1988). 
77 NASA, Earth Observing System Science Steering Committee (1987b); Kahle and Palluconi 
(1988). 
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I suggest that to understand this rhetoric and its utility, the inclusive 
interpretation needs to be taken seriously. In the United States, “real” geologic 
remote-sensing science and especially “global” EOS science were considered to be 
endeavors of international scale, and if the TIGER team considered themselves to be 
doing real geologic remote-sensing science and to be a part of the EOS enterprise, 
which they certainly did, then their science was by association international, even if 
the science in particular was only sponsored by the U.S. Government. The TIGER 
team leadership was funded by NASA, and they could claim to work on behalf of 
NASA, but they were not unambiguous state actors. They were rather liminal state 
actors who carried with them ideals of scientific autonomy and universalism which 
could be recalled and deployed when useful. Such an interpretation can only be 
justified with the benefit of additional illustrations that will arise in subsequent 
chapters. Nevertheless, I suggest that the TIGER team’s identification of their science 
with the international was not merely a strategic enactment. It was an assumption that 
could be strategic in its articulation. To say that the rhetoric was deployed strategically, 
which it most certainly was, is not to also say that the sensibility was disingenuous. 
When these Americans claiming to represent international science pressed Dr. 
Ishii to justify scientifically the rationale for ITIR’s thermal bands, he supported his 
position by moving outside the rhetorical realm of his domestic “operational” concerns 
and into the rhetorical realm of “international science.” He cited a study that was also 
“international,” in that the authors were not Japanese. The study, in fact, was of 
American origin. Ishii explained that the design of ITIR “was taken directly and 
exactly” from a public-private study paper on space-based thermal instrumentation 
which was jointly produced by NASA and the company EOSAT (EOSAT was a 
company that in the late 1980s had taken over developing and managing the U.S.’s 
Landsat series of satellites in an ultimately failed attempt to privatize Landsat’s 
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development and operations). This study, Kahle learned from Ishii, “was treated as 
something of a ‘bible’ in Japan.”78   
Kahle herself had actually chaired the Geology Working Group of that 
NASA-EOSAT joint study. If it was “treated as something of a ‘bible’ in Japan,” Kahle 
could provide an authoritative exegesis. In response to Ishii’s referencing of that study, 
Kahle explained that “the Eosat [i.e., EOSAT] report was strongly conditioned and 
constrained to fit within the modest modifications permitted by working within an 
existing design for the Thematic Mapper” [a satellite in the Landsat series].79 Kahle 
added that a Landsat with more extensive thermal capabilities “was viewed by at least 
some of the EOSAT Working Group members as a preliminary step to a more capable 
instrument we hoped would be a part of Eos.”80 According to Kahle’s and Palluconi’s 
trip report, in this discussion Ishii eventually conceded that “three bands in the thermal 
infrared represented a step back from current capability . . . and did not consider that 
three bands . . . could adequately represent the spectral information content in this 
region.”81 Ishii asked the TIGER team leadership for copies of the TIGER proposal 
and a white paper that would justify additional bands in the thermal infrared region. 
He said he would discuss the TIGER team’s arguments with the ITIR user committee. 
In this meeting, while common understandings of the capabilities of various designs 
were worked out, Ishii made no commitments or promises about changing ITIR’s 
design. In these discussions, which pitted the preferences of the TIGER team against 
those of MITI and JAROS, Kahle and Ishii debated and exchanged opinions about 
instrument characteristics. Still, Dr. Ishii made it clear that the decision was ultimately 
for MITI, JAROS, and the JAROS user committee to make. 
                                                  
78 Kahle and Palluconi (1989: 4). The study paper is Putnam (1986). 
79 Kahle and Palluconi (1989: 4). 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
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Kahle and Palluconi took away from their exploratory trip to Japan that what 
the TIGER team wanted out of the ITIR instrument (and presumably what they hoped 
NASA wanted out of the instrument) and what MITI and JAROS wanted out of the 
ITIR instrument were two very different things—different capabilities, different 
operations, different measurements. In their trip report, which was distributed to the 
other TIGER team members as well as to NASA, Kahle and Palluconi wrote that: 
 
From the Japanese point of view, ITIR, as currently specified, strongly 
supports commercial exploration applications by incorporation [sic] and, in 
some areas, extending the most attractive exploration features of SPOT (high 
resolution stereo, 15 meter resolution, same orbit stereo not available with 
SPOT) [SPOT is another remote-sensing satellite], Landsat (VNIR and SWIR 
bands) and TIMS (three TIR bands). From out [sic] point of view, ITIR, as 
currentlyh [sic] specified, duplicates the VNIR and SWIR spectral coverage 
of the Eos HIRIS instrument, is a step back in terms of spectral coverage and 
sensitivity from the aircraft TIMS, and does not have the spectral bands, 
spectral coverage, and sensitivity in the TIR to fully satisfy exploration 
requirements, let alone research requirements.82 
 
Kahle and Palluconi did not seek to transform this techno-political fact by 
trying to mandate changes that directly competed with MITI’s objectives for ITIR or 
by trying to convince the JAROS user committee to adopt as their interests those of 
the TIGER team or those of NASA (i.e., a move that would have been a Latourian 
translation). Rather, they conveyed to NASA Headquarters a “boundary object” 
strategy: the possibility of working with their Japanese counterparts to modify ITIR so 
that the instrument would be better able to accomplish the TIGER team’s goals 
without trying to challenge or dominate those of MITI and JAROS: 
 
On the positive side, we found the Japanese to be very open, direct, 
communicative and quite willing to listen and consider what we had to say. 
There is a possibility (whose probability cannot be estimated) that the TIGER 
Science Team can influence the design and performance specification of 
ITIR; but the potential is likely limited to the addition of one or two bands, 
                                                  
82 Ibid. 
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extending the wavelength limit and improving the signal to noise ratio. It does 
not appear possible to incorporate the major design innovations of TIGER in 
ITIR nor to capture the full research potential of TIGER in some modification 
of ITIR. ITIR funding and motivation is provided by a Japanese user 
community, lacking first hand experience with multispectral thermal data, 
interested in a practical, bread and butter instrument that exploits existing 
remote sensing knowledge.83 
 
Kahle’s and Palluconi’s assessment of the situation was not optimistic for fulfilling 
their research goals. The path they outlined for possibly influencing the instrument in 
order to achieve their goals (goals that might or might not have been NASA’s goals) 
was not ambitious. They largely accepted at face value what they had been told about 
the realities of the situation by the Deputy Director of the MITI Space Industry 
Division, by Dr. Ono, and by Dr. Ishii. Even if they were able to modestly improve the 
instrument for their research goals—restoring the number of TIR bands back to five 
from three, increasing the instrument’s sensitivity, etc.—the ITIR instrument would 
still be unsatisfactory for the research that the TIGER team members had conducted 
with the aircraft-based TIMS instrument and for the research that they had hoped to 
conduct with the TIGER instrument. ITIR was not going to meet their informational 
requirements.84 
                                                  
83 Ibid., p. 5. This Kahle and Palluconi trip report should not be interpreted naively. They were, 
after all, writing to NASA Headquarters which was still considering how the TIGER team would 
or would not be incorporated into the ITIR enterprise and into EOS. For instance, Kahle and 
Palluconi might have shared with NASA Headquarters their counter-argument to Ishii’s 
marshalling of the EOSAT study for the purpose of clarifying the value-added of the TIGER 
instrument to NASA Headquarters. For the arguments that I am advancing, however, the question 
of how Kahle and Palluconi crafted their report for the NASA Headquarters audience does not 
need to be answered, especially if another trip report, written for a completely different audience, is 
available for comparison and cross-referencing, in this case Chase (1989a). Kahle also distributed 
the Kahle-Palluconi trip report to her team members for their reference, so the trip report’s 
audience can not be said to have consisted of only NASA Headquarters. Along with the 
Kahle-Palluconi trip report, Kahle sent a letter to the TIGER team (which was not copied to NASA 
Headquarters) which supports my description of the TIGER team as engaging “boundary object” 
negotiations to realize their goals: “I think that it is essential at the outset to play the game and try 
hard to make ITIR the instrument we require” (Kahle 1989c: 1). 
84 In addition to the fact that ITIR would have fewer thermal bands than required by the TIGER 
team’s scientific goals, Kahle “steadfastly maintained” (Chase 1989b: 1) that to do their thermal 
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Yet, a cooperative arrangement with MITI on the ITIR instrument might be 
the best the ITIR team could do in terms of a thermal instrument. They proceeded with 
their “boundary object” strategy in an attempt to make the most of the situation. After 
their trip, Kahle wrote to her team members (a letter not copied to NASA) that “we 
need to consider what we should do if we fail with the Japanese. Quit?, [sic] Try to 
convince NASA to fly TIGER? Help the Japanese anyway? other options?” 85 
Answers to these questions were months away. The TIGER team first had to find out 
what, if any, instrument modifications MITI and JAROS would accommodate and 
what NASA Headquarter’s bottom-line requirements for ITIR were. Not knowing the 
answer to the second question, however, did not impede them from speaking for 
EOS’s goals in order to accomplish the first. The TIGER team was not NASA, but as 
liminal state actors, they could translate and assert what EOS’s goals meant for ITIR. 
 The white paper that Kahle and the TIGER team sent to Ishii in April 1989 to 
justify changes to the ITIR instrument illustrates two tactics of persuasion that Kahle 
and the TIGER team leadership used to try to ensure that ITIR would come as close as 
possible to satisfying their “informational requirements.” The first tactic recognized 
and affirmed the natural resource exploration goals that MITI and the JAROS user 
committee had asserted for ITIR. This tactic argued that if ITIR were going to be used 
as a tool for resource exploration, ITIR would be much more effective if it 
incorporated certain technology improvements that the TIGER team also 
wanted—such as increasing the number of sensing bands in the thermal region. To 
make this point, Kahle compiled into the white paper arguments that were submitted 
by team members at Kahle’s request.86  
                                                                                                                                               
remote-sensing science, ITIR would need to be at least three times more sensitive than it was being 
designed to be (Kahle 1989d: 9). 
85 Kahle (1989c: 1). 
86 In contrast to the tactics and translations explicated by Latour, these improvements were not 
intended to function as a craftily designed “detour” (i.e., a bait and switch) to ultimately enlist 
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The white paper emphasized the evaluations of team members who had 
prominent reputations in the field of natural resource remote sensing. Kahle’s 
presentation of these evaluations, which were listed under the heading of “user 
experience,” endowed the evaluations with a testimonial quality. Kahle introduced 
team member Harold Lang as “a JPL expert in petroleum exploration and sedimentary 
basin analysis.”87 Lang’s memo was titled “Comments on the Value of Thermal 
Infrared Capabilities of the ITIR Instrument as an Oil and Gas Exploration Tool;” 
Kahle selected from Lang’s memo a passage that argued that ITIR’s three proposed 
thermal bands “do not cover the appropriate wavelength interval,” that “the spectral 
features of interest are on the wings of the proposed spectral bands” and that ITIR’s 
thermal bands “will be of little value for oil and gas exploration.”88 Kahle also 
introduced Michael Abrams in her white paper as a “JPL geologist, and a world leader 
in remote sensing for mineral exploration.” Abrams’s comments concluded that “at 
least two bands long of the ozone absorption band are necessary to map these mafic 
and ultramafic rocks associated with gold deposits [ITIR only had one thermal band 
“long of” (i.e., beyond) the ozone band at this point].”89 
In their discussions with the TIGER team leadership, Japanese geologists had 
used a certain published scientific article to argue that three thermal bands for ITIR 
would be sufficient. As it happened, much in the same way that it turned out that 
Kahle had been chairperson of a working group for the NASA-EOSAT study that Dr. 
                                                                                                                                               
MITI and JAROS into NASA’s center of calculation (see Latour 1987:113-5). Latour’s analytical 
vocabulary and narrative form as exemplified in Science in Action can be arguably used to describe 
the making of technoscience as war, but it can not be used to describe the making of technoscience 
as diplomacy, in which the dynamic is one of achieving an advantageous compromise rather than a 
win at all costs. 
87 In lay terms, sedimentary basins are depressed regions of the earth’s surface where sediments 
have collected and become more compact. Most of the earth’s hydrocarbon reserves are located in 
sedimentary basins (Kahle 1989d: 5). 
88 Ibid., p. 6. 
89 Ibid., p. 7. 
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Ishii referenced, one of the co-authors of the article that the Japanese geologists 
referenced was a member of the proposed TIGER team.90 In her white paper, Kahle 
included the author’s personal reply to the Japanese geologists’ use of his article: 
 
Our enthusiasm in discussing the unexpected result has been misinterpreted 
as advocacy of few bands, but it is obvious from our work as summarized in 
Fig. 10 [of the paper at issue] that the larger the number of bands and the 
higher the resolution, the better.91 
 
Kahle concluded her white paper by saying that the TIGER team had judged that five 
bands in the thermal region were necessary to achieve two objectives: the 
discrimination of rocks and minerals and the determination of the earth’s surface 
temperature. The former objective for ITIR, which included the discrimination of 
natural resources, was one that had been emphasized by the Deputy Director of the 
MITI Space Industry Division and by Dr. Ishii (and also, presumably, the JAROS user 
committee); the latter objective for ITIR was a key measurement objective of the 
TIGER science team.92 While those two objectives could be argued to be two sides of 
the same coin, that was not the rhetorical tactic that Kahle took in her white paper. As 
she had done elsewhere in her paper, Kahle recognized and accepted that her team and 
her Japanese counterparts had different goals for the ITIR instrument, and Kahle 
worked for ITIR to be an instrument that would meet everyone’s needs. It was a 
“boundary object” strategy. Beyond the instrument itself, little, if any, “commonality 
of interest” was expected: you have your “operational” goals; I have my “science” 
goals; and let’s make this instrument work for the both of us so we can each do our 
own thing our own way. Kahle wanted to share separately. 
                                                  
90 Ibid., p. 8. It is unclear whether or not those Japanese geologists knew at the time that one of the 
authors of the paper that they cited was a member of the TIGER team. 
91 The words of Jack Salibury, quoted in Ibid., p. 8. 
92 Ibid., p. 10-11. 
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 The second tactic of persuasion that Kahle used in her white paper was to 
portray the recommended improvements as not just significant to the TIGER team but 
also as significant to EOS (and thus, by implication, significant to NASA 
Headquarters, who would ultimately approve or reject ITIR for the developmental 
phase of EOS). Kahle’s first tactic accepted MITI’s and JAROS’s operational goals 
and mustered scientific arguments for how design improvements could allow ITIR to 
better fulfill those goals. It rhetorically came at the political from the scientific. This 
second tactic assumed the necessity of the science and turned science into a political 
resource. In her cover letter for the white paper, Kahle listed in priority order the 
enhancements that she and her team recommended for ITIR’s thermal instrument: 
 
1. increase to 5 bands in the 8-12 µm region (three below the ozone band 
and two above) 
2. NE∆T < 0.3 K [NE∆T is a noise specification, presumably at 300K] 
3. 60-90 m spatial resolution 
4. increase to 8+ bands in the 8-12 µm region 
5. addition of 1 or more bands in the 3-5 µm region93 
 
After the presentation of the list, Kahle commented that “The first three . . . are all 
important to achieving the goals of EOS.”94 Kahle did not write that those three 
recommendations were important for “the goals of the TIGER team.” She wrote that 
they were important for “the goals of EOS.” EOS was not mentioned anywhere else in 
the cover letter or in the eleven-page body of the white paper. But there it was, an 
extra rhetorical nudge, leveraging the state to advance her team’s goals where possible. 
And at the bottom of the cover letter, among the names on the distribution list, were 
three individuals at NASA Headquarters: the Director of NASA’s Earth Science and 
Applications Division, the EOS program scientist, and the special assistant for 
international programs at NASA. As a liminal state actor, Kahle could make claims of 
                                                  
93 Kahle (1989a). 
94 Ibid. 
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representing an “international science community,” and then in other circumstances, 
she could also credibly allude to working to achieve the technological preferences of 
the state that had, after all, asked her to influence ITIR’s design on its behalf. 
 But what were the technological preferences of NASA, and more specifically, 
the EOS Project Office at NASA Headquarters to whom Kahle reported? Was NASA 
pushing for these improvements for ITIR’s thermal infrared radiometer as well, and so, 
was Kahle merely passing on, rather than articulating, state preferences? Judging from 
NASA Headquarters’ letter of introduction for the TIGER team, which was discussed 
above, it is reasonable to think that NASA might have been willing to go somewhat 
out of their way to support and accommodate an ITIR instrument that helped the 
TIGER team realize their research objectives. The goals and priorities of the TIGER 
team and those of NASA, however, were not identical. NASA’s and the United States’ 
goals for EOS in the late 1980s were to demonstrate U.S. leadership in space and in 
international cooperation and to build instruments that scientists could use to research 
global change, especially global climate change.  
While NASA’s handling of ITIR in 1989 supported these techno-political 
goals, NASA Headquarters did not independently press MITI or JAROS to adopt the 
TIGER team’s preferences. In a “NASA mail” electronic message in November 1989, 
Dr. Dixon Butler, who was the EOS Project Scientist at NASA Headquarters and who 
had chaired NASA’s EOS study groups throughout the 1980s, wrote to a team leader 
of a potential EOS instrument that: 
 
ITIR is quite secure on the EOS platform EOS-A because it is the essence of 
cooperation between Japan and NASA. The threats would only come from 
those whh [sic] don’t like the Platform per se and want us to break up the 
payload into little pieces. The key selling point for ITIR on the first platform 
is actually the use of the thermal bands (even if there were only 1) to provide 
high spatial resolution surface temperature measurements to complement 
HIRIS and MODIS [other EOS instruments]. I know this must strike you as 
ironic. The geology [which had recently taken a back seat to climate change 
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as a NASA priority] is really geting [sic] a free ride and if there is any need to 
augment the Japanese justifications and objectives of ITIR it will be with 
oceanography and land ecology aspects not better geology. The TIGER folk 
should work with and hopefully through the Japanese to get good 
communication going of the full motivations for ITIR (emphasis added).95 
 
From Butler’s e-mail, which was written several months after the TIGER team began 
their negotiations with MITI and JAROS, it can be inferred that NASA Headquarters 
would not have jeopardized its cooperation with “Japan” (or in this particular case, 
with MITI) in order to insist that ITIR have more than three sensing bands in the 
thermal region, an improvement that Kahle had judged to be important for achieving 
the goals of EOS. The TIGER team leadership had been pushing MITI and JAROS on 
their own for their own professional goals as much as for EOS’s goals. For NASA 
Headquarters in 1989, the capacity of a couple of thermal bands to provide a rough 
estimate of land surface temperature and the capacity of ITIR to demonstrate 
U.S.-Japan cooperation in the Earth Observing System warranted the technological 
and economic cost of accommodating on the first EOS satellite ITIR’s visible / near 
infrared radiometer, its shortwave infrared radiometer, and its thermal infrared 
radiometer. The stakes of demonstrating scientifically-credible international 
cooperation with Japan in EOS became even more important for NASA in 1989 and 
1990 when NASA’s prospects for international cooperation diminished elsewhere, 
specifically with the European Space Agency.96 Consistent with the conclusion that 
the TIGER team pushed MITI and JAROS for instrument requirements that NASA 
had not defined as EOS requirements, and had done so without NASA guidance or 
assistance, neither Dr. Kahle nor Dr. Butler could remember any time in 1989 in which 
NASA Headquarters became involved with pressing MITI or JAROS to add bands to 
                                                  
95 Butler (1989). 
96 Butler (2005), and see note 5. 
  
 
196
the ITIR thermal infrared radiometer.97 According to Butler, “we left it to Kahle and 
her team to make the scientific case to Japan [for their TIR requirements].”98 
 By no later than November 1989, and probably several months earlier in the 
spring of 1989, the Executive Managing Director of JAROS, the top official at JAROS, 
decided to follow the recommendation of the TIGER team. He stipulated that ITIR’s 
thermal infrared radiometer should have five bands.99 It was the Executive Managing 
Director himself who ultimately judged that, if Japan’s contractor for the thermal 
sensor could build a thermal infrared radiometer with five bands, JAROS should direct 
them to make one (and by implication, that MITI should fund it), according to 
recollection of Dr. Fujisada Hiroyuki, the chair of JAROS’s sensor committee for the 
ITIR instrument (i.e., the chair of the committee that had jurisdiction over matters 
relating to hardware and engineering for the instrument).100  
Fujisada was at the time an engineer at Japan’s national Electro-Technical 
Laboratory, which was an institute under the administrative jurisdiction of MITI. 
Before serving as an advisor to JAROS for the ITIR instrument, Fujisada had served 
as an advisor to JAROS for Japan’s first earth resources satellite, JERS-1. He was well 
acquainted with MITI’s efforts to nurture remote-sensing technology. In an interview 
                                                  
97 Kahle (2005) and Butler (2005). When interviewed about this matter, neither Kahle nor Butler 
were still supported by, or working for, NASA. Kahle had retired, and Butler was working for the 
U.S. House of Representatives. 
98 Butler (2005). 
99 I have dated the decision to no later than November 1989 using the report of Stillman Chase, 
Santa Barbara Research Center (A Subsidiary of Hughes Aircraft Company) Internal Memorandum, 
December 5, 1989. The dating of the decision to the spring of 1989 is based upon Kahle’s 
recollection of when she remembered the issue being settled (Kahle 2005). 
100 Fujisada (2003). The questions of at what cost—technological and financial—JAROS was 
willing to pay to support five bands in the thermal region was not addressed in the interview. 
Because potential contractors for the sub-instruments had already submitted proposals, and 
because those proposals and contractors had already been selected by JAROS by the time the 
decision was made to have five bands in the thermal sub-instrument, one can reasonably speculate 
that the cost of the two additional bands in the thermal region did not come at the expense of the 
two other sub-instruments or their contractors. More funds were very likely allocated to the ITIR 
instrument as a whole. 
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conducted over a decade after the Executive Managing Director’s decision, Fujisada 
explained that, from his perspective, the decision to have five bands in the thermal was 
a “mission oriented” decision that came about from Kahle’s request for at least five 
bands. He had debated with the thermal sensor’s contractor, Fujitsu, whether or not the 
contractor could actually follow through and build a radiometer with five sensing 
bands (presumably within a certain set of time and budgetary conditions). Fujitsu 
convinced Fujisada that it could. According to the Executive Managing Director’s 
earlier decision, it had already been decided that if Fujitsu thought they could build a 
five-band radiometer, then they should do it. For Fujisada, the meaning of the 
decision-making process suggested that JAROS was coming to do things under the 
direction of science leadership, in contrast to the “engineering first” approach used up 
to that date for satellites such as JERS-1.101  
Dr. Kahle and the TIGER team had successfully “made the case” for 
significant design improvements for the thermal infrared radiometer. Those 
improvements, however, did not satisfy the science requirements of the TIGER team. 
Before the TIGER team leadership learned of MITI’s and JAROS’s scaling back of the 
thermal sensor’s capabilities, they had wanted, at a minimum, five or six bands (they 
had proposed fourteen bands for TIGER). With respect to the signal-to-noise 
specification for the thermal infrared radiometer, Kahle had “steadfastly maintained 
that 0.1K [which was the signal-to-noise level of the 1980s TIMS instrument] is 
needed to do the science originally planned by the TIGER team,” in the words of one 
contemporary report of the negotiations in 1989.102 Yet, the TIGER team could only 
manage to negotiate a specification that allowed three times as much noise. For the 
sensor’s spatial resolution, the TIGER team ended up with ninety-meter resolution in 
                                                  
101 Ibid. 
102 Chase (1989b). 
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the thermal region, instead of the sixty meters that they had initially expected (they 
had proposed ninety meter resolution for the TIGER’s mapping sensor, but TIGER 
also had a sensor that was a profiler). Although from Fujisada’s perspective the ITIR 
instrument had taken a turn toward a “science mission,” in Kahle and Palluconi’s 
judgment, even with improvements, the ITIR’s thermal infrared radiometer was 
designed to “exploit existing remote sensing knowledge,” rather than to advance the 
science of thermal remote sensing.103  
Several months into the negotiations in 1989, the TIGER team leadership had 
even persuaded NASA to allow the team to explore with their Japanese counterparts 
Japan’s licensing of thermal remote-sensing technology from Hughes Santa Barbara 
Research Center (makers of Landsat), in order to boost ITIR’s performance. MITI and 
JAROS, however, were not interested in exploring any licensing arrangements, 
preferring instead to develop the necessary technology on their own, provided this 
technology was judged to satisfy EOS requirements. As a result of Japan’s rejection of 
any licensing arrangement, a TIGER team member—an instrument engineer—left the 
team. He worked for Hughes Santa Barbara Research and had hoped to use Landsat 
technology to improve the ITIR instrument (as well as, presumably, to improve 
Hughes’s profits). From the perspective of one of the JPL scientists, Michael Abrams, 
who was involved in the meetings at this time, Japan’s rejection of the Landsat 
technology “really emphasized the attitude that MITI/JAROS had, that they were 
going to build the technology from the ground up. . . . It was a constant struggle to try 
to get them to agree to improve the instrument.”104 Looking back, Abrams judged that 
improving the instrument’s design was actually one of their significant achievements 
in the collaboration, but it was a mixed one: 
 
                                                  
103 Kahle and Palluconi (1989: 5). 
104 Abrams (2001). See also Kahle (2005) and Chase (1989b). 
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We can look at [the final design of the instrument] with some amount of pride 
at having partially succeeded. I’m not sure where I’d put the level of success 
compared to what we really wanted . . . 50%, 70%, I don’t know. Certainly 
nowhere near 100%. If we had to design an instrument, it would be an 
entirely different instrument—different instrument, different capabilities, 
better capabilities. Given the constraints, the environment, we did have some 
significant impact upon improving the design. We did as much as we could. 
We pushed, pushed, and pushed.105 
  
The improved design specifications for ITIR’s thermal infrared radiometer 
did satisfy the requirements of EOS, both the version of those requirements which was 
privately stated by the chief EOS Project Scientist, Dr. Butler, in his e-mail in 
November 1989 described above and the version that Dr. Kahle articulated to MITI 
and JAROS in her April 1989 white paper. The two versions of requirements were 
significantly different. Dr. Butler required at most an instrument that demonstrated 
effective U.S.-Japan cooperation and an instrument that had a couple of thermal bands 
from which to calculate a rough estimate of land surface temperature. Dr. Kahle and 
her TIGER team were more demanding, and they were able to persuade their Japanese 
counterparts to provide much of what they requested. In fact, JAROS agreed to 
provide everything that Kahle called “important to achieving the goals of EOS.”106 
Because Dr. Butler and NASA Headquarters did not intervene in the negotiations and 
maintained its bilateral form, leaving it to Dr. Kahle to be the “U.S.” voice to work 
with “Japan’s” MITI and JAROS to achieve the goals of both EOS and the TIGER 
team, MITI and JAROS were not able to distinguish between what Kahle and the 
TIGER team said EOS’s requirements were for ITIR in the thermal region and what 
NASA Headquarters might have regarded as EOS’s requirements for ITIR in the 
thermal region, if that office had indeed ever come to a decision on such a matter in 
the first place. MITI and JAROS were presented with only one U.S. position. To be 
                                                  
105 Abrams (2001). 
106 Kahle (1989a). 
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sure, NASA’s letter of introduction did not cast Kahle in the role of NASA’s 
representative, and thus there was no reason for MITI and JAROS to presume that 
Kahle spoke with the official authority of the EOS Project and NASA Headquarters. 
Nevertheless, Kahle did speak for EOS by articulating to MITI and JAROS the 
specifics of EOS’s goals for ITIR and what design specifications would satisfy EOS 
goals.107 
 
Technoscientific Diplomacy as an Explanation 
 
Using a strategy that conceived of ITIR as a boundary object and tactics that 
took advantage of assertions of both scientific knowledge and political power, Kahle 
persuaded her counterparts. The Executive Managing Director of JAROS became 
convinced that, first, Kahle’s scientific argument was sound—that is, that these design 
improvements would help achieve science goals as well as MITI’s operational goals. 
Second, he became convinced that these improvements were significant enough to the 
science goals of NASA’s EOS that to brush them aside might risk jeopardizing ITIR’s 
confirmation for the definition phase of EOS and along with it, ITIR’s means of 
getting into space to orbit the earth. His conclusion was that these chances were not 
worth taking if Fujitsu, the contractor, could accommodate the improvements that 
Kahle had requested on behalf of EOS. While ITIR fell short of the TIGER team’s 
ambitions in the thermal region and was therefore not an efficacious boundary object 
for them, Kahle had been able to “make the scientific case” for the specific 
improvements to ITIR’s thermal infrared radiometer that she had herself named as 
being important for EOS, despite the fact that NASA’s bottom line for improvements 
                                                  
107 Such a role was a consistent with Kahle’s statement of work to NASA, in which she stated she 
would review ITIR’s “compatibility for the Eos [i.e., EOS] mission” (Kahle 1989e). 
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was not as demanding (which was a fact that was not communicated to MITI and 
JAROS). Thus, this outcome was not a self-evident meet-in-the-middle position 
between a priori preferences of each state. Nor was it a bargaining outcome, in the 
line with state-centered political realism. The outcome did not reflect each state’s 
power—if power is conceptualized as an asocial material property of a state (whether 
located in state bureaucracies or Latourian centers of calculation which are marshaled 
in a “trial of strength”). Nor did the outcome straightforwardly follow from a common 
idea of what was best for the promotion of thermal infrared remote-sensing science, as 
an epistemic-community approach would suppose.  
The outcome concerning the design of the thermal infrared radiometer was an 
outcome negotiated by liminal state actors who as mediators leveraged 
interdependencies between the two states to achieve their professional goals as well as 
state goals. NASA was relying upon MITI to provide an instrument with thermal 
remote-sensing capabilities, and MITI needed NASA to place its instrument into orbit. 
But what would the thermal capabilities of this instrument be? The TIGER team, in 
part to ensure the continuation of their work, negotiated and authorized a pragmatic 
compromise in the specifications for the thermal infrared radiometer. The 
compromise’s specifications would allow MITI to fund the instrument; the 
specifications would provide justification for NASA’s funding of the TIGER team to 
support the instrument; and this work would be carried out on behalf of achieving 
EOS goals—the meaning of which the TIGER team leadership themselves articulated. 
To effect this pragmatic compromise, the TIGER team leadership compellingly 
enacted both expert knowledge and state power, and MITI and JAROS took both of 
those enactments into account when they agreed to the compromise. Without the 
TIGER team leadership’s assertion of scientific expertise and expert knowledge in the 
thermal infrared, MITI and JAROS would likely have not been “pushed,” in Michael 
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Abrams’s words, to have as many as five bands in the thermal infrared. Without 
MITI’s and JAROS’s reliance on NASA’s EOS as a means to place ITIR into orbit, the 
TIGER team leadership would have had little with which to “push” MITI and JAROS 
to adopt the design specification for five bands. As is clear from which of the TIGER 
team’s requests for changes in specifications were fulfilled and which were not (e.g., 
dramatic improvements were not made in the thermal sensor’s signal-to-noise ratio), 
their scientific expertise and knowledge claims were alone not enough to effect their 
desired preferences. As liminal state actors, the TIGER team leadership convincingly 
asserted state power along lines of interdependency. Scientific knowledge and the 
techno-political power of states were used in concert. Only by understanding how they 
were used in technoscientific diplomacy can we convincingly account for the design of 
ITIR’s (and subsequently, ASTER’s) thermal infrared sensor.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
PERSISTENCE AND TRANSCENDENCE 
 
 Throughout the technoscientific diplomacy concerning the specifications for 
ITIR’s thermal infrared radiometer, the future status of the TIGER team was unclear. 
NASA had accepted the team to assist with only the definition phase of the ITIR 
instrument which originally was planned to conclude in the fall of 1990. While the 
TIGER team was negotiating the specifications for the thermal infrared radiometer, 
they were working out a place for themselves in the project for the long term by, for 
instance, demonstrating “the benefits that a U.S. team might bring to this enterprise,” 
to cite the words of the TIGER deputy team leader.1 By January 1992, however, when 
the two teams were in the thick of their deliberations over the specifications 
concerning the ITIR instrument’s shortwave infrared radiometer (which was another 
one of ITIR’s three sensors along with the thermal infrared radiometer and the visible / 
near infrared radiometer), formal institutional arrangements for the development and 
execution phases of the ITIR project had been made. A “Japan team” for ITIR had 
been selected, and the TIGER team had become attached to the ITIR instrument as 
ITIR’s “U.S. team.” The ITIR instrument had been renamed the Advanced Spaceborne 
Thermal Emission and Reflection radiometer (ASTER), and, in the same move, the 
two teams together were beginning to be called the “ASTER team.”  
In early 1991, NASA Headquarters had also tentatively confirmed the ASTER 
instrument for flight on its flagship EOS satellite.2 Although NASA’s EOS suffered a 
series of dramatic cutbacks from late 1991 through 1992, the ASTER instrument was 
                                                  
1 Palluconi (2001).  
2 Fisk (1991). 
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privileged to some extent throughout these “restructuring” and “rescoping” processes, 
since the instrument was perceived by NASA Headquarters as the lynchpin of 
U.S.-Japan collaboration in EOS. The instrument survived all of the progressively 
less-ambitious plans of NASA and its advisory committees which sorted out which 
EOS remote-sensing instruments would be onboard which satellites, satellites that 
were shrinking in capacity and number. In the discussions of these plans, ASTER’s 
presumed importance for U.S.-Japan cooperation in EOS was explicitly noted.3 In late 
1992, when the negotiations over the specifications for the shortwave infrared 
                                                  
3 See, for instance, the October 1991 and October 1992 Payload Advisory Panel reports (Moore 
1991 and Moore and Dozier 1992b: 7,37), the March 1992 NASA Red/Blue team report, and the 
U.S.-Japan instrument trading scheme purported therein. Frank Palluconi made a presentation to 
the U.S. ASTER team in November 1992 in which he mentioned an instrument trading scheme that 
had been discussed in the September Payload Advisory Panel meeting, which was the meeting that 
produced the conclusions described in the Panel’s October 1992 report. Palluconi noted in his 
presentation the importance of instrument trading for the entire EOS mission as well as for 
ASTER’s slot on the U.S. satellite, EOS-AM 1 (later called “Terra”). According to this purported 
trading scheme, the United States would fly Japan’s ASTER, and Japan would fly some U.S. 
instruments. In planning deliberations, NASA needed to make this trading scheme explicit because 
during this time ASTER’s placement onboard the EOS-AM 1 satellite was being questioned by 
members of the EOS community, both on the basis of ASTER’s value to EOS science (or lack 
thereof) and because it was possible that the seventh Landsat remote-sensing satellite might launch 
around the same time as ASTER. Since the Landsat satellite, as the name “Landsat” implied, 
would measure surface characteristics of the earth’s land in a way broadly similar to ASTER, it 
was debated whether or not ASTER would be redundant (see U.S. ASTER Science Team 1992: 2 
and Palluconi 1992).  
It should be noted that Japan’s space agencies, and more officially, Japan’s high-level, 
interagency Space Activities Committee, might not have had the same understanding of this 
purported trading scheme as NASA did, or have any understanding of a trading scheme, for that 
matter. First, ASTER was being funded by Japan’s MITI, and Japan’s other instruments and 
satellites that were supposedly implicated in this scheme were being built by Japan’s NASDA. It is 
far from clear that NASDA would view NASA’s hosting of ASTER as benefiting NASDA. 
Secondly, neither a MITI project manager for ASTER in its early years nor a long-time participant 
in ASTER’s development, both of whom attended meetings of the Space Activities Committee in 
the early 1990s, remembered any such trading scheme (Yokota 2004, Watanabe 2003). 
Furthermore, a trading scheme is not referenced in the U.S.-Japan Memorandum of Understanding 
for the ASTER instrument. Nevertheless, it is very clear not only from the 1991 and 1992 Payload 
Advisory Panel reports and Palluconi’s report of the 1992 Payload Advisory Panel meeting, but 
also from the minutes of a 1991 Payload Advisory Panel meeting, that NASA and its advisory 
committees were under the impression that there was some sort of trading scheme in play 
(accounts differed, however, over exactly which instruments were involved in this scheme). The 
reports of the Payload Advisory Panel are cited above, but the minutes of a 1991 meeting of the 
Panel, a copy of which I read at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory’s archives, have yet to be released 
after a request was initially made in 2001 (which has since been renewed yearly). 
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radiometer were concluding, the multi-year negotiations over a U.S.-Japan 
memorandum of understanding for the ASTER collaboration were beginning. 
Despite these changes, which implied that the ASTER collaboration was 
becoming a distinct transnational, institutional entity unto itself, albeit one supported 
by national governments, the technoscientific diplomacy concerning most of the 
specifications for the shortwave infrared radiometer was still bilateral in its social 
form—like it was for the thermal infrared radiometer—and the artifact under 
negotiation was still approached as a boundary object. A joint ASTER science team 
had been officially established, but a group of American scientists presented a unified 
front and spoke for the “United States” and a group of Japanese scientists presented a 
unified front and spoke for “Japan.” These two teams negotiated with each other how 
they could together design an instrument so that both of their goals could be satisfied, 
without requiring either team to necessarily buy into the goals of the other team and 
that team’s state (i.e., they still attempted to design what scholars in Science and 
Technology Studies call a boundary object). As was the case with the two teams’ 
design negotiations over the thermal infrared radiometer, their technoscientific 
diplomacy took into account both scientific knowledge claims and state power in their 
efforts to reach pragmatic compromises about the design of the shortwave infrared 
radiometer.  
In the case of the thermal infrared radiometer, it had been members of the U.S. 
TIGER team who had enacted state power under the name of NASA’s EOS in order to 
promote acceptance of their scientific judgment that at least five thermal bands were 
needed for EOS “science” goals, in addition to MITI’s “operational” goals. In contrast, 
for most of the negotiations over the specifications for the shortwave infrared 
radiometer (which are described below), NASA had already accepted, if not strictly 
guaranteed, the ASTER instrument in its broad concept for flight onboard a NASA 
  
 
206  
satellite. The U.S. team could no longer rhetorically exploit with much creditability 
Japan’s dependence on the United States for the launch of the ITIR/ASTER instrument. 
After the U.S. team’s incorporation into the ASTER enterprise, ASTER’s placement 
onboard NASA’s flagship EOS satellite became ballast for the ASTER collaboration, a 
shared weight of mutual dependency which stabilized the course of the collaboration 
for the Japan and U.S. teams. With the loss of leverage, enacting state power was now 
more difficult for the U.S. team. In the negotiations over the specifications of the 
shortwave infrared radiometer, the Japan team had the opportunity to wield their 
state’s material advantage. Japan was physically building the shortwave infrared 
radiometer and was recognized as being ultimately responsible for its engineering. The 
Japan team did not bolster, however, their position using explicit assertions of state 
power in the two teams’ negotiations over the shortwave infrared radiometer’s design. 
Rather, it was the U.S. team’s ascriptions of Japan’s state power as well as each team’s 
assertions and ascriptions of scientific knowledge which shaped the negotiations. 
Together the two teams enacted power, and in the enactment of Japan’s state power, 
the U.S. team played a leading role. 
 This chapter describes the formation of the “ASTER team” as the “U.S.” and 
“Japan” teams, detailing in particular the social makeup of the Japan team. It then 
compares two negotiations over the ASTER instrument’s design, both of which were 
conducted in the same time period, soon after the formation of the “ASTER team.” 
One concerned the design of the ASTER instrument’s shortwave infrared radiometer 
and the other the design of the operational capabilities of the ASTER instrument’s 
hardware. Bringing together the concern in Science and Technology Studies for 
accounting for ways of knowing and a social science emphasis on puzzle-solving, this 
chapter explains why, in the negotiation over the instrument’s operational capability, 
the teams broke out of their bilateral diplomacy and subsequently began to forge a new 
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international techno-political order, whereas in the negotiation over the shortwave 
infrared radiometer’s design, they did not do so, even though both negotiations were 
conducted after the establishment of the formal institutional workings of the ASTER 
intergovernmental collaboration, unlike the prior bilateral negotiation over the thermal 
sensor. Thus, the chapter comparatively explains persistence and transcendence in the 
negotiating practices of the two teams’ technical decision-making and collective 
scientific judgment. 
 
The Formation and Constitution of the ASTER Team 
 
 The social makeup of the ASTER team circumscribed how the team’s 
members took into account scientific knowledge and state power in their design of the 
shortwave infrared radiometer and the ASTER instrument’s operational capabilities. 
Whereas the specifications of the thermal infrared radiometer were negotiated by the 
leadership of the TIGER team on the one side and the leadership of JAROS and its 
advisory committees on the other side, the negotiations between the sides over the 
shortwave infrared radiometer and the ASTER instrument’s operational capabilities 
were conducted within and as a part of the “ASTER team.” While the negotiations 
over the shortwave infrared radiometer were still as bilateral as the earlier negotiations 
over the thermal sensor, the socio-political context and process of this bilateral 
technoscientific diplomacy were more complex. The ASTER team’s formation, 
constitution, and workings are critical to understanding how the U.S. team ascribed 
Japan’s state power in the two teams’ negotiations over the designs of both the 
shortwave infared radiometer and the ASTER instrument’s operational capabilities, 
even when such power was not explicitly asserted by the Japan team. It is especially 
critical for explaining why, despite the formation of the joint ASTER team, bilateral 
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diplomacy persisted in the negotiations over the shortwave infrared radiometer, and 
why the two teams transcended bilateral diplomacy in their negotiations over the 
operational capabilities of the ASTER instrument’s hardware.    
 
The TIGER Team becomes the U.S. Team 
 
By early 1990, the U.S. TIGER team and the Japan ITIR team were 
discussing what role the TIGER team might play in the future ASTER instrument. As 
things stood, only a few TIGER team members had actually proposed to also be ITIR 
team members (for example, as a part of Kahle’s ITIR team member proposal). If the 
ten or so other TIGER team members were to find homes on an EOS instrument team 
as NASA-funded researchers, the TIGER team would need to become integrated into 
the ITIR team. It was generally felt at the time that—true or not—the importance of 
the U.S.-Japan collaboration to NASA would provide some long-term security to the 
team’s funding and work.4  
In an interview, the TIGER deputy team leader, Frank Palluconi, explained to 
me the reasons why the ITIR/ASTER collaboration ultimately worked out for the 
TIGER team. He included among them that “in the long run, [the collaboration] gave 
us an instrument, which we might not have had otherwise.” In response, I queried, 
“[but] you clearly didn’t know all of this when you first decided to continue on with 
this [ITIR/ASTER] program.” He replied: 
  
Well, we did know something of it because, uh, the Japanese made an offer at 
the time that everyone [i.e., all of the potential EOS instruments] was 
competing, and NASA made a commitment to the Japanese to fly their 
instrument. So, right from the time when we realized that ITIR had received 
that level of commitment from NASA, we knew that if we committed to this 
                                                  
4 Kahle (1989c); Palluconi (2001); and Abrams (2001). 
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that there was a different level of NASA commitment to this instrument than 
was true of any of the U.S. instruments.5 
 
The TIGER team’s incorporation into the ITIR team and their shaping of the design of 
ITIR were means through which NASA could have the collaboration that it wanted. 
They were also means through which the TIGER team could work with an instrument 
that might approach allowing them to conduct the research that they had proposed to 
do with TIGER. 
Figure 5.1 (on the next page) is a diagram of the TIGER team leader’s 
proposed reorganization of the ITIR team to accommodate the TIGER team (which 
had been accepted by NASA without the team’s proposed TIGER instrument). “Phase 
B” was, in NASA terminology, the “definition phase” of EOS, which was scheduled to 
conclude at the end of September 1990, and “Phase C/D” was the “development and 
execution” phase. “EOS-A” refers to the satellite platform on which ITIR would orbit 
the earth, and it also refers to the EOS-A project office for the EOS-A satellite 
platform at the Goddard Space Flight Center. Figure 5.2 (on page 211) is a chart from 
the TIGER team’s proposal to the ITIR team for how the TIGER team could help with 
the development and use of the ITIR instrument and the data and information system 
for the instrument. In addition to advising the ITIR team, the TIGER team was 
proposing to “help” with or “do” almost everything as well, with the exception of the 
physical construction and laboratory calibration of the instrument, two activities that 
the Japanese scientists themselves would not generally “do” either. Rather, MITI’s and 
JAROS’s contractors would. 
NASA would be footing the bill to support the TIGER team’s proposed work 
and the travel of the TIGER team members, if MITI accepted them into the ITIR fold. 
The TIGER team members would bring with to the ITIR project unequaled expertise 
                                                  
5 Palluconi (2001). 
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Figure 5.1: The TIGER Team’s Proposal to be  
Incorporated into the ITIR Team (from Kahle 1990b) 
 
“Phase B” was known as the “definition phase.” Phase C and D were the 
“development and execution” phases. Phase C was planned to begin in October 1990.
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Figure 5.2: Proposed U.S. ITIR Team Tasks 
(from Kahle 1990b) 
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and experience in geologic remote-sensing. Yet, the Japanese scientists on the ITIR 
team were not quite sure that they could work with these Americans (nothing was said 
of the one Frenchman, a Frenchman who had yet to attend any of the meetings). Part 
of the problem was that the Japanese scientists considered the expertise and experience 
of the prominent TIGER team to be unequaled. In interviews, at least a few of the 
Japanese scientists recounted to me that when they first became involved in the 
collaboration they recognized the TIGER team researchers as among the top experts in 
the world in geologic remote sensing.6 TIGER team scientists had written landmark 
papers and textbooks that Japanese scientists on the ITIR/ASTER team had studied in 
their education and had taken to be authoritative.7 Dr. Yamaguchi Yasushi, who was at 
that time a geologic remote-sensing researcher in his mid-thirties at the Geological 
Survey of Japan, recalled that he and some of the other Japanese scientists wondered if 
they could work with such “big names.” At the same time, the challenge of working 
with these big names was part of the excitement of the project for them.8 
 According to Kahle’s recollection, MITI and the Japan team “out of the clear 
blue sky” invited the TIGER team to become not only ITIR team members but a “U.S. 
team,” and they invited Kahle to become the “U.S. team leader” and not just the first 
among equals of the American members of an international ITIR team (as had been 
depicted at the bottom of figure 5.1).9 Kahle recounted MITI’s naming of a “U.S. 
team” and a “U.S. team leader” to me with the broad, knowing smile of the Cheshire 
cat. The TIGER team’s transformation into the “U.S. team” and Kahle’s appointment 
                                                  
6 For some conspicuous co-authored publications, see Abrams, Ashley, Rowan, and Goetz (1977); 
the textbook Remote Sensing in Geology, Siegal and Gillespie (1980); Kahle and Goetz (1983); 
and chapters 13 and 31 of Manual of Remote Sensing, Colwell (1983). Not all of the team members 
became involved at the particular moment described above. 
7 The research of the members of the TIGER team is discussed in chapter three, p. 90-92. 
8 Yamaguchi (2002). 
9 Kahle (2003a). 
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as the leader of this “U.S. team” was evidently considered to be of good fortune, 
whether it came “out of the clear blue sky” or not.10  
There is evidence to suggest that this propitious invitation might not have 
come “out of the clear blue sky.” If MITI and the Japan team did initially broach the 
matter, Kahle certainly did not let MITI and the leadership of the Japan ITIR team 
forget it. In March 1990, Kahle proposed via fax to the leadership of the Japan ITIR 
team a list of tasks and responsibilities for the U.S. team leader position.11 When Tsu 
Hiroji, a central figure in the Japan ITIR team and the Director of the Research 
Planning Office of the Geological Survey of Japan, replied in May with a formal 
invitation for Kahle to become the “ITIR Deputy Team Leader,” Kahle on her copy of 
the fax crossed out “Deputy” and added “U.S.” in front of “ITIR” to make “U.S. ITIR 
Team Leader.”12 The “U.S.” signifier split, in name, the “ITIR team” into a “U.S. 
ITIR team” and a “Japan ITIR team,” instead of just leaving it as the “ITIR team,” 
which would have been a Japan-led international team (as had been depicted on the 
bottom of figure 5.1). The move also made room for Kahle to become a “team leader,” 
which would be a position on par with the other team leaders of EOS instruments. It 
also would be on par with what Kahle’s position would have been if her TIGER 
proposal had been fully accepted, rather than remaining a “co-investigator” on the 
ITIR team, which is how she had been accepted through her team member proposal 
for the ITIR instrument. This move to establish a “U.S. team” had been made possible 
by the TIGER team’s diplomacy since the first Japan visit of the TIGER team 
                                                  
10 The good fortune of this achievement was also hinted in documents from the time period which 
I collected, as will be explained below. 
11 Tsu (1990a). On March 6, Kahle also faxed to Tsu the proposals of TIGER team members to be 
ITIR team members (Kahle 1990b). 
12 Tsu (1990a). The Director of MITI’s Space Industry Division, Obara Michio, later wrote Dr. 
Fisk, who was the NASA Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications, and 
recommended that Kahle be appointed the “U.S. ITIR Team Leader.” He listed a set of tasks and 
responsibilities that in all probability derived from the list that Kahle had forwarded Tsu in March, 
to which Tsu referred in his 1 May fax (Obara 1990). 
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leadership in March 1989, when discussions about the design of the thermal infrared 
radiometer had begun. 
The stakes of the formal naming of a “U.S. ITIR team” and a “U.S. ITIR team 
leader” had just as much to do with Kahle’s position vis-à-vis NASA and other 
American members of the ITIR team as it did with providing the American scientists 
with some collective bargaining power as a “U.S. team” in their negotiations with the 
Japanese scientists. In April, NASA’s EOS Program Scientist had written to Kahle 
that:  
 
We [NASA] are very pleased that your Thermal Infrared Ground Emission 
Spectrometer (TIGER) Team has been able to effectively interact with the 
Japanese Intermediate Thermal Infrared Radiometer (ITIR) Team, helping to 
facilitate the design of the ITIR sensor. Considering this, and in response to 
the Japanese invitation for TIGER Team members to join the ITIR Team, we 
will need a proposal from each of your Team members to serve as a basis for 
supporting your involvement with ITIR Team activities. . . . In your capacity 
as Lead U.S. Co-Investigators [sic] of the ITIR Teams, we encourage you to 
work with your U.S. Team members to help coordinate their proposals.13 
[italics mine] 
 
Now, with Kahle’s change of “ITIR deputy team leader” to “U.S. ITIR team leader,” 
as was written on her copy of the May 1st fax from Mr. Tsu, Kahle could answer this 
request from NASA for a proposal to be a “lead U.S. co-investigator” with a proposal 
to be an “ITIR team leader.” Kahle submitted just such a “team leader” proposal to 
NASA Headquarters fifteen days after the fax from Tsu.14 In that proposal, Kahle 
posited that her appointment as the “U.S. ITIR Team Leader” would keep “science 
high in the Japanese priorities as they proceed with the ITIR development.”15 The 
                                                  
13 Wilson (1990). 
14 The other U.S. co-investigators had been members of the TIGER team. A few scientists who 
had not been part of the TIGER team had also proposed to be ITIR team members at the same time 
Kahle had submitted her ITIR team member proposal. 
15 Kahle (1990c: 1-2). The status of “team leader” was something that Kahle guarded not only in 
contractual language with NASA but also in her everyday work. Kahle held in her files a copy of 
the ITIR management organizational chart from 1990, a chart that was created by the Japan science 
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proposal’s “overall objective” was “to maximize the capability and utility of ITIR for 
meeting the science goals of the EOS mission.”16 In that proposal, Kahle and her 
colleagues committed themselves to the ITIR instrument. When ITIR had been in 
competition with TIGER, Kahle and her colleagues had argued in their 1988 proposal 
that the two instruments were in fact dramatically different and so were their specific 
scientific objectives.17 In the ITIR U.S. team leader proposal to NASA, however, 
Kahle now wrote that while her team members’ “proposed approaches to using the 
modified ITIR instrument may be somewhat different from the original TIGER 
concept,” “the science objectives are basically the same.”18 Kahle and her TIGER 
team members had lined up behind the ITIR enterprise. 
 
The Elevation of Japanese Users, Researchers, and Scientists 
 
 This ITIR enterprise had been, until the TIGER team’s involvement, primarily 
guided by JAROS management, the JAROS user committee that was chaired by Dr. 
Ishii, the JAROS sensor committee that was chaired by Dr. Ono, and industry 
hardware engineers (who comprised much of JAROS as well). These were the voices 
who had, in the mid-1980s, dominated the design of the MITI’s mission instruments 
for JERS-1, Japan’s first earth resources satellite. Users at ERSDAC, researchers at the 
Geological Survey of Japan, and academic scientists—all of whom were initially at the 
periphery of instrument design in 1988 but whose influence generally increased 
                                                                                                                                               
team and faxed to her. She kept her undated copy along with her 1990 correspondence with MITI 
and the Japan science team leadership. The organizational chart included a box for the “US ITIR 
team,” and it noted that Kahle was the “US Team Leader.” Kahle had circled that box and wrote 
“note ‘U.S. Team Leader.’” She was pointing that out to someone—to MITI, to NASA, or maybe 
to just herself. See figure 5.3. 
16 Kahle (1990c: 3). 
17 Kahle and Palluconi (1988: iii). 
18 Kahle (1990c: 2). 
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through the early 1990s—were brought into the design process of the ITIR instrument 
by four changes. First, in a move similar to the United States’ effort to privatize its 
Landsat series of satellites in the late 1980s (an effort that failed), the MITI Space 
Industry Division began talking about privatizing its satellite development and 
operations. According to this plan, the development of the JERS-1 and ITIR satellites 
were to nurture the remote-sensing industry, with the hope that the industry might 
eventually mature. For it to grow, MITI felt that it needed to demonstrate the utility of 
the technology to the natural resource industry that comprised ERSDAC and which 
was ERSDAC’s main constituency.19 Second, and related to the first, the MITI Space 
Industry Division, ERSDAC, and the MITI Space Industry Division’s key advisors 
from its national institutes, recognized a requirement for satellite remote-sensing 
projects to take the needs of users (and potential users) into better consideration, 
whether or not satellite development was eventually privatized. The policy rationale of 
technology development as a good in and of itself was starting to run out of steam. 
This (contested) consideration of users authorized the voices of experts who were not 
driven by the technology development goals of the hardware makers.20  
A third change that brought users at ERSDAC, researchers at the Geological 
Survey of Japan, and academic scientists further into instrument design was that MITI 
had proposed ITIR as an EOS instrument. Consequently, the MITI Space Industry 
Division required the expertise of scientists to justify scientifically to NASA that the 
ITIR instrument could be an EOS instrument. Japanese geologic remote-sensing 
scientists, in their own judgment, “had little power” and “little [project management] 
experience” up to the late 1980s compared with the hardware makers, but their 
                                                  
19 Yokota (2004) and see chapter three, p. 97-99, 104-105. 
20 See the comments of Professor Nakayama and Yamazaki Akira in chapter three (p 104-105) and 
more generally, Ishii (2003), Yamaguchi (2002), Watanabe (2003), and the accounts in Sōritsu 
jūnenshi henshū iinkai (1993). 
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influence started to increase when the MITI Space Industry Division came to geologic 
remote-sensing scientists at the Geological Survey of Japan for their assistance with 
writing the ITIR proposal to NASA in the fall of 1987 and with that proposal’s 
subsequent revisions in 1989 and 1990.21 
 The fourth change that moved Japanese remote-sensing users, researchers, 
and scientists closer to instrument design decisions in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
was that, according to the requirements for participation in EOS, MITI needed to 
constitute something that they could label a “team” of researchers to participate in the 
EOS enterprise, a team that would, as of spring of 1990, collaborate with a “U.S. ITIR 
team” composed of well-known geologic remote-sensing scientists. Over the next 
fifteen years, the collaboration between these two teams under the banner of EOS 
would ultimately be a socio-political mechanism and catalyst for opening up the 
development and operations of MITI’s remote-sensing system to many kinds of users. 
This U.S.-Japan collaboration, however, was driven and circumscribed by the 
particular social makeup of the two teams. While the social makeup and organization 
of the U.S. side did not change substantially between the negotiations over ITIR’s 
thermal infrared radiometer and the negotiations over ITIR’s shortwave infrared 
radiometer, the social makeup and organization of the Japan side changed dramatically, 
becoming more complex and diverse. Remote-sensing users, researchers, and 
scientists became part of the Japan team for the EOS enterprise. When the U.S. team 
of scientists pushed for instrument design changes, it was these Japanese users, 
researchers, and scientists—who had previously been peripheral to instrument 
design—that negotiated with the U.S. team first, rather than JAROS engineers and 
JAROS’s long-standing advisors. 
 
                                                  
21 Yamaguchi (2002) and chapter three, p. 135-137. 
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The Japan ITIR Team 
 
In the deliberations over the thermal infrared radiometer in 1989, the TIGER 
team did not negotiate with the collection of Japanese scientists who would constitute 
the future Japan ITIR team. The Japan team for the ITIR instrument had not been 
selected at that point. JAROS management and Dr. Ishii had been the TIGER team’s 
primary points of contact, along with Dr. Ono of Japan’s National Research 
Laboratory of Metrology. The MITI Space Industry Division, JAROS management, 
the chair of JAROS’s user committee (Dr. Ishii), the chair of JAROS’s sensor 
committee (Dr. Ono and then Dr. Fujisada), and JAROS’s engineering contractors 
spoke for the design of the ITIR instrument. While Dr. Ono and Dr. Fujisada became 
part of the ITIR team, it was not until a meeting at the end of November 1989 that the 
TIGER team met the core group of the collection of scientists and engineers who 
would become part of the future Japan team.22 The Japan team was composed of 
members who were drawn from relatively diverse institutions (e.g., national labs, 
government agencies, industry consortia, and universities), and it was a complex 
conglomerate in terms of its organizational structure as well as membership. The 
team’s core leadership, however, knew each other well, just as was the case for the U.S. 
team. 
According to Yokota Makoto, who at the time was MITI’s newly-appointed 
project manager for ITIR, MITI turned in 1990 to its Geological Survey of Japan and 
the “established network” from the JERS-1 project to constitute the Japan team for 
EOS.23 In keeping with the advisory committee system described in chapter three, 
Japan’s “ITIR team” was in its administrative structure a set of committees and 
                                                  
22 Chase (1989b); Abrams (2001); Palluconi (2001); and Yamaguchi (2002, 2005). 
23 The following paragraph draws from my interviews of Yokota (2004), Yamaguchi (2002), 
Fujisada (2003), and Rokugawa (2003). 
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sub-committees which served as advisors to MITI by advising project managers at 
JAROS and ERSDAC (see figure 5.3 on the next page). Yet, in a break with 
management practices from the development of JERS-1, Yokota wanted these advisory 
committees to be more independent of the hardware industry and to be more involved 
in project management.24 MITI as a bureaucracy might have wanted to encourage a 
source of technical information and expertise other than its contractors which would 
still be at the service of the bureaucracy. In my interview with Yokota, however, he 
only alluded to this motivation in passing, commenting on contractors’ 
conflict-of-interest in giving technical advice to the state. He did nevertheless 
matter-of-factly recall that he thought at the time that the state could make better use 
of its researchers at MITI’s national institutes by directly involving them in project 
management, an activity that had in the past been dominated by the hardware industry, 
Japan’s National Aerospace Development Agency, and the JAROS consortium: 
 
I recognized that researchers at the national institutes [collected under the 
umbrella of MITI’s Agency of Industrial Science and Technology] were 
cognizant of their duty toward matters of confidentiality for the reason that 
they were national civil servants, the same as us bureaucrats. I also 
recognized that their interest in the success of state projects as a whole was 
strong. And, at the same time, I thought that, provided managers took 
industrial research and administrative collaborative projects in a good 
direction, these researchers at the national institutes should not just be 
conducting research themes one-by-one but should use their knowledge and 
ability in a practical way, as staff for the project management side. I had 
conveyed these thoughts to many of my senior managers [in previous MITI 
projects], but they were not used. . . . the [ITIR/ASTER] project had just 
began constructing the project system [“taisei”] exactly at the time that I 
assumed my post, so the project was at a stage where I could try and test my 
ideas. To the researchers at the national institutes (the core being Tsu Hiroji of 
the Geological Survey of Japan, Fujisada of the Electro-technical Laboratory, 
Ono Akira of the National Research Laboratory of Metrology), I entrusted 
important project management duties (such as the adoption or rejection of  
 
                                                  
24 Yokota (2004). 
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Figure 5.3: Kahle’s Copy of ITIR Management Structure 
(from Tsu 1990 and Kahle 1990b) 
 
 
Acronym List 
 
AIST:  Agency of Industrial Science and Technology (a collection of MITI 
national research institutes) 
ERSDAC: Earth Resources Satellite Data Analysis Center 
ETL: Electro-technical Laboratory 
ITIR: Intermediate Infrared Thermal Radiometer 
GSJ: Geological Survey of Japan 
JAROS: Japan Resources Observation System Research Organization 
MITI: Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NRLM: National Research Laboratory of Metrology 
SID: Space Industry Division (of MITI)
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contractor proposals concerning scheduling, development, and the technical 
sides of things), and I mostly made use of their judgment.25 
 
The researchers at the national institutes who were named by Yokota in the 
above interview excerpt were from the JERS-1 “established network,” but in the 
JERS-1 project, MITI had not “entrusted important project management duties” to 
them. For the ITIR/ASTER project, MITI and its consortia elevated these researchers 
from MITI’s national institutes to project management. Dr. Fujisada Hiroyuki of 
MITI’s Electro-technical Laboratory had advised the development of components for 
the JERS-1 sensor and had also worked on the development of electro-optical 
semi-conductors for military sensors. For the ITIR project, the MITI Space Industry 
Division, in consultation with JAROS, named him chair of the hardware advisory 
committee for ITIR, which is shown in figure 5.3 as the “EOS Sensor Committee.” Dr. 
Ono of MITI’s National Research Laboratory of Metrology had previously chaired the 
EOS Sensor Committee, and when Dr. Fujisada was appointed chair of the committee, 
Dr. Ono continued to play an important role in the committee and continued to chair 
the subcommittee for instrument calibration. Both Ono and Fujisada had been 
involved in the negotiations over the thermal infrared radiometer back in 1989. These 
two researchers were thought of, by MITI management as well as by themselves, as 
the “neutral parties” who were responsible for leading the committee and mediating 
“the exchange of ideas” between the hardware makers and users (the latter of whom 
MITI initially considered to be mainly natural resource exploration and exploitation 
firms).26  
                                                  
25 Yokota (2004). Other interviewees, especially Yamaguchi (2002) and Fujisada (2003), 
collaborated Yokota’s story, praised Yokota’s managerial skills, and recognized his contribution as 
a key element of ITIR/ASTER’s history. Interviewees were not so kind to other MITI bureaucrats. 
26 The first quote is from Fujisada (2003), but Yokota (2004) also cast Fujisada and Ono as neutral 
mediators between users and the hardware industry. The second quote is from Yokota (2004), who 
further commented that Fujisada and Ono carried out this responsibility with “great effort” and that 
this was an important reason for what he regarded as the committee’s “smooth” workings and the 
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The EOS Sensor Committee was composed of about a dozen members who 
were drawn from ERSDAC, NASDA, and the national institutes that were under the 
umbrella of MITI’s Agency of Industrial Science and Technology, such as the 
Electro-technical Laboratory, National Research Laboratory of Metrology, and the 
Geological Survey of Japan. A couple of members were university scientists.27 The 
Sensor Committee itself did not include employees of JAROS (which was the 
organization that the committee was supposed to directly advise), hardware 
contractors (who had an obvious financial interest in the committee’s decisions), or 
representatives from non-renewable resource firms (who were the users of immediate 
interest to MITI). Scientists and engineers who were affiliated with these excluded 
groups did, however, staff the sensor committee’s four subcommittees—the ground 
system interface subcommittee, the calibration subcommittee, the cooler development 
subcommittee, and the platform interface subcommittee. While the groups that were 
deemed to be highly interested were excluded from the committee, the main 
committee nevertheless included scientists and engineers who had worked for 
non-renewable resource firms and hardware contractors for many years but who now 
worked for ERSDAC or other organizations as permanent employees (that is, 
employees who were not just on loan (“shukkō”), as some were).28 MITI also 
delegated to Fujisada and Ono the selection of scientists outside of the JAROS and 
ERSDAC consortia who would advise on instrument issues, such as Dr. Sakuma 
Fumihiro, who was Dr. Ono’s subordinate in the thermal measurement section at the 
National Research Laboratory of Metrology. 
Larger and more diverse than the EOS Sensor Committee was the “EOS 
Mission Committee,” also shown in figure 5.3. This committee was composed of 
                                                                                                                                               
ultimate success of the ASTER instrument. 
27 See, for example, Shigen tansa-yō kansoku sisutemu kenkyū kaihatsu kikō (2000: 1-0-J-4). 
28 Ibid. and Fujisada (2003). 
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twenty-eight “user” representatives, including scientists from national institutes and 
organizations under the jurisdiction of MITI, such as the Geological Survey of Japan 
(6 committee members), the National Research Laboratory of Metrology (2), the 
Meteorological Research Institute (2), the National Institute of Environmental 
Pollution Research (2), the Electro-technical Laboratory, and JAROS. Moreover, the 
committee included university scientists (6) and representatives from oil and mining 
companies that were members of the ERSDAC consortium, namely, Japan Petroleum 
Exploration Company (JAPEX), JAPEX Geoscience Institute Inc., Mitsui Oil and 
Smelting Company, and Teikoku Oil Company. Finally, the EOS Mission Committee 
included representatives from government ministries, such as the Ministry of 
Construction, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, and public 
corporations (i.e., tokushū hōjin), such as the Institute of Physical and Chemical 
Research and NASDA.29 As the EOS Sensor Committee was supposed to do for 
JAROS, this EOS Mission Committee was intended to serve as an advisory committee 
for ERSDAC and its ITIR/EOS program manager, and thus the committee’s members 
did not include employees of ERSDAC, although the committee obviously did include 
representatives from companies that were corporate members of the ERSDAC 
consortium. 
Note that this new “user committee” was formed under ERSDAC, rather than 
under JAROS, where the user committee chaired by Dr. Ishii had been located during 
the time of the U.S.-Japan negotiations over the thermal infrared sensor. The MITI 
Space Industry Division and, specifically, Mr. Yokota, pushed for the move of the user 
committee to ERSDAC, owing to the four changes that led to the elevation of users, 
researchers, and scientists which were noted above.30 While this move certainly 
                                                  
29 For a listing of the members of its first two years, see Sōritsu jūnenshi henshū iinkai (1993: 
106-7). Also see MITI (1991: 2-15 – 2-17). 
30 Yokota (2004); Yamaguchi (2002); and Yokota (1990). 
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signaled new circumstances (e.g., involvement in EOS) and policy changes (e.g., the 
promotion of users)—both of which brought new opportunities for ERSDAC’s user 
community, for research scientists at MITI’s national institutes, and for university 
scientists—the move was implemented in a way that also allowed for a definite sense 
of continuity. Mr. Tsu Hiroji, who was at the time the Director of the Research 
Planning Office of the Geological Survey of Japan, was named in the spring of 1990 
the chair of this new EOS Mission Committee. In the words of Mr. Yokota, Dr. Ishii 
had, in consultation with MITI, “passed the baton” of the user committee in the spring 
of 1990 to Mr. Tsu, whom Ishii held in “great trust.”31 Mr. Tsu was at the time a Ph.D. 
candidate who was advised by Ishii, in addition to being a senior 
scientist-administrator at the Geological Survey of Japan. 
Tsu himself brought onboard to the EOS Mission Committee other scientists 
and researchers, such as Dr. Satō Isao, Dr. Miyazaki Yoshinori, and Dr. Yamaguchi 
Yasushi, all of whom had worked for Tsu when he had been the Chief of the Applied 
Geophysics Section of the Geological Survey of Japan in previous years.32 Tsu, as the 
chair of this new user committee, also became the leader of the Japan ITIR team, 
because the MITI Space Industry Division had recently judged that “user scientists 
will play a more important role in [our] EOS project from now on.”33 The title of 
“team leader” had been held for a short while up to that point by Dr. Ono, who was a 
specialist in instrumentation. Dr. Rokugawa Shuichi was named the chair of the 
committee that would supervise the development of the aircraft model of the ITIR 
sensor. Like Tsu, he had been recommended by Dr. Ishii. Rokugawa had been another 
of Ishii’s students, and he held the professorship at the University of Tokyo from 
which Ishii had retired. In sum, this constitution of the two EOS committees in figure 
                                                  
31 Yokota (2004). 
32 Yamaguchi (2002) and Miyazaki (2003). 
33 Yokota (1990). 
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5.3 integrated geologic remote-sensing users, researchers, and scientists more closely 
into instrument design than ever before in the history of the development of Japan’s 
remote-sensing instruments, dramatically more so than they were in the development 
of JERS-1. 
 
The Japan “Science Team” in the Japan Team 
 
In the early 1990s, as NASA’s EOS moved from the instrument “definition” 
phase and into the “execution” phase, the EOS “instrument” teams started to become 
called EOS “science” teams.34 While the terms “U.S. ITIR team” and “U.S. ITIR 
science team” referred to the same collection of people, when that term was used by 
NASA, MITI, or members of the joint U.S.-Japan ITIR team, the Japan portion of the 
                                                  
34 This change in terminology occurred throughout NASA’s EOS teams in the early 1990s, but the 
change cannot be pinned down to a specific policy change at NASA Headquarters or to a uniform 
time (such as EOS’s “new start,” the start of the C/D phase). Different teams made the name 
change at different times and with different degrees of consistency. The MODIS team consistently 
called itself the “MODIS Science Team” as early as January 1990 (e.g., Salomonson 1990: 9), well 
before the beginning of phase C/D in October 1990. EOS Project Scientist Gerald Soffen, located 
at the newly-reorganized EOS Project Office that had moved from NASA Headquarters to the 
Goddard Space Flight Center in January 1990, referred in that same month to all of the “Science 
Teams” being formed (Soffen 1990: 1). Yet, a year later, NASA Associate Administrator Fisk in his 
official phase C/D selection letter to Kahle in January 1991, still referred to Kahle as an instrument 
team leader, not using the increasingly popular “science team leader” terminology (Fisk 1991). The 
U.S. ITIR/ASTER team made a clear change to the “science team” terminology in their 
documentation in the fall of 1992 (e.g., U.S. ASTER Science Team 1992), although the “science 
team” terminology began to be used here-and-there at team meetings over a year earlier (e.g., U.S. 
ASTER Science Team 1992: 50 and MITI 1991: 2-15). For some EOS teams, the name change was 
likely of little consequence, other than emphasizing that the teams were soon going to be “doing 
science” which they had proposed back when they were called instrument teams. Those instrument 
teams would have “done the science” whether they were called “instrument” teams or “science” 
teams (and the term did not imply a necessary change in personnel).  
For the ITIR/ASTER joint team, however, as described below, the different terminology 
was sometimes used in ways that were consequential for the organization and workings of the 
collaboration, especially with respect to the management of boundaries vis-à-vis JAROS’s EOS 
Sensor Committee and Goddard Space Flight Center’s EOS data and information system personnel. 
I speculate that the workings of the ITIR/ASTER team were not unique in this regard. For example, 
the MODIS Science Team—based out of the Goddard Space Flight Center—recognized and 
distinguished themselves from a “MODIS engineering team” which was also at Goddard Space 
Flight Center (see, Salomonson 1990: 9). 
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“ITIR team” delineated in figure 5.3 was not synonymous with the “Japan ITIR 
science team.” The combined membership of the EOS Sensor Committee and the EOS 
Mission Committee did not constitute the Japan “science team” for ITIR. When MITI, 
its consortia, and Japanese scientists did use the “science team” label to refer 
exclusively to a group of Japanese scientists, which was uncommon, they usually used 
it to describe a particular collection of Japanese scientists who contributed to what 
ERSDAC called its “science project.” This science project came under the advisory 
purview of the EOS Mission Committee and had its own project manager at ERSDAC 
(which is not shown in figure 5.3 but which is alluded to with the “science 
management” duty that was listed in ERSDAC’s box).35 Most of the Japanese 
scientists who were members of this “science team” were also members of the larger 
EOS Mission Committee, but not all were (in 1990 as well as in the future).36  
The members of this “science team,” which MITI had constituted to fulfill the 
EOS requirement for a team of EOS researchers, did not so much work together as a 
distinct and autonomous functional group, but were rather integrated into the 
                                                  
35 A reorganization of ERSDAC in 1993 made this “science project” distinction more explicit (Tsu 
1993). Prior to 1993, Japanese-language documents did not refer to a “Japan science project” or a 
“Japan science team.” Prior to 1993, if those terms were used by members of the Japan team, they 
were generally only spoken in English to English-language speakers, in an attempt to communicate 
smoothly in the categories of their audience or conversation partner. If the Japanese-language 
equivalent of “science team” was used (which was rendered in the Japanese language in katakana, 
which is a phonetic alphabet used for foreign loan words), it was typically used to refer to the U.S. 
science team for ITIR/ASTER or to the science teams of other EOS instruments, and not to a Japan 
science team. Consequently, members of the Japan ITIR team who spoke Japanese and English 
juggled various membership categories in their speech. On the other hand, the members of the U.S. 
ITIR team / U.S. ITIR science team regularly treated not only “U.S. ITIR team” and “U.S. ITIR 
science team” as terms that were interchangeable (or later, “U.S. ASTER team” and “U.S. ASTER 
science team”), but also the joint “ASTER team” and joint “ASTER science team” as 
interchangeable, and often even the “Japan team” and the “Japan science team” as interchangeable. 
Japanese-language speakers actually referred to the U.S.-Japan joint meetings in Japanese using 
the Japanese-language equivalent of “ITIR team meeting” or “ASTER team meeting.” Not 
surprisingly, these different habits of speaking sometimes led to confusion regarding who 
authorized what, who was responsible for what, and who was doing what. 
36 For the list of ITIR science team members in 1990, I am using the list included in Kahle’s ITIR 
U.S. Team Leader Proposal (1990c: 7). A different and more exclusive list that was provided to 
NASA is given in Kahle (1992: 14).  
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operations of JAROS, ERSDAC, and the larger Japan “ITIR team” (the Japan “ITIR 
team” that included the two advisory committees).37 The “Japan science team” 
categorization was generally meant for NASA’s consumption or for those outside of 
the development and operations of the ITIR remote-sensing system, such as 
international audiences who were accustomed to talking in terms of EOS “science 
teams” (e.g., audiences at international scientific conferences and at EOS meetings 
that called for the participation of “science team” members, etc.). The term was used 
out of comfort and convenience in international situations, to avoid having to 
reference and explain the workings of MITI’s consortia and its advisory committees. 
Consequently, in addition to JAROS and ERSDAC, the salient group on the Japan side 
was, in general, not the “Japan science team,” but the much larger “Japan ITIR team,” 
which was more simply referred to as the “Japan team.”38   
Kahle’s ITIR team leader proposal in May 1990 called the combination of the 
U.S. ITIR team and those individuals who were designated by MITI as the members 
of the Japan science team the “ITIR science steering committee.”39 Kahle’s proposal 
implied that this “science steering committee” would be “steering” the development 
and operations of the ITIR remote-sensing system as a whole. The absence of this 
committee as a distinct entity in MITI’s and the Japan team’s diagram of ITIR’s 
management structure (figure 5.3) suggests that the “science steering committee” 
might have “steered” just “science,” however narrowly “science” might have been 
defined vis-à-vis technology and operations. In contrast, as was illustrated in the 
                                                  
37 The ERSDAC science project did have working groups that met separately and regularly, and 
these mainly included scientists who were designated as members of the Japan “science team.” 
38 See, for example, the explanation of the workings of the Japan team offered in MITI (1991: 2-8 
– 2-10). Also see discussions of the organization of the Japan team in the following interviews: 
Iwasaki (2002), Yamaguchi (2002), Maekawa, Muraoka, and Okada (2003), Watanabe (2003), and 
Yasuoka (2003). 
39 Kahle (1990c: 7). The same “science steering committee” formulation was used at the first 
ASTER team meeting in November 1990 (ASTER Science Team 1990: 125).  
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negotiations over the design of the thermal infrared radiometer, the TIGER instrument 
team, which was now the U.S. ITIR team, did not define the scope of their science 
narrowly, owing both to the long-standing practices of the geologic remote-sensing 
community from which its members were drawn and to the team’s goal of improving 
the design of ITIR so that the instrument could more effectively support the scientific 
research that the U.S. team wanted to conduct.  
Not only did the typical representation of the ITIR/ASTER management 
structure shown in figure 5.3 avoid any suggestion of something called “science” 
driving the ITIR project, the representation of the management structure also provided 
no indication of the institutional disparities among Japan’s scientists in the ITIR 
team.40 For example, university scientists in Japan were not compensated for the time 
and effort that they dedicated to the ITIR/ASTER enterprise, and they were not 
provided relief in any way of their usual university duties. All the other members of 
Japan’s advisory committees who participated in the ITIR/ASTER enterprise did so in 
direct support of the organizations for which they worked (which were governmental 
organizations, national research institutes, or contractors billing the Government of 
Japan). Recognizing this disparity, Mr. Yokota, the MITI project manager for ITIR, 
broke new bureaucratic ground by allocating significant funds to JAROS and 
ERSDAC to support the travel of these scientists to international conferences to 
discuss the ITIR enterprise. International travel, at that time, was typically excluded 
from university funding or government research grants. Professors were known to pay 
for their international travel out of their own pockets. By funding international travel, 
Yokota—wanting the EOS collaboration with NASA to be successful and thinking that 
                                                  
40 This representation would eventually be included in official planning documents exchanged 
between the NASA and MITI a few years later. For example, see the Project Implementations 
Plans (Goddard Space Flight Center 1995, 1997), and also JAROS’s Nine Plans (MITI 1991: 
8-47). 
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the participation of scientists was needed for that to happen—tried to encourage the 
involvement of select university scientists in the ITIR team, even while the ITIR 
enterprise in the late 1980s and early 1990s was, from the perspective of MITI, to 
support the needs of the oil and mining industry first and foremost.41 In sum, the 
social makeup of the Japan “ITIR team” was quite diverse, much more diverse than 
the U.S. “ITIR team.” Representatives of “science” from academia and research 
institutes were just one element of the complex conglomerate that was the Japan “ITIR 
team.” 
  
The Implications of Social Makeup for Negotiations 
 
 The social makeup of the Japan ITIR team, specifically the elevation into 
project management of scientists from MITI’s national institutes and of scientist-users 
more generally, created an institutional division of responsibility and labor within the 
Japan team between user-scientists and engineer-makers which complicated the U.S. 
ITIR team’s efforts to influence the design of the ITIR instrument. First, the members 
of the U.S. ITIR team were no longer the only scientist-users in the discussion. 
Japanese scientists could now readily speak for science, too, especially in areas of 
their expertise, such as shortwave infrared remote sensing. In addition, they were now 
in a better organizational position to effect their preferences than they were when the 
design of the thermal infrared sensor was being negotiated.  
                                                  
41 Yokota (2004). In my interview with him, Yokota cited an annual travel budget of fifteen 
million Yen (in 1990) that he had allocated Fujisada and Tsu to distribute, as committee chairs, to 
the members of their committees and to other members of the Japan ITIR team whose travel 
expenses were not covered by their organization. At the time, fifteen million Yen was roughly one 
hundred thousand dollars. Compensation practices were apparently not standard across ministries 
in Japan. Like MITI, the Science and Technology Agency under the Ministry of Education during 
this time did not compensate researchers from national institutes for their support of government 
projects, but unlike MITI, the Science and Technology Agency did provide minimal compensation 
for consulting carried out by researchers at national universities. See Satō (2005). 
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A second reason why the social makeup of the Japan team complicated the 
efforts of U.S. scientists was that the scientists with whom the U.S. ITIR team would 
be dealing did not yet have at JAROS the seniority and influence of Dr. Ishii and Dr. 
Ono. Dr. Ishii and Dr. Ono were the two central individuals with whom the TIGER 
team had debated the specifications of the thermal infrared sensor in 1989. Dr. 
Fujisada (the chair of the EOS Sensor Committee), Dr. Tsu (the chair of the EOS 
Mission Committee and Japan’s team leader), and the younger scientists who Fujisada 
and Tsu brought onboard the ITIR enterprise, all needed to work through the program 
managers and the bureaucratic process at JAROS and ERSDAC in order to develop 
and implement their technical preferences to a degree that the significantly more 
senior Ishii and Ono did not. Whereas the U.S. ITIR team expected that it would be 
easier to work with the scientists from the national institutes and universities than with 
the instrument engineers of JAROS and the hardware makers, the realization of this 
hope came at the cost of additional layers of bureaucracy.42 The university scientists 
and the national institute scientists, the latter of whom were MITI’s “neutral parties” 
who would supposedly span the divide between user-scientists and engineer-makers, 
were all liminal state actors. They were not unambiguous decision makers in terms of 
the state’s bureaucratic delegation of authority.  
The social complexity of Japan’s project management structure and of the 
Japan ITIR team, encouraged, as we shall see, the U.S. ITIR team to ascribe moves of 
state power in the Japan team’s knowledge-making, even when state power had not 
been explicitly asserted by the Japan team. Such an ascription was made in the two 
teams’ negotiations over the specifications of the shortwave infrared radiometer. 
Despite the establishment of the joint team, these negotiations were bilateral in form 
                                                  
42 This hope was suggested in the interviews of Kahle (2005), Abrams (2001), and Palluconi 
(2001). 
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and were approached as if the two teams were negotiating a boundary object in which 
everyone’s “informational requirements” could be equally satisfied, as the U.S. team 
had approached negotiations over the thermal infrared radiometer. As in the design of 
the thermal infrared radiometer, a boundary object was not realized in the design of the 
shortwave infrared sensor. To understand why the two teams—negotiating under the 
name of a joint team—arrived at the specifications they did for the shortwave infrared 
radiometer, I trace how the social makeup of the U.S.-Japan ITIR team described 
above was implicated in the intertwining of the assertion of scientific knowledge and 
the enactment of state power.  
 
Persistence of Bilateralism: The Shortwave Infrared Radiometer, 1990-1992 
 
In November 1990, the first “ASTER team meeting” was held. JAROS had 
renamed the Intermediate Thermal Infrared Radiometer (ITIR) the Advanced 
Spaceborne Thermal Emission and Reflection radiometer (ASTER), and the joint 
U.S.-Japan team meeting was from then onward known as the “full” ASTER team 
meeting, dropping any national designation in favor of the solidarity afforded by the 
name of a shared instrument. At the beginning of the first meeting, Japan’s team leader, 
Tsu Hiroji, explained the change in the instrument’s name: the “ITIR” name 
emphasized the thermal bands, but the instrument’s name should indicate that the 
instrument had sensing bands in the visible and shortwave infrared regions as well.43 
Because the light that the instrument would sense in the visible and shortwave infrared 
region would generally be sunlight that had been reflected off the earth’s surface, 
rather than light that had been “emitted” from the earth as what is known as 
black-body radiation, the word “reflection” in the new name was supposed to indicate 
                                                  
43 Tsu (1990b: 24). 
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that the so-called “reflection bands”—that is, the visible and shortwave 
infrared—were also sensed by the instrument. Years later, Kahle said that while she 
had given her approval to this new name, she did not select it herself.44 Kudoh 
Masahiko, JAROS’s project manager for the ASTER instrument, explained in my 
interview with him that Dr. Ishii, who was a geophysicist, had actually chosen the 
name partly on the basis that “ASTER” supposedly sounded like English-language 
words for geologic minerals. Kudoh, on the other hand, said that he and the engineers 
who were working for JAROS liked the name “ASTER” because asteracea is the 
family name of the chrysanthemum, which is the seal and traditional symbol of 
Japan’s imperial throne.45 Thus, at least the name of the ASTER instrument worked as 
a boundary object, not only between the U.S. and Japan teams but also between 
Japan’s scientists and engineers.  
While everyone could agree on the instrument’s name, when it came to the 
specifications of the shortwave infrared radiometer, the technical preferences of the 
Japan and U.S. teams were not in agreement, nor were even Japan’s scientists and 
engineers initially in agreement. Figure 5.4 (on the next page) shows three alternative 
specifications for locations and widths of the bands for the shortwave infrared 
radiometer (SWIR). The band set at the top of the figure is not a band set for ASTER; 
it is the band set that was adopted for JERS-1’s shortwave infrared radiometer in the 
late 1980s.46 JERS-1’s shortwave infrared radiometer was built by Mitsubishi Electric 
Corporation, and this contractor apparently preferred for the ASTER shortwave 
 
                                                  
44 Author’s notes of Kahle’s remarks at a dinner reception for the Twenty-Fourth U.S.-Japan 
ASTER Science Team Meeting on May 21, 2003 at Nippon Seinenkan in Aoyama, Tokyo, Japan, 
and Kahle (2003a). 
45 Kudoh (2003). “Aster” means “star” in Latin, but this meaning was not mentioned as a reason 
for selecting ASTER as the name (acronym) of the instrument. 
46 Hino et al. (1991: 175). 
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Figure 5.4: SWIR Sensor Band Configurations 
 
The preliminary design review for the entire JERS-1 Optical Sensor (i.e., “JERS-1 
Ops”) was in 1987. The ITIR proposal for phase C/D, which was the development and 
execution phase, was submitted to NASA in May 1990. Both the ITIR “Baseline” and 
the ITIR “Optional” configurations for the SWIR sensor bands were presented at the 
first ASTER team meeting in November 1990. I have constructed this figure from 
sources that are noted in the text. 
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infrared sensor to refine the design that they had used for JERS-1.47 Thus, Mitsubishi, 
in consultation with Dr. Ishii, Dr. Ono, and JAROS, proposed that ASTER feature 
nearly the same spectral coverage as JERS-1, but with JERS-1 bands seven and eight 
split into two bands each, for greater spectral resolution. This band set was what 
JAROS considered to be “officially accepted” through its decision-making process, 
and it was included by Tsu in MITI’s rushed proposal to NASA. This band set, the 
“proposal” band set labeled in figure 5.4, remained in MITI’s proposals to NASA 
through the C/D proposal in May 1990, where it was noted that the bands were still 
under discussion.48  The “proposal” band set was also the band set that Kahle 
referenced in her U.S. ITIR team leader proposal to NASA in May 1990.49 
 Japan’s user community working through ERSDAC did not regard the 
“proposal” band set as satisfactory for their oil and mineral exploration goals. 
ERSDAC had contracted Sumitomo Metal Mining Company to determine what band 
locations and widths in the shortwave infrared region might be most suitable for 
discriminating and identifying minerals that might arguably indicate the presence of 
mineral deposits.50 The band centers that Sumitomo proposed, combined with the 
band width analysis of JAPEX Geoscience Institute, resulted in ERSDAC’s advocacy 
of the band set listed as “optional” in figure 5.4.51 The “optional” band set dropped 
band five from the “proposal” band set and split bands six and seven into three narrow 
bands (i.e., bands five, six, and seven in the “optional” band set).  
                                                  
47 I was not able to interview the individual who was Mitsubishi Electronic Corporation’s chief 
engineer for the ASTER shortwave infrared radiometer in 1989 and 1990. My account here of 
negotiations between engineers and users on the Japan side draws heavily upon my correspondence 
with, and the documentation of, Yamaguchi Yasushi, who was a key participant on the Japan side 
in the selection of the bands for the shortwave infrared radiometer (Yamaguchi 2002, 2005). 
48 Yamaguchi (2005) and MITI (1990:3-6). 
49 Kahle (1990c: 4). 
50 Sumitomo Metal Mining contractor report to ERSDAC, December 22, 1989, referenced in 
Yamaguchi (2005). 
51 Internal ERSDAC specification document for SWIR, January 26, 1990, referenced in 
Yamaguchi (2005). 
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What was unclear to the ERSDAC user community, however, was whether 
Mitsubishi could build such an instrument. Since it was considered inappropriate for 
the user community anchored around ERSDAC to interact directly with JAROS’s 
engineering contractors, ERSDAC needed to re-open this issue with JAROS to find 
out whether or not their preferred “optional” band set was actually feasible. Instrument 
changes could not be officially spoken for without the approval of JAROS and the 
EOS Sensor Committee. Consequently, the difference in band preferences was a 
matter that needed to be formally negotiated between, on the one side, the ERSDAC 
project manager and key members of the EOS Mission Committee (such as Mr. Tsu, 
Dr. Yamaguchi, and a Dr. Watanabe Hiroshi, who at this time worked for JAPEX 
Geoscience Institute) and on the other side, the JAROS project manager and key 
members of the EOS Sensor Committee (e.g., Dr. Fujisada and Dr. Ono).52 This was 
the institutional mechanism for arriving at a “Japan” consensus.  
In the early spring of 1990, in a meeting between the user-scientist and 
engineer-maker sides, it was decided to stay with the Mitsubishi/JAROS “proposal” 
band set until signal-to-noise estimates were available from Mitsubishi for the 
“optional” band set with the narrower bands. The narrower the widths of the bands, the 
more difficult it would be to manufacture the bandpass filters and the less the amount 
of light that reached the sensors. No one knew at this point what the “optional” 
changes meant for the sensor’s signal-to-noise ratio. Yet, signal-to-noise estimates 
were already available from Mitsubishi for the “proposal” band set, and because 
signal-to-noise estimates were required for the NASA C/D proposal, Tsu and MITI 
stuck with what they did know for use in the documentation for NASA. 53 
Nevertheless, Yamaguchi, Satō, and Tsu—who were all at that time scientists from the 
                                                  
52 Yamaguchi (2005). 
53 MITI (1990) and Yamaguchi (2005). 
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Geological Survey of Japan on the EOS Mission Committee—presented the 
“optional” band set as ASTER’s shortwave infrared radiometer’s preliminary band 
specifications in a 1990 presentation concerning the preliminary design of ASTER at a 
professional conference.54 In contrast, Fujisada and Ono—who were instrumentation 
specialists from the EOS Sensor Committee—presented the temporarily-agreed upon 
“proposal” band set at a different professional conference in 1990 as ASTER’s 
preliminary shortwave infrared band specifications. 55  The public professional 
literature at the time reflected the different preferences of the user-scientist and 
engineer-maker sides of the Japan team. 
  At the first ASTER team meeting in November 1990, the representative 
from Mitsubishi presented two band sets to the U.S. and Japan teams: a “baseline” 
band set that differed from the original “proposal” band set and the “optional” band set 
(see figure 5.4).56 The “baseline” band set was a new band set in the mix. Fujisada, 
the chair of the EOS Sensor Committee, had requested that Mitsubishi report back 
Mitsubishi’s signal-to-noise estimates for the “optional” band set that was preferred by 
ERSDAC users. At the same time, Fujisada also asked for Mitsubishi’s performance 
estimates for a band set that covered almost the same total spectral range as the 
“optional” band set and which had the same band centers, but which had wider 
individual bands. This “baseline” band set required bands to overlap. Mitsubishi’s 
performance estimates for what Fujisada rhetorically cast as the new “baseline” were 
reportedly intended to allow Fujisada the ability to isolate any difference in 
performance between the “baseline” and “optional” sets to the differences in their 
bandwidths, rather than to the spectral range or to band centers. This precise 
comparison was important for the Japan team’s deliberations and negotiations with its 
                                                  
54 Yamaguchi, Satō, and Tsu (1992:303). This paper was presented in June of 1990. 
55 Fujisada and Ono (1992:324). This paper was presented in September of 1990. 
56 Ono (1990: 5). 
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contractor. Mitsubishi preferred to design a sensor with wider bands, because it was 
less difficult and because, reportedly, Mitsubishi’s contract with JAROS was 
something closer to a fixed contract rather than a cost-plus contract. Consequently, 
Mitsubishi would bear some of the financial risk for any technological ambition on the 
part of MITI and the ASTER team.57 Still, the user community in Japan had clear 
preferences that conflicted with those of Mitsubishi, and Fujisada was working to 
convince Mitsubishi to accept them.  
In the November 1990 presentation to the ASTER team, months after 
Fujisada’s request for performance estimates, Mitsubishi still did not present the 
requested performance estimates for either the “baseline” or “optional” band sets.58 
Because these performance estimates were not yet available, and because 
“recommendations are a part of the task of the ASTER working groups” that had been 
constituted at this first ASTER team meeting, the U.S. ASTER team members did not 
express a preference for one band set over the other. The U.S. ASTER team took the 
stance that they simply did not have enough information to even start to make a 
decision.59  They planned to address the issue in the working groups once the 
performance estimates became available from Mitsubishi.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
57 Yamaguchi (2005). 
58 Ono (1990: 5). 
59 ASTER Science Team (1990: 3). 
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Japan Makes a Unilateral Selection 
 
By the second ASTER team meeting six months later in May 1991, the Japan 
team had themselves chosen between the “baseline” and “optional” band sets, and 
consequently, by the second team meeting, the leadership of the U.S. ASTER team had 
concluded that they had been left out of the decision-making loop. Fujisada and Ono, 
who were both on the EOS Sensor Committee under JAROS, had presented the 
“optional” band set as ASTER’s new specifications at a well-known professional 
society meeting in the United States the month before the second ASTER team 
meeting.60 This list of the bands was a change from what they had publicly presented 
a year earlier, which had had the “still under discussion” disclaimer attached to it. 
Their new listing, however, had no such disclaimer attached, suggesting that the 
specification was no longer under discussion. Some of the U.S. team members 
attended this professional society meeting, and given that Fujisada chaired the session 
on the ASTER instrument, it would be very surprising if the U.S. ASTER team 
leadership were not aware of the Fujisada and Ono paper.61 For that and other reasons, 
it can be concluded that the leadership of the U.S. team came to the second ASTER 
team meeting at least suspecting that the “optional” band set had been selected by the 
Japan team.62 The U.S. team had had an opportunity to think through their approach 
to the situation. 
In the opening plenary session of the second ASTER team meeting, the 
JAROS program manager for ASTER, Kudoh Masahiko, stated in his presentation of 
                                                  
60 Fujisada and Ono (1991: 247). Mitsubishi, in their presentation at the professional society 
meeting was still holding out, however, and presented both alternatives as under discussion. See, 
Akasaka, Ono, and Sakurai (1991: 269). 
61 Documents exist that imply the U.S. ASTER team was aware. See, for example, Lang (1991). 
62 Michael Abrams, for instance, in advance of the meeting, had made tentative calculations of the 
disadvantages of the “optional” band set. ASTER Science Team (1991: 27). 
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the status of the ASTER instrument that detailed feasibility studies had been 
completed and that the shortwave infrared radiometer’s “bands have been newly 
specified.”63 The Japan team had indeed chosen the “optional” band set. Kudoh’s 
presentation of this decision surprised the U.S. team, perhaps because of the 
matter-of-fact way in which he presented a decision about which they had not been, 
and were not then, consulted. The presentation provoked a rare intervention by the 
representative from NASA Headquarters who was sitting in on this meeting, rare 
because representatives from NASA Headquarters typically left it to the U.S. team 
leadership to deal with complications that were regarded as just scientific or technical 
details. Maybe the U.S. team leadership had decided in advance that it would be 
helpful for their cause if they brought in bigger guns and if NASA were seen as raising 
the first objection to the unilateral decision. When the NASA Headquarters 
representative asked why the specification change had been made, Tsu, the Japan team 
leader, replied that “these specifications were changed by Japanese scientists’ 
requirements.”64 The NASA representative retorted “NASA HQ is interested in this 
kind of specification change.”65  Discussion then broke out about having better 
communication, which might have relieved tension surrounding this sensitive topic of 
sharing design authority. Kahle commented that the U.S. team needed to work to 
achieve better communication, but the public nature of her comment—which was 
made in front of the entire ASTER team at the plenary meeting—implied that it was 
not the U.S. team alone who could make good communication happen.  
Later in the meeting, in a working group, Kahle raised again the issue of the 
unilateral change in instrument specifications, but she made her point more directly. 
According to the working group’s minutes, which in this case were taken by a staff 
                                                  
63 Kudoh (1990: 3). 
64 ASTER Science Team (1991: 14). 
65 Ibid. 
  
 
240  
person working for ERSDAC who was also likely a translator, Kahle “made a 
comment that the U.S. ASTER team would like to be informed of any consideration of 
changes to the instrument that would affect on science [sic].”66 Yokota, the MITI 
project manager for the ASTER instrument, also attended this working group meeting 
along with Kahle. His reply to Kahle’s remarks suggests how entrenched in the Japan 
team was the approach of putting technology and engineer-makers first, especially 
given that Yokota himself had repeatedly pushed for greater user involvement. Yokota 
“explained the Japanese situation that equipment accommodation would be decided 
through consultation with [the] Goddard Space Flight Center [who was integrating 
ASTER into the NASA satellite], therefore, there was some time lag to inform such 
instrumental changes to [the] U.S. ASTER team.”67 The minutes recorded that the 
“U.S. team showed understanding toward [the] Japanese situation and stressed [the] 
importance of cooperation in information exchanges between [the] two countries” 
[italics mine].68 Although it was not made clear how the changes to the bands of the 
radiometer related at all to the “accommodation” of the ASTER instrument into 
NASA’s satellite (i.e., the instrument’s integration), Yokota’s explanation reveals a 
presumption that instrument personnel will sort matters out first and then report it to 
the science team. Even if Yokota’s response is interpreted as merely a face-saving 
excuse, it still suggests that putting instrument personnel first was an appropriate 
practice. As the italicized words in the quotation suggest, the minutes also betray the 
bilateralism enacted in the meetings and the easy conflation of team, government, and 
nation. 
The Japan side did not just make a decision that came across to the U.S. team 
as uncommunicative. It was unilateral. The Japan team skirted a decision-making 
                                                  
66 ASTER Science Team (1991: 48). 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
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process that had been previously agreed upon at the first team meeting—vetting this 
specific question about the bands of the shortwave infrared radiometer through the 
joint ASTER working groups (e.g., in the Geology Working Group).69 But was not 
ASTER a Japanese instrument? Should not the Japan team have been the sovereign 
authority for determining the fundamental functional requirements of an instrument 
that the Government of Japan was funding? If those questions had been asked that way, 
in the abstract, the U.S. team leadership’s answer to both of those questions would 
have been “yes” in the abstract. But in the particular, it was a qualified “yes”—that is, 
in effect, “no, not absolutely.” According to Kahle’s proposal from a year earlier of the 
U.S. team’s tasks in the collaboration (see figure 5.2), and according to her U.S. ITIR 
team leader proposal and subsequent documentation, the U.S. team expected to 
“advise” and “help” with specifying the ASTER instrument’s functional 
requirements.70 In response, Tsu had written that he and MITI agreed with Kahle’s 
task list.71 Per the specification documents of both the Japan and U.S. teams, the 
“baseline” vs. “optional” question was undoubtedly a question that concerned a 
functional requirement.  
The shared status of the responsibility for functional requirements, however, 
was not without ambiguity—not only in practice, but also on paper. In the official 
correspondence from MITI to NASA about Kahle’s tasks as U.S. team leader, her 
tasks had been only summarized, and they had not been articulated as precisely as she 
had written them in her original task list. Providing advice on the instrument’s 
functional requirements had not been specifically enumerated in MITI’s 
                                                  
69 ASTER Science Team (1990: 3). The minutes of the first ASTER team meeting had been 
written and compiled by the U.S. ASTER team, since the meeting was held at JPL. Japan team 
leader Tsu was on the distribution list of the minutes. The location and secretarial duties of the 
team meetings alternated between the United States and Japan. 
70 Kahle (1990c); Kahle (1992: 19). 
71 Tsu (1990a: 2). 
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correspondence with NASA.72 Maybe the two teams had thought there was agreement 
when there was not. Or, put differently, maybe they had agreed on the broad principles, 
but the particulars of the situation were casting their agreement of broad principles as 
something rather narrow in terms of its practical applicability. 
Clear agreement or not, NASA had charged the U.S. team with improving 
Japan’s design basically as the U.S. team saw fit, provided that the improvements 
could be said to better support the broad goals of EOS. To carry out their charge and to 
fulfill their contracts, they needed to become part of the decision-making process. 
Being cut out of the decision-making loop could not become the norm if they were to 
succeed in “influencing the Japanese design.” When I asked Kahle years later in an 
interview how the U.S. team fostered international collaboration with respect to an 
instrument that the Government of Japan was funding and that Japanese contractors 
were building, she replied “we [the U.S. team] just assumed [collaboration] and did 
it.”73 In keeping with that assertive and pragmatic outlook, in this instance the U.S. 
team did not refer back to the original two-page letter that MITI had sent NASA, 
which had invited the participation of the U.S. team, in order to try to sort out these 
matters of decision-making and authority in the terms of that official letter. Nor did 
they wait for some U.S.-Japan memorandum of understanding to guide them, a 
document that was not finalized until over four years later and which would, as it 
turned out, largely codify the terms of four years of collaboration.74 What the U.S. 
team did was simply interrogate specific concerns in the meetings before them.  
For the U.S. and Japan teams, U.S.-Japan collaboration was less something 
that was legislated or dictated from “higher-ups” than it was something that they 
                                                  
72 Obara (1990). The description of roles and responsibilities provided in JAROS’s Nine Plans 
(MITI 1991: 2-8 – 2-10) neither explicitly included nor excluded the U.S. Team from discussions 
concerning the ASTER’s functional requirements. 
73 Kahle (2005). 
74 NASA and MITI (1996). 
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needed to forge in their practices when challenges arose. Such a challenge was 
designing the band specifications for the shortwave infrared radiometer. For the U.S. 
team, if they were going to stake out a claim to “have a say,” then they could not 
neglect their responsibility to understand the design of the shortwave infrared 
radiometer. This was not a question of competing a priori preferences. At the first 
meeting, the U.S. team did not even know enough about the performance estimates of 
the design alternatives to form any firm preferences. On the other hand, the Japan team 
had formed their own preferences and had come to their own technical conclusions 
regarding an issue that was significant to them (i.e., the remote sensing of minerals), 
and their preferences were formed in a technical area in which they had expertise (i.e., 
shortwave infrared remote sensing). These kinds of discussions, such as the “baseline” 
vs. “optional” debate, while potentially of first order importance to the achievement of 
each team’s goals, were not so much foreseen in advance of their collaboration as 
emergent through the process of collaboration and technological development. The 
socio-political dynamic was certainly not one of epistemic consensus, and nor was it 
one of “trials of strength” or bargaining. It was technoscientific diplomacy in which 
knowledge was being asserted, debated, and negotiated. 
 
Negotiations in the Geology Working Group 
 
The technical issue that subsequently arose in the Geology Working Group 
over the next few ASTER team meetings was the trade-off in the “baseline” and 
“optional” designs between the narrowness of the bandwidths for bands five, six, and 
seven and the effective signal-to-noise ratios for each of these bands. 75  The 
                                                  
75 In their debates, the signal-to-noise ratio specification was usually expressed in terms of noise 
equivalent differential reflectance (i.e., NE∆ρ). 
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signal-to-noise ratios of these bands would also be affected by the diameter of the 
optics for the shortwave infrared radiometer, which was another issue that was under 
contention at this time. Fujisada’s earlier introduction of the “baseline” band set into 
the planning discussions, which had been for the purpose of obtaining more 
information to use in the EOS Sensor Committee’s and JAROS’s negotiations with 
Mitsubishi, implied to the U.S. team that the baseline band set was actually a viable 
alternative for the Japan team (it had, after all, been named “baseline”), even while 
from the standpoint of the ERSDAC user community the baseline band set was not a 
viable alternative and did not merit consideration. For the ERSDAC user community, 
the baseline alternative was only supposed to be a bureaucratic device through which 
more information could be gathered from Mitsubishi about a “baseline” design, so that 
the EOS Sensor Committee and JAROS might improve their bargaining position 
vis-à-vis Mitsubishi. Mitsubishi, however, preferred the baseline design, since it was 
easier to manufacture and carried less risk on their part.  
Then, in the middle of this negotiation within the Japan team, the U.S. 
team—likely unaware of the motivations behind the existence of the baseline band 
set—expressed a preference for the baseline alternative because its wider bands would 
ensure adequate signal-to-noise ratios, a specification that Michael Abrams, Simon 
Hook, and Harold Lang (all from JPL) and Lawrence Rowan (from the U.S. 
Geological Survey) had come to regard as critically important for discriminating 
minerals, based upon their experience with the Airborne Visible/Infrared Imaging 
Spectrometer (i.e., the AVIRIS instrument). These U.S. members of the Geology 
Working Group were not worried that band six in the baseline set overlapped with 
bands five and seven, as were the Japan members of the Geology Working Group, 
because the U.S. scientists said that they could use a mathematical technique to 
effectively separate (i.e., deconvolve) the two bands. In their reasoning, concern about 
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spectral separation—which was the concern emphasized by Yamaguchi Yasushi of the 
Geological Survey of Japan and Watanabe Hiroshi of the JAPEX Geoscience 
Institute—was moot if there were not an adequate signal-to-noise ratio.  
This U.S.-Japan debate was a scientific debate about means, not ends. In the 
debate, there was not any competition or exclusivity between the goals of the U.S. and 
Japan teams. Both teams acknowledged and addressed each other’s goals in their 
bilateral debate (it was a bilateral debate in the sense that there were two sides, the U.S. 
side and the Japan side; it was not a debate among just team members). Both teams 
were out to design a shortwave infrared radiometer that worked as what scholars in 
Science and Technology Studies would call a boundary object.76  
From the debate’s beginning, when the U.S. team concluded by the second 
ASTER meeting that they had been cut out of the decision-making loop, this technical 
issue was inherently intertwined with the political issue of the scope of the U.S. team’s 
role and authority in the design of an instrument sponsored by the Government of 
Japan. The politics of how the technical specification would be decided was just as 
important to the ASTER collaboration as the technical rationale of the decision. To 
understand why the ASTER team negotiated the particular design specification that 
they eventually did for the shortwave infrared radiometer’s band set, and more 
specifically to understand why the U.S. team stopped pushing the issue when they did, 
we need to understand how scientific knowledge and state power were taken into 
account by the ASTER team, and in particular, how the U.S. team ascribed the 
exercise of state power to the Japan team, even if that power was not explicitly 
asserted.  
                                                  
76 ASTER Science Team (1991: 27); ASTER Science Team (1992b: 20, 29, and 64); Yamaguchi 
(2002); Yamaguchi (2005); Abrams (2001); and Abrams (2005). 
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The issue under debate—the design of a sensor’s band set—was similar to 
what the two teams had negotiated over two-years earlier in the case of the thermal 
infrared radiometer. Like in that case, in the negotiation over the shortwave infrared 
radiometer, scientific knowledge and state power were synthesized through 
technoscientific diplomacy by liminal state actors. Moreover, these liminal state 
actors—this collection of scientists—carried with them the practices, experiences, and 
concerns of two different communities of remote sensing, just as they had when they 
negotiated the thermal infrared radiometer’s specifications.  
Yet, in the case of the shortwave infrared radiometer, the socio-political 
context of the two teams’ negotiations had changed significantly. The performances of 
these liminal state actors were more circumscribed by the constitution and workings of 
the ASTER team, especially the social makeup of the Japan team, with its 
scientist-user/engineer-maker institutional division of responsibility and labor. The 
“team” was a complex collection of scientists and engineers who worked for, 
overlapped with, and otherwise intersected the developmental institutions of Japan’s 
space industry (figure 5.3). This team extended beyond the forum of the Geology 
Working Group where the negotiations about the radiometer’s specifications took 
place, and the members of the Geology Working Group took into account the ASTER 
team’s social makeup, workings, and collaborative arrangements. The negotiations 
differed from those concerning the thermal infrared radiometer in that NASA and its 
advisory panels had already expressed to Japan and the ASTER team their strong 
commitment toward launching the ASTER instrument. Bucking the U.S. team’s 
preferences on a matter that could be written off as a scientific disagreement about 
means was much less likely to throw into jeopardy ASTER’s placement on NASA’s 
satellite than was the debate over whether or not the thermal infrared radiometer 
would satisfy what Kahle was able to label as the goals of EOS. Kahle and her 
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colleagues were also now more invested in the ITIR/ASTER instrument and the 
ASTER team arrangement. Hence, not only were the scientists of the Geology 
Working Group positioned by their bureaucracies as liminal state actors, as Kahle and 
Ishii were in their negotiations over the thermal infrared radiometer, but their own 
collaborative arrangements circumscribed what enactments were feasible in their 
technoscientific diplomacy. Consequently, the dynamics and outcome of the two 
teams’ negotiation over the shortwave infrared radiometer’s bands were different than 
those of the negotiation over the thermal infrared radiometer’s bands, even if the two 
negotiations were bilateral in their form. 
 
State Power and Scientific Acquiescence 
 
The ASTER team’s ultimate decision about the band set of the shortwave 
infrared radiometer was the upshot of three socio-political conclusions drawn by the 
U.S. team members. Each of these conclusions implicated scientific knowledge and 
state power and was the consequence of enactments by liminal state actors which were 
circumscribed by the ASTER collaboration, particularly the social makeup and 
workings of the Japan team.  
First, the social makeup and workings of the Japan team led the U.S. team to 
conclude again and again that the Japan team, and especially JAROS and its 
contractors, did not want to consult the U.S. team members in the instrument design 
process. Japan’s unilateral decision initially set the stage for this conclusion. When 
questioned by the NASA representative at the second ASTER team meeting, JAROS 
Program Manager Kudoh and the Japan Team Leader Tsu responded firmly that the 
specifications of the shortwave infrared radiometer had been determined by the Japan 
team. Kudoh’s presentation did not offer those specifications as a proposal or tentative 
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plan to be discussed further. They had been formally approved by the EOS Sensor 
Committee and the EOS Mission Committee.  
Nevertheless, U.S. team members did not let that decision stand without 
question. In order to understand the general specifications and performance estimates 
of the radiometer, U.S. team members specifically and repeatedly requested detailed 
technical information about the assumptions and calculations that justified the 
numbers that were given to them in presentations by Japanese instrumentation 
scientists and hardware contractors.77 In particular, performance estimates of the 
signal-to-noise ratios of the bands were subject in the second and third biannual 
ASTER team meetings to robust and persistent questioning by U.S. team members, 
and these questions called for further information and documentation.78 Judging from 
the many calls for “cooperation” in documents at the time, as well as from 
participants’ recollections, the U.S. team members thought that answers to their 
questions were given only after much pressing.79 Satisfying answers were particularly 
difficult to give and receive since it was JAROS’s policy that U.S. team members were 
not allowed to communicate personally with JAROS’s contractors, with the exception 
of the question-and-answer period after the contractors gave presentations at ASTER 
team meetings. Many of Japan’s scientists operated under similar restrictions. At this 
point in the collaboration, all requests for technical information had to be handled by a 
member of the Japan team who would work the issue across the Japan team’s 
institutional divide between the scientist-users and engineer-makers.80  
                                                  
77 Kieffer (1990). 
78 ASTER Science Team (1991: 18, 27, 29, 48, 50); ASTER Science Team (1992b: 9, 20); and 
Yamaguchi (1992a: 2).  
79 For conspicuous calls for international cooperation, see ASTER Science Team (1991: 14, 48) 
and ASTER Science Team (1992b: 16). See also Abrams (2001), Palluconi (2001), and Biggar 
(2001). 
80 Biggar (2001), Thome (2001), Iwasaki (2002), and Yamaguchi (2002). 
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This activity, which can be described as “getting behind the power point 
slides,” is often present even in the least skeptical of scientific meetings and was in 
that sense not unusual. It was, however, much more socially marked and 
uncomfortable in the “thesis defense” type environment in which U.S. team members, 
as a matter of course, regularly asked Japan team members to defend instrument 
design decisions that the Japan team members had provisionally made without the 
consultation of U.S. team members, decisions with which the Japan team members 
were content and which they no longer questioned themselves.81 Consequently, the 
U.S. team members generally did most of the questioning at the meetings. The 
repeated nature of these requests for information from U.S. team members, the 
frequent tardiness of the responses (which were almost always provided not at the 
meeting itself but weeks or months later), and the instability of the numbers that were 
eventually shared, all wore on the U.S. team. 
The following contract report to NASA, written on behalf of a U.S. team 
member, suggests the degree of the U.S. team’s exasperation in their checking and 
interrogation of the Japan team’s calculations, calculations that were eventually 
provided after months of requests: 
 
                                                  
81 Although his comments were not specifically about the negotiations concerning the shortwave 
infrared radiometer, Frank Palluconi, in my interview of him, alluded to how the U.S. team 
members were asking the Japan team and its contractors to demonstrate to the U.S. team that 
Japan’s measurements and calculations were valid: 
“Um, a lot of the discussion [concerning the instrument design] was about how you 
validate that you have met the performance in the specification. A good example of that, 
and a difficult measurement, is what is the out-of-band response. All of the radiometric 
and spectral characteristics have questions about how do you really measure them in the 
laboratory in a way that will completely satisfy the requirements or that will demonstrate 
that you have satisfied the requirements. The actual changes in the instrument [from U.S. 
team’s involvement] I think, um, were important, but they were not by any means 
wholesale. I think more of the discussion focused on issues that relate to the quality of 
the instrument and how you knew along the way that you were getting the quality built 
into the instrument that you wanted. So the discussions were pretty wide ranging, and I 
think that it was a different process for both the U.S. side and the Japanese side . . .” 
(Palluconi 2001). 
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. . . [ASTER team member] Slater recalculated the [signal-to-noise ratios of 
the shortwave infrared radiometer] for all the gains presented by Dr. Fujisada 
and MELCO [Mitsubishi Electric Corporation] and for the latest values of 
array spectral quantum efficiencies, QEs, and system spectral transmittances. 
(Slater points out that MELCO have presented at least five sets of QEs in the 
last six months and therefore that the values used here are not likely to be 
those for the flight system. He anticipates that, for this and for several other 
reasons, his calculated SNRs may only be within +/- 20% of those of the 
flight system, although the relative changes of SNR with gain will be more 
precise, perhaps within +/- 5%).82 (emphasis mine) 
 
The parenthetical reference suggests that the patience of Dr. Philip Slater was wearing 
thin. Information gathering and the (re)checking of calculations were not fun work.83 
Michael Abrams, while not referring specifically to his experience in the deliberations 
over the shortwave infrared radiometer’s bands in the Geology Working Group, was 
left with the general impression that during the negotiations over the design of the 
instrument, the instrumentation specialists and contractors “didn’t want to hear from 
us, to be honest. They didn’t want us there, I don’t think. . . . They didn’t want to be 
bothered by these scientists telling them that they were wrong.”84 During the first few 
years of their collaboration, the U.S. team found it awkward and tiresome to 
collaborate with the Japan team on issues concerning instrument design, including the 
specifications for the shortwave infrared radiometer, largely owing to the institutional 
distance between Japan’s engineer-makers and the user-scientists. The U.S. team, 
however, judged this difficulty in collaboration to stem from a deep reluctance to 
consult with the U.S. team about the fundamental requirements of the shortwave 
infrared radiometer.     
 The ASTER team’s decision about the band set of the shortwave infrared 
radiometer was a consequence of a second socio-political conclusion drawn by the U.S. 
                                                  
82 Slater and Thome (1992: 2). 
83 An interview with the author of this contract report mentioned that Slater was often exasperated 
with the process of collaborating with the Japan team (Thome 2001). See also ASTER Science 
Team (1992a: 40). 
84 Abrams (2001). 
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team members concerning their collaboration: the U.S. and Japan team members who 
were negotiating this issue in the Geology Working Group were not seeing eye-to-eye 
and were not going to see eye-to-eye. Although the two sides were trying to create a 
boundary object that satisfied each other’s “informational requirements,” the two 
teams’ scientific assessment of what specifications would satisfy those informational 
requirements were in disagreement. Their disagreement was sustained in part by the 
different methods the U.S. and Japan team members used to judge the adequacy of the 
shortwave infrared radiometer’s signal-to-noise ratios. These different methods 
reflected differences in the practices and experiences of the two communities of 
geologic remote sensing from which the two states’ teams were composed.  
The adequacy of the shortwave infrared radiometer’s signal-to-noise ratios 
came into question at the second ASTER team meeting, when a U.S. team member 
asked a representative from Mitsubishi about a key assumption that went into 
Mitsubishi’s calculation of the estimates for the sensor’s signal-to-noise ratios. U.S. 
Deputy Team Leader Frank Palluconi asked Mitsubishi what percentage of sunlight 
Mitsubishi had assumed would be reflected from the earth (i.e., the surface’s 
reflectance). Mitsubishi’s reply was considered to be unrealistically optimistic for the 
surfaces that the majority of users would want to target, unrealistically optimistic not 
only in the judgment of the U.S. team members but in the judgment of Japan team 
members as well (Mitsubishi had assumed a surface reflectance of seventy percent).85  
Later in the ASTER team meeting—in the Geology Working Group the next 
day—Michael Abrams presented signal-to-noise calculations for the sensor’s imagery 
based upon a surface reflectance of almost one third of what Mitsubishi had assumed 
                                                  
85 The Mitsubishi presenter claimed that the EOS Sensor Committee of JAROS had given them 
the assumption. That the EOS Sensor Committee had passed on this inappropriate assumption was 
likely taken by the U.S. science team as yet another reason to be probing throughout the instrument 
design process (ASTER Science Team 1991: 16).  
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(Abrams used a surface reflectance of twenty-five percent). With that new assumption, 
the signal-to-noise estimates for even the baseline alternative, the one with the wider 
bands, promised just borderline performance, he argued.86 The Geology Working 
Group resolved that “both Japanese and U.S. sides” would present “more realistic” 
calculations of signal-to-noise estimates at the next meeting. The members of the 
Geology Working Group who were from the Japan team emphasized, however, that 
the optional alternative for the sensor’s band set was already “officially formally 
accepted in the Japanese committees based on the study work during the past one 
year” (the double strikethrough is in the hand-written draft of the minutes, and the 
change presumably cast the Japan team’s decision as slightly less unilateral and 
imposing).87  
Despite Mitsubishi’s use of what the Japan team recognized as a dramatically 
unrealistic assumption for estimating the shortwave infrared radiometer’s performance, 
Yamaguchi and Watanabe in the Geology Working Group stood firm on their team’s 
preference for the narrow band set specification (i.e., the optional alternative). Given 
their firm preference, either less-than-satisfactory performance would need to be 
accepted, or the signal-to-noise ratios of the sensor would need to be improved in 
ways that did not involve compromising on the narrow band set. The preference of the 
ERSDAC community had already passed through the Japan consensus process that 
included the EOS Mission Committee and the EOS Sensor Committee, and their 
preference was not going to budge, Yamaguchi and Watanabe asserted. These liminal 
state actors from the Japan team cast themselves as institutionally constrained. In this 
particular case, that constraint was fine with them, because it bolstered the position of 
their own scientific assessments. Unlike in the case of the negotiations over the 
                                                  
86 Ibid. 
87 Abrams and Yamaguchi (1991). 
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number of bands in the thermal infrared radiometer, in which Kahle negotiated with 
Ishii and JAROS, Japan had its own geologic remote-sensing scientists at the table in 
this debate. If the U.S. team was going to have any chance at influencing this design 
specification, they would need to scientifically demonstrate that the specification 
would result in patently unacceptable instrument performance. Assertions of expertise 
and experience were not enough. 
 As a result of the U.S. team’s outing of Mitsubishi’s poor design assumption, 
JAROS pushed Mitsubishi to design a better sensor, a sensor that would at least meet 
the signal-to-noise ratio requirements that Mitsubishi had originally stated that they 
could meet before their poor design assumption had been exposed. Mitsubishi did 
come back with a better design, one that took advantage of the flexibility and 
willingness of NASA’s satellite engineers to open up more space and cooling 
resources on the satellite itself in order to improve the instrument. At the third ASTER 
team meeting in January 1992, JAROS’s ASTER Project Manager described 
Mitsubishi’s shortwave infrared sensor as having “remarkably improve[d] 
signal-to-noise ratio[s].”88 The diameter of the aperture of the sensor had been 
increased from 170 millimeters to 190 millimeters (to focus more light through the 
bands onto the actual detectors). The entire sensor had been placed horizontally on the 
satellite instead of vertically, to make use of a cold plate that NASA would provide on 
the satellite to stabilize the temperature of the sensor. Furthermore, the design of the 
coating for the bandpass filters had been improved (to allow more light to pass onto 
the detectors).89 JAROS and Mitsubishi had not informed either the U.S. team or the 
user-scientists on the Japan team of the new performance estimates of this redesigned 
sensor before they announced the changes at the beginning of this third ASTER team 
                                                  
88 ASTER Science Team (1992b: 73) and Kudoh and Koyama (1992: 6). 
89 ASTER Science Team (1992b: 9) and Michioka (1992: 2). 
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meeting. Consequently, the Geology Working Group at this meeting had little choice 
but to proceed to deliberate about whether or not the signal-to-noise ratios of this new 
design were satisfactory, using their own estimates of the new design’s performance 
instead of Mitsubishi’s estimates.90 
Both the U.S. and Japan teams—that is, “both sides,” in the words of the 
working group minutes—presented more realistic calculations of the shortwave 
infrared radiometer’s performance, as they had said they would do at the last team 
meeting, but they presented different calculations. To be clear, they did not present 
different numbers for the same calculation; they presented different calculations. The 
two teams used different methods for assessing the adequacy of the shortwave infrared 
radiometer with the narrow band set (i.e., the optional alternative). Michael Abrams 
and Lawrence Rowan from the U.S. team showed a comfort with instrument design 
and used simulations of the signal-to-noise ratios for the sensor to argue for an 
increase of the sensor’s aperture from what had been 170 millimeters to 200 
millimeters (they had just learned at this meeting about Mitsubishi’s new 190 
millimeter design).91 As was the case with the U.S. team’s argumentation from the 
previous meeting, their calculations of signal-to-noise ratios assumed that everyone 
could recognize and agree upon sufficient signal-to-noise ratio numbers when they 
saw them. What the U.S. team members questioned was if the sensor would have the 
signal-to-noise ratio numbers that they desired. Thus, they did not present an 
assessment at this meeting of whether or not the numbers that they wanted were 
themselves adequate, or too demanding, or too loose. They thought that their preferred 
signal-to-noise ratio numbers would achieve everyone’s measurement goals. The U.S. 
team members simply asserted that their preference for signal-to-noise ratios was 
                                                  
90 ASTER Science Team (1992b: 20). 
91 Rowan (1992: 6). They also argued for a double gain option, which I will not detail.  
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based upon their expertise and prior experience as geologic remote-sensing 
researchers.   
In contrast, Yamaguchi’s and Watanabe’s calculations took the tack of arguing 
that the narrow band set was fine for the task of spectrally discriminating the minerals 
that were of most interest to the ERSDAC user community (emphasizing spectral 
discrimination over signal-to-noise ratios, as the Japan team members of the Geology 
Working Group also did at the previous meeting).92 The presumption of their method 
was that if the sensor were up to that empirical task, then the sensor would succeed 
elsewhere. Neither the assessment method of the U.S. team nor that of the Japan team 
was explicitly argued to be more flawed than the other in its assumptions. The two 
methods for assessing the adequacy of the narrow band set simply did not directly 
compete with each other. They were not mutually exclusive.93 Michael Abrams was 
persuaded that maybe the baseline alternative’s wide bands—which were 70 
nanometer bands for bands five, six, and seven—were not as critical, given the 
sensor’s new 190 millimeter aperture and the other design improvements that 
Mitsubishi had announced. He still, however, was not convinced that the optional 
alternative’s narrow bands—which were 40 nanometer bands for bands five and six 
and a 50 nanometer band for band seven—would make a better sensor. For Abrams, 
without robust signal-to-noise ratios, the Japan team members’ concerns about spectral 
separation were moot. He said he would study the advantages and disadvantages of 50 
nanometer bands for bands five and six. This was a compromise position between the 
optional alternative’s 40 nanometers and the baseline alternative’s 70 nanometers.94  
                                                  
92 Yamaguchi (1992a) and Watanabe (1992). 
93 I am not arguing that these methods were incommensurable. They were, in fact, interdependent 
and could be technically reconciled in theory. But they were not technically reconciled at this 
meeting. 
94 ASTER Science Team (1992b: 20). 
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Pressed by the U.S. team members, the Geology Working Group at this 
January 1992 ASTER team meeting recommended to the EOS Sensor Committee that 
a 200 millimeter aperture was needed, in order to distinguish minerals with low 
reflectance (e.g., an effective surface reflectance of twenty percent, taking into 
consideration variations in slope and vegetation of the earth’s surface, etc.).95 The two 
teams left the Geology Working Group with the “action item” to study again the 
shortwave infrared radiometer’s signal-to-noise ratios, but this time using Mitsubishi’s 
performance estimates of the new design, once Mitsubishi passed them along to the 
working group members through JAROS and the EOS Sensor Committee.96 JAROS 
and the EOS Sensor Committee set a March 1992 deadline—less than two months 
away—for any recommended design changes. This deadline, they stated, would allow 
the fabrication of the engineering model of the instrument to begin with the start of the 
new Japanese fiscal year in April.97  
After the U.S. team had recovered from being cut out of the loop of the 
radiometer design process a year earlier, after they had ferreted out Mitsubishi’s 
inappropriate surface reflectance assumption, and after they had grounds for claiming 
some success in bringing about design improvements, the U.S. team decided that 
enough was enough. They were done with this issue. Even if JAROS and Mitsubishi 
were not forthcoming with a 200 millimeter aperture, which they were not, the U.S. 
team decided that it was time to move on. Mike Abrams decided to stop debating and 
not to continue pressing for bands that were wider than those in the optional band set, 
the band set which had been preferred by the ERSDAC user community from the very 
beginning. Although Yamaguchi came to the conclusion that he had successfully 
persuaded Abrams of the merits of the narrow band set, Abrams in fact remained 
                                                  
95 ASTER Science Team (1992b: 29). 
96 Yamaguchi (1992a: 2). 
97 Fujisada (1992: 9) and ASTER Science Team ( 1992b: 29). 
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convinced that the wider bands, along with the use of a common mathematical 
technique to distinguish spectral information in overlapping bands (i.e., 
deconvolution), would have promised better results—perhaps even improvements of a 
few percentage points, which for some studies can be of real importance.98 The U.S. 
team, and more specifically Michael Abrams, determined that the representatives of 
the two teams in the Geology Working Group were just not going to see eye-to-eye on 
this issue.99 The two teams were approaching the question using different methods 
that reflected the different practices and experiences of each team’s distinct 
community of geologic remote sensing. Still, one might wonder, could not the 
compromise position of 50 nanometer bands have been further explored? Might the 
shortwave infrared radiometer have become a boundary object after all? 
These two questions bring us to the U.S. team’s third socio-political 
conclusion. The instrument design process to date and the social makeup of the Japan 
team suggested to the U.S. team that even if they were able to persuade the members 
of the Japan team on the Geology Working Group of the merits of the U.S.’s 
preference for wider bands, changes to the band set of the shortwave infrared 
radiometer were quite unlikely because the Japan team and its bureaucratic 
institutions—that is, what the U.S. team called simply “Japan”—could not have been 
pushed any further, especially in such a short time.100 The JAROS Program Manager, 
Kudoh, and the EOS Mission Committee Chair and Japan Team Leader, Tsu, appeared 
to give no ground on this issue at the second ASTER team meeting, nor was a 
                                                  
98 Yamaguchi (2005) and Abrams (2005). Looking back on this debate with the hindsight of 2005, 
an uncharacterized phenomenon unexpectedly plagued the shortwave infrared radiometer, and this 
phenomenon overwhelmed the differences of a few percentage points which were at issue here. 
This phenomenon was “cross-talk.”  
99 Abrams (2003) and Abrams (2005). 
100 As an aside, power can be expressed in classical physics as the amount of force used to push a 
mass a given distance in a given amount of time. In terms of this physical understanding of the 
concept of power, the U.S. team did not think that they had the power to push Japan.  
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compromise position suggested at the third ASTER team meeting by Yamaguchi and 
Watanabe, who were user-scientists no less. The latter two scientists had ensured that 
the “official formal” decision of Japan’s committees was noted in the minutes and 
reported to the ASTER team as a whole at the closing plenary session of the third team 
meeting. Maybe it was really true, as these enactments conveyed and as was 
commonly said, that once Japan’s bureaucratic decision-making process arrived at a 
consensus decision, a decision that spoke for Japan as a state, that that decision was 
nearly impossible to change.101 True or not, despite the lack of an explicit assertion of 
state power on the part of the Japan team to oppose the U.S. team’s preferences—an 
action that the scientific disagreement in the Geology Working Group had rendered 
unnecessary—the U.S. team ascribed to the Japan team the power of a stubborn 
Japanese state (and, along with that ascription, a corresponding lack of power on the 
part of the U.S. team to do anything about it). The will of the Japan team was accepted 
as embedded in bureaucratic and committee-based decision-making and as 
advantageously strengthened by an unwieldy institutional divide between 
scientist-users and engineer-makers.102 The preferences of ERSDAC’s users became 
the Japan position, and that position was not going to budge. The enactments on the 
part of the Japan team members, in combination with the Japan team’s social makeup, 
provided the U.S. team with a compelling rationale for that ascription, whether it was 
true or not.    
Once this socio-political interpretation of Japan’s power to resist change was 
accepted, more pragmatic reasons were nails in the coffin of further debate. The EOS 
Sensor Committee and Mitsubishi had already managed one set of design 
                                                  
101 For example, the supposed importance of, and stubbornness of, consensus decision-making in 
Japan was described in a “survival guide” for negotiating with the “Japanese” which was pulled 
together for the use of the U.S. team (Avellar 1993).  
102 In my interview with her, Kahle emphasized this divide as a consideration in how much the 
U.S. team could push Japan to improve the shortwave infrared radiometer (2005).  
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improvements for the sensor, and given the pending deadline, there was not enough 
time to build a strong consensus among all of Japan’s user-scientists to push for more 
design improvements, which would then need to make their way across the 
user-scientist/engineer-maker divide.103 Furthermore, from the perspective of the U.S. 
team, many other issues about the ASTER instrument still needed to be assessed and 
negotiated, requiring the time and energy of the U.S. team, and more specifically, the 
U.S. members of the Geology Working Group.104 And then there was the final nail of 
closure: it was, in the end, “Japan’s” instrument, as was said.105 When U.S. team 
members came to talk about ASTER as “Japan’s” instrument, or as “their” instrument, 
as some did when recalling negotiations over the ASTER instrument’s design, it 
indicated that U.S. team members had acquiesced to something and that that 
something did not meet their satisfaction. The boundary object ideal proved again to 
be elusive, as it had in the case of the thermal infrared radiometer, even if a boundary 
object strategy had been a sensible strategy to pursue. 
The U.S. team’s first socio-political conclusion was that JAROS and the 
contractors did not want the advice of the U.S. team. Their second socio-political 
conclusion was that the members of the Geology Working Group were not seeing 
eye-to-eye and were not going to see eye-to-eye. The U.S. team members then drew a 
third socio-political conclusion that closed the debate and settled the ASTER team’s 
decision about the band set of the shortwave infrared radiometer: the Japan team and 
its bureaucratic institutions—the complex that U.S. team members referred to as 
                                                  
103 Yamaguchi Yasushi, in correspondence with me, has suggested that design changes to the 
shortwave infrared radiometer were still possible to implement at this point, provided that the 
changes were compelling (Yamaguchi 2005). I think Yamaguchi is optimistic in his assessment. In 
any case, no design changes were found to be compelling, and that is what is of significance. 
104 Abrams (2005). Other issues in contention during this time that were judged to be of more 
significance, post Mitsubishi’s design changes, include instrument calibration, the approval of 
common data products, and basic scenarios for instrument operations (ASTER Science Team 
1992a, 1992b). 
105 Abrams (2003). 
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“Japan”—could not be moved, and the U.S. team could not do anything about it, since 
the ASTER instrument was, in the end, “their” instrument. If the U.S. team escalated 
the issue to the level of NASA and MITI, which was the ASTER team’s equivalent of 
escalating things to a trade war, that would have made the issue a “political matter,” 
and it would have been largely out of the control of their technoscientific diplomacy. 
The “political matter” would have been resolved through unscientific means, and the 
U.S. team had no reason to anticipate that the resolution would be resolved in their 
favor. The cost and risks of escalation were much too high, they judged. The U.S. team 
leader, Dr. Kahle, never seriously considered it. For her, the issue was up to the 
Geology Working Group to sort out scientifically based upon their expertise.106 
Escalation would have risked placing the integrity of the ASTER team and its 
cooperative spirit in jeopardy. The U.S. team had at least ten more years of 
collaboration to work out with the Japan team if the ASTER instrument was going to 
be a success.107 
As was the case with the design specifications for the thermal infrared 
radiometer, the specifications for the bands of the shortwave infrared radiometer were 
pragmatic compromises that were negotiated through the technoscientific diplomacy 
of liminal state actors. The American and Japanese scientists, in their two years of 
negotiations over the shortwave infrared radiometer as a boundary object, consistently 
enacted bilateralism, with a U.S. side versus a Japan side, despite the establishment of 
the joint ASTER team which might imply (mistakenly) transnational community. 
Bilateralism was practiced within the joint team. Yet, the enactments of this 
                                                  
106 Kahle (2005). The chair of the EOS Sensor Committee, Fujisada, stated as well at the third 
ASTER team meeting that the issue first needed to be worked out at the Geology Working Group. 
Fujisada (1992: 9). 
107 The importance of long-term relationships and of looking to the future was emphasized in a 
general way in my interviews with Fujisada (2003), Kahle (2003a), Palluconi (2001), Pniel (2001), 
and Yamaguchi (2002).  
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bilateralism by the U.S. and Japan sides in the Geology Working Group were 
circumscribed by the techno-political commitments that had brought them together in 
the first place and by the collaborative arrangements of the ASTER team beyond the 
Geology Working Group. The social makeup and workings of the Japan team, in 
particular, led U.S. members of the Geology Working Group to the above three 
socio-political conclusions, conclusions that implicated both scientific knowledge and 
state power. Those conclusions, taken together, ascribed a power to the Japanese state 
that could not be advantageously countered along lines of interdependency by the U.S. 
team, as the leadership of the U.S. team had done in the case of the thermal infrared 
radiometer. As a result, the U.S. team’s conclusions led to the U.S. team’s scientific 
acquiescence. The technical and political cost of their acceptance of the narrow band 
set had been moderated, however, by Mitsubishi’s re-design of the shortwave infrared 
radiometer after the U.S. team had ferreted out the flawed design assumption. 
 
Transcendence of Bilateralism: 
The ASTER Instrument’s Operational Capabilities, 1991-1993 
  
 At the fourth joint ASTER team meeting in June 1992, the Geology Working 
Group as its first order of business officially approved the “optional” band set as the 
specification for ASTER’s shortwave infrared radiometer. 108  Many other issues 
concerning the design of the ASTER remote-sensing system remained to be settled in 
the Geology Working Group as well as in the seven other working groups of the joint 
team. Some of these outstanding issues still directly involved the design of the ASTER 
instrument. Most concerned the design and development of the ASTER ground data 
and information system, the calibration of the ASTER instrument, the governance of 
                                                  
108 Yamaguchi (1992b). 
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the operations of the entire ASTER remote-sensing system, and the validation of the 
data that would be produced by the ASTER remote-sensing system. Because many of 
the team’s design tasks were entangled with each other, a challenge of designing the 
ASTER remote-sensing system was often that of focusing a joint group on a defined 
task long enough to achieve closure on some issue, even if that achievement was 
incomplete. Other tasks that were intertwined with any given achievement often 
threatened to destabilize an achievement by redefining its assumptions and terms. 
Specifying the operational requirements for the hardware of the ASTER instrument 
presented just such a challenge. 
 While the U.S. and Japan teams initially approached this challenge in ways 
that were similar to their approach to the design of the band and signal-to-noise ratios 
for the thermal and shortwave infrared radiometers, the dynamics of the two teams’ 
technoscientific diplomacy over the ASTER’s instrument’s operational specifications 
quickly became strikingly different. For both the negotiations over the thermal infrared 
radiometer and the shortwave infrared radiometer, the two teams enacted bilateralism, 
even despite—in the case of the shortwave infrared radiometer—the establishment of 
a formal institutional arrangement for the international ASTER team which might 
imply transnational community. In negotiating the operational requirements of the 
hardware for the ASTER instrument, although the two teams did not abandon their 
boundary object strategy, they broke out of their bilateral diplomacy and began mixing 
technical claims and political power in new ways that displaced the “two sides” 
premise of their boundary object strategy. To specify designs that the two sides each 
independently desired, the U.S. and Japan teams still occasionally pushed and recoiled 
along lines of U.S.-Japan interdependency, as they had in their negotiations over the 
band and signal-to-noise specifications for the thermal infrared and shortwave infrared 
sensors. Yet, in addition, the members of the two teams wove together technical claims 
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and political power in intersubjective problem-solving. This weaving finessed mutual 
dependence between the U.S. and Japan teams into collaborative work that was driven, 
configured, and governed by transnational community and authority. 
 
Operational Modes  
 
The origins of this new international techno-political order were in the same 
ASTER team meetings that negotiated the specifications of the shortwave infrared 
radiometer. While the Geology Working Group was debating the band and 
signal-to-noise specifications of the shortwave infrared radiometer in 1991 and 1992, 
they were also discussing other ways that the functional requirements of the ASTER 
instrument might be changed or tweaked to be more responsive to what were 
sometimes asserted as “science requirements.” As this dissertation has illustrated, 
these “science requirements” did not exist as a priori sources of authority for the joint 
team. Science requirements had not even been articulated for the ASTER instrument 
previous to its design, except in the broadest of terms. The science requirements for 
the ASTER instrument were decided along with the design of the instrument.  
By the time of the first ASTER team meeting, the ASTER instrument had 
been designed so that it could be used in two “operational modes.” A full mode would 
simultaneously use all three of ASTER’s radiometers to characterize the earth’s land. A 
night mode would use just the thermal infrared radiometer to measure the temperature 
of the earth’s surface. The use of the ASTER instrument in these two modes was 
constrained by a variety of factors. The ASTER instrument relied upon the NASA host 
satellite for its power and data transmission. These resources were scarce, especially 
since they had to be shared with the other instruments onboard the host satellite (the 
ASTER instrument demanded far and away the most power and data resources). The 
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ASTER instrument was limited also by ASTER’s own wear and tear (including its 
heating and cooling), whatever that wear and tear might ultimately turn out to be 
through the life of the instrument. The two teams looked to the engineer-makers to 
provide estimates of what engineering constraints the teams should use in their 
planning. NASA specified the power and data bandwidth allocated to ASTER in its 
interface documents with JAROS. For its part, JAROS and its contractors explained at 
ASTER team meetings the capabilities that were going to be built into the ASTER 
instrument (these capabilities would later be codified in documentation between 
JAROS and its contractors). As a result of these design specifications, ASTER was 
anticipated to acquire data for only about eight minutes of the daytime half of its orbit 
and for about eight minutes of the nighttime half of its orbit (which, given ASTER’s 
orbit of approximately one hundred minutes, was a sixteen percent duty cycle for the 
full orbit for the thermal infrared radiometer and eight percent duty cycles for the other 
two radiometers).109 
In May 1991, at the second ASTER team meeting, U.S. team members in the 
Geology Working Group—and a JPL volcanologist in particular—requested that the 
shortwave infrared radiometer be made available for acquiring data at night, along 
with the thermal infrared radiometer, for the purpose of monitoring volcanoes.110 The 
U.S. team proposed, in effect, a new operational mode, a third operational mode, what 
they called a “volcano mode.” In response, the Japan team said that they would study 
its feasibility. At this joint team meeting, which was the same meeting in which the 
Japan team made its unilateral decision regarding the band set for the shortwave 
infrared radiometer, the U.S. team “stressed that science operation scenarios should be 
fully recognized by both teams” [italics mine].111 Strictly speaking, the operational 
                                                  
109 Fujisada (1990: 7) and Chang et al. (1992: 3). 
110 ASTER Science Team (1991: 27) and Abrams and Yamaguchi (1991). 
111 ASTER Science Team (1991: 33). 
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scenarios outlined the operations of the instrument, and not the operations of the two 
teams’ science, but the U.S. team was making a point about who they wanted to shape 
those operational scenarios, namely the user-scientists of both teams (per their 
boundary object strategy) and not just the engineer-makers of the Japan team. 
Instrument operations, including the proposed third operational mode, were thus 
asserted as science operations.  
Over six months later, at the third joint team meeting, the U.S. team 
recommended a fourth observational mode: a daytime emergency mode that used the 
visible and near infrared radiometer to look perpendicular across its orbital path at 
much larger angles, up to twenty four degrees.112 This large-angle pointing capability 
would allow the radiometer to make observations of emergencies and other 
time-urgent observations that could not wait up to sixteen days for the ASTER 
instrument to pass within the view of its regular pointing. Whereas the Japan team was 
still studying the U.S. team’s request for the third observational mode, the volcano 
mode, at the time of the fourth ASTER meeting in June 1992, the request for the 
fourth observational mode was promptly accepted. The difference between the fates of 
the requests is partly explained by the different hardware engineering challenges that 
they supposedly posed. The third operational mode was said to require the 
development of new cooler technology for the shortwave infrared radiometer (to 
extend the radiometer’s use), while the fourth mode just necessitated the redesign of 
the visible and near infrared radiometer but not the development of new technology. 
The difference between the fates of the two requests is also explained by who had 
made the requests. For the fourth mode, unlike for the third mode, NASA 
Headquarters and the EOS Project Office had directly asked MITI and JAROS to 
                                                  
112 ASTER Science Team (1992b: 29) and Yamaguchi (1992a). 
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implement the large-angle “emergency mode” capability.113 MITI and JAROS quickly 
agreed to the request. As for the third mode, however, the two teams’ liminal state 
actors were left to work it out. 
 
Negotiating Operational Scenarios and Instrument Capabilities 
 
While operational modes were agreed upon in concept, such as the first two 
operational modes and the fourth mode, they were not necessarily agreed upon in their 
specifics. At the fourth joint team meeting in June 1992, the meeting in which the 
Geology Working Group approved the narrow band set for the shortwave infrared 
radiometer, the U.S. and Japan teams started to try to specify just what was meant by 
eight minutes of full-mode observations in the day time and eight minutes of 
observations using the thermal infrared radiometer in the night time (i.e., respectively, 
the first and second operational modes). Could that block of observation time—and 
the power, data resources, and wear and tear that it represented—be broken down into 
smaller blocks of time for instrument operations, or were the eight minutes of 
observation time required to be consumed continuously? Separate from the question of 
what kinds of operations and sequences of operations might be held to be technically 
possible, what kinds of operations were desired? Was there any such thing as 
“optimal” operations, and if so, what did they look like? As of June 1992, no one on 
either team had hard answers to these questions. 
The two teams did have vague preferences. More precisely, they had leanings. 
The U.S. team leaned toward flexibility in operations, given their team members’ 
professional interests in scientifically characterizing and monitoring targeted sites over 
time (e.g., certain volcanoes, glaciers, sedimentary basins, mountain ranges, cities, 
                                                  
113 ASTER Science Team (1992b: 10). 
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etc.). The U.S. team members had been selected as EOS scientists at least in small part 
on the basis of their scientific research agendas. For instance, at least three U.S. team 
members had previously conducted remote-sensing investigations for the purpose of 
contributing to volcanology and had proposed to continue with this work using 
ASTER.114 On the other hand, in the early 1990s, Japan’s user-scientists leaned on the 
whole toward regional and global mapping. Regional and global mapping implied at 
the time that relatively large blocks of continuous observations might be operationally 
sufficient and would avoid the fragmentation that targeted observations might 
presumably risk. The user-scientists on the Japan team did not, in general, have 
well-defined scientific research programs that made intensive use of remote-sensing 
imagery. For instance, although the Japan team listed volcanic monitoring as one of its 
key areas of scientific interest in its “Science Management Plan,” the Japan team itself 
did not include a volcanologist among its members until the U.S. team, at the second 
ASTER meeting, requested that the Japan team include at least one volcanologist.115  
For the Japan team’s user-scientists, global and regional mapping was an 
operations plan that covered many of their concerns. ERSDAC and the oil and mining 
firms associated with ERSDAC wanted to compile databases of imagery that mapped 
Asia, especially a database of three-dimensional topographic imagery constructed 
from the two telescopes of ASTER’s visible and near infrared radiometer. Moreover, a 
high-resolution map of the earth’s entire land surface had yet to be made using 
imagery from a satellite sponsored by the Government of Japan, and that conspicuous 
national goal was promoted to and by MITI early on. Finally, global and regional 
mapping suggested consistent and regular operations that ASTER’s engineer-makers 
could model and could satisfy with confidence.116 As of early 1992, the two teams’ 
                                                  
114 Kahle and Palluconi (1988) and Kahle (1990c). 
115 MITI (1991: 2-3) and ASTER Science Team (1991: 27). 
116 Chang et al. (1992: 3) and Yamaguchi (2002). 
  
 
268  
leanings, however, were just leanings and were not settled preferences. They had not 
been explored in much detail. 
The first joint opportunity for the two teams to explore these leanings, arrive 
at specific preferences, and negotiate an operational approach that would satisfy both 
teams’ goals, was when an NEC engineer presented an analysis of the ASTER 
instrument’s operations in the first plenary meeting of the fourth ASTER team meeting 
in June 1992. NEC was the contractor for the systems engineering for the ASTER 
instrument, as well as the maker of the instrument’s visible and near infrared 
radiometer. NEC’s approach to ASTER’s operations was very top-down and 
systematic. NEC took the five years of the instrument’s planned lifetime and broke it 
down into groups of forty-eight days, which included three sixteen-day cycles around 
the earth. The orbital path of the ASTER instrument, projected on the earth’s surface, 
retraced itself every sixteen days. NEC reasoned that for the first sixteen-day cycle, 
the ASTER instruments might primarily look directly down (i.e., at the nadir path). 
For the next sixteen days, ASTER might look to the right or to the left, and then, for 
the following sixteen days, to the left or to the right, depending upon which direction it 
had looked the previous cycle. That group of three cycles would roughly repeat itself 
throughout the instrument’s five years, according to NEC’s plan.117 
Within this plan, how NEC proposed approaching the division of the eight 
minute blocks of continuous observation was illustrated by figure 5.5, which is one of 
the slides from NEC’s presentation (below on the next two pages). It depicted an 
ASTER full-mode operational sequence in which the daytime half of the ASTER orbit 
was divided into six equal segments, accompanied by a seventh segment for 
instrument calibration. The first six of the highest bars in each radiometer’s 
operational sequence represented the observations (the “CSP” at the bottom of the  
                                                  
117 Takahashi (1992: 3). 
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Figure 5.5: ASTER Operational Sequence for Six Evenly Divided Observations 
during the Daytime Half of One Orbit 
(from Takahashi 1992: slide 10)  
 
 
VNIR:  Visible and Near Infrared Radiometer 
SWIR: Shortwave Infrared Radiometer 
TIR:  Thermal Infrared Radiometer 
CSP:  Central Signal Processor 
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vertical axis does not denote a radiometer, but ASTER’s central signal processor). 
Each of those six high bars marked observations of approximately thirty seconds. The 
seventh bar at the end, the widest bar, was the time that was required for the 
calibration of the radiometers. This calibration was planned to occur once every 
sixteen days (i.e., once every cycle of ASTER’s path around the earth).118  
As depicted in figure 5.5, NEC proposed an operational approach that, if the 
eight minute blocks needed to be divided, they would be divided into a set number of 
divisions, as opposed to allowing the number of divisions to vary. Moreover, 
according to the NEC plan, those divisions would be equal divisions, as opposed to 
allowing for the length of the divisions to vary. NEC suggested that the maximum 
possible observation time, in total, for a six division plan, of the type shown in figure 
5.5, was too short to be practical. Power constraints, the time required for the 
radiometers to prepare to make an observation, and other issues such as cooling, took 
their toll on the total amount of observation time. In this calculation, the resources and 
constraints that allowed for a block of eight continuous minutes would amount to a 
total of less than three minutes when that time was divided equally into six divisions. 
In light of the cost of the constraints of a six division scenario, JAROS and NEC 
suggested dividing the eight minute block into a set number of divisions between three 
and five, and not six, which was their limiting case.119 
The reactions of U.S. team members to NEC’s presentation of ASTER’s 
operations were deflated and somber. First, NEC did not present all the operational 
capabilities that the U.S. team had anticipated. For example, no mention had been 
made of the shortwave infrared radiometer operating at night along with the thermal 
                                                  
118 In another calibration procedure, the thermal infrared radiometer was calibrated before and 
after each observation. This calibration, owing to its short duration, was only depicted once in 
figure 5.5, the rise just before the first observation of the thermal infrared radiometer. 
119 Takahashi (1992: 7) and ASTER Science Team (1992a: 26). 
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infrared radiometer, in what was known as volcano mode. After commenting on how 
comprehensive the presentation had been, a U.S. team member—recorded in the 
minutes as simply an “American”—remarked that “there is a science requirement for 
SWIR observations at night” which had not been taken into consideration.120 In 
response, Dr. Yamaguchi explained that while the science requirement had been 
approved by the Geology Working Group, the requirement had been passed on to just 
the Operations and Missions Planning Working Group but had not yet been passed 
across the user-scientist/engineer-maker divide for consideration by JAROS, the EOS 
Sensor Committee, and the contractors, such as NEC. Dr. Ono from the EOS Sensor 
Committee explained further that the asserted science requirement was “still on the 
user side,” that there was “some kind of misunderstandings on both sides [i.e., 
between the user and instrument sides of the Japan team],” and that “sufficient 
discussions [had] not been made yet on the hardware side.”121 It was far from clear 
that this “science requirement” would actually be fulfilled, and if it were to be, this 
exchange presaged that further negotiations would likely be required. 
Other U.S. team members worried that the instrument was too constrained for 
effective operations. Dr. Lang from the U.S. team asked if the power and data 
transmission constraints of the host satellite were too restrictive to the entire ASTER 
operational scenario and if the constraints were “terribly detrimental to any 
science.”122 He wondered if Dr. Tsu and Dr. Kahle should petition NASA for more 
power and data transmission resources, even contacting the team leaders of the other 
instruments slated to be onboard the NASA satellite to see if those team leaders 
wanted to join the petition. In sum, in this interpretation of NEC’s presentation, 
                                                  
120 ASTER Science Team (1992a: 25). 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid. 
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dividing the eight minutes of continuous observation did not so much as offer 
flexibility as it reduced over all capability.  
Dr. Kahle, however, had seen ASTER’s potential operational capabilities 
presented differently a week earlier at a U.S.-Japan hardware interface meeting.123 
After Dr. Lang made his comments about the possibility of petitioning NASA for more 
power and data resources, Kahle remarked that once Lang heard an upcoming 
presentation he might “find that it is not quite as bleak as perhaps pictured by 
Takahashi-san [who was the NEC engineer].” For the U.S. team, figure 5.5 was 
inflexible, austere, and bleak. Maybe the figure’s engineering aesthetic encouraged 
that impression, drawing the eye’s attention to what little observational capabilities the 
instrument would possess in comparison to all of the housekeeping tasks the 
instrument’s operations required (which amounted to overhead time). The next 
presentation, however, offered a much more serviceable picture of ASTER’s 
operations. 
 In this same plenary session, Dr. Miyazaki Yoshinori, from the Geological 
Survey of Japan, presented an analysis of ASTER’s operations and data acquisition 
which he qualified as his “personal idea.”124 Figure 5.6 (on the next page) was among 
the slides that Miyazaki showed. Rather than focusing on the housekeeping tasks and 
presuming equal divisions of observation time, the table did not display the amount of 
overhead time required for housekeeping, nor did it demand equal divisions of 
observations. The highlighted diagonal was set at the ASTER instrument’s allotted 
maximum average power for two consecutive orbits (i.e., 424 watts). The number 
underneath the power, the instrument’s data rate, was determined by the number of  
                                                  
123 The meeting was one of a series of meeting in which JAROS engineers and Goddard Space 
Flight Center engineers met to discuss and negotiate the ASTER instrument’s physical interface 
and integration with the NASA host satellite.  
124 ASTER Science Team (1992a: 26). 
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Figure 5.6: Trade-Off between Number of Operations (i.e., Observations) and 
Total Observation Time for Full Orbit Scenarios  
(from Miyazaki 1992a: slide 24)  
 
In this matrix, the shaded diagonal held constant the maximum average power that was 
allocated to ASTER for any two consecutive full orbits (i.e., 424 watts). By doing so, 
it showed how the number of day and night observations—the former of which would 
use all three of the radiometers and the latter of which would use only the thermal 
radiometer—would affect the total observation time of the instrument during the day 
and night and the average data rate of the instrument (which was not to exceed an 
average of 8.3 megabits per second over any two consecutive orbits). 
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observations (the table’s vertical axis) and by the power. The two-orbit average for the 
data rate could be no more than 8.3 megabits per second (Mbps). Together, the 
instrument’s power, the number of observations, and the data rate determined the 
horizontal axis at the top of the table, which is the total number of observation minutes 
for the night and day. With the table’s diagonal line, vertical axis, and horizontal axis 
established, the reminder of the chart could then be filled with pairings of power and 
data rate. In addition to the plethora of combinations which the table displayed, the 
table also integrated into its calculations a trading scheme in which instrument 
resources that would not have been used at night could be “traded” into more 
instrument resources for daytime observations. Miyazaki’s scheme rendered 
instrument resources as much more fungible and instrument operations as more 
flexible than NEC’s proposal had done.125 Not surprisingly, the U.S. team was much 
more enthusiastic and engaged with Miyazaki’s “personal idea” than with NEC’s 
proposal.126 
While Miyazaki’s analysis of ASTER’s operations and data acquisition was 
no doubt his own, the table shown in figure 5.6 was actually not constructed by him. 
This table was what the U.S. team leader, Anne Kahle, had referenced in her earlier 
exchange with Dr. Lang. The table, along with others like it, had been presented by 
Scott Lambros, who was the chief engineer for the NASA satellite into which ASTER 
was to be integrated. Lambros worked at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, and 
the tables that he presented had actually been constructed by another engineer at 
NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, Edward Chang, the operations manager for the 
NASA satellite. Aware that Miyazaki was working on his own analysis of ASTER’s 
operations, either Chang or Lambros had passed on Chang’s tables to Miyazaki for his 
                                                  
125 Miyazaki (1992a: slide 24); ASTER Science Team (1992a: 30). 
126 ASTER Science Team (1992: 25-28). 
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potential use. Perhaps not wanting to redo the tedious calculations, Miyazaki 
pragmatically incorporated the tables into his own analysis, which was an analysis that 
went well beyond these tables. In his use of the tables for his larger project, Miyazaki 
took on board the tables’ assumptions of resource interchangeability and instrument 
flexibility. Likely aware that these assumptions and other assumptions in his analysis 
had not yet been approved by Japan’s “instrument side,” Miyazaki went out of his way 
to label his analysis his “personal idea.”127 
 
Analytical Mixing and Nucleation Sites  
 
Over the next few ASTER team meetings, “Miyazaki’s Operations Scenario 
Analysis,” as it was called, served as the primary resource for the two teams in their 
negotiations over ASTER’s operations. 128  It was the analysis’s tables in 
particular—constructed by the operations manager at the Goddard Space Flight Center 
but spoken for by a member of the Japan team—which were most valuable to the U.S. 
team and which were used in repeated deliberations between the two teams. These 
tables were not coerced into or sneakily slipped into the collection of operations 
documentation and then subsequently taken on face value by the two teams in some 
unreflective way. That is, they were not, in the vocabulary of actor-network theory, 
semiotic “immutable mobiles” that imperially extended the analytical reach of the U.S. 
team through the intrinsic ability of the table’s representation to discipline and enroll. 
Furthermore, they were not an epistemic community’s consensus representation of 
how a physical system naturally worked or should work. The trade-off tables were 
rather instances of analytical mixing that facilitated intersubjective problem-solving. 
                                                  
127 ASTER Science Team (1992a: 26-27); Lambros (1992); and Chang (1992). 
128 ASTER Science Team (1992a: 6). 
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They were nucleation sites around which the teams negotiated how ASTER’s 
engineering resources could best be used, and these nucleation sites carried with them 
starting assumptions that had at least the personal imprimaturs of both a Japanese team 
member and an American, if not that of their teams as a whole. 
This analytical mixing and nucleation were steps toward breaking out of the 
two team’s boundary object strategy. The joint Operations and Mission Planning 
Working Group did initially have an action item to “develop a scheme by which Japan 
and the U.S. decide operationally on the division of resources ([e.g.,] instrument 
bandwidth).”129 In light of Miyazaki’s analysis (and the tables that partly constituted 
it), the two teams did not follow through with that initial idea in line with engineering 
a boundary object. According to that strategy, they would have designed ASTER’s 
operations in a manner that split instrument resources (such as bandwidth), avoided 
questions of community, and preserved two distinct communities of practice (which 
would have allowed for “coherence” while preserving separate “social worlds,” in the 
vocabulary of Star and Griesemer). Instead, the two teams directly confronted 
questions concerning “informational requirements,” and Miyazaki’s analysis and 
pragmatic use of the passed-on tables facilitated the collective action of their broader 
problem-solving about ASTER’s operations. 
Both Miyazaki and Chang, the operations manager for the NASA satellite, 
incorporated the “trade night-for-day” table (i.e., figure 5.6) into the wide-ranging 
operations scenarios that they presented to the teams at the fourth joint team meeting. 
Chang’s presentation in the plenary session followed Miyazaki’s plenary session 
presentation. The discussion of Chang’s presentation, as recorded in the minutes of the 
meeting, centered on the “trade night-for-day” scheme that was illustrated by the table, 
but it also touched upon the magnitude of the benefits of possibly extracting more 
                                                  
129 ASTER Science Team (1992a: 58-59). 
  
 
278  
power from the host satellite, avoiding the operational demands of trading. With 
respect to the question of extracting more power from the host satellite, Scott Lambros, 
NASA’s chief engineer for the NASA host satellite, jokingly commented that “the way 
to change your power allocation is to lock me in a closet for three days and don’t feed 
me until I say yes!”130 Given Lambros’s firm stance about ASTER’s power allocation, 
Chang’s presentation and the discussion that followed reinforced the trading scheme as 
the main operational framework under joint consideration that might allow for an 
optimal solution to the various demands upon ASTER’s operations.131  
While Chang’s presentation, coming after Miyazaki’s, reinforced the utility 
and legitimacy of the trading scheme as a joint framework, it was Miyazaki’s 
presentations at the team meeting that put the scheme to use. Miyazaki’s presentations, 
both the presentation in the Operations and Mission Planning Working Group that was 
on a day after the plenary session as well as the presentation that was in the plenary 
session and previous to Chang’s, integrated the table’s flexible approach into a 
feasibility analysis of a plan to acquire different kinds of imagery. The plan distributed 
ASTER’s acquisition of imagery across four categories, namely emergency 
observations, team requests, regional monitoring, and cloud-free global mapping. 
Miyazaki also used the “trade night-for-day” table (and other tables like it which had 
been originally constructed by Chang), along with the results of rough calculations of 
the desired volume of acquisitions within each category, to estimate how many times 
the telescopes of the ASTER radiometers might need to point in order to fulfill 
imagery acquisition objectives. The number of “pointing operations” that the 
telescopes for ASTER’s three radiometers could perform was one of those engineering 
constraints that was limited by wear and tear, as well as by the possible impact of 
                                                  
130 Ibid., p. 31. 
131 Chang (1992) and ASTER Science Team (1992a: 30-31). 
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pointing operations on the positional stability of the entire NASA satellite (when one 
telescope moves on a free-floating platform in space, that movement needs to be 
countered if the platform is going to conserve momentum and remain stable; pointing 
operations can also cause vibrations on the platform known as “jitter”). For planning 
purposes, NEC and the other contractors had cautiously estimated that approximately 
ten thousand pointing operations for both the visible and near infrared radiometer and 
the shortwave infrared radiometer were feasible over the life of the instrument, taking 
into consideration issues such as lubrication, oil pressure for the bearings, and quality 
control. Miyazaki’s analysis of ASTER’s operations—using figure 5.6—suggested that 
ten thousand might not be enough, given the global mapping and other data 
acquisition goals that Miyazaki proposed. 132  This issue of how many pointing 
operations would be designed into the instrument arose again in later team and 
working group meetings, and Miyazaki’s analysis was an important resource in 
pushing for more point operations. 
Miyazaki’s use of figure 5.6 in his analysis—and his personal endorsement of 
that table’s assumptions of flexibility—invited a discussion of shared goals, shared 
data acquisition methods, and shared instrument operations. At the same meeting 
where the U.S. team acquiesced to the Japan team’s preferences regarding the band set 
and signal-to-noise ratios of the shortwave infrared radiometer, in which “Japan” was 
ascribed as monolithic and the U.S. team was not able to leverage mutual dependence 
between the U.S. and Japan teams to move “Japan” to their advantage, Miyazaki’s 
analysis served as a resource with which the U.S. team could cast aside NEC’s plan for 
ASTER’s operations, breaking out of bilateral diplomacy by breaking down “Japan.” 
The U.S. team’s dependency on the ASTER instrument, and here more precisely the 
U.S. team’s dependency on the Japan team to design the ASTER instrument’s 
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operational capabilities, was gradually finessed into encouraging the design of the 
instrument’s operational capabilities to be undertaken by the two teams as a 
community enterprise. Premised upon Miyazaki’s use of the trade tables, Miyazaki’s 
“personal idea” was eventually accepted into the two teams’ design discourse as the 
joint baseline for ASTER’s operation scenario, a scenario that had implications for the 
design of the ASTER instrument’s hardware. Adjustments, and proposals for 
adjustments, were made to Miyazaki’s baseline and not to NEC’s proposal. For 
example, at the plenary session, Dr. Kahle said Miyazaki’s presentation “left [her] a 
perfect opening to request another mode,” and that mode—a fifth operational 
mode—was deliberated upon in terms of the Miyazaki’s operations scenario.133 The 
U.S. team’s Dr. Kieffer and the Japan team’s Dr. Fujisada and Dr. Ono, the last two of 
whom were members of the EOS Sensor Committee, discussed this fifth 
mode—which was a mode for monitoring glaciers—within the framework of 
Miyazaki’s operations scenario, and not NEC’s. Given the scenario’s discursive 
ascendancy, NEC’s engineer was left to say “for the ASTER system as a whole we 
have not looked into that possibility [i.e., of a fifth mode] but if there is such a request 
or requirement then we are ready to make a study on that.”134 
As was suggested by that diplomatic response from the NEC engineer, the 
intersubjective problem-solving that revolved around Miyazaki’s operations scenario 
and the trading tables did not settle once and for all the design of the operational 
capabilities of the ASTER instrument. The problem-solving sessions in the plenary 
session, in the Operations and Mission Planning Working Group, and in the Geology 
Working Group did all conclude with general endorsements of Miyazaki’s scenario, of 
its imported flexible trading scheme, and of the additional modes. While these 
                                                  
133 ASTER Science Team (1992a: 27). 
134 Ibid., p. 28. 
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endorsements were assertive steps based upon the authority of agreement between 
both teams’ user-scientists, NEC just said that it was “ready to make a study” of such 
requests. As members of both teams were well aware by this point in the ASTER 
collaboration, those words from Japan’s contractors were far from a “we will do that.” 
Dr. Ono closed the discussion of Chang’s presentation of ASTER’s operations by 
reminding everyone of “the general procedures for changing the design of the 
instrument . . . requests for changes should be made through JAROS which is the 
other team for ASTER to NASA’s Goddard, formally [speaking]” (emphasis mine).135 
The institutional boundary in the Japan team between the user-scientists and the 
engineer-makers was not erased through one episode of intersubjective 
problem-solving. Dr. Ono’s words even projected the user-scientist/engineer-maker 
boundary onto the U.S. team, distinguishing the engineers at NASA’s Goddard Space 
Flight Center from the U.S. team. For Ono and for Kudoh, JAROS’s project manager 
for ASTER, the instrument side of the Japan team was “the other team” in the ASTER 
collaboration, namely the “instrument team” and not the “science team.”136    
 
Intersubjectivity 
 
Despite the persistent maintenance of a boundary between engineer-makers 
and user-scientists, Miyazaki’s analysis—and the imprimatur of a member of the Japan 
team—was nevertheless a helpful resource for the purpose of negotiating a design for 
ASTER’s operational capability that was not only accepted by both teams but that was 
jointly understood, and also understood to be jointly understood—in one word, 
intersubjective. Miyazaki’s analysis was a way for the U.S. team to work itself into 
                                                  
135 Ibid., p. 31. 
136 The distinction between “instrument team” and “science team” is made by Dr. Ono in Ibid., p. 
43. See Kudoh’s comments on p. 35. 
  
 
282  
instrument design discussions within the Japan team, breaking negotiations out of 
bilateral diplomacy first by breaking down “Japan” and then by engaging different 
Japanese liminal state actors in ways that did not enact the socio-political dynamics of 
the United States vis-à-vis Japan. Rather than the United States vis-à-vis Japan, it was 
the ASTER team that was coming to understand what operational capabilities would 
be best, and it was the ASTER team that was gaining confidence that Japanese and 
American interpretations of the operational design of the ASTER instrument were 
converging.  
For example, after Miyazaki’s presentation of his analysis in the Operations 
and Mission Planning Working Group, Dr. Ono presented the instrument side’s 
proposal of what operational scenarios the instrument side of the Japan team would 
study in light of the discussion that had occurred among the two teams’ user-scientists. 
Dr. Ono’s proposal took an earlier comment made by the U.S. team members, which 
was that all eight minutes at night would likely not be needed on a regular basis, to 
mean that the eight-minute allocation at night could be cut back and fixed to an 
estimate of what would be needed on a regular basis, which was said to be 
approximately two minutes. In discussions earlier in the meeting, U.S. team members 
had said that the two middle columns of figure 5.6, which each offered 1.9 minutes at 
night, were, in their judgment, realistic day/night distributions.137 Upon hearing Dr. 
Ono’s proposal to fix the instrument to something like those distributions, Dr. Kahle 
realized that a point that she had made in support of the feasibility of flexibility (i.e., 
up to eight minutes, but usually two minutes) had been transformed into a new 
limitation (i.e., that really only two minutes would be needed). Kahle marshaled 
Miyazaki’s analysis to explain why Ono’s proposal was unsatisfactory: 
 
                                                  
137 Ibid., p. 27. 
  
 
283  
I find this [i.e., Dr. Ono’s proposal] to be not very acceptable in that there is 
probably less flexibility now than we had with eight minutes in the daytime 
and eight minutes at night. You are only allowing us eight minutes in the 
daytime and the total amount at night had been cut down to two minutes. So 
we’ve really lost the amount of data we can acquire with this type of scenario. 
I prefer the type of scenarios that we saw that Dr. Miyazaki presented. We had 
six scenarios [under Miyazaki’s analysis], which sort of covered the entire 
ground from all of the data would be take in the daytime, [to] some of the 
data would be taken in the daytime and some at night and allow the complete 
flexibility between the amount of data that would be taken day or night within 
the constraints of the power and pointing [i.e., as in figure 5.6]. This [i.e., Dr. 
Ono’s proposal] to me seems more limiting that what we had at the very 
outset [i.e., even before Miyazaki’s analysis].138 
 
Dr. Ono replied by giving an explanation of what Miyazaki’s operational scenario had 
meant to him: 
 
But the only reason I cut down the nighttime operation from eight to two 
minutes was because I could not find any scientific reason [in Miyazaki’s 
scenario] that would justify having the operation last in the nighttime for as 
long as eight minutes. So I think this two minutes is extremely reasonable.139 
 
Although Dr. Miyazaki’s analysis had been marshaled by Kahle, as it turned out, 
Miyazaki had also worked with Dr. Ono on Ono’s proposal of what operational 
scheme the instrument side should study. Unavoidably embroiled in this debate, 
Miyazaki placed figure 5.6 on the overhead projector and interjected his interpretation 
of his operational scenario: 
  
This [figure 5.6] is the OHP [overhead project slide] that I showed you on the 
first day [in the plenary session]. And in my interpretation this one [and this] 
one [i.e., the two 1’s on the vertical axis for night operations in figure 5.6] 
means eight minutes [and] eight minutes [i.e., potentially eight minutes at 
night for each of them] and therefore it is my personal opinion is [sic] to have 
as much as [sic] capability as possible and I do fully support Dr. Kahle’s 
comment of eight minutes. But the reason why we dropped this to 1.9 minutes 
[in Dr. Ono’s study proposal of what the instrument side should study] was to 
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284  
increase the number of divisions [that were possible in the eight minutes], so 
it was a strategic reason why we dropped it to 1.9 minutes.140  
 
Miyazaki walked the fine line between, on the one side, standing by his analysis and 
agreeing with Kahle’s interpretation of it, and, on the other side, coming to Dr. Ono’s 
defense by explaining the rationale for the drop to 1.9 minutes, a defense which itself 
alluded to the need for more flexibility in the baseline operational scenario by 
increasing the number of feasible divisions. At the closing plenary session, in his 
report about his proposed operations, Miyazaki displayed figure 5.7 as his final slide 
(see the next page), conveying the tensions within, and the complexity of, designing 
ASTER’s operational capability. 
 Miyazaki articulated an interpretation that was understood and accepted by 
both teams, and understood as such. It was an accomplishment of intersubjectivity 
among the team members, and especially, between the members of the U.S. and Japan 
teams. Both the political and the material made possible this intersubjectivity, which 
informed what “1” night operation and “1.9” minutes meant on an overhead slide, and, 
which, more broadly, helped to effect intersubjective problem-solving with respect to 
ASTER’s operational capabilities. As the above discussion illustrates, Dr. Miyazaki’s 
deft man-in-the-middle diplomacy was undoubtedly important to establishing an 
understanding of what the ASTER instrument’s operational capabilities should be, and 
that diplomacy has been remembered by team members.141 Nevertheless, the sharing 
and mixing of analytical material, such as the table of figure 5.6, forgotten as those 
quiet materials might be,142 served as nucleation sites around which liminal state 
actors such as Kahle and Miyazaki finessed the techno-political interdependence of the  
 
                                                  
140 ASTER Science Team (1992a: 44). 
141 E.g., Yamaguchi (2002). 
142 E.g., Ibid.; Miyazaki (2003); and Kahle (2005). 
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Figure 5.7: Miyazaki and the Tensions in Mission Operations 
The slide was titled “Mission Operations Working Group” (Miyazaki 1992c: slide 7).  
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Japan and U.S. teams into politically-robust technical knowledge, knowledge that had 
the power to shape what the U.S. and Japan could do with the ASTER instrument. 
The fourth joint team meeting concluded with a shared interpretation of what 
figure 5.6 and, more broadly, Miyazaki’s operational analysis, meant for the design of 
the ASTER instrument and for the two teams’ general operations scenario, which was 
understood to be a common operations scenario, with shared goals and shared methods. 
The third, fourth, and fifth operational modes (which were, respectively, the volcano 
mode, the large-angle emergency mode, and the mode for monitoring glaciers) were 
recommended as important for fulfilling the data acquisition objectives that were 
specified by Miyazaki’s analysis, as articulated in that analysis’s four data acquisition 
categories and its desired imagery volumes for those categories. The instrument side 
of Japan’s team had already agreed to the fourth operational mode, which had been 
requested by NASA Headquarters, but the liminal state actors of the two teams’ 
user-scientists managed to forge a qualified consensus of some strength which 
recognized benefits to the other two modes.143 The acceptance of the third operational 
mode implied, however, that the shortwave infrared radiometer would need to be able 
to run at night as well as day, which would require the instrument’s maker, Mitsubishi, 
to further develop its cooler technology and to add an additional radiator. The third 
and fifth modes were eventually accepted as design specifications (although the fifth 
in a different form), and Mitsubishi designed its shortwave infrared radiometer for the 
burden of operating at night as well as day, for a longer total observation time in each 
orbit.144 The two teams also made headway by recognizing that their common 
operations for the ASTER instrument might significantly benefit from an increase in 
the pointing operations specification for the telescopes of the visible and near infrared 
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radiometer and the shortwave infrared radiometer; 10,000 might possibly do, but this 
constraint definitely needed further study, in the judgment of members of both teams. 
Within the next year, the contractors for those two radiometers, NEC and Mitsubishi, 
reported that they were likely able to meet a design specification for 20,000 pointing 
operations, which did become the specification.145  
The two teams’ common understanding of Miyazaki’s general analysis and 
their confidence in that common understanding also spurred more specific studies on 
the part of both teams which were implicitly and explicitly premised upon Miyazaki’s 
operational scenario and the resource-trading tables that it incorporated. For instance, 
U.S. and Japan team members were assigned action items to “make multiple, typical 
16 day scenarios and statistical [analyses of] five year mission characteristics” which 
were “based on” the two teams’ discussion of Miyazaki’s operational scenarios.146 
These studies were conducted over the next three years.147 Most significantly, a clear 
and strong joint consensus formed around the resource-trading tables, a consensus that 
demanded that the ASTER instrument be designed to allow operations that assumed 
fungible instrument resources and operational flexibility, involving night/day trading, 
other forms of temporal trading (within over all maximum averages) and variable 
divisions of observations within orbits. NEC’s plan for fixed and regular operations 
was deemed utterly inadequate and unacceptable.148 A year later NEC described at a 
joint team meeting an instrument design that integrated many of the operational 
capabilities that had been requested by the user-scientists of both teams, and they 
worked to integrate more.149  
                                                  
145 Miyazaki (1993). 
146 ASTER Science Team (1992a: 460). 
147 E.g., Morrison (1992); Hekl (1993); Miyazaki (1993); and Watanabe (1993). 
148 The chair of the EOS Sensor Committee, Dr. Fujisada, recognized the unacceptability of the 
NEC plan and of the initial specifications for the ASTER instrument’s operational capabilities at a 
meeting in June 1993 (Fujisada 1993). 
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Members of both teams came to remember their negotiations in the early to 
mid-1990s over ASTER’s operations and the ASTER instrument’s operational 
capabilities as different in some qualitative way from their negotiations over the band 
sets and the signal-to-noise ratios of ASTER’s radiometers, even though in the case of 
the shortwave infrared radiometer these negotiations overlapped to some extent in 
time and in personnel. As recently as six months after the fourth joint team meeting, 
far before many of the operational issues were settled, Kahle reported at an internal 
JPL project management review that her team had successfully “identified and helped 
resolve operational constraints which were being ‘built in’ by Japanese contractors 
and/or General Electric.”150 Her team had, however, “made about as much progress as 
possible in [instrument] S/N [signal-to-noise] issues.”151 Also at this review, the JPL 
Project Manager for JPL’s participation in the collaboration described “instrument 
operations scenario and constraints analysis” as a “recent accomplishment,” but he 
named as a “concern” the team’s “lack of insight into details of instrument design.”152  
While contemporary documentation of the perspectives of members of the 
Japan team are unavailable, both Miyazaki and Yamaguchi over a decade later recalled 
the negotiations over operations in the early years as intensely collaborative, 
cross-cutting, and complex, with many working group meetings outside of the joint 
team meetings. With the exception of the early difference in what kinds of operations 
the two teams initially leaned toward, targeted observations vis-à-vis global mapping, 
sweeping generalizations about “U.S. versus Japan” skirmishes in the early to 
mid-1990s over operational planning and over the design of the ASTER instrument’s 
operational capabilities were non existent in interviews, in comparison with the easy 
recollection of sharp debates over the band sets and signal-to-noise ratios of the 
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radiometers.153 Although perhaps exaggerated in part to construct a history of the 
ASTER collaboration’s success, Kahle remarked that in the two teams’ negotiations of 
the ASTER instrument’s operational capabilities and operational scenarios, “we had 
none of that U.S. versus Japan stuff, none of that.”154 It was in the two teams’ 
negotiations over the ASTER instrument’s operational capabilities that they first broke 
out of bilateral technoscientific diplomacy and began to use transnational authority to 
design an international techno-political order. Analytical mixing, the nucleation sites 
of Miyazaki’s resource-trading tables, and intersubjective problem-solving had 
together enabled the two teams to transcend bilateralism. 
 
Breaking Out of Bilateral Diplomacy 
 
Although the U.S. and Japan teams set out to design ITIR, and then ASTER, 
using a boundary-object strategy that was to avoid the need for the negotiation of 
common goals, common methods, and other manifestations of transnational 
community, that strategy to share separately proved to be fraught with complications. 
The ASTER instrument did not become a boundary object. The politics of 
technoscientific diplomacy offered both less and more to the two teams than ASTER 
as a boundary object. It offered less, in that the design specifications of the ASTER 
instrument were outcomes that were negotiated by liminal state actors from distinct 
communities of practice who had different professional interests and who worked on 
behalf of states with interests and goals that were sometimes at odds. The designs of 
the thermal infrared radiometer, the shortwave infrared radiometer, and the 
instrument’s operational capabilities, did not meet many of the “science requirements” 
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of the U.S. team. Conversely, in more than a few cases, MITI and its contractors were 
persuaded to spend more time, money, and resources to satisfy preferences of the U.S. 
team and of the joint ASTER team, especially for the additional bands for the thermal 
infrared radiometer and for the more capable design and hardware for ASTER’s 
operations. Neither the epistemic communities approach nor Latourian actor-network 
theory can account for the diversity in these outcomes. This chapter has argued that a 
satisfactory explanation of these outcomes must take into account how liminal state 
actors assert scientific knowledge and enact state power in their technoscientific 
diplomacy. In particular, the contrast between the negotiation over the shortwave 
infrared radiometer and the negotiation over the ASTER instrument’s operational 
capabilities illustrates how the mixing of knowledge and power is an interpretative 
undertaking, in which U.S.-Japan relations is enacted as much as it is dictated by 
states’ goals or structured by states’ material power. 
The politics of technoscientific diplomacy offered more to the two teams than 
ASTER as a boundary object in that the two teams’ negotiations—because they were 
enacted by liminal state actors—articulated not only joint specifications, but along 
with them, new and refined goals, more effective methods, and new techno-political 
arrangements. The TIGER team managed to negotiate its incorporation into the ITIR 
team and to design a vastly more capable thermal infrared radiometer. User-scientists 
in Japan’s geologic remote-sensing community became more influential in instrument 
design in Japan as a consequence of their participation in the ASTER collaboration, 
determining key specifications for the shortwave infrared radiometer. By the 
mid-1990s, owing to the two teams’ intersubjective problem-solving, the teams had 
broken out of their bilateral diplomacy and began facing the challenge of building and 
governing an international techno-political system to produce knowledge about the 
earth. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY  
OF THE ASTER DATA AND INFORMATION SYSTEM 
 
 In their negotiations over the operational design of the ASTER instrument in 
1992 and 1993, the U.S. and Japan teams broke out of their bilateral diplomacy and 
into collaborative dynamics that fostered transnational authority. In contrast with their 
negotiations over the designs of the thermal and shortwave infrared sensing bands, in 
their negotiations over the instrument’s operational design the two teams 
intersubjectively analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of different operational 
capabilities for the instrument. In their discussion, they used Miyazaki’s operational 
scenario especially as a nucleation site around which they generated their preferred 
specifications for the instrument, and they successfully pushed contractors to build the 
instrument according to those specifications. 
While these discussions over the ASTER instrument’s operational design had 
implications for the instrument’s basic data acquisition capabilities, particularly how 
flexibly the instrument and it sub-instruments could be turned on and off to acquire 
data in different observation modes at different times in an orbit, these fundamental 
design decisions did not determine how the instrument would in fact be used in 
practice. Recall from the last chapter that Kahle, in an internal JPL management 
review in December 1992, had reported that her team had successfully “identified and 
helped resolve operational constraints which were being ‘built in’ by Japanese 
contractors.”1 Kahle would later report at a JPL-NASA internal review in March 1994 
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that these discussions had “greatly increased data acquisition flexibility.” 2 
Nevertheless, as of March 1994, this flexibility was still only potential flexibility. As 
Kahle had explained in the 1992 review, this flexibility was the loosening of hardware 
“constraints” that would impede the possibility of flexibility in operations. It remained 
to be seen whether or not, for example, the design, implementation, and operation of 
the ASTER data and information system would take advantage of this hardware 
flexibility and would consequently facilitate an ASTER remote-sensing system that 
was satisfactorily flexible. Would the two teams’ transnational authority that had arisen 
in their negotiations over ASTER’s operational design ensure that flexibility was 
actually engineered into ASTER’s remote-sensing system? This particular question 
about the implementation of flexibility begs a more general one. Did the transnational 
authority of the U.S.-Japan ASTER team extend beyond the negotiations over 
ASTER’s operational flexibility and pervade negotiations over the design, operation, 
and maintenance of the ASTER remote-sensing system writ large?  
This chapter explains how the two teams worked together as the ASTER team 
to design and maintain the ASTER data and information system. Furthermore, the 
chapter explains how, as the two teams designed and maintained the ASTER data and 
information system, they also configured and governed that system’s organized 
interactions of consumption, production, and distribution of scarce scientific data 
among states, their researchers, and hundreds, if not thousands, of other consumers of 
ASTER’s remote-sensing data. In other words, the chapter shows how when the two 
teams were developing a data and information system, they were also developing an 
international political economy of scientific data. The chapter contends that the 
transnational authority of the two teams did reach beyond the design of the ASTER 
instrument’s operational capabilities and into the remote-sensing system and its 
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international political economy writ large. In explaining the ASTER team’s design and 
maintenance of their data and information system and their configuration and 
governance of that system’s international political economy, the chapter illustrates the 
team’s exercise of transnational authority and delineates the scope of their authority. I 
argue that the ASTER team underpinned their exercise of transnational authority and 
their construction of international order—order in the form of an international political 
economy—by using and enacting a normative notion of U.S.-Japan partnership and 
equality. By focusing on how the liminal state actors of the ASTER team used and 
enacted this normative notion as one line of prescriptive reasoning and action, I 
account for the dynamics of these liminal state actors’ technoscientific diplomacy as 
they grappled with wide-ranging concerns that included economic value and efficiency, 
the integrity of scientific knowledge, national autonomy, state power, and U.S.-Japan 
relations. I suggest that the utility of a normative notion of U.S.-Japan partnership and 
equality for the team’s technoscientific diplomacy was enhanced by team members’ 
liminality with respect to their states and by socio-political interdependency in their 
joint work. 
 
A Data and Information System as a Solution to Problems of International Order 
 
For NASA, the ASTER data and information system was one system among 
many other data and information systems that were to be integrated together to form 
the EOS Data and Information System (EOSDIS). EOSDIS was a fundamental 
component of NASA’s Earth Observing System. While EOS satellites orbited the earth, 
EOSDIS was intended to enable NASA to establish an international order on the 
ground, organizing an international community of scientists and engineers as well as 
organizing data production, distribution, and consumption across states. Latourian 
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actor-network theory and the epistemic communities approach differently suggest how 
NASA and its scientists and engineers would use EOSDIS to establish and govern an 
international order and how they would integrate the ASTER data and information 
system into that order. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, NASA endorsed a vision for EOS which 
extended beyond the United States and reached across the globe. NASA, Congress, 
and the White House looked to multinational cooperation with Japan and Europe to 
lessen EOS’s unprecedented cost in particular. Of course, that rationale was not 
usually stated quite so bluntly. The 1987 strategy report of NASA’s steering committee 
for EOS asserted a “commonality of interest and mutual benefit of shared cost” that 
“bind the national efforts in Earth science together and have led to significant ongoing 
cooperation in satellite programs and Earth remote sensing.”3 The report continued to 
explain how global investigations that “transcend national borders” required “various 
kinds” of multinational resources, such as intellectual and financial support and 
geographical access. In such an international effort, involving collaborations such as 
the ASTER collaboration, how would these “various kinds” of multinational resources 
be negotiated and coordinated? The report explained that the “Earth science research 
community,” which is what NASA called the primary intended users of the EOS 
system, was “quite large and widely distributed throughout the United States and the 
world.”4 What kind of unity among these scientific investigators would actually be 
required to produce global knowledge about earth processes? 
For NASA administrators and scientists, EOSDIS was essential to any 
solution to these questions about international coordination and unity. NASA’s steering 
committee explained EOSDIS as “the key to the EOS concept and to its ultimate 
                                                  
3 NASA, Earth Observing System Science Steering Committee (1987b: 29). 
4 Ibid., p. 27. 
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success in meeting the needs of the Earth science community.”5 NASA conceived of 
EOSDIS as an extensive system of satellite command and control centers, data 
processing facilities, data archive and distribution systems, and communications 
networks. This vision of EOSDIS also included numerous systems that were dedicated 
to specific remote-sensing instruments that, like ASTER, would sit onboard NASA’s 
satellites. 6  In NASA’s vision, international as well as national instruments and 
systems were all wrapped into EOSDIS. 
When NASA planners in the late 1980s and early 1990s portrayed EOSDIS, 
however, they conceptualized their international system as coordinating and uniting 
not diverse governments, organizations, and communities of practice, but more 
reductively, individuals with instruments. The strategy report of the NASA steering 
committee declared that the “implementation of EOS should start with a data and 
information system that unites researchers and sources of data” (emphasis mine).7 In 
the steering committee’s concept of EOSDIS’s architecture (see figure 6.1 on the next 
page), on top were rows of boxed users who submitted their requests for instrument 
observations to the data management and communications network, which then would 
pass those requests down (in the figure’s frame of reference) to an instrument on the 
platform via the satellite platform’s network. Once instruments acquired the data, the 
data would be passed back to the ground systems for processing, archiving, and 
distribution.8 The text that accompanied figure 6.1 described EOSDIS’s architecture 
as non-hierarchical and distributed but also as integrated. This massive data and  
                                                  
5 Ibid., p. 25. Also see the earlier EOS Data Panel report on which this implementation strategy 
was based, NASA, Earth Observing System Data Panel (1986), and a later development of the 
EOSDIS vision, NASA (1992). 
6 In EOS planning in the late 1980s, the “satellites” were large platforms that would be serviced by 
space shuttle missions. 
7 NASA, Earth Observing System Science Steering Committee (1987b: 29). 
8 Ibid., p. 28. This architectural concept was initially proposed by NASA, Earth Observing System 
Data Panel (1986). 
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Figure 6.1: The EOSDIS Concept 
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information system was thought to be “the foundation upon which the rest of the 
[EOS] mission is built.”9 NASA’s plan for EOSDIS to connect instruments with 
individual user-researchers cut out the middle man of politics between nations, and it 
envisioned a reordering of international politics around an integrated, yet distributed, 
techno-political system.  
If Latourian actor-network theory were used to describe this vision of 
EOSDIS, EOSDIS would be NASA’s “center of calculation” in which “immutable” 
and “mobile” black-boxed users and instruments—national and international—were 
all “enrolled” into EOSDIS’s extensive imperialist networks, bringing virtual 
“inscriptions” of imagery back to EOSDIS’s home at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight 
Center (GSFC) or to one of the several EOSDIS distributed active archive centers. 
EOSDIS would likely be interpreted on the whole as an enterprise that eschewed 
concerns of transnational community and authority in favor of state-centered empire 
building.  
In 1990, after further planning, NASA’s advisory panel for EOSDIS stressed 
many of the same features and objectives for EOSDIS’s system architecture as had 
been described in the 1987 strategy report, but with further specification (see figure 
6.2 on the next page).10 First, EOS was indeed going to be a large and extensive 
enterprise. In 1992, NASA estimated that it would spend over three billon dollars to 
develop EOSDIS through the year 2000, which at that time, was between a quarter and 
a third of the entire budget for EOS. NASA anticipated that as many as ten thousand 
earth science researchers would use the system and perhaps as many as two hundred  
 
                                                  
9 NASA, Earth Observing System Science Steering Committee (1987b: 25-7). 
10 The figure is from Dozier (1990: 14). Dozier was the chair of the NASA’s advisory panel for 
EOSDIS. That figure of EOSDIS’s architecture was also used in NASA’s vision of EOSDIS as 
described in NASA (1992: 10) and in NASA (1993: 28). The figure was picked up and used to 
explain EOSDIS to international audiences, see for example, Tsu (1991: 141). 
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Figure 6.2: The EOSDIS Architecture 
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thousand other users. 11  In testimony to Congress in 1992, the U.S. General 
Accounting Office described EOSDIS as: 
 
a massive undertaking, both in terms of the system’s scope as well as its 
cost. . . . The sheer size of EOSDIS is staggering; its intended scope far 
exceeds that of any previous civilian data management system. Over its 
lifetime, the system could accumulate a mass of data equivalent to more than 
1,000 times the amount of text stored in the Library of Congress.12 
  
The EOSDIS advisory panel struggled to find a balance between centralized 
hegemony and individualistic autonomy in their proposed architecture. They found 
their balance by casting EOSDIS not only as an infrastructure but also as a generalized 
socio-technical space in which scientists could produce knowledge. In contrast to a 
Latourian imperialist vision, EOSDIS planners made clear in their reports that they 
were not seeking to impose a top-down monopoly on the production of knowledge. 
“Individualized styles of research must be accommodated,” the EOSDIS advisory 
panel said. Yet, they insisted that “EOSDIS must become the logical integrator” of 
facilities and researchers that are “not now closely knit.”13 To accomplish this 
integration without hegemonic centralization and bureaucratization, the chair of the 
EOSDIS advisory panel encouraged the adoption of a “philosophy” that envisioned 
EOSDIS as a “place”:  
 
A view that EOSDIS is a thing, a piece of hardware supported by software, is 
fundamentally mistaken. EOSDIS is not a collection of hardware and 
software, it is a “place” where scientists communicate with each other and 
with the data they have collected with the help of engineering and operations 
disciplines. . . . It may even be correct to view EOSDIS as the place where the 
                                                  
11 U.S. General Accounting Office (1992a: 12-15). The two hundred thousand figure is from U.S. 
General Accounting Office (1995a: 3). 
12 U.S. General Accounting Office (1992b: 1). 
13 Dozier (1990: 12). The amount of text stored in the Library of Congress is generally said to be 
around 20 terabytes of information, for the purpose of these comparisons, if the Library of 
Congress were to digitize its holdings. 
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scientists produce information to be used by other scientists. EOSDIS must be 
run by scientists, for scientists.14 (emphasis in original) 
  
Scientists would both use and govern EOSDIS, and that, in this vision, would go a 
long way toward holding centralization and hegemony in check.  
Yet, this vision seemed to stipulate, as does much of the literature on 
epistemic communities, that scientists from around the world would be able to gather 
as a community into a single town hall and come out agreeing on how to produce 
knowledge about the earth. In this vision, EOSDIS would be run by something akin to 
scientist-philosopher Michael Polanyi’s “Republic of Science,” a polity in which the 
judgments of individual scientists were spontaneously checked and coordinated 
throughout the world only by other scientists via “the invisible hand.” 15 In NASA’s 
vision, that invisible hand would be EOSDIS. Whatever its mechanism of governance, 
the EOSDIS advisory panel as well as subsequent NASA scientists and engineers who 
spoke for EOSDIS portrayed the system’s “place” as not at NASA’s GSFC, but as 
spanning across the globe (e.g., figure 6.2), creating a coherent system of systems.16 
EOSDIS and its associated data and information systems were to help bring about a 
global order of knowledge production. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, when NASA Headquarters and the GSFC 
were planning EOSDIS and starting to define EOSDIS’s scope and requirements, 
MITI’s Earth Resources Satellite Data and Analysis Center (ERSDAC) had yet to 
begin a similar process for the ASTER instrument’s data and information system. 
ERSDAC was focusing on developing and operating the data and information system 
                                                  
14 Ibid., p. 10. This “overview and philosophy” of EOSDIS is also restated in NASA (1992: 
29-30). 
15 Polanyi (1962). In the context of the times in which it was originally asserted, Polanyi’s image 
of science was actually in reaction to populism. 
16 Dozier (1990: 14), NASA (1992: 10), and NASA (1993: 28). Recent architecture concept 
diagrams are also inclusive of systems funded and developed by other governments. See, for 
example, the work-in-progress architecture diagrams of NASA’s Interface Control Working Group 
(2002).  
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for the first Japanese Earth Resources Satellite (JERS-1), which was the satellite 
program that had prompted the establishment of the ERSDAC industry consortia in 
the early 1980s. JERS-1 was planned to launch in 1992, and ERSDAC’s development 
of JERS-1’s data and information system continued up until that launch date. The 
system, which was called the Earth Resources Satellite Data Information System (in 
line with the name of the JERS-1 satellite), was a substantial enterprise that was 
designed to receive, process, and distribute data from JERS-1’s radar and optical 
sensors.17  
JERS-1’s Earth Resources Satellite Data Information System required, 
however, only a small fraction of the resources that were anticipated to be required by 
EOSDIS—somewhere around ten managers, not a hundred; around a hundred 
scientists, engineers, and technicians, not a thousand; and less than a hundredth of the 
capital.18 Assuming that both the JERS-1 and EOS satellite programs went as planned, 
the Earth Resources Satellite Data Information System for JERS-1 would have 
involved less than a hundredth of EOSDIS’s users and would have handled well less 
than a ten thousandth of the information that EOSDIS was expected to process.19 In 
                                                  
17 Sōritsu jūnenshi henshū iinkai (1993: 140-149). 
18 Some readers might want to know the basis for this comparison. These estimates are rough and 
conservative, based upon the approximate workforce and equipment of NASA’s GSFC, the nine 
EOSDIS data centers, and their contractors, in comparison to the workforce of ERSDAC and the 
equipment for the Earth Resources Data Information System (Ibid.). 
19 This last comparison is based upon a conservative back-of-the-envelope calculation that almost 
certainly underestimates the difference in scale of the two data and information systems. Drawing 
upon information from the JERS-1 handbook (Jinkō eisei kaihatsu honbu chikyū kansoku eisei 
gurūpu 1991), the calculation compares the maximum possible throughput of the planned JERS-1 
satellite over the satellite’s expected life-span with the amount of data that EOSDIS was expected 
to accumulate. It then allows for NASA to process and distribute a hundred times more data for 
users, which is certainly a significant underestimate given the difference in the size of the user 
populations and given that NASA’s EOSDIS was expected to offer (and process) almost a hundred 
times the types of “data products” that JERS-1’s data information was expected to process (by 
“types” I mean different kinds of data products which represented different geophysical 
measurements).  
 302  
sum, EOSDIS would dwarf ERSDAC’s system for JERS-1. Similarly, EOSDIS would 
dwarf ERSDAC’s system for JERS-1’s successor, the ASTER instrument.  
If MITI, ERSDAC, and the Japan team were going to have any real power in 
their negotiations with NASA, GSFC, and the U.S. team over the design and 
operations of the data and information system for the ASTER instrument, the 
negotiations could not resemble “trials of strength” between Latourian “centers of 
calculation.” According to Latour’s account of the dynamics of technoscience, if 
Latour’s use of the words “size,” “scale,” and “length” to characterize the strength of a 
network means anything, U.S.-Japan technoscientific diplomacy over ASTER’s data 
and information system would necessarily end in NASA’s dominance, barring 
extraordinarily weak “associations” in NASA’s massive network. Yet, U.S.-Japan 
diplomacy did not end in NASA’s hegemony. U.S.-Japan technoscientific diplomacy 
was, nevertheless, laden with the exercise of power to an extent that is unrecognized 
and unaccounted for by both the “Republic of Science” vision and the epistemic 
communities approach. 
 
Designing the ASTER Data and Information System  
 
The “ASTER Centric” End-to-End Data System Concept 
 
 The U.S. and Japan science teams played significant roles in the design and 
operation of the ASTER data and information system. The two teams did not, however, 
engineer and build that data and information system from the ground up 
themselves—selecting all the hardware, testing and implementing all the computer 
systems, and writing all the layers of software code. It was GSFC and ERSDAC that 
had immediate design and contractor responsibility for the U.S. and Japan sides of the 
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ASTER data and information systems. NASA Headquarters expected the ASTER data 
and information system to be integrated with GSFC’s EOSDIS, which would have its 
own across-the-board requirements and standards for the dozens of data and 
information systems incorporated into its network. Yet, since the U.S. and Japan 
science teams were the ones who had initiated the ASTER collaboration at its broadest 
and were meeting regularly and extensively in the early 1990s, the two teams had the 
opportunity to become significantly involved in the process of developing the 
architecture of the ASTER remote-sensing system, including its data and information 
system. In the first half of the 1990s, many of the basic requirements for the ASTER 
data and information system were still being worked out. High-level documents such 
as the U.S.-Japan Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and the GSFC-ERSDAC 
Project Implementation Plan (PIP) for the ASTER data and information system were 
still being negotiated, with contributions from key members of the two teams. In 
addition, the development of EOSDIS lagged the development of the ASTER 
instrument as well as the rest of the instruments on EOS’s first satellite. Consequently, 
in the early 1990s the U.S. and Japan teams were asking questions and exploring 
solutions before GSFC and ERSDAC had settled upon their own answers, many of 
which would have in any case taken into consideration the preferences of the two 
teams. 
The U.S.-Japan ASTER data and information system was to be a well 
integrated, continuous system that allowed comprehensive interoperability across the 
Pacific between the U.S. and Japan sides.20 In 1992, David Nichols was appointed as 
JPL’s project manager for the “ASTER Science Project.” The “project” was JPL’s 
support for project management and engineering which the JPL management had 
                                                  
20 Remember that in the early 1990s, the hardware and software infrastructure for high-speed 
internet use was not yet available. The early, experimental versions of hypertext browsers such as 
Mosaic / Netscape Mosaic were not developed until 1994. 
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decided Anne Kahle needed in order to effectively carry out her work as the leader of 
the “U.S. ASTER Science Team.”21 The project included scientists, system engineers, 
and software engineers who were not themselves formal members of the U.S. ASTER 
science team, which was the team whose members had been directly designated and 
funded by NASA and/or MITI.22 One of David Nichols’s responsibilities as project 
manager was to help Kahle “ensure ASTER instrument applicability and contribution 
to EOS scientific objectives by influencing the development of instrument 
requirements and Ground Data System designs.”23 Almost from the beginning, the 
U.S. science team considered it to be their responsibility to be involved in the design 
work for the ASTER data and information system (i.e., the “Ground Data System” 
referenced in that last quote).  
In carrying out this responsibility, Nichols decided in the fall of 1992 that a 
“System Concept Document” was needed that would take an “ASTER centric 
end-[to-]end view of the system.”24 The need for a data system concept document had 
been mentioned in the data system working group at the fourth U.S.-Japan ASTER 
team meeting the previous summer, and it had become an action item of the working 
group for the U.S. side to write such a document and present it “to Japan for 
discussion.” 25  “ASTER centric” meant a perspective of the ASTER data and 
information system which looked outward from the ASTER instrument and the 
                                                  
21 Several interviewees at JPL informed me that JPL management had pressured Kahle into 
accepting this JPL support. The funding for this organizational and technical support would come 
out of NASA’s funding for the U.S. ASTER team, which were funds that were, once allotted, 
largely under the control of Kahle as the U.S. team leader. Although Kahle had reportedly 
expressed, initially at least, that she thought that such organizational support was excessive and 
would be a drain on NASA funds for the U.S. ASTER team, JPL management disagreed, and the 
JPL ASTER project came into being in early 1992. Interviewees preferred that this bit of 
information not be attributed to them. 
22 Nichols (1992b: 4).  
23 Nichols (1992d: 2). 
24 Nichols (1992a: 4).  
25 Data Receiving, Processing, Archiving and Distribution Working Group (1992a: 65). Data 
Receiving, Processing, Archiving and Distribution Working Group (1992b: 54).  
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ASTER team’s work. This perspective was not necessarily the perspective that was 
presumed by the system engineers at either MITI’s ERSDAC or GFSC’s EOSDIS or 
by NASA Headquarters. Nevertheless, this ASTER centric concept document was 
intended to be, and was in practice, “developed in conjunction with” the 
GSFC-ERSDAC PIP as well as the NASA-MITI MoU during the early 1990s.26 In the 
fall of 1992, the task of writing the concept document had landed in the lap of Gary 
Geller, a system engineer for the JPL ASTER project.27 Below, I quote at length his 
explanation of the purpose of the ASTER End-to-End Data System Concept Document 
to convey the general political sensibility of “ASTER centric” planning and 
coordination, and in particular, how Geller understood his role as a system engineer in 
the ASTER project: 
 
You know, people would ask me, you know, “what do you do?” I say, I, I, 
argue with people. Oh so you’re a lawyer! Oh, no, no, no, I’d say, I’m a 
system engineer in this project. Everyone has heard of that but people never 
have any idea of what that is, so I would explain with great simplification that 
there are all these different groups, some of them are at JPL, but within 
different cultures at JPL, some are somewhere else in the U.S., some are in 
Japan, some are at Goddard [i.e., GSFC], the funding agency, and so forth. 
And these groups don’t really like to talk to each other. Um, but they are all 
building different parts of the system, so if they don’t talk to each other, the 
system won’t work, because this guy will build it this way, but this guy will 
expect it that way. So, I would tell them what I would do is try to argue with 
people, but in a way that they didn’t know that we were having an 
argument. . . . Basically, since no one worked for me, I had to convince 
people to do the right thing, even though you had no real authority over them, 
especially if they were in Japan or were at Goddard or somewhere. So that’s 
kind of arguing, but they don’t know you are having an argument, um, to try 
to ensure that in the end you would have this continuity [in the data and 
information system]. So the purpose of this document [i.e., the End-To-End 
Data System Concept document] was not exactly to do this design, but to 
create a framework within which you could do the design, and also to figure 
out what you didn’t know, so you could earmark that as a gap that you would 
then need to fill in one way or another.28 
                                                  
26 Nichols (1992a: 4). See also Geller (2003) and Nichols (2001).  
27 Geller (1992). 
28 Geller (2003). 
 306  
 
In sum, the document was a high-level engineering document that was written to help 
foster national and international consensus around, and win authority for, an ASTER 
centric data and information system.29 
At the sixth U.S.-Japan team meeting in November 1993, Geller distributed 
the first draft of the ASTER End-to-End Data System Concept Document.30 That 
document included a draft of figure 6.3 (on the next two pages).31 This diagram of the 
ASTER data and information system, as well as the document’s accompanying 
description, highlighted the connections and data flows between Japan on the left and 
the United States on the right, with the ASTER instrument positioned on the 
international boundary (as chapters four and five have argued, the ASTER instrument 
did not in fact become a “boundary object”). The diagram was the U.S. team’s 
proposed architecture for the U.S.-Japan international relations that the ASTER data 
and information system would materialize. Both the Japan and U.S. teams eventually 
used later versions and variations of this diagram—typically a colorful Power Point 
version of it—to convey the basics of the U.S.-Japan relationship that they were 
building. They used versions and variations of this diagram not only in presentations 
to each other, but also in their presentations to broader audiences, such as to NASA 
                                                  
29 The document itself said as much as well. The introduction to the document read: “The purpose 
of this document is to establish a common understanding (among the U.S. Science Team members 
and the EOS Program and Project) of the operational end-to-end data system for the Advanced 
Spaceborne Thermal Emission and Reflection Radiometer (ASTER). . . . It is the responsibility of 
the AST [i.e., the ASTER Science Team] to understand all aspects of this end-to-end system so that 
the Team can 1) influence, to the extent possible, the design of this system to maximize the 
scientific utility of the ASTER mission, and 2) characterize the team’s responsibilities and 
interfaces with other organizations regarding the development and operations of particular pieces 
of this end-to-end system” (Geller 1994: 1). The draft of the document, which was distributed a 
year earlier, had an introduction with almost exactly the same wording. 
30 Geller (1993b). 
31 Figure 6.3 is actually a copy of the diagram from a later version of the concept document, Geller 
(1994). Because the first draft, version 1.0, included in it some connections and flows that this 
chapter does not discuss and which are of lesser importance to the overall development of the 
system’s architecture, I have used here the later, more polished version of the diagram. Differences 
between the draft and the later version are noted in the above discussion when relevant. 
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EOS project administrators, MITI officials, other earth scientists and space system 
engineers, and general users. Often the diagram was titled “U.S.-Japan Relations” in 
English or the equivalent in Japanese (nichibei kankei).32 
 
Symmetry and Interoperability 
 
The relationship between the United States and Japan in the design of the 
ASTER data and information system depicted in figure 6.3 was characterized by 
roughly symmetrical systems and capabilities and a high-level of interoperability, 
or—in the language of international politics—mirror imaging and interdependence. To 
show this mirror imaging and interdependence, I outline below how the end-to-end 
data and information system was basically supposed to work, according to the 
conceptual design of figure 6.3 and the ASTER End-to-End Data System Concept 
Document (the details of the system’s design and construction is unpacked later in the 
chapter).  
At the starting “end” of the end-to-end system at the bottom of the figure, 
users in either Japan or the United States place data acquisition requests (“DARs” in 
the figure) with their state’s distributed active archive center, that is, with their 
“DAAC” (in the figure, the acronym is expanded in a non-standard way, as a “data” 
active archive center). The DAAC in Japan is physically located at ERSDAC, and the 
DAAC in the United States is located in South Dakota, at the site of the U.S. 
Geological Survey’s Earth Resources Observation and Science Data Center.33 The 
                                                  
32 Nichols et al. (1995: 53); Watanabe et al. (1995: 35); Yamaguchi et al. (1999: 1420); Zaidan 
Hōjin Shigen Kankyō Kaisoku Kaiseki Sentā (1999: II-34); Kahle (2003b: 30); and Yamaguchi 
(2003: 12). 
33 While the U.S. DAAC for ASTER was located at the Earth Resources Observation and Science 
Data Center in South Dakota, the U.S. website for the data acquisition requests for ASTER as it 
turned out was hosted by NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center in Maryland.  
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data acquisition requests are then passed on to Japan’s instrument control center at 
ERSDAC (via Japan’s DAAC, for the case of data acquisition requests from the 
United States). The instrument control center in Japan creates an observation schedule 
for each orbit of the ASTER instrument, including where the instrument will look, 
when it will turn on and off, what observational modes it will use, etc.  
If a scheduling conflict arises that calls for the attention of the U.S. and/or 
Japan team, their respective Science Scheduling Support Group (“SSSG” in the 
diagram) can intervene. The U.S. and Japan teams can interact with Japan’s instrument 
control center through their instrument support terminals at JPL and ERSDAC. 
Breaking the symmetry in control capability, however, the U.S. team’s terminal at JPL 
would go through Japan’s terminal first. The U.S. team had initially wanted to be able 
to interact directly with the instrument control center in Japan from JPL, which would 
have preserved the symmetry in control relations between the two teams. When the 
request was made early on, however, NASA Headquarters and the GSFC made clear 
that they would not fund the extra cost of such an arrangement, given that the GSFC 
would have its own instrument support terminal for ASTER at the EOS Operations 
Center at the GSFC in Maryland. GSFC’s terminal would thus preserve some 
symmetry in control at the level of states. Once ASTER’s observation schedule is 
provisionally settled at Japan’s instrument control center, it is sent to the EOS 
Operations Center at the GSFC for integration with the commands for other 
instruments onboard the NASA satellites. The commands are then sent to the EOS 
satellite (“AM1” in the diagram) through the EOS Data and Operations Center in West 
Virginia (“EDOS” in the diagram) and through NASA’s tracking and data relay 
satellite system.   
After the ASTER instrument acquires its imagery data, the data are stored on 
the satellite’s data recorder and transmitted along with the rest of the satellite’s data 
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through NASA’s tracking and data relay satellite system and to ground receiving 
stations at NASA’s White Sands Complex in New Mexico. Japan also proposed that an 
alternative path be made available, using a direct downlink (“DDL” on the diagram) to 
Japan’s ground receiving stations in Japan (or possibly elsewhere). This direct 
downlink would have the advantage for Japan of not going through NASA’s systems, 
and thus would preserve another element of symmetry and national autonomy. The 
direct downlink would be more limited in the quantity of data that it could transmit 
than would the path through NASA’s systems, however, because the direct downlink 
would not utilize any kind of tracking and data relay satellite system when ground 
receiving stations were out of the satellite’s range during the satellite’s orbit around the 
earth.  
NASA’s station at the White Sands Complex forwards the satellite’s data to 
the Earth Data and Operations Center, which strips away data that are not relevant to 
the ASTER instrument and strings together the data that are relevant, generating what 
are called ASTER’s “level 0” data. The level 0 data are archived in the United States 
and are sent to Japan electronically. Japan’s DAAC at ERSDAC then uses the level 0 
data to produce level 1A and level 1B scenes of imagery.  
The distinction between level 1A and 1B is quite significant. In level 1B data, 
each of the thousands of pixels that compose an image scene is geometrically and 
radiometrically corrected. The image scene in level 1A data, however, is not 
geometrically and radiometrically corrected (“radiometric correction” refers both to 
the conversion of “raw data” into measurements that are related to standardized 
quantities and to the adjustment of “raw data” to compensate for changes in the 
sensor’s sensitivity; to “radiometrically correct” an instrument, the instrument must be 
“calibrated” periodically). According to all of the parties involved in the ASTER 
collaboration, the generation of information that is used to correct any particular level 
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1A scene requires calculations that are computationally intensive and complex, 
especially for the geometric correction. 34  Furthermore, the generation of this 
correction information also requires the changing sensitivity of each of ASTER’s three 
sensors to be characterized pre-flight and in-flight. Everyone involved expected that 
most users would prefer for the starting point of their use of the imagery data either the 
corrected level 1B “data product” or the “higher-level data products” that are 
calculated from the level 1 products. Because the level 1 data products are the staple of 
the ASTER data and information system, both the United States and Japan regarded 
level 1 processing as requiring significant computing resources. 
Higher-level data products—level 2 and higher—are data products that use 
lower-level data to calculate estimates of particular measurements that scientifically 
describe the earth’s surface. These measurements are often represented as an image. 
For example, one level 2 data product for the ASTER instrument was anticipated to be 
measurements of the earth’s surface temperature with a resolution of ninety meters 
(which is the resolution of ASTER’s thermal sensor). This difficult calculation 
involves, among other things, correcting level 1B data for “atmospheric effects”—that 
is, for what happens to electromagnetic waves as those waves travel from the earth’s 
surface to the sensor. One level 3 data product that was planned by both the U.S. and 
Japan teams was a three-dimensional digital elevation map of a scene of the earth’s 
surface. This data product would make use of data from the ASTER instrument’s two 
telescopes for the visible region of the electromagnetic spectrum in order to obtain a 
stereo view of the earth’s surface. From this stereo view an elevation map can be 
constructed.  
                                                  
34 For the sake of simplicity, my use of the term “geometric correction” includes the processes for 
spatially correcting the shortwave infrared sensor’s parallax and for spatially registering ASTER’s 
telescopes with each other. 
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In the definitional scheme of data product “levels,” a scheme that was based 
upon international practices in earth observation in the 1970s and 1980s and which 
NASA, its advisory groups, and EOSDIS tweaked in the early 1990s, each higher 
level of data is roughly another step away from the “raw data” that are produced by an 
instrument’s electronic response to the electromagnetic waves that hit the sensor while 
the sensor is orbiting in space. Getting from the ASTER instrument’s electronic 
response to meaningful and useful information about the earth’s surface was a core 
responsibility of the two teams.  
Once either or both of the states’ DAACs generated data products using 
algorithms that the two teams developed, the DAACs catalogue the data products and 
make them available to users who are authorized by each state. These users could 
include users from third-party states. The ASTER End-to-End Data System Concept 
Document envisioned the two DAACs and their catalogues as interoperable: the 
DAAC in the United States could, on behalf of U.S. users, request products from the 
DAAC in Japan, and vice-versa. The distribution and exchange of data would be in 
accordance with a general policy and pricing arrangement that was to be negotiated by 
states that were participating in the Earth Observing System (i.e., in what was called 
the “International Earth Observing System”). Such an EOS-wide data exchange policy 
was in its final stages but was still under negotiation when Geller and the U.S. team 
authored and distributed both the first version and final version of the ASTER 
End-to-End Data System Concept Document.35 
Although the concept document was, strictly speaking, just a JPL working 
document and not a document that the U.S. and Japan team leaders, or NASA’s GSFC 
and MITI’s ERSDAC, would finalize and jointly sign, it was nevertheless intended, 
according to its introduction, “to establish a common understanding (among the U.S. 
                                                  
35 Geller (1993b). 
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Science Team members and the EOS Program and Project)” of the ASTER data and 
information system. Furthermore, the U.S. team distributed the document to the Japan 
team and to ERSDAC for discussion, as the joint data system working group had 
requested when they initially called for the document in an action item.36 In my 
interview with Geller, I asked him what he and the U.S. team were hoping to 
accomplish by distributing the document to his Japanese counterparts, since according 
to the parenthetical in the above quote from the document’s introduction (see footnote 
29), the Japan team had not been included as the intended audience of the document: 
 
That’s a good question. I think [the intended audience] was primarily the U.S., 
and I think . . . what you said reminded me that was the other reason [for 
creating the document]. We wanted other people to look at this and make sure 
that they knew what other people were thinking, to line them up for this 
end-to-end continuity thing. But we wanted Japan to know what we were 
doing, so that if there was some problem we could resolve, but we don’t have 
any authority over them, and we didn’t want to offend them. So I think that’s 
why that parenthetical thing was in there, so that we could distribute it to 
them and make it clear that we were not telling them what to do, but if this 
doesn’t make sense, could you please let us know.  
   
Geller’s response conveys how these kinds of informal and conceptual working 
documents were shared diplomatically as resources for building international as well 
as national consensus, in the same way as the “trade night-for-day” matrix described in 
the previous chapter was passed from GSFC engineers to Miyazaki and ultimately 
served as a nucleation site after Miyazaki incorporated it into his plan for ASTER’s 
operational design.  
At the prodding of Nichols, who according to Kahle and Geller “liked 
documents,” the ASTER science project in the early 1990s authored several other JPL 
                                                  
36 Ibid., p. 1-1. I know that the U.S. team distributed the document to the Japan team not only 
because the document was included in the minutes of the 6th team meeting, but also because 
members of the Japan team were listed on the document’s distribution list and because I saw copies 
of the document in the offices of members of the Japan team. 
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working documents that informally were disseminated to the Japan team for their 
consideration.37 These documents concerned the U.S. team’s plans for the ASTER 
data and information system and were in addition to presentations that they exchanged 
during team and working group meetings. They included the ASTER Team Member 
Algorithm Software Development Guidelines (1992), the Product Generation System 
Concept (1993), and DAR Generation and Processing Concepts (1994).38 In contrast, 
informal working documents that members of the Japan team or ERSDAC authored 
made their way over to the U.S. team much less commonly. One of the few examples 
was User Interface Requirements Document Overview (1993). The document was 
authored by Satō Isao, who was a scientist at the Geological Survey of Japan, a 
member of the Japan team, and the chair of ERSDAC’s advisory committee for the 
ASTER Ground Data System Committee.39 Satō’s document, which was an English 
version of a Japanese original, was presented and distributed to the two teams at the 
sixth team meeting, just after the distribution of the first draft of Geller’s document. 
The timing of the distribution of the two documents was almost as if their distribution 
were an exchange of think pieces.40 Yet, whereas Geller’s document presented a broad 
view of the ASTER data and information system, including an end-to-end architecture, 
data acquisition procedures, and geometric and radiometric calibration plans, thus 
staking out broad and substantial territory for the two teams’ discussion and joint 
jurisdiction vis-à-vis their two respective data and information system bureaucracies, 
Satō’s document focused more narrowly on what features ERSDAC should include in 
the user interface to ERSDAC’s DAAC.  
                                                  
37 Kahle (2003) and Geller (2003). 
38 Voge and Larson (1992); Voge (1993); and Borutzki (1994). 
39 Satō (1993).  
40 ASTER Science Team (1993a). 
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This contrast in scope was one of many contrasts that denoted the different 
demands placed upon, and ambitions of, the two teams. While both of these working 
documents were valuable to try to get everyone on the same page before the formal 
documents were settled, members of the U.S. science team and the JPL project could 
hold out these working documents to JPL and NASA management as work that had 
been accomplished in the early development stages of a project. In the parlance of 
project management, they could be pointed to as “deliverables.”41 Members of the 
Japan science team, as advisors to ERSDAC, had no pressing need to produce 
time-marking and place-holding deliverables, especially if those deliverables had to be 
written in a language that was not their native language. Moreover, members of the 
U.S. team, in creating an “ASTER centric” discussion of the ASTER data and 
information system, were opening issues for negotiation vis-à-vis Japan which 
ERSDAC might have otherwise assumed as its prerogative. Influencing the 
development of the ASTER remote-sensing system was, after all, what the U.S. team 
had been charged to do from the beginning by NASA Headquarters. The members of 
the Japan team were, rather, to serve as advisors to ERSDAC (and to JAROS, for 
issues that concerned the instrument), to act as a neutral party among ERSDAC’s 
contractors, and to fulfill NASA’s requirement for the participation of a “science 
team.” As late as December 1992, a year before Geller’s concept document was 
distributed, MITI had still preferred that team cooperation and science obligations be 
left to a more “flexible” agreement, rather than be included in the more “rigid” MoU 
that they felt was necessary for the instrument and data processing arrangements.42 
 
 
                                                  
41 See, for example, Nichols (1994: 8) and Pniel (1994: 13). 
42 The quotes are the words of MITI’s project manager for ASTER at the time. See Yokota (1991: 
50), and see also Kahle (1992b: 13). 
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The U.S.-Japan Memorandum of Understanding and Clean Interfaces 
 
While Geller’s End-to-End Data System Concept Document raised many 
issues for discussion between the two teams as well as with other parties for the 
purpose of constructing the continuous and interoperable flow of the ASTER data and 
information system, the MoU that was under negotiation from 1992 to 1996 between 
the international office at NASA Headquarters and MITI emphasized “clean 
interfaces.”43 The MoU’s writing of clean interfaces agreed with the symmetry and 
mirror imaging of the ASTER End-to-End Data System Concept Document. First, the 
form of the MoU highlighted the symmetry and mirror imaging of responsibility 
between the two states. For example, Article 3 listed the “Programmatic 
Responsibilities of NASA,” and Article 4 listed the “Programmatic Responsibilities of 
MITI.” Paragraph D of section 2 of Article 3 stated that NASA would use “its best 
efforts” to “designate a National Data Node in the United States to be responsible for 
international coordination, connection and transfer of data between the data systems of 
the Parties.”44 Likewise, paragraph D of section 2 of Article 4 stated that MITI would 
use “its best efforts” to “designate a National Data Node in Japan, the Earth Remote 
Sensing Data Analysis Center (ERSDAC), to be responsible for international 
coordination, connection and transfer of data between data systems of the Parties.”45  
The MoU was in this way generally symmetrical in both its organization and 
substance, but it was not completely symmetrical. For example, Japan was providing 
the instrument, and the United States was providing the satellite platform. The United 
States would be doing most of the level 0 processing (if the direct downlink was not 
                                                  
43 Chapter two discusses a philosophy of “clean interfaces” as central to the NASA international 
office’s management of international collaboration. 
44 Article 3, section 2, paragraph D in NASA and MITI (1996). 
45 Article 4, section 2, paragraph D in Ibid. 
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used), and Japan would be doing most of the level 1A processing, and these and other 
asymmetries would leave openings for the potential exercise of power. Yet, U.S.-Japan 
symmetry was a dominant organizing theme of the MoU as well as of the end-to-end 
document. 
 This organizing theme of symmetry in the discourse of these documents was 
also a principle that guided the design and development of the ASTER data and 
information system in practice. For example, when GSFC and ERSDAC met to 
discuss the system engineering of the ASTER data and information system, as they did 
regularly from 1993 onward, the GSFC regularly pushed for symmetry and mirror 
imaging in design. At one such meeting in 1993, GSFC’s objective for the meeting 
was “to define (to the greatest extent possible) the system-level interfaces needed to 
ensure interoperability between EOSDIS and Japan’s ASTER ground data system [i.e., 
Japan’s data and information system for ASTER].”46 In an internal talking points 
memo that was passed via e-mail around in preparation for the meeting, the GSFC’s 
lead for the ASTER data and information system, Mathew Schwaller, who was also 
the lead U.S. negotiator for the data and information system’s PIP, instructed 
participants to push for symmetry based upon NASA standards: 
  
At present, MITI is developing an RFP [i.e., Request For Proposals from 
contractors] for its ASTER GDS [i.e., Ground Data System]. In fact, a 
number of MITI’s potential ASTER GDS contractors will be present at the 
meeting (see list). Thus, we have the opportunity to present EOSDIS design 
philosophy, architecture, functionality, standards, and operating procedures to 
a receptive audience at the earliest stages of their system design. 
 
In the effort to ensure compatibility between ASTER GDS and EOSDIS, I 
believe that we should use this meeting as to recommend and encourage MITI 
to adopt as much of the EOSDIS design as possible. Thus, I would like 
speakers to be explicit about defining EOSDIS standards, procedures and 
protocols, especially as they relate to the ASTER GDS. Please specify 
EOSDIS-wide standards, for example, in open systems (UNIX/POSIX), 
                                                  
46 Schwaller (1993c). 
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software generation (C, FORTRAN, use of the EOSDIS software toolkit, data 
distribution formats, media), network protocols, etc.47 
 
In an e-mail to NASA Headquarters which alerted the EOS Project Scientists and 
others of his objective for the meeting, Schwaller was even more to the point: “To the 
greatest extent possible, MITI’s ASTER GDS shall be functionally identical to the 
ASTER GDS at EDC [i.e., NASA’s DAAC]. . . . MITI’s ASTER GDS shall be as 
DAAC-like as possible” (emphasis in original).48 In interviews, Schwaller and Glenn 
Iona, another key person for ASTER issues at the GSFC, both called my attention to 
how the architecture of the functional systems in Japan did indeed come to resemble 
that of EOSDIS, even down to the naming of the components of the system, which 
were named in English using the English alphabet (i.e., the Roman alphabet) before 
they were named in Japanese (in katakana) as loan words.49 The architecture that 
ERSDAC adopted for their side of the ASTER data and information system was a 
departure from the data and information system that they had developed for their 
JERS-1 satellite in the early 1990s, even if not a radical one in terms of its functional 
organization.50 The U.S.-Japan symmetry and mirror imaging—which often meant 
standardization—were central organizing themes of the design of the ASTER data and 
information system. 
Unlike the end-to-end concept document, the MoU did not try to address the 
actual flows and interfaces between the United States and Japan, opting instead to 
leave those more technical questions for lower-level documents, such as the 
end-to-end concept document, the GSFC-ERSDAC PIP, interface requirement 
documents, and interface control documents. Thus, while the MoU certainly provided 
                                                  
47 Schwaller (1993c). 
48 Schwaller (1993d). 
49 Schwaller (2001) and Iona (2001). 
50 This can be judged by comparing Sōritsu jūnenshi henshū iinkai (1993: 140-149) and ERDSIS 
in ASTER Science Team (1992a: 377) with Watanabe et al. (1995).  
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policy guidance on many issues (e.g., data exchange and access policy), it was silent 
on many significant issues as well, usually intentionally. For example, after examining 
figure 6.3 and reading its description in the end-to-end concept document, one might 
wonder if the data products distributed in the United States were going to be the same 
as the data products distributed in Japan. Would the United States and Japan distribute 
the same kinds of data products? And if the two states distributed the same kinds of 
data products, would their calculations need to agree? Or would the user get different 
scientific measurements depending upon whether or not the scene was processed in the 
United States or Japan? If the quality of the products were different, might then users 
prefer to order (and pay for) data products from one provider but not from the other?  
The MoU was intentionally silent on the potentially consequential issue of 
higher-level data product standardization. The document explicitly endorsed symmetry 
and asserted clean interfaces, but it did not speak to international standardization (both 
NASA and MITI preferred international standardization, as long as they each could set 
the standard). So, rather than addressing the important details of the flows and 
interfaces, the MoU wrote symmetry and clean interfaces into the data and information 
system: 
 
[NASA would] make available to MITI the algorithm software (source code 
and documentation), compatible with EOSDIS standards, used by NASA to 
produce ASTER standard data products, according to a schedule defined in 
the jointly-developed Project Implementation Plan.51 
 
[MITI would] make available to NASA the algorithm software (source code 
and documentation), in accordance with EOSDIS standards, used by MITI to 
produce ASTER higher level standard data products, according to a schedule 
defined in the jointly-developed Project Implementation Plan.52 
 
                                                  
51 Article 3, section 2, paragraph C(5) in NASA and MITI (1996). 
52 MoU, Article 4, section 2, paragraph C(5) in Ibid. 
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To be clear, the language of “standard” data products in the U.S.-Japan MoU did not 
mean products internationally standardized between the United States and Japan. A 
“standard” data product, as defined in the MoU, was a data product that was 
“generated as a part of a research investigation, of wide research utility, accepted by 
IWG [i.e., EOS’s Investigators Working Group, a high-level scientific advisory body 
to NASA] and the EOS Program Office [at NASA Headquarters], routinely produced, 
and in general, spatially and/or temporally extensive data products.”53 Thus, when 
MITI signed the MoU, they signed on to the discursive constraint of being able to 
label a data product a “standard” data product only if NASA Headquarters and its EOS 
advisory bodies approved that product as a “standard” data product. Standard data 
products were not stipulated in the MoU as data products that are standardized 
between the United States and Japan, if corresponding products were produced by 
each state’s DAAC. Thus, according to the MoU, there could be U.S. “standard” 
products and Japan “standard” products, and these products would not necessarily be 
standardized with each other. Furthermore, if MITI or ERSDAC wanted to develop a 
data product and not run it through the NASA approval process to receive the 
“standard” label, then they could call that data product a “semi-standard” or 
“specialized” data product. 
This silence in the MoU about standardization was not an oversight. The lead 
negotiator of the MoU for NASA Headquarters recalled that:  
 
Certainly NASA HQ did not REQUIRE the science team to standardize level 
2 algorithms and products—that [would be] the science team's decision. My 
recollection is that the US side thought it could do a better job [on the data 
products] but wanted to be able to learn what the Japanese were doing as well 
in hopes of achieving a standard product [i.e., standardized 
internationally]. We would not have required [international] standardization 
                                                  
53 Appendix 2 in Ibid. 
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for fear of being "stuck" with a product the US community might not have 
been satisfied with.54 (emphasis in original) 
 
Thus, while the MoU, and to a lesser extent the GSFC-ERSDAC PIP that was 
negotiated between 1993 and 1997, mapped out general responsibilities for the United 
States and Japan in a symmetrical way and asserted clean interfaces for data sharing 
and exchange, it was left to the technoscientific diplomacy of the U.S. and Japan 
teams, as well as to GSFC and ERSDAC personnel and their contractors, to specify 
and build symmetry and interoperability into the U.S.-Japan relations of their 
ASTER-centric, end-to-end data and information system. 
 
Configuring an International Political Economy 
 
 As the U.S. and Japan science teams, their respective centers (i.e., GSFC and 
ERSDAC), and those centers’ contractors went about designing and building ASTER’s 
data and information system, they also were at the same time bringing into existence 
an international order. In particular, they were configuring an international political 
economy. I use here the word “configuring” instead of “designing” for two reasons. 
First, “configure” can be used as a synonym for “design.” In some ways the U.S. and 
Japan teams and their sponsors were intentionally and self-consciously designing an 
international political economy. Yet, second, an international political economy was 
not the system that the two teams saw themselves as designing during most of their 
work.  
The word “configure” suggests an action that is less intimate, less total, and 
less fixed than “design,” that is, a more provisional arranging of components and an 
adjusting of settings, perhaps so that someone can get on with what he or she really 
                                                  
54 Shaffer (2006). 
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wants to do. Think of when the settings of a computer system or of a new software 
program such as an internet browser are configured and re-configured so that it can be 
interacted with and used as one wishes. Typical users are only occasionally interested 
in their computer’s configuration, usually when it is causing them problems. That is 
not the stereotypical attitude of the engineer who “designed” the computer system. 
When users do become interested, it is not unusual for them to be intensely interested. 
That, I argue, captures how most of the members of the two teams and their colleagues 
were interacting with the international political economy that was emerging with the 
data and information system that they were designing. As they developed their ASTER 
data and information system, they confronted and solved problems of international 
order, and in particular, problems that concerned the international political economy of 
ASTER’s scientific data. When they designed and built their data and information 
system, they configured that international political economy.  
The term “international political economy” is not one that members of the 
U.S. or Japan team themselves used to describe what they were either designing or 
configuring. They did use, however, the terms “production” and “consumption” 
throughout their discussions of the ASTER data and information system.55 Moreover, 
“data products” were often at the center of their attention. Despite the two teams’ lack 
of use of the term “international political economy,” they were configuring organized 
interactions of consumption, production, and distribution around scarcity, organized 
interactions that were among states, their researchers, and hundreds, if not thousands, 
of other consumers of ASTER’s remote-sensing data.56  
The two teams not only configured these interactions. As liminal state actors, 
they enacted an international political economy in both senses of the word “enact”: 
                                                  
55 For example, Tsu and Kahle (1997: 10); Okada (2003b: slide 37). 
56 Gilpin (2001) adopts a similar definition for “global” political economy (e.g., p. 17-18). 
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“establish” as well as “acted out.” The configuration and enactment of this 
international political economy was a political as well as a technical achievement. 
Here is a brief outline of the order of this international political economy:57 
Scarcity: The number of ASTER’s observations was limited. For 
each pass from north to south in its polar orbit around the earth, ASTER could 
acquire data for only about eight percent of the time. Furthermore, ASTER 
had three telescopes that could be operated independently, one each for the 
visible, shortwave infrared, and thermal regions. Each of these telescopes 
could point at an angle of differing degrees. Owing, however, to the design 
specifications for the ASTER instrument for “wear and tear” and to other 
operational specifications, some of which the previous chapter described, the 
two teams regarded the number of times that these telescopes could be 
pointed to be limited over a given orbit as well as over the instrument’s life. 
So, not only were the number of ASTER’s observations limited, but so were 
the number of times that it could point. 
Consumption: The consumers of ASTER’s imagery could order data 
from either NASA’s DAAC in the United States or from ERSDAC’s DAAC 
in Japan (see figure 6.3). Many issues revolved around consumption: who 
would be ASTER’s authorized users? (only researchers? what about 
industry?); how would these users go about ordering data? (could users in 
United States and in Japan order data from either NASA or ERSDAC?); how 
much data could users request? (could team members request more data than 
other users?); and what price would be charged? (would NASA and ERSDAC 
charge the same price?). All of these issues were negotiated through 
                                                  
57 Morrison (1993); Geller (1994); Nichols et al. (1995); Watanabe et al. (1995); Yamaguchi et al. 
(1999); and Satō et al. (1999). 
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technoscientific diplomacy in some way, even after NASA and international 
EOS participants signed a high-level data exchange policy in 1996. 
Production: According to the ASTER End-to-End Data System 
Concept Document, once a user requested data, either ERSDAC’s DAAC or 
NASA’s DAAC would handle the request. If the requested data were not 
already archived by those systems from previous observations, then the data 
and information system would need to generate a data acquisition request (i.e., 
a DAR). Because the ASTER team anticipated that users’ requests would 
conflict, the requests would need to be evaluated and compared with each 
other before the instrument’s observation schedule for a given day could be 
determined. The scheduling process was expected to be a massive daily 
calculation that would take into account, among other things, constructs of 
users’ categories, the requirements of thousands of requests for data, and 
real-time operational conditions, such as what operation the instrument last 
performed and where clouds were predicted to be that day. After the requested 
scene was observed by the instrument, the imagery data would need to be 
processed. Which DAAC would do that processing? Would the types of 
higher-level data products offered by the two DAACs be similar? When both 
DAACs offered the same type of data product, would the data that they 
produced be identical? How much processing would be done by each DAAC? 
Distribution: Finally, depending upon what scenes were requested 
and what type of processing had been requested for those scenes, the imagery 
data might need to be passed between NASA’s and ERSDAC’s DAACs for 
different kinds of processing before the data product was distributed to the 
user who had requested it. Would the two DAACs be able to do this sharing? 
That is, would the two DAACs be interoperable? The End-to-End Data 
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System Concept Document implied that they would, especially the draft 
version in 1993, but the MoU that was eventually signed in 1996 was silent 
about the particulars of the international flows. The MoU just connoted that 
the interfaces would be “clean interfaces.” 
 
A Partnership in Production 
 
 This section examines the two teams’ technoscientific diplomacy of designing 
and developing symmetry, interoperability, and international standardization into two 
“production” flows: the production of the level 1A and 1B data products and the 
production of two closely-intertwined higher-level data products, namely the 
temperature and emissivity of the earth’s surface, both of which are level 2 data 
products. It argues that the practice of technoscientific diplomacy in the design and 
development of these two production flows illustrates three of this chapter’s 
contentions. First, the transnational authority of the ASTER team did in practice 
extend via technoscientific diplomacy from the two teams’ negotiations over ASTER’s 
operational design into the design of the ASTER data and information system writ 
large, as the “ASTER centric” End-to-End Data System Concept Document envisioned. 
The moves and strengths of the two states’ “centers of calculation,” ERSDAC and 
GSFC, explain neither the epistemic core of the production of the data products (e.g., 
their algorithms) nor the architecture of the ASTER data and information system, as 
Latourian actor-network theory implies that they should. The two teams’ 
technoscientific diplomacy better accounts for the epistemic core and architecture of 
the ASTER data and information system, especially for the ways in which the ASTER 
data and information system extended outward from the two teams’ negotiations rather 
than inward from the two states’ centers of calculation.  
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Second, in contrast to the dynamics of epistemic communities which are 
assumed by the epistemic communities approach, the practice of the two teams’ 
technoscientific diplomacy pragmatically, and sometimes strategically, took into 
account each state’s political-economic power relative to the other state. Power and 
politics were (unavoidably) part of enacting a system for producing scientific data. 
Moreover, it is difficult to argue that the arrangements for these production flows and 
data products (as well as for other data products, I would argue) can be explained by a 
process in which members of a transnational epistemic community relayed consensus 
views to decisionmakers who then did the consequential negotiating. Rather, the 
designs of these two production flows were shaped in crucial ways by the two teams’ 
technoscientific diplomacy that involved the assertion and ascription of state power as 
well as the consideration of scientific and technical claims.  
Third, the two teams, and especially the U.S. team, advanced in their 
technoscientific diplomacy a normative notion of U.S.-Japan partnership, initially at 
least for strategic reasons. Nevertheless, they continued to enact it as a prescriptive 
principle for their collaboration when the professional interests of members of each 
team and the national interests of each team’s state no longer presented compelling 
reasons for advancing such a normative notion. 
 
The Level 1 Compromise: Product and Process 
 MITI’s “baseline” configuration in 1991 for the ASTER level 1 data 
production flows stated that “all level 1 ASTER data” (emphasis mine) would be 
generated and archived in Japan and that “level 1 data” would be transferred to the 
United States. Note in that second quote the absence of an “all.” The kind and quantity 
of level 1 data that would be transferred to the United States went unspecified in 
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MITI’s baseline configuration.58 The “all” in the first quote, and its absence in the 
second, were potentially very significant. The “all” in the first quote could mean a 
daily volume of as many as 780 scenes for level 1A and then another 780 scenes for 
level 1B—with each scene being sixty kilometers square, comprising imagery from all 
three sensors and their fourteen spectral bands, with a resolution that varied according 
to the particular ASTER sensor (fifteen meters for the visible sensor’s three spectral 
bands, thirty meters for the shortwave infrared sensor’s six spectral bands, and ninety 
meters for the thermal sensor’s five spectral bands). That volume would amount to 
about eighty gigabytes of data to process each day for level 1A alone. The absence of 
the “all” in the second quote meant that MITI had not yet agreed to transfer to the 
United States any or all of the computationally-intensive, hardware-dependent, 
geometrically and radiometrically corrected level 1B data.  
Taking on the primary responsibility for level 1 data production could bring 
both costs and benefits for MITI and ERSDAC, costs and benefits that were 
understood in their gist by those involved in the ASTER collaboration in the United 
States and Japan.59 Although it is not unusual in 2006 for eighty gigabytes of data to 
fit onto the hard drive of a personal computer, in the mid-1990s to store that amount of 
data on a daily basis and run it through computationally complex processes each day 
required expensive parallel-processing machines and storage systems, with costs 
totaling well into the millions of dollars for the equipment and maintenance. In a 1998 
article, ERSDAC described the volume of ASTER level 1 data to be processed each 
day as “huge” and as a major engineering challenge.60 Any increase (or decrease) in 
                                                  
58 MITI (1991: 10-3). When MITI originally proposed to NASA in 1987 to provide an instrument 
for EOS, they had also proposed to produce level 1A and 1B data. Producing level 1A and 1B data 
was an up-front requirement for every EOS instrument and its provider (NASA 1988b: 19). 
59 For example, the following interviews: Abrams (2003), Eng (2001, 2003), Iona (2001), Fujisada 
(2003), Schwaller (2001), Watanabe (2003), and Yamaguchi (2002). 
60 Watanabe et al. (1998: 45). 
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processing requirements would lead to an increase (or decrease) in the funding that 
was required.  
Yet, some of the general benefits for MITI and ERSDAC of producing this 
level 1 data, while less tangible than the costs, were also widely agreed upon on both 
sides of the Pacific.61 First, everyone involved thought it made good sense for the 
state that had built and provided the instrument to hold the primary responsibility of 
generating level 1 data, especially since the task of correcting the data required 
detailed pre-flight and in-orbit characterization of the sensitivity of the instrument’s 
sensors. Unless exceptionally elaborate measures were taken well in advance of launch, 
the sensors’ makers would need to assist in this characterization. Second, for MITI, 
ERSDAC, the corporate members of ERSDAC, and the Japan team, producing level 1 
data would ensure that they could access and use ASTER data relatively 
unencumbered by the United States. Third, MITI and ERSDAC hoped to recoup some 
of their costs by selling ASTER data, not only to their domestic industry, but to 
everyone to whom they could sell it, worldwide. To effectively sell ASTER level 1 
imagery, ERSDAC reasonably judged that it needed to be the primary provider of that 
imagery. I know of no one who disagreed with that business judgment. To what degree 
ERSDAC needed to be the exclusive provider of level 1 imagery to sell it effectively 
was up for debate. And that is where ERSDAC’s level 1 production plans, particularly 
the question of what data would be transferred to the U.S. DAAC—which went 
unspecified in MITI’s baseline configuration—intertwined with NASA’s preferred data 
exchange policy and the plans of the U.S. team for producing level 1 data products.  
 NASA Headquarters, from the beginning of EOS planning, pushed for EOS 
data to be open for wide-spread research use at no more than the marginal cost of 
                                                  
61 Again, the following interviews: Abrams (2003), Eng (2003), Iona (2001), Fujisada (2003), 
Schwaller (2001), Watanabe (2003), and Yamaguchi (2002). 
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producing and delivering the data product (my emphasis). Team members and data 
centers would have no period in which they would have exclusive access to the data. 
All “research users” who were authorized as such by states participating in EOS would 
have open and equal access to all archived data, according to the data exchange policy 
that NASA planned. A draft of this policy was circulated and discussed among 
members of the U.S. and Japan ASTER teams as early as their first joint meeting in 
1990.62 Policy for commercial users and for non-research users residing outside the 
states that were participating in EOS (namely, outside Canada, Europe, Japan, and the 
United States) went unsettled, however, throughout much of the 1990s. It was largely 
left in the hands of each state to decide in accordance with that state’s national laws 
and policy.  
In the United States, the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 directed 
that all users, including commercial users, be charged “the cost of fulfilling user 
requests” (i.e., the data product’s marginal cost) for the level 1 data that were to be 
received from the next Landsat satellite, which would be launched in the late 1990s 
around the same time as ASTER. 63  In addition, the Act declared that the 
“development of the remote sensing market and the provision of commercial 
value-added services based on remote sensing data should remain exclusively the 
function of the private sector.”64 While certainly judged as relevant to ASTER by key 
members of the U.S. and Japan teams, what these two statements meant precisely for 
NASA’s preferred policy regarding the distribution of ASTER data to commercial 
                                                  
62 ASTER Science Team (1990: 1, 15-16); IEOS Data Exchange Principles in NASA and MITI 
(1996). 
63 According to section 5602, paragraph 2, of the Act, “the term 'cost of fulfilling user requests' 
means the incremental costs associated with providing product generation, reproduction, and 
distribution of unenhanced data in response to user requests and shall not include any acquisition, 
amortization, or depreciation of capital assets originally paid for by the United States Government 
or other costs not specifically attributable to fulfilling user requests.” Land Remote Sensing Policy 
Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-555, at 15 U.S.C., section 5601 et seq. 
64 Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-555, section 5601, paragraph 15.  
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users was not clear to Japan in the early 1990s.65 By the time the MoU was signed in 
1996, however, ERSDAC and members of the Japan team had read the Act as well as 
the language about marginal cost in the ASTER MoU and had expected that NASA’s 
pricing policy for users who were not sponsored by, or affiliated with, the EOS 
programs of member states—including research users as well as commercial 
users—would be charged the marginal cost of the data product.66 They expected that 
many EOS and other government-funded users, but no one else, might receive from 
NASA their ASTER data free of charge, taking advantage of the explicit “no more 
than” marginal cost wording that was eventually included in the MoU. 
 Given the goals of the EOS program and the U.S. Congress’s emphasis as 
expressed in the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act on distributing level 1 data 
inexpensively and widely to foster a value-added services industry for remote sensing 
data, NASA and its DAACs had little or no reason to try to become the exclusive 
provider of ASTER level 1 imagery. NASA was not operating on the quasi-business 
model that the ERSDAC consortia was.67 In fact, NASA’s baseline configuration had 
been that ERSDAC would not only process all of the level 1A and 1B data but, in 
contradistinction to MITI’s baseline, would also make all of data available for 
shipping to the U.S. DAAC.68 What NASA wanted to ensure was that the U.S. DAAC 
would contain as much quality level 1 data product as was possible for the least 
possible cost, for the purpose of archiving it for the record and for distributing it 
promptly to EOS researchers. For NASA, the answer to the question of where that 
                                                  
65 Abrams (2001, 2003) and Yamaguchi (2002). As late as February 1993, NASA Headquarters 
and MITI had not discussed pricing policy with respect to commercial users (Shaffer 1993a). 
66 Watanabe (2003) and Yamaguchi (2002). 
67 Interviews: Abrams (2001), Iona (2001), Pneil (2001), and Schwaller (2001). As early as 1993, 
NASA and GSFC did discuss the possibility of charging for ASTER data, at no more than the cost 
of fulfilling the user’s request. See, for example, Schwaller (1993a) and Shaffer (1993a). 
Throughout the 1990s, EOSDIS and its DAAC for ASTER neither designed nor implemented a 
billing and accounting system for charging for ASTER imagery. See, in particular, Iona (2001).  
68 Geller (1993a: DD3). 
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level 1A and 1B imagery should be produced should be “based primarily on cost 
effectiveness.”69 In the spring of 1992, Daniel Goldin had become the new NASA 
Administrator under the slogan of “faster, better, cheaper;” NASA’s EOS program was 
entering its “descoping” phase as a result of Congressional budget reductions; and the 
budgets for GSFC’s EOSDIS, which included the U.S. DAAC for ASTER, were 
beginning to tighten. NASA and GSFC did not want to pay for more processing 
capacity than it really needed.  
In light of these expressed preferences of MITI/ERSDAC and NASA/GSFC, 
everyone expected that ERSDAC could be counted on to produce at least all of the 
level 1A imagery (i.e., at a maximum of 780 scenes a day).70 The questions in the 
early 1990s which concerned Japan’s production activities were: whether or not 
ERSDAC was going to produce routinely the computationally-intensive, corrected 
level 1B data product (ERSDAC could, alternatively, produce level 1B “on-demand” 
as it was ordered); how much of the level 1B data would ERSDAC produce, either 
routinely or on-demand; and what kind of data and how much data would ERSDAC 
pass to the U.S. DAAC. The questions for the U.S. side in the early 1990s were: 
whether or not the U.S. DAAC would produce the level 1A and/or the corrected level 
1B data (for the latter data, the U.S. DAAC would need to receive regularly from 
Japan information that was required to characterize the changing sensitivity of the 
instrument’s sensors); if the U.S. DAAC were going to produce level 1A and/or 1B 
data, would the U.S. produce it routinely or as needed (i.e., “on-demand” when an 
order came in); and whether or not the U.S. DAAC would rely upon ERSDAC for any 
                                                  
69 Geller (1992: N6). 
70 Japan’s team leader announced Japan’s intention to process all level 1A imagery at the first joint 
ASTER team meeting in November 1990 (ASTER Science Team 1990: 8). That level 1A 
processing was also included in MITI’s “baseline” execution plan in 1991 (MITI 1991: 10-3). 
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data, and if so, for how much data. Each side’s answers to these questions needed to be 
compatible with the other side’s answers, if any data were going to be produced.71 
It was left to the U.S. and Japan teams to sort out many of these crucial issues 
and to configure U.S.-Japan data production in the international political economy of 
ASTER data. The U.S. team in particular weighed in heavily on whether or not the 
United States should rely upon ERSDAC to produce quality level 1A and/or 1B data 
products. If the United States could not, the United States would need to produce level 
1A and/or 1B data products, potentially threatening the realization of MITI’s business 
and market-building ambitions, not to mention throwing a blow to the scientific 
credibility of ERSDAC’s data products. The Japan team and ERSDAC needed to 
decide just what level 1 data it was willing to share with the United States (the 
corrected 1B or only 1A?) and how it was going to do so. Provided the United States 
deemed Japan’s level 1 production reliable, the more data Japan shared with the 
United States, the less the United States would seem to need to produce level 1 data on 
                                                  
71 Some kind of techno-political interdependency existed between the United States and Japan in 
every hypothetical configuration for data production. Take the highly-improbable and extreme “go 
it alone” configuration. The United States could not completely go it alone in data production. For 
geometric and radiometric correction, the U.S. DAAC required periodic information regarding the 
changing sensitivity of the sensors. Unless extraordinary measures were taken well in advance, 
only Japan could provide this information, since its contractors had physically built and 
characterized the instrument. In the extreme “go it alone” configuration, Japan would not provide 
that crucial information to the United States if the United States produced data of a kind and of a 
volume that clearly relegated Japan to being a secondary provider of the staple data products of the 
ASTER instrument, an instrument that the Government of Japan funded. On the other hand, Japan 
could not go it alone (and not share data with the United States), because—if push came to 
shove—the United States had the option of not sending the level 0 data to Japan. Only the U.S. 
received the level 0 data that were transmitted from the instrument by the NASA host satellite. 
U.S.-Japan interdependency becomes more complex as more cooperation is planned (for the 
purpose of realizing, for example, cost-savings through data sharing). Given the political and 
technical considerations that have been described so far in the chapter, the reader can construct 
many other configurations of interdependency for varying degrees of cooperation.  
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its own, unless it turned out that it was simply cheaper to process it in the United 
States than to ship it from Japan.72  
The U.S. team in the fall of 1992 leaned toward producing in the United 
States some portion of, if not all of, ASTER’s level 1 data. At a U.S. team meeting in 
November 1992, U.S. team members expressed three primary concerns about relying 
upon Japan for level 1 data. First, they were concerned that the coolers for the 
shortwave infrared and thermal sensors might cause the ASTER instrument to shake 
and vibrate to such an extent that the “jitter” would harm the geometric accuracy and 
precision of the instrument’s observations.73 If jitter were a real possibility—and the 
issue was being investigated by JAROS and GSFC instrument engineers and 
contractors—then the geometric correction in the level 1 processing would need to be 
well enough understood and flexible enough to allow some changes after the 
instrument was in orbit, if not before. U.S. team members were skeptical that 
ERSDAC would be that flexible in accommodating changes.74 Second, in the opinion 
of the U.S. lead for geometric correction, Hugh Kieffer, “the influence of [the] U.S. 
side on level 1 processing is unknown.”75 Kieffer was particularly concerned about 
the designs of the level 1A and 1B data products that Japan would supposedly transfer 
to the United States (under NASA’s baseline configuration, at least). Neither of the 
designs allowed the United States to reverse engineer the product to understand 
Japan’s geometric corrections. In addition, the products’ designs did not enable the 
United States (or anyone else) to undo the geometric correction for the purpose of 
                                                  
72 The rate of the shipping and data transfer rate also needed to be considered—how fast a given 
volume of data could make the trip between Japan and the United States. Since the issue was not a 
dominant concern, I have omitted it in the above text for the sake of simplification and readability. 
73 “Jitter” was technically defined as “the short term variation of the attitude [of the satellite] 
around the actual position” (Scholz 1990: 156).  
74 U.S. ASTER Science Team (1992: 10, 13) and Lambros (1992b). 
75 Kieffer (1992: DD2). 
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producing higher-level data products of better quality or for troubleshooting.76 Kieffer 
judged that “the U.S. will have little visibility into the Level 1 processing if it is done 
exclusively in Japan,” and that “the fundamental impact is that any flaws, etc., 
introduced in the Level 1 processing by the Japanese will be there forever in all 
subsequent data products.”77 Third, it did not seem that Japan would be incorporating 
“ground control points” (i.e., “ground truth” anchor points for map projections) into 
their level 1 processing for the purpose of locating their scenes on the earth. The lack 
of ground control points was especially a concern for producing digital elevation maps, 
a widely-anticipated data product for the ASTER instrument. One of U.S. team’s 
experts in producing digital elevation maps stated that, in contrast to what the Japan 
team had suggested, “there are no magic systems out there that do not require ground 
controls – period.”78 If the United States were to integrate ground control points into 
the ASTER production flow to create a digital elevation map, it would be best to do it 
in level 1 processing, assuming the U.S. team had “visibility” into that level 1 
processing.  
The writer of the meeting minutes commented that “the magnitude of the job 
of developing level 1 processing capability was a surprise to most of the attendees. 
Also the importance of having a U.S. capability was brought home.”79 The team 
agreed to push GSFC and NASA Headquarters to ensure that the United States would 
have all the level 1 software source code, correction information, and other 
hardware-dependent information that were required to have a level 1 processing 
capability in the United States. GSFC personnel were in attendance at that U.S. team 
                                                  
76 The particular level 1 processing steps to which I am referring here are the re-sampling required 
for the inter-telescope registration and the application of geometric calibration coefficients to the 
data. Both were thought to be “irreversible” transformations (Ibid., p. DD1). 
77 U.S. ASTER Science Team (1992: 13). 
78 Ibid., p. 18. 
79 Ibid., p. 20. 
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meeting, and so was NASA Headquarters’ point person for ASTER.80 Two months 
later, in true bottom-up fashion, the U.S. team’s preference for having a level 1 
processing capability in the United States was passed on from GSFC to NASA 
Headquarters, in preparation for the U.S.-Japan negotiations over the MoU.81 NASA 
Headquarters had not expressed a specific position on this issue prior to hearing of the 
U.S. team’s desire to have a level 1 processing capability in the United States. Either 
NASA Headquarters was quickly convinced by the U.S. team, or alternatively, NASA 
Headquarters needed no convincing.  
Within several months of this meeting there was no doubt among the U.S. 
team and other U.S. participants in the ASTER collaboration that having the capability 
to produce level 1 data in the United States was a top negotiating priority of the United 
States. In a worst-case catastrophe, the United States would want to be able to produce 
level 1 data independently. Reportedly, a prominent individual in EOS at NASA 
Headquarters declared that “we want to be able to produce ASTER data even if we go 
to war with Japan.”82 More often in my interviews, rationales for national autonomy 
would reference a different kind of catastrophe: instead of war breaking out, a 
devastating earthquake hits Japan. Having the capability to do something, however, is 
much different in its consequences than actually doing it. 
It is in that difference that the United States and Japan were ultimately able to 
negotiate a compromise that did not threaten MITI’s and ERSDAC’s primacy in level 
1 production but that still placed the U.S. team in a negotiating position that would 
help them to ensure the quality of ASTER’s level 1 data. Technoscientific diplomacy 
                                                  
80 Ibid., p. 5. 
81 Schwaller (1993b). 
82 Although three U.S. scientists and engineers, speaking separately, relayed this quote to me and 
told me the name of the individual who offered these words as guidance, since those scientists and 
engineers do not wish to go on the record, I do not think it is appropriate for me to name the 
speaker based upon what would be just anonymous hearsay, even if it is multiply-sourced hearsay. 
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between the two teams which synthesized the production of knowledge about the earth 
with assertions and ascriptions of each state’s political-economic power was integral to 
achieving this compromise. This diplomacy proceeded in roughly four moves: the U.S. 
team’s hedge toward national autonomy; Japan’s proposal for a “limited partnership” 
that redefined the level 1 data products in a critical way; the U.S.’s counter-proposal 
that stuck with the U.S. team’s hedge; and the grand compromise. 
First, the U.S. side started to hedge what they judged to be the U.S.’s potential 
risk. In the fall of 1992 and winter of 1993, the U.S. team investigated the scientific, 
economic, and political advantages and disadvantages of various proposals for 
regularly producing different elements of level 1 data in the United States, although 
they realized that NASA’s “formal position” was that Japan should produce and 
provide all the level 1 data, in line with NASA’s cost-conscious baseline 
configuration.83 They began to conduct what was known in systems engineering 
circles as a “trade study” that examined the “trade offs” of various level 1 processing 
configurations. With the approval of JPL management, they also sent GSFC a rough 
cost estimate of the software code required for both a prototype and production 
version of level 1 processing in the United States.84 At the same time, the U.S. team 
requested that GSFC and NASA Headquarters make it a negotiating priority to receive 
from Japan the level 1 source code, correction information, hardware data, and other 
documentation required to have a level 1 processing capability at the U.S. DAAC. The 
U.S. team also decided to mitigate some of their “risk” (their language) by becoming 
more closely involved in the design of the level 1 processing algorithm and by 
“establishing and maintaining close communications” with those team members in 
Japan who would be doing the level 1 design work.85 
                                                  
83 Kieffer (1992: DD1). 
84 Nichols (1993a).  
85 Voge (1992: 9) and Kieffer (1992: DD3). 
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Japan then made the second move. In February 1993, at the next U.S.-Japan 
ASTER team meeting (which was their fifth), Japan proposed a “limited partnership” 
for level 1 processing.86 It is not clear to me what Japan did or did not know at this 
point about the U.S. team’s efforts in exploring the development of an independent 
level 1 processing capability in the United States, but at the opening plenary session, 
both team leaders listed the level 1 data processing at the top of their issues to be 
discussed at the meeting. 87  Because level 1 processing issues mixed “science” 
questions such as georeferencing, geometric correction, and radiometric correction 
with “engineering” questions such as level 1 data flows and the design of the 
architecture of the ASTER data and information system, it was awkward for the Japan 
team and ERSDAC to manage the design of level 1 processing. ERSDAC and the 
Japan team leader (who worked at both the U.S. Geological Survey of Japan and 
ERSDAC) preferred to draw a clear boundary between the responsibilities of Japan’s 
science advisors and ERSDAC (in a similar way to the science/engineering boundary 
that was asserted by the Japan team in the negotiations over the shortwave infrared 
bands discussed in the previous chapter).88  
Owing to this concern of mixing but also for the purpose of focusing the 
efforts of the joint team on level 1 data production, Japan’s team leader, Tsu, proposed 
at the joint meeting a “restructuring” of the working groups in order to create a “Level 
1 Data Products Working Group.” This new structure, which likely received the assent 
of the U.S. team leader, Anne Kahle, in advance of the meeting, was intended by the 
Japan side to ensure the “engineering” purity of the working group that handled the 
                                                  
86 Geller (1993a: DD-5). Whether the Japan team or the U.S. team first described the Japan team’s 
proposal as a “limited partnership” is also unclear, but that was what it came to be called. Given 
how it is quoted in the document cited in this note, I suspect that the description initially came 
from the Japan team. 
87 ASTER Science Team (1993b: 4-5). 
88 See also Tsu’s comments in (Ground Data System Working Group 1993: PV1). 
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engineering of the architecture of the ASTER data and information, which was called 
the ground data system working group.89 On the U.S. side, however, the mixing of 
science and engineering work and responsibilities was less of a concern, and the 
people who attended those two working groups overlapped more than they did for the 
Japan side. For example, it was common for the system engineers and software 
developers from the science project at JPL, such as Gary Geller, as well as Anne Kahle 
and U.S. team member Hugh Kieffer, to attend both groups—the newly formed, more 
“science” level 1 data products working group and the more “engineering” ground 
data system working group. The level 1 issues discussed in these two groups 
sometimes overlapped and were often closely connected. Although Japan’s team 
leader and ERSDAC preferred a clear boundary between science and engineering 
work, because those distinctions had implications for their institutional hierarchy, the 
U.S. team did not leave the international flows for level 1 data production to ERSDAC 
to work out on their own with GSFC.90 The U.S. team could only vouch for quality of 
the level 1 data product if they had a role in its design. 
 The Japan side’s proposal at this joint team meeting for a “limited 
partnership” in level 1 data production addressed the concerns of both the U.S. and 
Japan sides. In line with MITI’s original baseline configuration, the Japan side 
                                                  
89 ASTER Science Team (1993b: 5). See also Tsu’s comments in the “Minutes of the Level 1 Data 
Product Working Group” in ASTER Science Team (1993b) and Ground Data System Working 
Group (1993: PV-1). It was typical for the agendas of the joint meetings and working groups to be 
approved in advance by, respectively, the two team leaders and the two chairs of each working 
group. 
90 See, for example, the minutes of the Level 1 Data Products Working Group and of the Ground 
Data System Working Group (1993: PV-1) in ASTER Science Team (1993b), and in particular, 
Arai’s, Kieffer’s, and Geller’s questions. When, at the request of ERSDAC, ERSDAC and GSFC 
formed after the fifth joint team meeting their own ground data system working group to handle 
engineering issues, which was a working group that Japan (but not the United States) considered to 
be at a “higher level” than the joint science team, the U.S. science team was “plugged into” that 
working group. That working group was called the “greater” (i.e., broader) ground data system 
working group. See the comments of Lambros in Ground Data System Working Group (1993: 
PV-1).  
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proposed to produce all of the level 1A data in Japan at ERSDAC. It also proposed to 
make available all level 1A data to EOSDIS for NASA’s pick up, as had been expected 
by NASA’s baseline configuration. The critical compromise, however, was that the 
Japan team also redefined the level 1A data product and the basic structure of the 
algorithm that would produce it. The file for the level 1A data product would now 
include all of the geometric and radiometric correction information that was needed 
for the scene to be corrected in future processing to level 1B, assuming that that 
processing used the appropriate software (the horizontal flow labeled “Level 1A 
Coefficients” in figure 6.3 reflected this new commitment). While all of the geometric 
and radiometric correction information would now be included in the 1A data file, it 
would not be applied to the imagery scene. The imagery scene would still correspond 
to the instrument’s uncorrected electronic response.  
That separation between the correction information and the uncorrected scene 
was the critical move that helped to bring, to use Kieffer’s word, “visibility” to the 
level 1 data products. The U.S. team was reassured by this redesign of the level 1A 
data product because the separate provision of both the correction information and the 
instrument’s response enabled the U.S. team to tweak and troubleshoot more easily the 
imagery data (because the raw measurements and the corrections could be 
independently “seen”) and to produce better higher-level data products by going back 
to the least processed data that were still formatted as a scene for easy manipulation.91 
The provision of scene-specific correction information also allowed NASA to avoid 
the computationally-intensive and costly step of producing that information, but it still 
kept ERSDAC in control of the level 1 processing pipeline. Finally, by separating out 
the correction information, the Japan side encouraged a separation between the work 
                                                  
91 Geller (1993a: DD-5). For the 1990-1992 working definition of level 1A, see Iwashita (1990: 
182) and Bothwell (1990: 198). 
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of “science” (attending to how that correction information would be calculated and 
adjusted) and the work of “engineering” and “project management” (determining the 
volume of the 1A and 1B data that would be provided to the United States and the 
particulars of the data formats and software interfaces).  
Japan’s “limited partnership” configuration was not completely satisfactory 
for everyone, of course. To stock the U.S. DAAC with level 1B data, Japan proposed 
that the United States carry out the production from level 1A to 1B using 
Japan-supplied software. 92  This processing amounted to the application of the 
correction information embedded in the level 1A data file to the imagery scene 
included in the level 1A data file. While that step was certainly less demanding of 
processing resources than the initial calculation of the correction information, that 
processing would still demand resources that NASA Headquarters had not committed 
in its baseline configuration. Yet, MITI and ERSDAC would be giving the U.S. 
DAAC the go ahead to independently produce level 1B data from their level 1A data 
products. The details of how this production would be coordinated with ERSDAC 
were to be determined. Finally, the U.S. team (or other users) would still not have the 
independent capability to completely reverse engineer the correction calculations 
unless the U.S. DAAC also received all the level 1 algorithms, source code, correction 
information, and other necessary hardware-dependent information.  
The third move in the sequence of the technoscientific diplomacy over level 1 
processing was NASA’s counter-proposal that would try to secure the U.S. team’s 
hedge and then ask for more. The U.S. team assessed the Japan side’s February 
proposal for a “limited partnership.” Then, in an “April Fool’s Meeting” with NASA 
Headquarters and EOSDIS managers at GSFC, the U.S. team recommended that the 
United States accept Japan’s proposal, provided that a level 1 processing “testbed” was 
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developed for the U.S. DAAC in which the United States—and specifically the U.S. 
team—would have the capability for complete level 1 testing and processing. NASA 
Headquarters “agreed that a U.S. L1 [level 1] testbed was a good idea.”93 A “testbed” 
at the U.S. DAAC meant that Japan would need to provide the software code and 
hardware-dependent information that was required for the United States to have an 
independent level 1 processing capability. That effectively was the hedge that the U.S. 
team had recommended earlier to NASA Headquarters (under the Japan proposal, the 
United States would now receive the correction coefficients in the level 1A data 
product). Although the language in the MoU had yet to be worked out, by July 1993 
the “basic concept of [the] Japanese proposal seem[ed] to be informally accepted” by 
NASA Headquarters.94 The catch, of course, was that Japan had yet to agree to turn 
over the software code and other hardware-dependent information required for the 
United States to have an independent level 1 processing capability. That item had not 
been part of Japan’s initial “limited partnership” proposal. 
In addition to the independent level 1 processing capability in the United 
States, NASA Headquarters wanted a little more from Japan. In line with their baseline 
configuration, NASA wanted Japan to make available to the U.S. DAAC at least some 
of the level 1B data products that ERSDAC would produce, provided that the United 
States decided not to produce the level 1B data products at the U.S. DAAC because of 
reasons of expense. With respect to the provision of level 1B data, NASA wanted then 
to have its cake and to eat it too. They wanted to have the option of independently 
producing level 1B data, but they wanted to receive the data from Japan if that option 
was less expensive than independent production. Under NASA’s counter-proposal, 
Japan would—on top of providing the U.S. with an independent processing 
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capability—effectively be on the hook for providing level 1B data, but without 
pipeline control. The Japan side reported in the summer of 1993 that it was a “very big 
problem,” for them to provide the level 1 processing source code because the source 
code would be the property of ERSDAC’s contractor and not the property of the 
Government of Japan.95 Japan supposedly could not turn over the source code even if 
it wanted.  
The grand level 1 compromise in the fall of 1993 negotiated the tension 
between the U.S. side’s desire for an independent level 1 processing capability and the 
Japan side’s desire for primacy in level 1 processing, with financial expense also in 
mind for both parties. NASA did secure an independent level 1 processing capability 
for the United States, as the U.S. team had wanted. Yet, NASA informally assured 
Japan that that capability would likely be used only for testing and not for general 
production, thus preserving Japan’s primacy in the international political economy of 
ASTER level 1 processing. After all, NASA from the beginning did not want to pay 
for the capacity required to independently produce level 1 data products on a daily 
basis. The Government of Japan bought a license to their contractor’s level 1 source 
code, so it could provide NASA with the source code required for the U.S.’s 
independent level 1 processing capability. In return, NASA kicked in the capability for 
its satellite to direct downlink ASTER’s data to Japan’s ground receiving stations (see 
“DDL” in figure 6.3).96 Japan would provide level 1B data to NASA, but only “in 
response to NASA’s requests,” in the wording of the MoU, at a volume that would be 
determined in future negotiations over the PIP (this volume was decided to be “limited 
to” 310 scenes per day, according to the 1997 PIP, which is about roughly forty 
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96 Article 4, section 2, paragraph A in the NASA and MITI (1996); Shaffer (1993b); Miyazaki and 
Schwaller (1993); Miyazaki (2003); and Schwaller (2001). 
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percent of the level 1A scenes that were expected to be produced).97 Because Japan 
would be providing the level 1B data “in response to NASA’s requests,” Japan would 
still be in control of the level 1 production flows, and the level 1 production flows at 
least would be internationally standardized.  
Crucially, however, the hedge that the U.S. team had initially insisted upon 
would allow the United States to ensure that Japan’s control of the level 1 production 
flows, such as its provision of level 1A and 1B data products to the U.S. DAAC, went 
as expected. Moreover, the U.S.’s “full capability to produce level 1 data products” 
provided “a framework to interact with Japan during [further] level 1 algorithm and 
code development,” according to the assessment of a U.S. level 1 working group 
meeting.98 In other words, the U.S. team hoped that they could use their hedge to 
exercise power in future technoscientific diplomacy concerning level 1 processing and 
production. 
Although the redefinition of the level 1 products to allow “visibility” and the 
laying down of the basic configuration of level 1 data processing were significant 
achievements, a few years worth of issues remained to be negotiated concerning just 
level 1 processing and production. After announcing that the two teams had committed 
themselves to an internationally-integrated and interoperable configuration for the 
ASTER data and information system, the two team leaders commenced the sixth joint 
ASTER team meeting in November 1993 with a call for “closer collaboration” 
between the two teams, particularly in algorithm development. It was “necessary to the 
sucess of ASTER Project [sic],” according to Tsu’s overhead.99 The team leaders 
promised to do their best to make more funding available for extra meetings, if needed. 
They referenced as an exemplar of close and productive cooperation the ad-hoc 
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meeting of the Operations and Mission Planning Working Group which had been held 
that past summer. 100  At that meeting, the two teams had established a strong 
U.S.-Japan consensus on ASTER’s operational design (which was discussed in the 
previous chapter). ERSDAC’s project manager told the level 1 working group that he 
would “make more cooperation” and that “we will be cooperating more tightly in the 
future.” 101  After he spoke, Geller distributed the first version of the ASTER 
End-to-End Data System Concept Document, calling attention to the international 
flows and how messy even clean interfaces can be. 
 
Creating a U.S.-Japan Hybrid: The TES Algorithm 
 U.S.-Japan technoscientific diplomacy over the design of the ASTER 
remote-sensing system’s level 1 data processing and production negotiated concerns of 
economic value and efficiency, the integrity of scientific knowledge, national 
autonomy, state power, and U.S.-Japan relations. The two teams’ bilateral 
technoscientific diplomacy did not assert, ascribe, or significantly exercise 
transnational authority of the kind that had been fostered in the previous two years of 
negotiations over the ASTER instrument’s operational design in the Operations and 
Mission Planning Working Group. While the two team leaders’ call for “closer 
collaboration” cast the negotiations over the instrument’s operational design as an 
exemplar of cooperation and urged more communication and community between the 
two teams, their call also pointed out that the ASTER collaboration was, for them, not 
yet close, or at least, not close enough, especially in the selection and development of 
the higher-level data products.  
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The two team leaders backed up their call for enacting “closer collaboration” 
with recommendations for organizational reforms that encouraged joint work and 
transnational authority. Just as Tsu and Kahle at the fifth ASTER team meeting had 
restructured working groups and had formed the “Level 1 Data Products Working 
Group” for the purpose of focusing the teams’ joint efforts on defining the level 1 data 
products, at the sixth ASTER team meeting they recommended to their teams that an 
existing working group be restructured to focus on the coordination of the joint 
development of higher-level data products. According to the charter of the new 
“Higher-Level Data Products Working Group,” the purpose of the working group was 
to “oversee all aspects of joint U.S.-Japan team collaboration and coordination with 
respect to the specification and development of ASTER [higher-level] data 
products.”102 Following Tsu’s recommendations for closer collaboration which he had 
outlined at the opening plenary of the sixth team meeting, the working group 
discussed and adopted a set of principles for collaboration on higher-level data 
products. The Japan chair of the working group, Yamaguchi Yasushi, reported these 
principles to the two teams at the team meeting’s closing plenary: 
 
The first one is that all algorithms [for higher-level data products] produced in 
both countries will be identical. The source code can be different. . . . Next, 
we will create one unified data product list, and one science data product 
specification (SDPS) document. So this means that we will prepare for the 
ATBD—what does ATBD stand for? Algorithm Theoretical Basis Document, 
ok—we will create one document for US and Japan data products. And for 
data products specification document, I propose this description, and the US 
side has already prepared a sort of documentation, so Geller-san and 
Hook-san will work to combine to create data products specification.103 
 
Yamaguchi went on to explain that the Higher-Level Data Products Working Group 
had decided to leave it to each disciplinary working group to define when differences 
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in source code were substantial enough that the U.S. and Japan algorithms under each 
group’s purview were in fact no longer identical in practice, although the algorithms 
might have purported to calculate the same geophysical information. He suggested 
“maybe one idea is maybe 1/10th of the absolute accuracy, or maybe 1/100th of the 
absolute accuracy, maybe something like that.”104  
Over the next few years, none of the disciplinary working groups—at least 
according to the minutes of their meetings—attempted to establish such performance 
benchmarks for similarity. In 1993, most of the working groups were busy selecting 
higher-level data products for production and were developing algorithms and 
Algorithm Theoretical Basis Documents (ATBDs) in preparation for NASA’s March 
1994 peer-review of proposed “standard” data products (as explained earlier in the 
chapter, “standard” data products were not, by definition, products that were 
internationally standardized; rather, they were data products that were 
NASA-approved, peer-reviewed, and slated to be routinely-produced by national data 
centers). As of November 1993, the U.S. and Japan teams each listed about ten 
“standard” data products that they would produce and another dozen of “specialized” 
data products that they would produce “in house” and not for public distribution. Most 
of each team’s list of “standard” data products overlapped with the other’s list. These 
overlapping data products purported to calculate the same geophysical information 
(e.g., surface reflectance, surface temperature, etc.).105 Yet, as Yamaguchi’s comments 
about establishing benchmarks for similarity suggested, two algorithms could both 
claim to calculate the same geophysical information, but in practice they might come 
up with different answers, maybe to such an extent that users could be left to wonder 
whether either the U.S. or Japan product was systematically superior, or even whether 
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or not the two products were in fact—to use the language of remote 
sensing—“extracting” or “recovering” the same geophysical information. Rather than 
deciding at this point to proceed on the path of competition, the team leaders and the 
members of the Higher-Level Data Products Working Group chose to advance the 
international cooperation that had been realized in the designs of ASTER’s operational 
capabilities and level 1 processing system and take “closer collaboration” one step 
further by enacting a normative notion of U.S.-Japan partnership. 
 Rhetorically acting out partnership is one thing; consistently enacting it in 
practice is another. As of 1993 most of the working groups that were proposing 
“standard’ data products were still evaluating and debating between competing 
algorithms for calculating a particular type of geophysical information. Not all of these 
competitions were between one algorithm proposed by the U.S. side of a working 
group and another algorithm proposed by the Japan side. In certain cases, discussions 
within working groups also included debates over two or more competing algorithms 
that were proposed by one side. Nevertheless, for the competitions among U.S. 
algorithms or among Japan algorithms, either the U.S. or Japan chair of the relevant 
working group could weigh in with an influential recommendation, or if need be, the 
team leader could make the deciding call. For the debates between U.S. and Japan 
versions of the “same” data product, there was no single authority in an organizational 
hierarchy to make the ultimate decision, if discussions came down to needing one. The 
respective teams could choose to differently “recover” the “same” geophysical 
information using different “standard” data products. Still, the team leaders pressed the 
working groups to come to a U.S.-Japan consensus, even if the decisions within each 
side might not have been consensus decisions. For example, in their efforts to come to 
a U.S.-Japan consensus on the data products within their purview, the ASTER team’s 
Temperature-Emissivity Working Group enacted U.S.-Japan partnership and 
 349  
established their group as a transnational authority over the design and maintenance of 
their data products. But this partnership and transnational authority did not come easy.  
The working group’s objectives for their temperature and emissivity data 
products were to map on a pixel-by-pixel basis the temperatures and emissivities of a 
scene that had been observed by ASTER’s thermal infrared sensor. The term 
“temperature” has an intuitive meaning in everyday language which does not require 
further definition in order to understand the working group’s efforts to design 
algorithms for their two data products. But the term “emissivity” requires brief 
elaboration. 
The emissivity of a particular material is the extent to which a material’s 
surface emits light in comparison to a theoretical standard that is characterized by 
Planck’s law of black-body radiation. The emissivity of a material can vary, depending 
upon the wavelength of light (i.e., the wavelength of electromagnetic radiation). 
Planck’s law describes the intensity of light (or, more precisely, the spectral radiance 
of electromagnetic radiation) that is emitted by a theoretical “black body.” The law can 
be expressed as a function of temperature and wavelength, with intensity as the 
independent variable. At a given temperature and wavelength, real materials reflect 
more light and absorb less light in comparison to the ideal black body. When real 
materials are in thermal equilibrium in which the energy that is absorbed must also be 
emitted, because they absorb less light than an ideal black body, they also emit less 
light. This “emissivity” of real materials is a percentage of the perfect “1” that is a 
black body’s emissivity at any temperature and wavelength, and the percentage is 
different for different wavelengths of light. Thus, if Planck’s law of black-body 
radiation were used to predict the intensity of light emitted by a real material at a given 
temperature and wavelength, the result would need to be multiplied by the emissivity 
of that material at that particular wavelength (i.e., multiplied by the fraction to which 
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that material looks like a black body at that wavelength). Water and water-filled 
materials such as vegetation have high emissivities across the thermal infrared region 
of light. Their emissivities are close to one. They come close to being “black-bodies” 
and are said to be “gray-bodies.” Materials such as minerals and dry soils have lower 
emissivities, and their emissivities vary significantly according to the wavelength of 
light that is absorbed and emitted. That is, minerals and dry soils look more or less like 
black bodies depending upon the wavelength of light that is sensed.  
Because the emissitivity of many minerals vary significantly and differently 
according to the wavelength of light that is emitted, particularly in the thermal infrared 
region (i.e., they are not all “black” and have, in effect, different “colors” in the 
thermal region), an instrument such as the ASTER instrument’s multi-band thermal 
infrared radiometer can be used to discriminate among and possibly identify minerals 
on the earth’s surface according to their characteristic emissivities at various 
wavelengths in the thermal region (i.e., according to their “colors”). The calculation of 
these emissivities and the discrimination and identification of materials are both easier 
tasks if the remote-sensing scientist has independent knowledge of—or can make good, 
educated guesses about—the kinds of materials that are likely to be found in the 
remotely-sensed scene under investigation. 
The remote-sensing literature from the 1980s and through the 1990s presented 
the task of designing increasingly robust and general methods for “recovering” 
temperatures and emissivities of land surfaces from remote-sensing data as a 
formidable challenge worthy of further work. This challenge became more significant 
with the development of airborne and space-based instruments such as the ASTER 
instrument that offered, or would offer, greater capabilities around which these 
methods could be tested and refined.106 The ASTER team described the ASTER 
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instrument as an instrument that could be used to map the temperature and emissivity 
of land surfaces without the benefit of extensive, independent knowledge of the 
particulars of the scene that was going to be mapped (e.g., whether the scene was, for 
example, a desert, a receding snow field, a volcano, a forest clearing, an irrigated 
agricultural field, or a city; what kinds of minerals were expected to be in the desert 
scene, etc.).107  
Excellent performance for arid and semi-arid scenes was of particular interest 
to the U.S. team, especially since those scenes would best take advantage of the 
emissivity-mapping capabilities of ASTER’s thermal infrared sensor. These 
capabilities derived, after all, from the sensor’s multiple bands that the TIGER team 
had pushed for in negotiations in 1989 with the specific objective of mapping the 
emissivities of arid and semi-arid scenes, in distinction to the goals of the U.S. state 
and of NASA’s EOS, which had emphasized the study of climate change by 
investigating biogeochemical cycles and which had required, at a minimum, only one 
or two bands in the thermal infrared region for mapping temperature. With five bands 
in the thermal infrared region, the capabilities of the ASTER instrument for recovering 
temperature and emissivity information were unlike any other (unclassified) 
space-based instrument that had been launched prior to ASTER or any instrument that 
has been launched to date since.   
The ASTER team’s Temperature-Emissivity Working Group took on the 
challenge of “recovering” temperature and emissivity information in a most ambitious 
way. The group sought to write an all-purpose, generalized algorithm that would 
generate temperature and emissivity data products for the so-called “general” user who, 
it was assumed, would not want to be bother with many details of the calculations and 
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who would want temperature and emissivity maps of diverse land scenes. That is, the 
working group sought to design an algorithm that would not be limited to particular 
kinds of scenes and which would not know in advance what kind of land surface it was 
mapping. The widely-recognized, fundamental dilemma at the core of all efforts to 
recover temperature and emissivity information for land surfaces was that the 
contributions of temperature and emissivity were mathematically and physically 
indistinguishable in the intensities of light which remote-sensing instruments sensed.  
Here was the particular form of that fundamental dilemma for the ASTER 
instrument: Each of the five bands of ASTER’s thermal infrared radiometer was to 
sense, on a pixel-by-pixel basis, intensities of light at the particular band’s wavelength. 
Using Planck’s law, these intensities could be mathematically equated to an unknown 
emissivity at the wavelength of each of ASTER’s bands, provided the temperature of 
the material was known (remember, emissivity was the fraction of light that was 
actually emitted in comparison to what was expected according to Planck’s law, which 
was a function of wavelength and temperature). Yet, not only was the emissivity of the 
material at that pixel unknown, but the temperature was unknown too. Using only 
math and fundamental principles of physics, and without venturing any initial, 
educated guesses about the kind of scene that was being mapped, there was no way to 
derive emissivity by comparing the sensed intensity of light with the intensity of light 
that Planck’s law predicted a black-body would emit, because temperature was also 
unknown, and it—like emissivity—also contributed to the intensity of light emitted by 
a material. 
The contributions of emissivity and temperature were, in effect, mixed in the 
intensity information, and the analytical task was to somehow “separate” temperature 
and emissivity. Because the emissivity of the material varied for the wavelength of 
each sensing band, but the material’s temperature did not, using Planck’s law, a set of 
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five equations, one for each wavelength band, could be written. These five equations, 
however, included six unknowns—the five different emissivities (a different 
emissivity for every band) and their shared unknown of temperature. If one more 
equation with no additional unknowns were formulated and introduced into this set of 
equations (i.e., more precisely, this set of simultaneous equations), the set of equations 
could have been, in theory, mathematically solved for the pixel’s temperature and for 
the pixel’s emissivities at five different wavelengths, which might have allowed that 
pixel to be matched to a material or at least contrasted with materials at other pixels on 
the image. Much of the debate in the Temperature and Emissivity Working Group was 
how that additional equation could be formulated and what assumptions could be 
wisely made to enable its formulation. Yet, because they sought to design a 
generalized algorithm for the general user, they could not formulate an additional 
equation that assumed too much independent information to “separate” temperature 
and emissivity, such as an equation that took into account the particular kind of land 
surface was being mapped. 
 The working group had discussed and evaluated over ten competing methods 
for deriving temperature and emissivity information, not all of which recovered 
absolute numbers for both temperature and emissivity over land surfaces. By the time 
of the sixth joint team meeting, they spent most of their time examining and debating 
the advantages and disadvantages of three. Each of these three methods was generally 
developed, refined, or used by different members of the working group. Alan Gillespie, 
the U.S. chair of the working group, had developed the “normalized emissivity 
method,” which is commonly abbreviated NEM. 108  This method provided the 
required “additional equation” by assuming a middling emissivity value for one of the 
                                                  
108 Gillespie (1985) and Hook et al. (1994). NEM was a refinement of the “reference-channel 
method” (or, alternatively, the “model emissivity method”). For the reference-channel method, see 
Lyon (1965). 
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five equations.109 This value was then used, along with the intensities sensed at each 
of the five wavelength bands, to calculate the temperature of the land surface at that 
pixel and the emissivities of the material at that pixel at the other four wavelengths 
(the fifth emissivity being assumed from the beginning). The key flaw that the 
working group saw with this method was that it assumed the same, fixed emissivity 
for one of the wavelengths for every pixel of every ASTER scene. It was hoped that 
this flaw could be repaired by using ASTER’s other sensors to “classify” the scene on 
a pixel-by-pixel basis (as water, soil, vegetation, etc.), and then use that classification 
to pick a better assumed emissivity on a pixel-by-pixel basis (whether the scene was 
water-filled vegetation or desert rock would make a significant difference in the 
assumed emissivity, that is, the initial educated guess of NEM). The repair of 
classifying scenes, however, would introduce much more complexity, the working 
group agreed, and the costs and benefits of this complexity were unclear.  
 Simon Hook, who was a geologic remote-sensing scientist at JPL and a 
member of Kahle’s research group, had used and assessed the second method that was 
discussed by the working group. This method was called the “alpha-derived 
emissivity” method, commonly abbreviated ADE.110 The ADE method provided the 
“additional equation” to enable the separation of temperature and emissivity by 
making, at the method’s core, one mathematical approximation and one 
                                                  
109 In NEM, the equation (i.e., wavelength band) that was selected for this assumption was the one 
that yielded the highest temperature using the assumed emissivity. 
110 The ADE method had been developed by Kealy and Gabell (1990). For Hook’s use of the 
method, see Hook (1992: AA1), Hook et al. (1992), Kealy and Hook (1993), and Hook et al. 
(1994). Gabel, Hook, and Kealy all collaborated together on temperature and emissivity separation 
for geologic remote-sensing in the early 1990s (e.g., Kealy and Gabell 1990; Hook et al. 1992; 
Kealy and Hook 1993). As young scientists, they had taken similar career paths as well. Gabell had 
been a U.S. National Research Council postdoctoral fellow at JPL, advised by Kahle, from 1986 to 
1988. Hook first came to JPL as a National Research Council postdoctoral fellow in 1989 and was 
also advised by Kahle. Kealy received his Ph.D. from the same department that Hook had, but two 
years later. Hook received his Ph.D. from the University of Durham in the United Kingdom in 
1989. Kealy received his in 1991.  
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empirically-based statistical generalization. First, the method used a well-known 
approximation of Planck’s law to equate mathematically, for each pixel of land surface, 
the intensities that would be sensed by each of the five wavelength bands of the 
instrument to mathematically-manipulated versions of their respective, unknown 
emissivities. The temperature variable was conveniently separated out from the 
equation in the mathematical approximation and manipulation. But in the 
mathematical manipulation, information concerning the mean of the five emissivities 
had also been subtracted from each of the mathematically-manipulated versions of the 
five emissivities. This subtraction of information about the mean of the five 
emissivities had left the emissivity information with only their respective variations 
around the mean. Thus, only half of the emissivity information was recovered through 
mathematical approximation (analogously, to reconstruct a student’s absolute grade on 
an exam in a class requires knowing the mean grade of the class as well as how much 
better or worse he did relative to the mean).  
The ADE method estimated the subtracted information concerning the mean 
by statistically matching the variation in the mathematically-manipulated versions of 
the five emissivities to an empirical mean, by generalizing from a 
laboratory-constructed database of the thermal-infrared emissivities of over eighty 
materials that are common on the earth’s surface. With that statistically-matched 
information about the empirical mean emissivity (which was taken to be the “real” 
mean) the emissivities at each of the five wavelength bands could be calculated from 
their respective variations from the “real” mean. Once these emissivities were 
“recovered” for the five wavelength bands, so could the temperature that was shared 
by the equation for each wavelength band. The recognized flaws of the ADE method 
were that, first, the mathematical approximation introduced a systematic bias. Second, 
the method’s statistical matching was limited by the inherent uncertainty of 
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generalizing from a database that may or may not be representative of the material 
sensed in the pixel. 
  The third method that was still being discussed and debated by the 
Temperature-Emissivity Working Group around the time of the sixth ASTER team 
meeting was a “split window” method. Rokugawa Shuichi, the Japan chair of the 
working group, and Matsunaga Tsuneo, who was at the time Rokugawa’s graduate 
student at the University of Tokyo, were the two members of the working group that 
were proposing an algorithm that used a split-window method.111 The split-window 
method had a long track record of use for recovering the temperature of sea-surfaces, 
but not for land surfaces. In this method, the emissivity of the sea’s surface was known 
in advance or could be reliably assumed, unlike for land surfaces. One advantage of 
the split-window method was that it compared the intensities that were sensed at two 
wavelength bands (which created the “split window”) and used that comparison to 
reduce atmospheric effects in the calculation of surface temperature. In contrast, the 
NEM and ADE methods both relied upon a separate algorithm that would have been 
run earlier in the data processing to remove atmospheric effects. Another advantage of 
adopting the split-window method for the standard data product for temperature was 
the possibility of comparing both the algorithm and its data products with the 
split-window algorithm and data products of another EOS instrument that was slotted 
to be on the same satellite as ASTER.112 The working group invited a scientist from 
that instrument’s team to their meetings for the purpose of examining that 
possibility.113  
                                                  
111 That method was explained in Matsunaga et al. (1993). 
112 Gillespie (1993b: 3) and the discussion in Gillespie et al. (1999: 35). 
113 That person was Zhengming Wan, from the University of California at Santa Barbara. He was 
writing the Algorithm Theoretical Basis Document for recovering temperature and emissivity of 
land surfaces for the moderate-resolution MODIS instrument, using classification in the visible and 
near infrared region and in the shortwave infrared region (1999). This algorithm, however, was not 
intended to be capable of mapping geologic materials in arid and semi-arid regions. Wan attended 
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Yet, the working group considered the split-window method to have 
significant disadvantages. First, it could not be used to map the emissivities of land 
surfaces. Emissivity-mapping was a central goal, however, of the U.S. ASTER team 
and had been, from the beginning, a central goal of the TIGER team. ASTER’s 
emissivity-mapping was intended to build upon the work of Kahle’s research group at 
JPL in the 1980s and early 1990s, which mapped emissivities using an airborne 
instrument called the Thermal Infrared Multispectral Scanner. Second, owing to the 
design of ASTER’s thermal infrared bands, the split-window method’s ability to 
recover temperature over land surfaces was limited to, at best, scenes that were 
well-characterized in advance on a scene-by-scene basis.114 Consequently, U.S. team 
members did not consider the method to be an appropriate choice for a 
general-purpose standard data product of the kind that the working group had set out 
to design.  
Nevertheless, the members of the working group from the Japan team 
proposed the split-window method for at least “a” U.S.-Japan standard data product 
for temperature (particularly for sea-surface temperatures), if not for “the” U.S.-Japan 
standard data product. U.S. support for this proposal, however, was not 
forthcoming—the decision was repeatedly deferred.115 From the perspective of the 
U.S. team, many different algorithms—including one that used the split-window 
method—could be selected for “in-house” specialized products, but the U.S. team 
                                                                                                                                               
at least the 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th, and 11th U.S.-Japan ASTER Team Meetings and the U.S. ASTER Team 
Meeting in November 1992 (respectively, ASTER Science Team 1993b, 1993a, 1994, 1995, and 
1996 and U.S. ASTER Science Team 1992).  
114 Other disadvantages of the split-window method for the ASTER instrument are discussed in 
Gillespie et al. (1999: 48). In the working group’s report to the ASTER team at the fifth team 
meeting, Gillespie relayed the idea of using the split-window method for only water surfaces 
(1993b: 18). 
115 Rokugawa and Hook (1993) and Rokugawa (1993). In the 7th meeting, Gillespie mentioned 
exploring an alternative algorithm for sea-surface temperature as a specialized data product and not 
as a standard data product (Gillespie 1994a: 1). 
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supported having only one standard data product for temperature and only one for 
emissivity (and presumably, the U.S. team also considered it to be advantageous if 
those two data products were produced from the same algorithm to ensure their 
agreement, since temperature and emissivity were highly intertwined in each other’s 
calculation). 116  The U.S. team had proposed one standard data product for 
temperature and one for emissivity to NASA in their list of standard data products for 
ASTER. Furthermore, the U.S. team and a NASA review panel had been pruning that 
list, to keep it in line with projected funding cuts.117 In these circumstances, it was 
unlikely that the U.S. team could have added more standard data products for 
temperature and emissivity even if they had wanted, which they did not. 
 Gillespie, Hook, and the other U.S. members of the Temperature-Emissivity 
Working Group planned to select the standard data product through a “play off” of the 
various methods.118 The play off compared the performances of these methods by 
using the methods to map the temperatures and emissivities of the same simulated 
scenes and model targets. By the time of the sixth joint team meeting, the U.S. 
members had narrowed their preferred methods down to two primary contenders, 
NEM and ADE.119 While the play off between the NEM and ADE methods had been 
partially completed, the results were mixed, and the U.S. members could not yet agree 
on one method over the other for the standard data products for temperature and 
emissivity. Several months before the sixth team meeting, the U.S. chair of the 
working group, Gillespie, reported to the U.S. team as a whole that “concurrence will 
be sought from Japanese counterparts” to provisionally select both NEM and ADE 
                                                  
116 Gillespie (1992b: V1), Gillespie (1993b: 2), and Kahle’s and Hook’s comments in 
“Higher-Level Data Products Working Group (1993a: 2).  
117 List of [U.S.] Data Products (1993) and Kahle (2003). 
118 The quote is from Gillespie (1992a: V2). For the playoffs, see Hook (1992: AA1), Hook et al. 
(1992), Kealy and Hook (1993), and Hook et al. (1994). 
119 See Gillespie’s comments in U.S. ASTER Science Team (1993: 14). 
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(but not split-window) for the U.S.-Japan common algorithm for the U.S. and Japan 
standard data products.120  
At the sixth ASTER team meeting, however, where the two team leaders and 
the Higher-Level Data Products Working Group endorsed the idea of joint U.S.-Japan 
algorithms, the U.S. team received no such concurrence from the Japan team to select, 
on a provisional basis, both the NEM and ADE methods for the joint algorithm. No 
such concurrence was received for two reasons. First, as Rokugawa’s minutes for the 
working group’s meeting prominently noted, Gillespie was absent from the meeting. 
Second, Rokugawa and Matsunaga were not yet convinced that either NEM or ADE 
should be selected at that time as Japan’s standard data product for emissivity as well 
as for temperature. The classification step that was important for refining the NEM 
method was still just a concept and not a working algorithm, and the flaws introduced 
by the ADE method’s mathematical approximation and statistical generalization were 
still causes of concern for members of the Japan team.121  
Furthermore, as the thinking reportedly went for the members of the Japan 
team, if the U.S. team could not yet agree on a single algorithm to propose as “the” 
U.S.-Japan standard data product, then the Japan team was not yet required to make a 
decision. At the time, the default position of the Japan team was, as Matsunaga 
recalled in an interview over a decade later, not to select any temperature or emissivity 
method for Japan’s standard data product, but to relegate all of the contested methods 
to “in-house” specialized products, as the members of the U.S. team had proposed for 
the split-window method that was advocated by members of the Japan team.122 But, if 
Japan would not have any single standard data product, then a single U.S.-Japan 
                                                  
120 Gillespie (1993a: AA1). 
121 Rokugawa and Hook (1993: 2); Rokugawa (1993: 1); Rokugawa (2003); Matsunaga (2003); 
and Matsunaga (2006). 
122 Matsunaga (2006). 
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standard data product could not exist either. In March 1994, the U.S. team submitted 
for peer-review to NASA an ATBD for temperature and emissivity which had no 
co-authors from the Japan team. The document proposed, on a provisional basis, both 
NEM and ADE as standard data products. Presumably, the two methods were 
proposed as only “U.S.” standard data products, but the document made no note of the 
issue, writing just that NEM and ADE were “the two” algorithms that were “under 
consideration.”123 
The scientific and technical work of the U.S.-Japan Temperature-Emissivity 
Working Group had so far involved: understanding the expected performance of the 
ASTER instrument, which was still under development; making educated guesses 
about the probable uncertainties of not-yet-written algorithms for atmosphere 
correction which would produce data that the temperature and emissivity 
algorithm—whatever it would turn out to be—would likely require for its calculations; 
characterizing the implications of different approximations and assumptions that were 
made by competing methods to provide the required “additional equation”; testing in 
“play offs” the performance of competing algorithms using model targets and 
remote-sensing scenes that had been modified to simulate the data that was expected 
to be acquired by the ASTER instrument; and statistically analyzing these tests. Each 
of these tasks, however, was not actually conducted by the working group as a whole 
but by individual members of the working group, who would report their results back 
to working group as a whole. It should not be that surprising that given a problem that 
everyone agreed from the beginning was mathematically and physically 
underdetermined, individual members proceeded down different evaluation paths, 
became familiar with and accustomed to different ways of providing the additional 
equation that was required, and had substantively different recommendations for what 
                                                  
123 Hook et al. (1994:4). 
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additional equation and what algorithm would work best, recommendations that 
aligned with their own methods, practices, and, arguably, professional interests.  
Amid these specific differences, the question is: how did the working group 
come to enact U.S.-Japan partnership and exercise transnational authority over a 
common algorithm? First, especially after the fifth and sixth joint team meetings, the 
two team leaders pressured the working group to stop fine-tuning methods, to stop 
testing methods against each other, and to start finding a middle ground.124 Productive 
compromises were, after all, being made in other working groups and in other areas 
(e.g., in the Operations and Mission Planning Working Group, on the MoU, etc.). 
Hook remembered that the U.S. team members “were encouraged to settle on an 
approach and stop researching other methods.”125 The two team leaders pushed their 
respective team members on the working group to make good on the call for “closer 
collaboration” and on the normative notion of U.S.-Japan partnership that the team 
leaders had advanced. 
In addition, U.S. team members, after not unifying around a single method for 
the ATBD, were not able to successfully act out state power and were more open to 
compromise. A contingency—the results of the review—arguably threw a spotlight on 
the weaknesses in the U.S. team members’ enactment. The March 1994 NASA 
peer-review of version 1.0 of the U.S. team members’ ATBD did not result in a strong 
endorsement for either NEM or ADE. While the reviewers did not split down the 
middle, they—like the members of the U.S. team—did not decisively endorse one 
method over the other. Neither method was found to be overwhelmingly compelling. 
According to an account given in a later version of the ATBD, “some reviewers” were 
satisfied with the core assumptions made by either the NEM or ADE methods to 
                                                  
124 Matsunaga (2003) and Hook (2006). 
125 Hook (2006). 
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provide the necessary additional equation, noting that “sometimes nature is not kind” 
and that the indeterminacy was not likely to be settled through empiricism. “Others” 
were not satisfied with the core assumptions, approximations, or generalizations of at 
least one of the two methods. Reviewers commented that both methods were relatively 
untested. Furthermore, other critiques were numerous. A second review was deemed to 
be necessary after more work was completed.126 Soon after the review, members of 
the Japan team became aware of the lack of a strong endorsement for either NEM or 
ADE.127 
The Temperature-Emissivity Working Group’s enactment of U.S.-Japan 
partnership and their exercise of transnational authority are most explained by 
analytical mixing and by the emergence of a nucleation site in their technoscientific 
diplomacy. The working group members’ own explanations for their eventual 
consensus around a common algorithm emphasized that it was a mixing of methods 
that fostered agreement. For example, Rokugawa, the Japan chair of the working 
group, explained in an interview: 
 
Although what kind of assumption should be made [to provide the additional 
equation] was argued over exceedingly, we found a method, at least, that 
would become the base [of the algorithm]. I say “found.” Well, this included 
combining (kumi-awase) along the way various proposals that came to be 
offered from the science team, such as Gillespie’s and Hook’s, in addition to 
the proposals that were available in the beginning [from the literature]. . . . 
We came to a decision of the form of “this method is probably fine.”128 
            
The methods that needed to be combined, I suggest, were not, for example, just 
Gillespie’s NEM and Hook’s ADE, but methods that had been proposed by members 
of both teams. The joint working group could have proceeded down the path of mixing 
or combining Gillespie’s NEM and Hook’s ADE the year before the review of the 
                                                  
126 Gillespie et al. (1999:35).  
127 Gillespie (1994b: 3) and Matsunaga (2003). 
128 Rokugawa (2003). Hook (2006) used the word “blending.” 
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ATBD. Yet, Rokugawa did not go along with the provisional selection of both NEM 
and ADE, which would have been a first step toward the eventual mixing of the two 
methods and the creation of a U.S.-Japan standard algorithm. A standard algorithm 
that was acceptable to all parties apparently needed to include methods that were 
proposed by members of both the U.S. and Japan teams. The gap was wide, however, 
between the split-window method that was advanced by members of the Japan team, 
and the NEM and ADE methods that were advanced by members of the U.S. team. No 
one offered a proposal for how the split-window method could be reconciled with 
either of the other two. Unlike both NEM and ADE, the split-window method did not 
attempt to “recover” emissivities. It assumed they were known. 
 At the ASTER team’s seventh meeting in May 1994, Rokugawa’s graduate 
student, Matsunaga, presented to the Temperature-Emissivity Working Group his 
recent research on what he called the “Mean-Maximum Difference (MMD) 
method.”129 Matsunaga had submitted a Japanese-language article about his new 
method to a remote-sensing journal in Japan in January of that year. A few months 
later and a couple of weeks before the joint meeting, the article had been accepted for 
publication.130 As Matsunaga explained to the working group, his MMD method 
incorporated the NEM method and made use of the empirically-based statistical 
generalization that was at the heart of the ADE method. His MMD method first used 
the NEM method to generate emissivities for the sensed pixel at each of the five 
wavelength bands (with one of the five emissivities being assumed from the 
beginning). Rather than taking these emissivities to be the final emissivities, as the 
NEM method did, the MMD method took these emissivities as “first guesses” that 
would be provisionally used and then later improved.  
                                                  
129 Gillespie (1994b: 3) and Matsunaga (2003). 
130 Matsunaga (1994). 
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The MMD method, like the ADE method, provided the additional equation by 
making an empirically-based statistical generalization between a kind of variation in 
the presumed emissivities for the five wavelength bands and a “real” mean emissivity. 
The kind of variation that MMD used, however, was different than the kind of 
variation used by the ADE method. Whereas the ADE method used a variation that 
was a standard deviation of mathematically-manipulated versions of emissivities, the 
MMD method used a variation that was simpler. It used the range of the emissivities: 
the difference between the maximum and minimum among the “first guesses” of the 
emissivities for the five wavelength bands. Once the presumed “real” mean was found 
from the statistical matching, it was taken as the mean for the emissivities of the five 
wavelength bands and the “first guesses” from the NEM method were subsequently 
adjusted around their new mean accordingly, preserving their original variance. The 
MMD method was able to avoid the convenient, but problematic, mathematical 
approximation that was used in the ADE method because the MMD method had used 
the NEM method, instead of mathematical approximation, to generate the initial 
emissivity information. 
Like Miyazaki’s trade-off table that initially enabled the two teams to break 
out of bilateral diplomacy, Matsunaga’s MMD method carried with it starting 
assumptions that had the imprimatur of members of both the U.S. and Japan teams. 
The MMD method emerged as the nucleation site around which the 
Temperature-Emissivity Working Group negotiated their common algorithm. The 
working group generally produced minutes that were matter-of-fact, reserved, and 
sparse. For example, a typical description of work conducted at the meetings was this 
line from Gillespie’s minutes from the meeting at the fifth ASTER team meeting: 
“discussion on data product definition (Japan, U.S.)—continued.”131 In contrast, here 
                                                  
131 Gillespie (1993b: 1). 
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is the minutes’ description, which was also written by Gillespie, of Matsunaga’s 
presentation: 
 
Next, Matsunaga presented details on a new Japanese algorithm (MMD) that 
combines characteristics of the Normalized emissivity and Alpha emissivity 
methods. Gillespie notes this approach could also be used to make Watson’s 
ratio method yield accurate temperatures and emissivities. After the session, 
Japanese members suggested combined application of Normalized and MMD 
emissivity. Wan reported on the MODIS SST [sea-surface temperature] 
algorithm, and the team considered how to adapt it to ASTER. This might be 
a separate algorithm, but if the Alpha or MMD approach was used, the 
algorithms could be combined.132 
 
Not only did the minutes note that Matsunaga’s MMD combined aspects of NEM and 
ADE, but Gillespie suggested enticingly that MMD could serve as the base for two 
other methods that the Japan team had previously expressed an interest in: Watson’s 
ratio method (which has not been described in this chapter) and a split-window 
method for sea-surface temperature. The U.S. team had also been interested in both 
methods, but as specialized data products and not as standard data products. Finally, in 
what was a rare comment for any of the ASTER team’s minutes, Gillespie’s minutes 
took note of something that happened outside of the meeting itself: “Japanese 
members” (not only a particular individual) suggested using NEM along with MMD 
for the standard product. A U.S.-Japan hybrid algorithm was in the making, and MMD 
had served as a nucleation site for it.   
 Matsunaga shared in an interview that he considered that presentation and 
MMD more generally to be among his most significant personal contributions to the 
U.S.-Japan ASTER collaboration (and at the time of the interview, almost a decade 
after the presentation, Matsunaga was still heavily involved in the ASTER 
collaboration, which at that point largely concerned the operations and maintenance of 
                                                  
132 Gillespie (1994b: 3). 
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the remote-sensing system).133 Furthermore, Matsunaga said that his most vivid 
memory of the collaboration was something that Kahle said at the working group 
meeting during his presentation. Matsunaga expected that the U.S. and Japan teams 
would not agree on a U.S.-Japan standard algorithm for temperature and emissivity 
separation and that the Japan team would relegate all of the algorithms to “in house” 
specialized data products. Matsunaga recalled that, during his presentation, he said “I 
think it’s too late for ATBD or ASTER standard algorithm.” Kahle, however, 
authoritatively interjected “it’s not too late,” and she, along with Gillespie, suggested 
that perhaps a common algorithm could be agreed upon using MMD as the core of the 
new version of the ATBD. Kahle’s comment, Matsunaga shared in the interview, made 
a deep impression on him. Kahle was “at the time like my father (boku no 
chichioya-gurai) . . . I mean, generally speaking . . . senior in years and having broad 
vision.” He was astonished, Matsunaga said, that his MMD would be central to the 
standard temperature and emissivity algorithm for the ASTER remote-sensing 
system.134   
By the ninth joint team meeting, in May 1995, the U.S. and Japan teams both 
expressed their clear support for a U.S.-Japan standard algorithm designed around 
MMD. It was called “TES” for “Temperature and Emissivity Separation.”135 The 
second version of the ATBD, which was the first version with TES, was labeled 
                                                  
133 Matsunaga (2003). 
134 Matsunaga (2003). Matsunaga’s use of “father” instead of “mother” might strike some readers 
as odd. Judging from my observations of joint team meetings that occurred between 2001 and 2004, 
Kahle’s status as the U.S. team leader, her strong personality, her abrupt style of questioning, and 
her stereotypically American hard-charging principal-investigator disposition pushed aside any 
gender expectations that members of the Japan team might have had. A few members of the Japan 
team have confided in me that they found at times Kahle’s habit of interrupting presentations with 
questions and comments to be impolite, but I suspect that they would have found those questions to 
be impolite if they had been asked by a man as well. Similar comments have been made to me 
about one or two other U.S. participants (who were men, like all the participants in the 
collaboration with the exception of Kahle). 
135 Gillespie, “T/E Working Group Meeting,” in 9th AST Meeting, p. 1. 
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version 2.0 (as opposed to 1.1) in order to denote that the version was a major revision 
of the 1.0 document that had been produced for the March 1994 review. By June 1996, 
the working group reported to the ASTER team that the TES algorithm was “mature” 
and would “change little before launch.”136 The abstract of the last version of the 
ATBD for TES, version 2.4, described TES as an algorithm that “hybridizes two 
established algorithms,” NEM and ADE, with MMD described as being an adaptation 
of ADE.137 In the body of that document and in the body of a prominent 1998 
English-language journal article that documented the TES algorithm and discussed its 
contribution to the field of remote sensing, TES was described as being “most closely 
related to the Mean-MMD method [among the many methods in the literature],” citing 
Matsunaga’s Japanese-language article for the “Mean-MMD method.”138 In the U.S. 
team’s usage of the MMD acronym, MMD came to stand not for “Mean” and 
“Maximum Difference,” as Matsunaga had originally parsed it in his 
Japanese-language article, but “Maximum-Minimum Difference,” thus requiring an 
additional prefix for the “Mean.”    
After Matsunaga’s presentation in May 1994, the basic MMD method 
underwent significant development, expansion, and fine-tuning in its transformation 
into the complex TES algorithm. The work of transforming MMD into the TES 
algorithm involved almost ten members of the Temperature and Emissivity Working 
Group, and the bulk of the work—judging from the action items listed in the working 
group’s minutes—was done by Gillespie, Matsunaga, Hook, and Rokugawa. The 
documentation shared at working group meetings shifted from the pre-MMD 
documentation of elaborations on concepts, outlines of methods, and analyses of play 
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offs, to post-MMD documentation of flow charts of a single algorithm’s processes, 
statistical analyses of one algorithm’s various components, considerations of potential 
trade-offs within the algorithm, and lists of changes made to design and of potential 
changes for the future. Individual members of the working group still reported to the 
group as a whole, but they took each other’s work products and incorporated them into 
their own work (e.g., Gillespie incorporated Matsunaga’s analysis of different options 
for the statistically-matched “additional equation”). While the Japan team was writing 
its own implementing code, and while the U.S. team was writing its own 
implementing code, they were turning to the same ATBD for guidance, and they 
returned to the working group meetings with issues that required further clarification 
(when they were not handled through e-mail). Occasionally, Gillespie’s University of 
Washington group passed code directly to Rokugawa and Matsunaga (e.g., code for 
scene classification).139  
The TES hybrid had five modules (here the description is specifically of 
version 2.4). The first module of TES was based upon NEM, and it established the 
best “first guesses.” The second module used Watson’s ratio method to construct ratio 
versions of the emissivities which were less sensitive to error than the first guesses. 
The third module, the core of TES, was the MMD module, which used a modified 
version of the additional equation that was used in Matsunaga’s original MMD. 
Instead of statistically matching a difference between the maximum and minimum of 
the emissivities of the five wavelength bands to an empirical mean emissivity (which 
was then used to adjust each emissivity of the five wavelength bands), the additional 
equation statistically matched a difference between the maximum and minimum of 
                                                  
139 For discussion of common flow charts, assessing together different options for the “additional 
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ratio versions of the emissivities to an empirical minimum emissivity. Furthermore, 
this statistically-matched additional equation was no longer a linear equation, but a 
power law (i.e., the max-min difference was operated upon by a constant exponential). 
These significant changes to the additional equation that was provided by MMD were 
hashed out together by both teams and both teams agreed that these changes resulted 
in a more stable and robust statistical matching. The final module of the algorithm was 
a quality assurance module that estimated the accuracies and precisions of the data 
product.140  
Many fine-tunings and optimizations were explored and implemented inside 
these five modules. For example, the use of a scene classification algorithm had been 
investigated, although ultimately one was not implemented as a part of TES. On the 
other hand, an iterative approach was implemented. In this approach, calculated 
temperatures and emissivities were used again and again as better “first guesses” for 
the next versions, until the difference in the two versions was less than the noise 
specification of the instrument. The iteration was first implemented in the MMD 
module, but then it was later moved up front to the NEM module. Throughout this 
development of the U.S.-Japan hybrid algorithm, MMD and TES were not competed 
against ever more fine-tuned competitors in play offs (such as with the traditional 
ADE). MMD served as the sole nucleation site for developing the U.S.-Japan TES 
hybrid.141  
The Temperature and Emissivity Working Group made good on the two team 
leaders’ call for “closer collaboration.” They also fulfilled their share of the language 
in the GSFC-ERSDAC Project Implementation Plan that tasked “the ASTER Science 
Team” with “developing a common set of algorithms for ASTER standard data 
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products to be generated both in Japan and in the U.S.”142 Kahle and Nichols had 
written that language into the draft PIP that had been under negotiation in the fall of 
1993, a few months before Tsu and Kahle called for “closer collaboration” at the sixth 
ASTER team meeting.143 The PIP was not signed, however, until the fall of 1997, 
after the Temperature and Emissivity Working Group had, in practice, already enacted 
U.S.-Japan partnership in the design of the TES hybrid and had exercised transnational 
authority over the development of multiple versions of that standard algorithm. 
Nevertheless, the algorithm’s implementation was ultimately not exactly the 
same in both countries. For example, where the U.S. team’s code took ratios of 
emissivities in the second module, the Japan team’s code took ratios of intensities.144 
Despite this difference, a 1997 joint comparison of the performances of the two codes, 
which was based on common target sites, showed only “very small differences.”145 At 
that time, however, the code’s implementation and testing was just in its beginning. 
Once Rokugawa and Matsunaga handed off their code to Japan’s DAAC, ERSDAC, in 
the fall of 1997, where ERSDAC’s contractors—with the assistance of 
Matsunaga—further developed the code and implemented it into ERSDAC’s systems, 
the code became much less open to change. After the launch of ASTER in December 
1999, the joint Temperature-Emissivity Working Group fine-tuned the details of the 
TES algorithm, advancing the code’s version number incrementally from 2.5 to 2.9. 
By this time, ERSDAC and its contractors had finished what they considered to be 
their engineering and development stage and were then into operations. ERSDAC did 
not want to open up the code that their contractors had supposedly completed, 
especially if the importance of the changes were relatively small. More money had to 
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be allocated to contractors for ERSDAC to make changes. ERSDAC made a 
management decision not to keep pace with the joint working group’s recommended 
updates to the algorithm. Japan’s code was not open to amendment to the same extent 
that the U.S.’s code was.146  
In the United States, Gillespie’s University of Washington group passed 
revisions to the software engineers at JPL, who then passed it on to the U.S. DAAC 
for implementation, usually in the form of consolidated packages that included updates 
for the other standard data products as well. Updates to TES were made in April 2001, 
October 2001, April 2002, and June 2002.147 Every update to the algorithm might be 
an update that ERSDAC would not make. For example, the implementation of TES at 
the U.S. DAAC had an option that was said to improve the estimation of temperature 
over water surfaces and vegetation (i.e., over gray bodies). ERSDAC chose not to 
implement this option.148 At this level of specificity, the question of whether or not 
the United States and Japan actually had a U.S.-Japan standardized data product was 
for users to decide. From the perspective of the two team leaders and the two chairs of 
the Temperature and Emissivity Working Group, the working group had agreed to an 
internationally standardized data product that was documented by an ATBD that had 
U.S. and Japan co-authors, and the working group was exercising a joint authority 
over the maintenance of that standard data product. The working group’s transnational 
authority over the U.S.-Japan partnership in production was substantial, but the scope 
of that transnational authority was not unlimited.    
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U.S.-Japan Equality in the Governance of Consumption 
 
A normative notion of U.S.-Japan partnership underpinned the ASTER team’s 
exercise of transnational authority in another area of the ASTER remote-sensing 
system’s international political economy: consumption. In the realm of consumption, 
“partnership” also meant “equality.” One early issue that the two teams’ Operations 
and Mission Planning Working Group confronted was the fact that not all users were 
alike. Users could not be treated as interchangeable black-boxes, although they were 
often simplified that way in diagrams (e.g., see figure 6.1). The two teams decided that 
different categories of users were to have different rights to consumption of the 
ASTER instrument’s resources, although it took a few years of work to define just 
what those user categories would be.149 While user categories came to be hierarchical 
for users within each of the national groupings, a strict equality was observed and 
enacted, at least on paper, between the rights of “Japan” and “U.S.” users. This 
equality was in agreement with, but was not specifically dictated by, a general 
philosophy of “non-discrimination” in data exchange which was expected to be 
forthcoming in the international data exchange policy for EOS. According to most 
descriptions of international political economy, states are not typically guaranteed an 
equal slice of consumption under a notion of international partnership, or even just a 
“right” to equal consumption in the abstract.150 Nevertheless, in the configuration of 
the international political economy of ASTER data and information system, a right to 
equal consumption was indeed affirmed as a principle of U.S.-Japan partnership and 
equality. 
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For instance, the two teams granted individual members of each team the 
right to acquire more than four times the amount of observations that any single 
general user could acquire. The Japan and U.S. team leaders were each allocated ten 
times that of the general user. Likewise, acquisition requests from a “Special Priority 
Japan User” who was affiliated with a mineral or natural resource firm and those from 
a NASA-sponsored investigator who was associated with other EOS studies were both 
allowed twice as much as a general user.151 
Yet, despite evidence of a wide difference in demand, the two teams 
established equal allocations of consumption for corresponding user categories 
between Japan and the United States. That is, a U.S. team member’s individual 
allocation was in principle equal to a Japan team member’s individual allocation, and 
the individual allocation for an EOS user was equal to the allocation of a Special 
Priority Japan User. This equality was emphasized and formally established in such 
planning documents as the Long-Term Instrument Plan, which was written and signed 
by the team leaders.152 The Long-Term Instrument Plan was also signed by the 
program management at NASA and MITI. To give an indication of how much the 
demand could vary between the U.S. and Japan teams, after a preliminary survey of 
desired observations was conducted for planning and simulating the instrument’s 
operations, U.S. scientists had requested more than three times the number of scenes 
as Japan’s scientists had requested over the anticipated life of the instrument (the 
numbers of scientists on each team was close to equal in number); moreover, if the 
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“common ground” of a global land map is discounted, at this early date U.S. scientists 
had requested more than ten times the number of scenes that Japanese scientists had 
requested.153 At the time, there was good reason to regard this survey of demand as an 
important but speculative exercise; this particular survey was conducted several years 
before the launch of the instrument, and interest among scientists in Japan was 
expected to increase.154 Nevertheless, the U.S. team never considered trying to work 
out an arrangement in which the United States or U.S. users were formally allocated 
more observational resources in light of the significant difference in the sizes of the 
potential science user communities in the United States and Japan. In no way was this 
kind of equality—equality on the basis of states as well as users—mandated by the 
international data exchange policy that at the time was expected to be forthcoming. In 
practice, when the U.S. team leader saw an opportunity to work in more requests from 
U.S. colleagues, such as by funneling in more proposals from non-team members 
through the team acquisition request process, she generally seized it. Nevertheless, a 
norm of equality was enacted.155 
This presumptive norm of equal consumption between similar user categories 
was not just held as a principle of equality that should govern allocations only between 
the two teams. It was held to extend to the use of ASTER by Japan’s and the U.S.’s 
general users who were not associated with the teams in any way other than sharing a 
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national membership category. These users were expected to certainly number in the 
hundreds, possibly in the thousands. Moreover, the U.S.’s general users were not to 
“crowd out” Japan’s general users. Because, however, observation requests from 
general users received relatively low priority in the scheduling of observations in 
comparison to the requests that came from members of each team as well as from 
other prominent users, this presumptive norm against crowding out was rarely 
tested.156  
The presumptive notion of equality between the consumption of national 
general users extended into pricing as well, but not without significant contention. 
NASA Headquarters had in the late 1990s wanted the ASTER data that NASA 
distributed to be free to general research users, in accordance with their policy for 
other EOS instruments.157 The U.S. DAAC had in fact distributed ASTER’s data free 
of charge after the instrument’s level 1 data products were released for user orders in 
November 2000, subsequent to the instrument’s initial check out period in the first 
months of its launch. In NASA’s view, such a policy promoted ASTER, promoted 
NASA, and promoted the value-added services industry for remote sensing in 
agreement with the Land Remote Sensing Act of 1992. Furthermore, the ASTER MoU 
allowed for such a policy, with its wording of “no more than” the marginal cost.  
Yet, ERSDAC wanted to recover some of their costs by charging for ASTER 
data.158 If NASA freely distributed ASTER data, users who were not otherwise 
committed to receiving imagery from ERSDAC (especially private firms outside of 
either Japan or the United States) would largely request their ASTER imagery from 
NASA. Given Japan’s earlier expectations about pricing, Japan unsurprisingly 
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protested NASA’s free distribution of ASTER’s data, dramatically reading a letter of 
objection at the opening plenary sessions of joint team meetings, often after the 
representative from NASA Headquarters spoke, if one attended.159 The situation was 
“ugly, ugly, ugly,” in the opinion of one U.S. team member.160 A member of the Japan 
team said “we felt like Japan was being treated as a U.S. subsidiary.”161 After being 
lobbied by both the Japan and the U.S. teams, NASA Headquarters made an exception 
to their general EOS data policy for the case of ASTER imagery.162 After years of 
diplomacy, MITI and NASA ultimately agreed to pricing policies that were roughly 
comparable (exchange rates fluctuate, after all).163 The two teams had not only 
configured equality of consumption into the international political economy of the 
ASTER data and information system, but in this important issue at least, they 
governed as a transnational authority using a normative notion of partnership and 
equality.  
As a consequence of the new pricing policy, NASA’s monthly distribution of 
ASTER’s basic data product dropped “in dramatic fashion” to one percent of what it 
had been before the pricing policy was implemented.164 NASA, which had always 
been conscious of public outreach for the EOS program, regarded the massive 
reduction in its distribution of ASTER data to the public as a significant political cost. 
According to one individual involved in the negotiations from the U.S. side, NASA’s 
equalizing of pricing policies was designed to emphasize “a basic notion of fairness” 
in order to open up the door for a future change to the data and information system 
which the U.S. team would propose to the Japan team and to ERSDAC; this change 
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was a delicate matter that concerned the United States re-processing arguably flawed 
imagery that it had received from Japan.165 A quid-pro-quo, however, had not been 
suggested, much less agreed upon, prior to NASA’s decision to start charging for its 
imagery.166 NASA’s and the U.S. team’s move to start charging for ASTER imagery 
distributed through the U.S. DAAC in the United States was normative as well as 
strategic. They considered it an important move to strengthen the U.S.-Japan 
relationship and the ASTER team’s transnational authority by showing in a clear way 
that the United States valued a balanced partnership with Japan. While the Japan and 
the U.S. teams’ notions of an equitable U.S.-Japan partnership did not always have 
such clear stakes, the use of that notion in their technoscientific diplomacy to 
configure and enact an equitable international political economy through their data and 
information system was not unusual. 
 
The Utility of a Normative Notion of a U.S.-Japan Partnership 
 
In addition to working out a scheme to specify how much data various 
categories of U.S. and Japan users could consume and in addition to agreeing upon the 
cost, the teams also had to negotiate issues concerning who could use various 
instrument capabilities and how much of those scarce capabilities they could consume. 
The capability of the ASTER instrument to point its three telescopes a limited number 
of times over its expected life was just such an issue. The two teams needed to decide 
the way in which the consumption of ASTER’s scarce pointing maneuvers would be 
regulated. Their technoscientific diplomacy over this issue deployed technical 
reasoning and asserted and ascribed state power, and the closure of two teams’ 
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discussions concerning this issue was facilitated by the enactment of a normative 
notion of a U.S.-Japan partnership. 
Questions about how to regulate ASTER’s pointing capabilities came to a 
head in March of 1997, a couple of years before ASTER’s launch, when the team was 
evaluating the (simulated) performance of their routines for scheduling ASTER’s 
observations. At a joint Operations and Mission Planning Working Group meeting, a 
mission analyst working at and for ERSDAC as a contractor explained that the 
scheduling algorithm that his firm was developing for the system was expected to be 
too slow. Because the U.S. and Japan teams had not finished collecting what they 
considered to be “realistic” data requests with which to run scheduling simulations, no 
one knew how slow the scheduling software was, or even if it was actually slow.167 
But the two teams suspected that the scheduler was indeed slow, particularly because 
they had been experiencing other problems with the scheduler that ERSDAC’s diligent 
but “overcommitted” contractor was developing.168  
One way of speeding up the processing was to be especially strict about when 
the scheduler would consider observations that required the visible telescope to point 
at large angles. 169  Eliminating large-angles eliminated many more potential 
observation schedules that would need to be considered in the scheduler’s search to 
find an optimal one-day schedule. The two teams had already agreed that large-angle 
pointing observations were appropriate only in emergencies, such as to monitor an 
erupting volcano or a forest fire. But now they had to specify and implement this 
general guideline. They left the meeting with this issue unresolved, and the Operations 
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and Mission Planning Working Group posted it as their 116th action item.170 This 
action item was an important one for the working group, but it was only one in a long 
list of action items that had been opened and closed over their years of collaboration. 
A couple of months later before the next joint team meeting, the Japan 
co-chair of the joint working group, Yamaguchi Yasushi, e-mailed the U.S. co-chair of 
the working group, Moshe Pniel. To resolve the question about how to restrict the use 
of large-angle pointing, Yamaguchi had proposed that only U.S. and Japan team 
members should be able to submit requests to use the large-angle pointing capability 
and that they should only be able to do so in the case of a specific kind of observation 
request. His proposal seemed to make a sharp distinction between who could and who 
could not use the visible telescope’s capability to look sideways at large angles.171  
The co-chair of the Operations and Mission Planning Working Group, Pniel, 
in a response over e-mail to Yamaguchi, stated that it was Pniel’s and Kahle’s 
recommendation that they discuss this issue with the two teams as a whole during the 
plenary session of the upcoming meeting.172 Everyone involved with the development 
of the ASTER remote-sensing system—the U.S. and Japan teams, ERSDAC and 
JAROS managers, even sometimes representatives from NASA 
Headquarters—typically attended the plenary session of team meetings. Kahle and 
Pniel desired to retain the flexibility of the large-angle viewing for users other than the 
two teams, and they suspected that the U.S. and Japan teams as a whole would agree 
with them. They also thought that the two teams as a group should determine a method 
by which the data and information system could calculate when to limit the use of the 
large-angle pointing. Kahle and Pniel wanted the above-mentioned scheduling 
program of the data and information system, which the ERSDAC contractor was 
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developing, to integrate this calculation into its scheduling routines. This proposal for 
a technological fix was e-mailed to Yamaguchi.173  
Yamaguchi e-mailed a response to Kahle and Pniel, reiterating his position on 
the matter, arguing that they should not ask the two teams about this question at the 
upcoming U.S.-Japan joint team meeting before the joint working group had come to a 
position among themselves. He had reasoned that it was a “very political matter” and 
that it was best for the working group to present a single rationale to the two teams 
together as a group.174 Yamaguchi’s hesitancy to broach the question of how to 
regulate the consumption of ASTER’s pointing capabilities during a plenary session 
stemmed from a number of general concerns: 1) JAROS engineers had already 
requested that the ASTER instrument, for whose technical health they were directly 
responsible, not be needlessly taxed with pointing maneuvers; opening up pointing 
capabilities to general users was a risk in that regard; 2) industry users associated with 
ERSDAC had been concerned that emergency pointing maneuvers would detract from 
their more regular and less-time dependent observation goals; and 3) as was mentioned 
above, ERSDAC’s contractor for the scheduling program for ASTER was already 
overcommitted and was having some problems developing the complex scheduler. 
Because Yamaguchi did not list in his e-mail these general concerns, concerns which 
had been explicitly voiced in other forums in which Yamaguchi was involved, the 
salience of these concerns is a matter of interpretive judgment. It is certainly 
reasonable to assume, however, that these concerns would have complicated any 
discussion of the issue during a plenary session. For different reasons, many parties 
had a stake in this issue. Wide-ranging discussions at the relatively large plenary 
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session risked a contentious scene in which Japan’s two consortia would be pitted 
against scientists from both the Japan and U.S. teams.  
In his e-mail to Kahle and Pniel, Yamaguchi suggested that he feared that any 
discussion at the plenary would highlight ERSDAC’s and its contractor’s inability to 
develop, given their tight budget allocations, a scheduler that could fulfill what would 
likely be a request from both teams to have the scheduling software manage the 
large-angle pointing issue.175 Yamaguchi’s alternative proposal, to decide at the 
working group level to restrict pointing maneuvers for everyone but team members, 
had the merit of ensuring that the general consumption of ASTER’s limited pointing 
maneuvers would be strictly limited without burdening the scheduling software. He 
also proposed that exceptions to this rule would be allowed on a case-by-case basis, to 
be determined by a joint committee. If that was not going to be the procedure for 
regulating pointing maneuvers, however, Yamaguchi wanted to know in advance of 
any plenary session what the procedure would be.176 
 Yamaguchi’s response pushed Kahle, Pniel, and others at JPL who were 
discussing the issue to name their specific objections to Yamaguchi’s proposal. They 
disagreed with Yamaguchi’s proposal on the grounds that it would appear to favor the 
two teams—in their words, “the insiders”—over the general users. And on that basis, 
they would expect to receive complaints. EOS teams were, in general, under consistent 
pressure by NASA Headquarters to level user hierarchies and avoid insider advantages. 
But as we have seen in the case of, for instance, data acquisition allocations, that 
demand for leveling only goes so far. In addition to exacerbating possible outsider 
complaints about a system that would be alleged as rigged for the insiders, the U.S. 
team argued that Yamaguchi’s proposal would require a joint team working group to 
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evaluate every urgent request, instead of leaving it to the computer processing system 
to calculate whether or not an urgent request would fit into the schedule.177 The U.S. 
members of this scheduling committee did not want to have any direct agency in this 
scheduling calculation. Instead, they preferred to leave it to computer algorithms to 
sort out, algorithms which would of course need to be designed and agreed upon in 
advance. 
Yamaguchi persisted with his position, pointing out that other insider/outsider 
discrepancies were already embedded into the U.S.-Japan team’s user classification 
scheme.178 He closed by writing “if you [Pniel and others] still want to nominate this 
issue [for the plenary], we agree, but please understand our feeling which were 
mentioned in this and previous mail.”179 Notes on the U.S. team’s discussion show 
that the plea to “understand our feeling” solidified the issue as not just a request from 
Yamaguchi but as a request from Yamaguchi speaking for “Japan.”180 Yamaguchi, 
whose English was excellent, often served as a spokesperson for the Japan team in 
negotiations with the U.S. team. Pniel reported to the U.S. team that it was “Japan’s 
STRONG feelings that this was a closed issue” (emphasis in original).181 Yamaguchi’s 
rhetoric had ascribed primacy to a U.S.-Japan partnership, arguing that that partnership 
should trump any domestic insider/outsider concerns that the U.S. team had. 
Yamaguchi’s enactment of this norm did not allow the U.S. team to easily insist that 
ERSDAC fund the integration of a new calculating routine into a complex scheduling 
program that ERSDAC’s contractor was already having problems developing. Would 
the U.S. team deny the importance of this U.S.-Japan partnership that buttressed their 
transnational authority? Ultimately, after the U.S. team members discussed the matter, 
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Kahle and Pniel decided that they would “concede” to what by now had moved from 
being just Yamaguchi’s request to the “Japan team’s position.” The U.S. team wanted 
to avoid any further escalation of the issue. Nevertheless, they thought it amounted to 
what they characterized as a “loss of science.” They strategized, however, that that 
concession would leave enough good will for them to “go for” another issue of 
importance to the U.S. team leader regarding the international political economy of the 
ASTER data and information system.182 Yamaguchi’s proposal became policy, and 
rather than going for a technological fix, the two teams further enacted partnership in 
the U.S.-Japan relationship and enhanced the ASTER team’s transnational authority in 
the particular socio-political practices of the two teams: on a case-by-case basis, an 
ASTER team working group would evaluate requests for observations that required 
using the visible and near infrared telescope at large angles and through that practice 
the ASTER team would configure yet another aspect of consumption in the 
international political economy of the ASTER data and information system. 
 
Transnational Authority and Socio-Political Interdependency 
 
As the ASTER science team designed and maintained the ASTER data and 
information system, they also configured and governed that system’s international 
political economy. The organization and substance of this international political 
economy was not primarily determined by the decisions of “high-level” senior 
officials from U.S. and Japan state bureaucracies such as NASA Headquarters or MITI, 
or even by managers in their respective offices of international affairs. The two science 
teams, using documents written by, for instance, Nichols, Geller, and Satō, negotiated 
                                                  
182 U.S. ASTER Science Team (1997: 3) and ASTER Operations and Mission Planning Working 
Group (1997b). 
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an “ASTER centric” data and information system and sought to establish a “common 
understanding” about its design and purpose. Settling questions about the international 
political economy of the ASTER remote-sensing system was an inherent part of that 
technoscientific diplomacy. Neither the NASA-MITI MoU nor the GSFC-ERSDAC 
PIP set out, in advance of the two teams’ diplomacy, a framework for their 
configuration of the ASTER system’s international political economy.  
While high-level documents asserted “clean interfaces” for the U.S.-Japan 
relationship in the ASTER remote-sensing system, the construction of clean interfaces 
was neither natural nor easy, and the prescription of clean interfaces left the two teams 
to work out the politically and technically significant issues of standardization and 
interoperability which might allow interfaces to be “clean.” After discussing with the 
Japan team possible designs for the level 1 data products, the U.S. team was the driver 
behind the U.S.’s hedge during the negotiations over the MoU. They pushed the 
United States to have a level 1 processing capability, in part so the U.S. team could 
have “visibility” into the level 1 data products and vouch for the integrity of those data 
products that would flow between Japan and the United States. The two team leaders, 
Tsu and Kahle, and not the MoU or PIP, pushed the two teams to have “closer 
collaboration” and to enact U.S.-Japan partnership. The language in the PIP that tasked 
the ASTER team with negotiating common ATBDs had been in fact crafted by Kahle 
and Nichols before the call for closer collaboration at the sixth joint team meeting. 
Furthermore, the MoU and PIP were signed only after closer collaboration had been 
achieved in practice. In the Temperature-Emissivity Working Group, although 
members of the U.S. and Japan teams had competing preferences for how to deal with 
the indeterminancy of temperature and emissivity separation—preferences that aligned 
with their professional interests and which were embedded in their respective 
communities of practice—the working group was able to make good on Tsu’s and 
 385  
Kahle’s call for “closer collaboration” by building on the nucleation site that was 
Matsunaga’s MMD method. The working group also exercised transnational authority 
over successive versions of their U.S.-Japan hybrid algorithm, although the authority 
of their working group was more limited when it came to updating the algorithm’s 
implementation. 
U.S.-Japan transnational authority and the enactment of U.S.-Japan 
partnership extended as well into the configuration and governance of consumption in 
the ASTER systems’ international political economy. In particular, the two teams 
successfully pushed for equality in the pricing arrangements for the U.S. and Japan 
data products, when the political and economic interests of NASA and MITI diverged. 
Even in the more mundane task of negotiating how the scarce pointing resources of the 
ASTER instrument would be distributed, a normative notion of U.S.-Japan partnership 
had utility for the two teams and buttressed their exercise of transnational authority. 
Neither Latourian actor-network theory nor the epistemic communities 
approach can account for how the two teams’ configured ASTER’s international 
political economy or for why they negotiated the above outcomes. The Hobbesian 
realism of Latourian actor-network theory suggests that NASA and the U.S. team 
should have dominated most of these issues, given the overwhelming disparity 
between the center of calculation of GSFC and the U.S. DAAC for ASTER on one 
side and the center of calculation of ERSDAC and the Japan DAAC for ASTER on the 
other side. GSFC was able to impose many EOS software standards onto ERSDAC, 
especially since the development of ERSDAC’s data and information lagged the 
development of GSFC’s EOSDIS. Yet, for level 1 processing, ERSDAC retained flow 
of the production pipeline and agreed to produce only 40% of the level 1B products. 
Moreover, the U.S. team did not dictate the definition of the level 1 data products. In 
the design of the temperature and emissivity standard data products, neither Gillespie’s 
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NEM nor Hook’s ADE won out. TES was a thoroughly hybrid algorithm. From the 
perspective of Latourian actor-network theory, this outcome is especially surprising 
since the laboratory that created the empirical emissivity data for the statistical 
matching of the ADE method was at JPL. No counter-laboratory and 
counter-emissivity claims arose in Japan, and yet Matsunaga’s MMD additional 
equation served as the nucleation site for TES. Finally, given the significant difference 
in the market power of the U.S. and Japan DAACs, and that the U.S. had a level 1 
processing capability, the U.S.’s concession on pricing arrangements cannot be 
accounted for by Latourian actor-network theory. 
The extensive technoscientific diplomacy described in this chapter suggests 
that the epistemic community approach is right to call attention to the work of 
epistemic communities in order to understand international policy coordination. While 
the chapter did not examine “policy coordination” outside the realm of the 
international earth observing system, we could imagine how ASTER remote-sensing 
data might feed into policymaking about such issues as climate change, urban 
planning, and even international security (reportedly, ASTER standard data products 
were used to assess the extent of bombing and fires in and around Baghdad during the 
Iraq War of 2003). Clearly, however, the depth of difference between the two teams’ 
communities of practice as borne out in their technoscientific diplomacy belies the 
epistemic communities approach’s core assumptions of shared “principled” and 
“causal” beliefs. Moreover, there is no reason to think that the ASTER team is 
exceptional in its initial lack of epistemic and normative solidarity. More importantly, 
if the epistemic communities approach were adopted to understand, for example, why 
NASA and MITI ultimately harmonized their pricing policies, the account would 
misunderstand why the two teams pushed in the first place for that issue to be resolved. 
It was not because they idealistically believed EOS data should be priced at the same 
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“marginal cost” everywhere (overlooking for the moment that the calculation of 
“marginal cost” depends upon local arrangements), but because the U.S. team wanted 
to enact “a basic notion of fairness” so that they could continue to do business with the 
Japan team. The U.S. and Japan teams’ work was political as well as scientific. 
In contrast to Latourian actor-network theory and the epistemic communities 
approach, this chapter’s analysis of the two teams’ technoscientific diplomacy 
accounts more compellingly for how the two teams designed the ASTER data and 
information system and configured that system’s international political economy. I 
also argue that this “how” account can better explain why the two teams reached the 
scientific, political, and technical settlements that they did. The explanatory sketch of 
technoscientific diplomacy emphasizes: the moves of liminal state actors; their 
enactment of international relations, especially their enactment of state power and 
normative notions; and the mixing of scientific claims and assertions of power. It can 
indeed offer “because” answers to “why” questions: The U.S.-Japan level 1 
compromise was reached because, owing to the U.S. team’s push for “visibility” on 
the grounds of assuring scientific integrity and the Japan team’s redesign of the level 1 
data products, NASA and MITI were able to negotiate a tension between the U.S. 
side’s desire for an independent level 1 processing capability and the Japan side’s 
desire for primacy in level 1 processing. The U.S. and Japan members of the 
temperature and emissivity working group developed the hybrid TES because Tsu and 
Kahle—perhaps for their own strategic reasons—pushed the working group to enact 
U.S.-Japan partnership. Yet, because Matsunaga’s MMD method served as a 
nucleation site with assumptions that had the imprimatur of members from both teams, 
the working group was eventually able to exercise transnational authority over the 
development of the TES hybrid. The U.S. team agreed with Yamaguchi’s proposal to 
limit large-angle pointing because his enactment of “Japan” and of a normative notion 
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of U.S.-Japan partnership challenged the basis of the Operations and Mission Planning 
Working Group’s transnational authority, which the U.S. team valued (in part, but not 
only, for strategic reasons).  
The new “why” puzzle that this chapter leaves us with is why transnational 
authority was exercised in some negotiations and not others. Why did transnational 
authority and normative notions of U.S.-Japan partnership have persuasive force in, 
for instance, the Operations and Mission Planning Working Group and, eventually, the 
Temperature and Emissivity Working Group, but not in the negotiations over level 1 
processing? I suggest that the persuasiveness and affirmation of transnational authority 
and of normative notions of U.S.-Japan partnership were predicated upon local 
socio-political interdependency in particular joint work.  
This interdependency in joint work cannot be read alone from the 
arrangement of material artifacts, such as the interdependency in the architecture of 
the data and information system which shaped the negotiations over level 1 processing 
and production. While asymmetry in material interdependencies can give rise to power 
relations that enable coercion,183 the kind of interdependency that fostered the use of 
normative notions of U.S.-Japan partnership and transnational authority in the two 
working groups noted above was a local interdependency. To some extent the two 
teams’ enacted U.S.-Japan partnership in their joint work because conspicuous 
alternative paths were becoming more challenging (e.g., months after months of 
disagreement on those alternative paths; the mediocre peer-review of ATBD version 
1.0 for temperature and emissivity). Yet, owing to joint work conducted around 
nucleation sites, normative notions of U.S.-Japan partnership and the exercise of 
transnational authority could become part of the work process. In the development of 
TES and in the negotiations over the regulation of pointing consumption, the two 
                                                  
183 Keohane and Nye (1977) is the seminal work on this theme. 
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“sides” were problem-solving together, exchanging e-mails, code, faxes, and results 
that were salient to the task at hand of at least someone on the “other side” of an issue. 
Papers, diagrams, and presentations did not repeatedly drive home difference (such as 
in the “play offs” between NEM and ADE) as much as they were building an 
algorithm or object that was mutually-shared and mutually-owned. While this local 
socio-political interdependency does not of course guarantee the exercise of—much 
less the effectiveness of—transnational authority, they maintain its possibility rather 
than assuming the normality of state-centered, bilateral politics. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
BETWEEN STATE AND TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
 
 This dissertation has sought to understand and explain the politics of technical 
decision-making and scientific judgment in the development of a U.S.-Japan 
remote-sensing system. It has argued that these politics can be best understood and 
explained using a new interpretative approach that the dissertation has developed, 
called “technoscientific diplomacy.” This concluding chapter summarizes this new 
approach, argues the merits of its explanatory power in comparison to that of other 
approaches, and suggests the approach’s broader applicability for investigating 
activities that are conducted in socio-political spaces between states and transnational 
communities.    
The interpretative approach of technoscientific diplomacy has been used to 
highlight four qualities of the negotiating practices of the U.S. and Japan scientists and 
engineers who—on behalf of their respective states—developed, operated, and 
managed the ASTER remote-sensing system (see table 7.1 on the next page). First, the 
dissertation has conceptualized these scientists and engineers as neither state actors 
nor non-state actors, but as liminal state actors. As such, they often worked with the 
presumption of transnational community but at the threshold of the states of the United 
States and Japan. By situating their personal agency in relation to their respective 
states as well as transnational community, and by (re)articulating and deploying state 
goals in their decision-making and collective exercise of scientific judgment, they 
mediated international relations between the United States and Japan. Second, the 
approach of technoscientific diplomacy has been used to attend to how members of the 
ASTER team conducted international relations in and through their decision-making 
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and collective exercise of scientific judgment. These scientists and engineers asserted 
scientific knowledge, ascribed and projected state power, and enacted U.S.-Japan 
relations in their decision-making. They also enacted U.S.-Japan relations in their 
work practices, in their design and operation of the ASTER remote-sensing system, 
and in the ASTER system’s international political economy of scientific data.  
 
Table 7.1: The Interpretative Approach of Technoscientific Diplomacy 
 
1. Liminal state actors who (re)articulate state goals 
2. Enactment of state power and international relations 
3. Intertwining and synthesis of knowledge and power 
4. Local conditions for transnational decision-making 
 
The interpretative approach of technoscientific diplomacy has been used to 
highlight a third quality of the negotiating practices of the U.S. and Japan teams: 
interplay and interdependence between transnational knowledge production and 
politics among states. By closely tracing the intertwining of assertions and ascriptions 
of scientific knowledge that transcended states and assertions and ascriptions of state 
power in an international arena, the dissertation has used the approach to explain in 
detail the ASTER team’s decision-making and collective exercise of scientific 
judgment. Finally, the approach of technoscientific diplomacy has been used to show 
how local socio-political interdependency between the U.S. and Japan teams could 
foster transnational authority and community, even if their realization was not in any 
way guaranteed. In particular, nucleation sites and normative notions of partnership 
and equality have been investigated as resources for the fostering of transnational 
authority and community. In sum, by using technoscientific diplomacy as an 
    
 392 
 
interpretative approach, the dissertation has provided an original and compelling 
account of how the U.S. and Japan teams worked together to build an international 
remote-sensing system. It has also contributed to our understanding of the politics of 
intergovernmental collaboration in science and technology more broadly. 
Technoscientific diplomacy, however, is not just a new interpretative approach 
that has been used to persuasively account for the development of the ASTER 
remote-sensing system and illuminate interplay between knowledge production and 
politics among states. It is a better approach for explaining decision-making and the 
collective exercise of scientific judgment in intergovernmental collaborations in 
science and technology. This dissertation has used the approach of technoscientific 
diplomacy to provide detailed accounts of overlapping and interdependent episodes of 
decision-making and scientific judgment (see table 7.2 on the next page). Each of 
these episodes can be roughly captured by an explanatory sketch, and this explanatory 
sketch can then be compared with those that can be offered using other theoretical 
approaches. Recall from this dissertation’s introductory chapter that an explanatory 
sketch is an interpretation that provides a rough account of some specific event, 
activity, or observation which can be compared and contrasted with other sketches of 
that event, activity, or observation and which can also offer lessons that can be 
adapted to other empirical contexts (p. 30). Table 7.3 (on p. 374) summarizes the 
expected outcomes of explanatory sketches for each episode for three different 
approaches: epistemic communities, actor-network theory, and technoscientific 
diplomacy. 
The episodes of technoscientific diplomacy that have been described by this 
dissertation have had diverse outcomes, both in terms of the socio-political form of the 
decision-making that the two teams enacted in the episodes (table 7.2 and table 7.3) 
and in terms  of the specifications that the two teams adopted  for the design of  the  
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Table 7.2: Episodes of Technoscientific Diplomacy 
 
Chapter and Episode 
 
Critical Years of 
Negotiation 
Form of 
Decision-Making
   
Chapter Four: Thermal Infrared 
Radiometer (TIR) 1989  Bilateral 
Chapter Five: Shortwave Infrared 
Radiometer (SWIR) 1990-1993 Bilateral 
Chapter Five: ASTER Operational 
Capabilities (Ops) 1991-1993 Transnational 
Chapter Six: Level 1 Product and 
Process (Level 1) 1992-1993 Bilateral 
Chapter Six: Temperature – 
Emissivity Separation (TES) 1993-1995 Transnational 
Chapter Six: User Consumption 
and Pricing (C & P) 1993-1997; 2001-2005  Bi/Transnational 
Chapter Six: Regulation of 
Pointing Capabilities (Pointing) 1997 Transnational 
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ASTER remote-sensing system (table 7.3). A satisfactory explanatory sketch for each 
of these episodes must not only explain the “why” of these outcomes in a way that is 
consistent with its guiding interpretative approach, but it must also compellingly 
explain the “how”: the dynamic, historical process that produced those outcomes. 
Thus, what it means to “compellingly explain the ‘how’” is not simply the 
documentation of a plausible process that might provide the historically correct 
outcome (which is often the objective of using “process tracing” to construct “causal 
mechanisms”). Rather, an account of a process which is, itself, a history independent 
of the outcome contributes separately to the power of the explanatory sketch and to the 
adequacy of its guiding interpretative approach. In short, “how” as well as “why,” and 
“process” as well as “outcome,” need to be understood to explain persuasively the 
politics of decision-making and the collective exercise of scientific judgment in the 
development of the ASTER remote-sensing system. 
 According to this standard, the interpretative approach of technoscientific 
diplomacy is better able to explain the episodes listed in tables 7.2 and 7.3 than either 
the epistemic community approach or the Latourian actor-network theory of Science in 
Action. Chapters four through six of the dissertation have advanced this argument 
episode-by-episode and in detail. Here, in order to examine as a whole the general 
merits of technoscientific diplomacy vis-à-vis those alternative approaches, I compare 
just the explanatory sketches of a few of these episodes.  
The negotiations over the thermal infrared radiometer perhaps illustrate best 
the merits of conceptualizing scientists and engineers as liminal state actors, of 
examining their (re)articulation and deployment of state goals, and of explaining 
outcomes in terms that account for the intertwining and synthesis of knowledge and 
power (i.e., qualities #1 and #3 in table 7.1). Only by accounting for how Dr. Kahle as 
a liminal state actor was able to articulate her team’s goals as the goals of NASA 
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Headquarters as well as those of an international community can we understand why 
the thermal infrared radiometer has five bands, rather than one, two, three, or seven, 
and why neither the radiometer’s signal-to-noise ratio nor its spatial resolution was 
improved. In particular, Kahle’s cover page to her white paper for Dr. Ishii, which was 
copied to the EOS program office at NASA Headquarters, had listed increasing the 
number of thermal bands as the top priority for EOS regarding improvements to the 
radiometer, even when the EOS program office at NASA Headquarters would have 
apparently been satisfied with just two bands.  
The epistemic community approach, however, would counterfactually presume 
solidarity among the EOS epistemic community, and this epistemic community would 
likely be represented by EOS advocates who circulated through the EOS program 
office at NASA Headquarters. Consequently, the approach would suggest that a 
NASA/EOS consensus of one or two bands would probably have been the agreed 
upon design. Like NASA Headquarters, MITI and MITI’s JAROS also required fewer 
than five bands; they preferred no more than three. Five bands were expensive after all 
and were not needed to satisfy their “operational” goals of natural resource exploration 
and exploitation, according to both Dr. Ishii and Dr. Kahle. Given that MITI, JAROS, 
and their contractors were funding and building the instrument in their laboratories, 
Latourian actor-network theory would suggest that MITI and JAROS had all the 
material resources that they needed to counter Kahle’s claims with a longer network of 
facts in a “trial of strength.” And actor-network theory cannot account for Kahle’s 
strategy to negotiate what scholars in Science and Technology Studies would call a 
boundary object. Latourian actor-network theory would counterfactually suggest that 
Kahle would have sought to “translate” MITI’s interests into hers and “enroll” MITI in 
her project, but she did not. Neither the epistemic community approach nor the 
Latourian actor-network theory of Science in Action is suited for explaining the 
    
 397 
 
negotiations over the thermal infrared radiometer. In contrast, the interpretative 
approach of technoscientific diplomacy is much more able to explain the TIR episode 
persuasively. This is not, perhaps, surprising because it was in part inductively 
developed around this episode; its performance on the other episodes or on a different 
case entirely is a better test of its relative superiority. 
The two teams’ negotiations over the shortwave infrared radiometer and the 
ASTER instrument’s operational capabilities illustrate the significance of the second 
and third qualities of technoscientific diplomacy listed in table 7.1. By examining how 
the teams’ enactments of state power and assertions of scientific knowledge were 
circumscribed and bolstered by the social make-up of the ASTER team, 
technoscientific diplomacy is able to account for the difference in the outcomes of the 
two negotiations, both of which occurred in the same period of time. In the episode 
concerning the shortwave infrared radiometer, consensus arose not through U.S.-Japan 
agreement on the issue that was under debate, but through termination of the bilateral 
debate; the U.S. members of the Geology Working Group ascribed power to “Japan” 
owing to the institutional divide between engineers and scientists in the Japan team 
and the supposed stubbornness of decision-making processes in Japan. Agreement did 
not arise through consensual knowledge and principles among working group 
members or through a political solution on the part of ministry bureaucrats, as the 
epistemic community approach would suggest with its experts-then-policymakers 
framework for understanding the process of policy coordination. Latourian 
actor-network theory can more closely account for the episode, especially the Japan 
team’s unilateral insistence on the “optional” band set and the Japan team’s mustering 
of evidence from the laboratories of its contractors. Still, the approach’s Hobbessian 
leanings misses the crucial importance of compromise and the U.S. team’s 
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acquiescence for the sake of future community, both of which account for why the 
“optional” band set was modified closer to the preferences of the U.S. team.  
In the episode concerning the ASTER instrument’s operational capabilities, the 
approach of technoscientific diplomacy can be used to illuminate why Dr. Miyazaki’s 
trading tables served as a nucleation site and fostered transnational authority in 
decision-making and collective scientific judgment: Miyazaki borrowed 
visually-intelligible and flexible operational scenarios from the U.S. team and 
distanced himself from the cramped and rigid operational scenarios provided by NEC. 
In addition, Dr. Miyazaki consistently came to the support of the Japan team. Dr. 
Kahle and others on the U.S. team recognized the opportunity presented by this mix of 
technical assertions and political power and used it to advance transnational 
decision-making, which was in the U.S. team’s immediate and, arguably, long-term 
interest. As indicated in table 7.3, both the epistemic community approach and 
Latourian actor-network theory can not capture this dynamic. An EOS epistemic 
community was neither posited nor important in the episode, and the two science 
teams together prevailed against the significant material and network advantages of 
the hardware maker, NEC. While the U.S. team still had to receive most of their facts 
about the hardware from JAROS and NEC, the U.S. team’s preferences regarding this 
issue became the ASTER team’s preferences. The negotiation process that brought 
about this outcome called attention to local conditions, such as nucleation sites, which 
effect transnational community.  
The fourth quality of the technoscientific diplomacy approach—the focus on 
interdependency and the local conditions for transnational decision-making—can be 
used to capture well the design of the temperature-emissivity separation algorithm as a 
U.S.-Japan hybrid, and more generally, the configuration of an international political 
order through the development of the ASTER data and information system. Although 
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members of the U.S. and Japan teams had competing preferences for how to deal with 
the indeterminacy of temperature and emissivity separation—preferences that aligned 
with their professional interests and which were embedded in their respective 
communities of practice—the working group was able to make good on Dr. Tsu’s and 
Dr. Kahle’s call for “closer collaboration”: the working group built on the nucleation 
site that was Dr. Matsunaga’s MMD method. The epistemic community approach 
would suggest that the method that was most prominent and well-documented among 
the relevant epistemic scientific community—i.e., either the ADE or NEM 
method—would have likely been adopted. Furthermore, since the U.S. advocates of 
the ADE and NEM methods had more rhetorical resources from the literature and 
from the laboratory, Latourian actor-network theory also would suggest that either 
ADE or NEM would have prevailed. Because, however, the approach of 
technoscientific diplomacy explicitly takes into account the benefits of a U.S.-Japan 
hybrid that would address concerns of international collaboration and the change in 
technical practices that allowed MMD to evolve as a hybrid (e.g., moving away from 
the playoffs among the methods), it—unlike the epistemic community approach and 
Latourian actor-network theory—does not need to be stretched to explain the process 
and outcome of the development of the temperature-emissivity separation algorithm. 
The power of this dissertation’s interpretative approach of technoscientific 
diplomacy does not question the general insights or intellectual utility of either the 
epistemic community approach or Latourian actor-network theory. This study affirms 
the central insight of the epistemic community literature that scientists can shape 
politics as well as science. The approach of technoscientific diplomacy conceives of 
the relationship between the two enterprises differently, however: as two sides of the 
same coin rather than as separate components in a systematic belief system. Indebted 
to Latourian actor-network theory, the dissertation has followed scientists and 
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engineers as they make technoscience, and the interpretative approach of 
technoscientific diplomacy is attentive to their rhetoric. Yet, the approach of 
technoscientific diplomacy also presses for the details of technical practice to be 
investigated and suggests an international politics between states in the collaboration, 
in which power is enacted as state power rather than as power that has force through 
its self-evident materiality, as is the case with Latourian immutable mobiles. 
Furthermore, the approach of technoscientific diplomacy directly investigates 
international politics between states in the practice of technoscience. Consequently, 
because technoscientific diplomacy’s explanatory sketches better explain process as 
well as outcomes in the development of the ASTER remote-sensing system than 
explanatory sketches guided by the epistemic community approach or Latourian 
actor-network theory, I argue that the approach of technoscientific diplomacy 
promises a better understanding and explanation of the politics of technical 
decision-making and scientific judgment in intergovernmental collaboration more 
generally. 
Given the particular context, however, of the development of the interpretative 
approach of technoscientific diplomacy, is it portable? That is, is it open-ended 
enough that it—like the epistemic community approach and Latourian actor-network 
theory—can be learned from and adapted to other empirical contexts? Provided that, 
first, core participants in the intergovernmental collaboration are liminal state actors, 
in that they are ostensibly not employees of the state but yet are working in some 
capacity for the state in which they can, as members of a transnational community, 
also assert their independence (e.g., scientists, doctors, teachers, international 
development specialists, etc.) and, second, that these participants are engaged in the 
development of technoscience, then I suggest that intergovernmental collaboration in 
which they participate can be analyzed as technoscientific diplomacy. The 
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(re)articulation and deployment of state goals in practice can be followed; participants’ 
abilities to enact state power and assert scientific knowledge in varying international 
contexts and in an intertwining way can be analyzed; and the fostering of transnational 
decision-making and authority—through nucleation sites and the assertion of 
norms—can be interpreted.  
For example, both of the U.S.-Japan collaborations that have been described in 
chapter two—the FS-X fighter co-development project and the international space 
station—could be analyzed using the approach of technoscientific diplomacy and, 
through comparison, could illuminate the dynamics of scientific and technical 
development in international affairs. In the case of the FS-X fighter, the “U.S.” 
contractor (i.e., Lockheed Martin) and the “Japan” contractor (i.e., Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries) were both intimately involved in the co-development project. Based upon 
the discussion of the case in chapter two, it is very reasonable to surmise that they had 
opportunities to deploy state goals and enact state power in their technical discussions. 
In the development of the international space station, contractors have mediated 
intergovernmental communication and shaped state goals, based upon anecdotal 
evidence.1  
Another conspicuous example is intergovernmental collaborations in 
non-proliferation which have been coordinated by organizations such as the 
International Atomic Energy Agency or the U.S. Department of Defense’s 
Cooperative Threat Reduction program (i.e., the Nunn-Lugar program). For these 
collaborations, the interpretative approach of technoscientific diplomacy as outlined in 
table 7.1 might prove useful for explaining the processes and outcomes of 
decision-making, the collective exercise of scientific judgment, and how those 
                                                          
1 Interview with NASA Headquarters official who wished to remain anonymous. He related a 
story in which a contractor had helped both the U.S.’s NASA and Japan’s NASDA establish a 
common bilateral direction in the development of an element of the International Space Station. 
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processes and outcomes entailed international politics. These collaborations involved 
experts in weapons of mass destruction who were employed by national laboratories 
and universities and who were ostensibly—but far from determinatively in 
practice—joined together by non-proliferation goals and non-proliferation protocols. 
They were likely situated in international contexts, however, in which they not only 
fostered transnational community, but acted as liminal state actors, advancing state 
goals. These examples suggest that the interpretative approach of technoscientific 
diplomacy promises to be of broad utility for understanding and explaining science 
and technology in international affairs and, in particular, the intertwining of the 
creation of knowledge and international politics. Yet, only further empirical research 
can substantiate this promise. 
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Note on Sources 
 
The bibliography below lists all of the sources that are cited in the footnotes of 
the text, with the exception of public laws and web pages. These exceptions are, 
however, cited fully in the footnotes. Japanese-language sources are listed together 
with English-language sources in the bibliography, and translations of titles and 
corporate authors are provided. Most of the primary sources that are referenced in the 
dissertation were personally sought and collected by the author (e.g., minutes of 
meetings, overhead presentations at working group meetings, specification documents 
and their draft versions, instrument performance reports, contractor project 
management documents, statements of work, letters, faxes, and e-mails). To date, most 
of these sources cannot be found in major research libraries or in archives that are 
open to the general public, either in Japan or the United States.  
Several documents in the bibliography were gathered from the library of 
Japan’s National Space Development Agency (now the Japan Aerospace Exploration 
Agency) in Tsukuba, Japan and from the library and archives of the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory in Pasadena, California. Some documents were retrieved from NASA’s 
Goddard Space Flight Center with the assistance of a Freedom of Information Act 
request. Many primary sources likely can be found in the private collections of Japan’s 
Earth Remote Sensing Data Analysis Center (formerly the Earth Resources Satellite 
Data Analysis Center), Japan Resources Observation System organization, or the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory (the documents that can still be found at JPL may or may not 
eventually be made available in JPL’s archive). A few of the scientists involved in the 
ASTER collaboration might still retain personal copies of some documents. Finally, 
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the author has in his possession either a hardcopy or scanned copy of every document 
that is listed in the bibliography which cannot be found through a major research 
library. These documents can be made available upon request. 
Preceding the bibliography are a list of meetings observed by the author and a 
list of interviews and personal correspondence. The interview list does not include a 
handful of interviews with individuals from the Japan Defense Agency, NASA 
Headquarters, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the U.S. Embassy in Japan who 
preferred to remain anonymous. These anonymous interviews are not central to the 
dissertation. The interviews listed below ranged from 45 minutes to 3 hours in length, 
and they were conducted in English, in Japanese, or sometimes, in both English and 
Japanese, as is noted. 
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